lecture22 - BioNB 221: Lecture 22 Oct. 20, 2008 Lecture 22:...

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BioNB 221: Lecture 22 Oct. 20, 2008 Page 1 Lecture 22: Reproductive “Skew” Theory Professor H. Kern Reeve Reproductive skew theory attempts to explain the reproductive partitioning within animal societies according to the ecological, social, and genetic attributes of those societies. Social groups in which one or a few breeders strongly dominate the reproduction are high skew societies; societies in which reproduction is shared more equitably are low skew societies. Particularly promising are transactional models of skew, in which the dominant breeders of the society "pay" subordinates (by yielding reproduction) to stay in the group and cooperate peacefully. Dominants can provide at least two kinds of reproductive incentives to subordinates: 1. a staying incentive -- a fraction of the reproduction just sufficient to guarantee that the subordinate stays and helps the dominant versus leaves to breed solitarily. 2. a peace incentive -- a fraction of the reproduction just sufficient to guarantee that the subordinate cooperates peacefully instead of fighting to the death for complete control of the group's resources. Let's use Hamilton's rule to develop a simple model of staying incentives for a
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This note was uploaded on 08/28/2008 for the course BIO 2210 taught by Professor Seeley during the Fall '08 term at Cornell University (Engineering School).

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lecture22 - BioNB 221: Lecture 22 Oct. 20, 2008 Lecture 22:...

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