lecture20 - BioNB 221: Lecture 20 Oct. 15, 2008 Lecture 20:...

Info iconThis preview shows pages 1–2. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
BioNB 221: Lecture 20 Oct. 15, 2008 Page 1 Lecture 20: Game Theory and Evolution of Conflict Professor H. Kern Reeve 1. The mysterious case of the speckled wood butterfly: 2. The Hawk-Dove Game: Hawk Dove Hawk (1/2)(V-C) V Dove 0 V/2 In this payoff matrix , V = value of resource; C = cost of injury. 3. ESS's in the Hawk-Dove Game Dove is an ESS if V/2 > V (never for V > 0!) Hawk is an ESS if (1/2)(V - C) > 0, i.e., V > C What happens if C > V (i.e., injury is very costly)? Neither Hawk nor Dove is an ESS. Selection favors a "mixed" strategy, i.e., individuals should play Hawk with probability P*, Dove with probability 1-P*. But how do we find P*? In a mixed ESS, the average payoffs for the component strategies are equal. That is, P* is such that when two individuals playing the mixed ESS meet each other, the average payoffs for playing Hawk and playing Dove are the same. (This makes sense, because if the average payoff for playing Hawk [for example] were greater than that for playing Dove, then Hawk should be played with higher probability.) Thus, let's set up the equation:
Background image of page 1

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
Image of page 2
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

This note was uploaded on 08/28/2008 for the course BIO 2210 taught by Professor Seeley during the Fall '08 term at Cornell University (Engineering School).

Page1 / 4

lecture20 - BioNB 221: Lecture 20 Oct. 15, 2008 Lecture 20:...

This preview shows document pages 1 - 2. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Ask a homework question - tutors are online