RayGillespie(Natives&Newcomers)

RayGillespie(Natives&Newcomers) - NATIVES AND NEWCOMERS...

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Unformatted text preview: NATIVES AND NEWCOMERS in England at that time, and some historians today. English residents in Ireland were pained by this ignorant assumption and would carefully explain the similarities and common civilisation between the two countries. Weaning out those particularly rosy assertions designed to entice further settlers, these comments confirm the image of Munster as akin to a slightly raffish county on the English borders. The New English in Munster found they had to come to terms with this society which had moved gradually from medieval to modern. The settlers aided the transition undoubtedly, yet they were not dealing with an unvarnished and remote land. Towns, large buildings, orchards, gardens, all existed before their arrival. That is why Munster differs from other colonial examples. In America, the local inhabitants did not live reasonably the same sort of lives as the English settlers, nor could they match them in many fields. Unlike Ulster, much less than half the province had been confiscated for plantation, and from their prominent position as landowners some of the natives in Munster could, and did, exercise a strong local authority. The newcomers were forced to compromise and adapt to an extent unknown elsewhere. To slot Munster-into the English colonial system is to give a misleading impression of the internal nature of the province and its relationship to England. 190 8 The End of an Era: Ulster and the outbreak of the 1641 rising RAYMOND GILLESPIE It is almost impossible to overestimate the impact of the Irish war between 1641 and the early 1650s on the minds of contemporaries both in Ireland and in England. Politically it was to prove a decisive factor in shaping both Irish and English attitudes in the first half of the 1640s. Economically it was no less significant since it was to be the ruin of many of the key early-seventeenth century landed families in Ireland who were not sufficiently solvent to withstand almost ten rentless years. Moreover, as contemporaries were not adverse to pointing out, the rebellion had hit the crown where it hurt most — in the exchequer. George Storey, a Williamite army captain in Ireland, estimated that the war of the 1640s had cost about three times as much as the Williamite war and about tWenty to thirty times as much as the Nine Years War. The rebellion also had an important symbolic significance demonstrating to contemporaries the fundamental disloyalty of the native Irish. Certainly as late as the 1680s the lord lieutenant, Lord Clarendon, wrote of the danger of admitting the native Irish to the army for ‘how can we forget the barbarous murders committed on us by their fathers’ and settlers ‘have still in their memories the cruelties they suffered in the late rebellion’. Such sentiments persisted well into the eighteenth century.‘ These attitudes were as much the product of propaganda as of reality. There was no uniform national rising in 1641. There were wide regional and political variations in the pattern of the rebellion and in the settler response to it. In Ulster, for example, the distinctive aims of the rebels and the intervention of a Scottish force under Munroe in 1642 made for a situation which was radically different from that produced by the political manouverings of the earl of Clanricard in Connacht or Lord Inchiquin in Munster. These regional differences were revealed most clearly in the debates on policy in the supposed uniting force of the rebellion, the Confederation of Kilkenny.2 191 NATIVES AND NEWCOMERS Not only were the military events of the 1640s geographically diverse, the character of the war also changed over time. From the outbreak of the Ulster rebellion on the evening of 22 October 1641 until the invasion of the Pale at' the end of November in the same year the rising was largely a provincial one. The involvement of the Old English gave it a national dimension and after the outbreak of the English civil war in August 1642 the war acquired an international tone, Irish events becoming part of the war of the three kingdoms. Within this broad chronology there were also subtle shifts of attitude by the various participants such as the move by the native Irish of Ulster from the modest demands of October 1641 to the more radical ‘Demands of the Irish’ issued on 3 February 1642.3 Explaining the origins of such a complex event is in itself a formidable task. The nineteenth-century scholars who approached the Irish rising did so in an attempt to prove either how savage the rising had been or how well the rebels had behaved — depending on the political viewpoint of the author. As a result, debate revolved around the fruitless exercise of counting the numbers mentioned as murdered in the depositions taken by the administration in the aftermath of the rising. Political considerations also influenced explanations of causality, one camp arguing that the rising was the result of treachery and ‘popish bigotry’ and pointing to the long history of rebelliousness among the Catholic Irish, while the other camp justified the rising as a reaction to official cruelty and repression. There the debate rested until the reassessments of the Old English and Strafford’s'lord deputyship by Aidan Clarke and Hugh Kearney respectively. Although neither directly examined the position of the native Irish, both sides of the nineteenth-century interpretative divide were being gradually clipped away. Recent work on plantations has demonstrated that the repression beloved of nineteenth-century nationalists was as much a myth as was the vision of the golden age which supposedly preceded colonisation. The ‘popish bigotry’ theory has also been undermined by studies of Gaelic society and of the counter reformation which have begun to reveal the reality of Gaelic society in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. As a result of these developments Aidan Clarke has recently ascribed the immediate cause of the war to the events in Dublin in the summer of 1641.4 Such an explanation may be too simple. The pattern which is emerging from studies of the origins of the English civil war suggests that the outbreak of war was rather more complex, involving the interplay of local and national forces in a wider chronological context and cannot be explained simply in 192 ULSTER AND THE 1641 RISING terms of the national events immediately preceding it. In the light of this work, the historian of the Irish rebellion, which broke out some ten months earlier than the English one, has two main problems to address: first why did a number of prominent native Irish lords conspire together, albeit ineffectually, as early as February 1641, and secondly, why, almost eight months later, was the conspiracy turned into action. I 'The plans for a rising were laid by Ulster natives. The earliest dateable evidence for the conspiracy of the native Ulster lords which ultimately led to rebellion, comes from the ‘Relation of Lord Maguire’, one of the chief plotters, drawn up after his capture following the discovery of the plot by the lords justice on the 22 October 1641.5According to Maguire, he was appoached in late January or early February 1641 by Rory O’More, who was originally from Longford but was by then a County Armagh landowner, who proposed that the time was ripe for a rising. They gathered a few others around them, but significantly none of those later to be the key figures in the rebellion were plotters at this stage. There was much discussion, but' few firm decisions were made. The conspirators met again in May but apparently made no progress and as late as August, Maguire related, they had no real plan. O’More made vague noises about sounding out great men in the Pale but there is no evidence that he did so. He certainly mentioned no names except on one occasion when he hinted that Miles Bourke, Viscount Mayo, was backing the rebellion. Although later evidence mentions a visit by O’More to Lord Mayo, the viscount’s support for a conspiracy was most unlikely given his reaction to later events.6 Fumbling as these attempts to plan a rising were they nevertheless present the historian with a problem. The plotters were men whose grievances were sufficiently strongly felt to be worth the risk of being party to a conspiracy and it is important to uncover these discontents. The motives which drew these men together were complex. Traditionally the plot has been explained as the result of grievances following on the loss of land and power by the ancestors of the plotters in the Ulster plantation scheme some thirty years previously. This explanation no longer holds good. Recent work on the plantation has demonstrated that the scheme tended to absorb many features of Gaelic society and many of the traditional lords were retained within the plantation scheme 193 NATIVES AND NEWCOMERS as ‘deserving natives’. The very low population of sixteenth-century Ulster meant that it could easily absorb the settlers with relatively little disruption in the short term. In aggregate the native Irish had done well from the plantation scheme. They had received over 94,000 acres — about a third more than the church and about a fifth more than the English or Scots.7 Paradoxically, many of those who conspired or rebelled were not the dispossessed but rather the beneficiaries of the plantation scheme. The flight of the earls in September 1607 had removed the traditional power brokers of 'Gaelic Ulster leaving the way open to new men, mainly those of collateral septs who in the late sixteenth century were already becoming disenchanted with the great lords. The Lord Maguire in 1641 was in such a position. The nearest common relation hecould claim to the senior branch of the family was Tomas Mér who had died in 1430. Sir Phelim O’Neill had a more recent claim going back to Conn O’Neill who died in 1493. Indeed there had been persistent legal trouble between the earl of Tyrone and Sir Phelim’s grandfather in the sixteenth century, a situation which had caused him to support the English during the Nine Years War for which service he was knighted in 1604. Similarly, Lord Maguire, grandfather of the conspirator, had been in dispute with the chief of the family in the late sixteenth century and during the Nine Years War had also sided with the English. In return, he was rewarded with lands and a pension which were subsequently transferred to his son and grandson.8 Many of the conspirators were prominent men under the new order: Maguire a peer, Sir Phelim a member of parliament and justice of the peace, and Rory O’More an army officer? A more plausible explanation of what drew these men into ' conspiracy is provided by Rory O’More himself who spoke to Maguire of the afflictions and sufferings of Lord Strafford’s government ‘which sufferings did beget a general discontent over the whole kingdom". Three aspects of Strafford’s rule had made a particularly deep impression on the consciousness of all sections of Irish society, his land policy, his religious programme, and his attempts to built up a political group to carry these out by ignoring those who regarded themselves as the traditional governors of Ireland.[0 Wentworth’s land policy was relatively straightforward. Since land was the key to political power at national level and local landed rights were the basis for local political and economic power, Wentworth determined that as much of this power as was feasible should be in the hands of the king. He was further encouraged to move against the great landowners by the fact that crown rents 194 ULSTER AND THE 1641 RISING and other duties, which had been set at very low levels in the early years of the century and not revised, were a potentially lucrative source of crown revenue. The methods he used were not new. He intensified the activities of the court of wards in collecting alienation fines, liveries and wardship dues, he attempted to change the tenurial structure through the commission of defective titles and he attempted to introduce a plantation scheme for Connacht. While many of the elements in the policy were well tried and tested they had not been used in conjunction with each other before. More0ver, Wentworth’s timing in introducing his attack on landed interests was disastrous since it coincided with a major economic crisis in the late 1630s. A series of harvest failures in 1629-33, combined with a general downturn in economic activity in the mid-16305, left many Irish landlords in a poor financial condition.” Poverty was to prove an important impetus to revolt since one had little to lose — it produced the ‘men of broken fortune’ of Richard Belling’s description of the Ulster plotters.12 According to Maguire’s own evidence an incentive to join the O’More plot was that he was ‘overwhelmed in debt and the smallness of my now estate’. The same comment could have been made by Sir Phelim O’Neill who, according to an inquisition of 1661, was in financial difficulties by 1641, having mortgaged lands for at least £13,066 to individuals in Dublin, London and locally. He Was also heavily in debt locally.13The best documented cases of the decline in native landownership as a result of indebtedness are the MacMahons of Monaghan and the Magennises of county Down but the experience was widespread. In Armagh, for example, the amount of land held by native Irish had fallen from about 25 per cent in 1610 to about 19 per cent in 1641 and in Cavan the fall in the same period was from 20 per cent to 16 per cent.”The natives were not the only group to suffer as a result of strained economic circumstances since many settlers, both in Ulster and elsewhere, were experiencing problems with their estates and were . borrowing money and selling land to remain solvent. In this context threats of confiscation of land, as in Connacht, and tenurial insecurity created by the commission of defective titles were disastrous. No landlord could be sure of his title to land and so his ability to acquire new land, sell part of his holding, or even mortgage part of his estate was severely impaired. His ability to take on new tenants and hence increase his income was also jeopardised by threats of confiscation. In county Down, for example, a number of leases from the late 1630s contain clauses stipulating that if the land in question should be confiscated the lessee would be compensated with land elsewhere. Undoubtedly 195 i i l 1 l 1 NATIVES AND NEWCOMERS land prices were also affected although little research has been done on this aspect of seventeenth century Irish economic history. Certainly, in Munster during the 16305 purchasers of land were aware of the possibility of confiscation when calculating the price they should pay for land. A comment of the 16505 records that Munster land in 1640 was worth only six years purchase, about six times its annual rental value — a dramatic drop from up to twenty years purchase early in the 16303.15 It is not surprising that one of the concerns of the New English after the fall of Wentworth was that of securing land titles. I Intimately linked to the question of landownership was that of the changes in legal procedures under Wentworth. Legal processes were the mainmeans by which land tenure was protected and justified, and many of the problems of mortgaged land and debt resolved. Indeed the law and legal procedures were an integral part of both settler and native society in early seventeenth century Ireland. It is significant, for example, that when in the summer of 1641 the Irish House of Commons attempted to introduce major constitutional change they did so through the sending of Queries to the judges.‘°Moreover, there is evidence that there‘was more business than ever coming before the Irish courts in the 1630s. Both the number of fines levied in common pleas and the number of Orders made by the court of chancery doubled between 1610-14 and 1635-39. Similarly, the business of the equity side of the Exchequer more than trebled between 1625-29 and 1635-39.17 The reasons for this are unclear but part of the explanation is provided by landed disputes arising from population increase and complex tenurial arguments which resulted from grants of mortgaged lands under the commission of defective titles. Thus attempts by Wentworth to interfere with the legal process, notably through increased use of the court of Castle Chamber, pleased no one since they rendered land titles and other rights, such as the right to present to benefices'and to hold church land, increasingly uncertain. As the native Irish author of the poem ‘Do frith monuar an uain si ar Eirinn’ suggested, it was not the courts themselves that the natives objected to but rather the way in which they had been manipulated — indeed by 1641 the native Irish were frequent users of the Dublin courts.18 Wentworth’s religious programme was also straightforward. He wanted to make a reality the assumption of the acts of uniformity . and supremacy that the Church of Ireland embraced all the people of Ireland. To achieve this aim he moved on two fronts. First, in order to eliminate lay patronage in the church he launched an attack on the right to patronage of clerical livings being held by 196 ULSTER AND THE 1641 RISING laymen, and on church land which should have been used to support the clergy being held by laymen. Secondly, with the help of some judicious appointments to the Irish episcopal bench, such as Bishops Atherton and Bramhall, he attempted to move the Anglican church in Ireland from its Calvinist theological position to a more Arminian one as adopted by the Church of England under the guidance of Wentworth’s friend Archbishop Laud. It is difficult to gauge the impact of this new departure because little is known of the relationship between various religious groupings at local levels before 1641. It appears that in the case of relations between Catholics and Protestants some form of accommodation between the two groups had been reached by the mid-16305. Certainly, Catholic priests were well known locally yet were rarely proceeded against and according to one deposition made by William Skelton of Kinnard, County Armagh after the rebellion broke out, settlers and natives before the rising ‘differed not in anything . . . save only that the Irish went to mass and the English to the Protestant church’.19 His experience is borne out by the surprise of many contemporary commentators at the outbreak of the rebellion. While part of their portrait of the idyllic society before the rising was drawn for the sake of contrast, part was certainly genuine, and is also reflected in the depositions. It seems that many knotty theological problems were also being sorted out locally including, for example, the arrangements for bringing up the children of mixed marriages reported on in a Catholic account of the state of the diocese of Down in 1639.20 Under Wentworth’s administration many of these local accommodations were placed under increasing strain. Presbyterian clergy in Ulster, for example, were no longer allowed to occupy ‘ Anglican cures as they had done earlier in the century, and the increased use of the ecclesiastical courts at national and local level began to press hard on non-conformists —— Protestant as well as Catholic. Wentworth was nothing if not thorough, the court of Castle Chamber was used for the punishment Of recusancy and the normal processes of law were also used to reduce the control of the Catholic bishops.“ It is no surprise that one of the main demands of the parliamentarians of 1640-1 was the abolition of High Commission, which had been instituted by Wentworth. As had been the case with land, Wentworth’s timing caused problems in the religious sphere also.The 1630s saw a rapid growth in the numbers of Catholic clergy in the localities. The Franciscans, the largest religious order in early seventeenth-century Ireland, probably trebled the number of friars working in the country to about 600 between 1623 and 1639 and a number of their friaries, 197 NATIVES AND NEWCOMERS abandoned since the early years of the century were reoccupied in the 1630s, mainly in Ulster and Connacht_.22 Most of these clergy were continentally trained and when they returned to Ireland were politically pro-Spanish and intent on implementing the full force of the continental counter-reformation in Ireland. To judge from the religious zeal of some of the rebels in destroying Protestant bibles they seem to have had some success. On the Protestant side the alienation of Ulster Presbyterians as a result of Wentworth’s progress produced a more violent reaction when he attempted to administer an oath, commonly known as the Black Oath, that the king was head of the church, to them in 1639. Thus pressure from three sources, Lord Deputy Wentworth, the counter-reformation clergy, and the increased radicalism of Ulster Presbyterianism, partly prompted by religious developments in Scotland in the 1620s, forced the various religious groups in Ulster, and indeed Ireland, to become more aware of their distinctiveness and hence less aware of any common arrangements among them. Indeed the evidence of the depositions suggests that in many cases the rebels equated Catholicism with the natives and Protestantism with the settlers. The third development of Wentworth’s lord deputyship was only partly his own creation — the rise to power of a new group of men both in politics and in the localities offended settler and native alike. Wentwlo was the first powerfiil deputy since 1605 to have no experience of Irish society before his appointment and thus was not attuned to the niceties of Irish social behaviour. By ignoring the norms of the society especially in attempting to create around him a new group of men in positions of power, he alienated much local support. The Irish House of Lords petitioned the king in May or June 1641, for instance, that posts had been given to ‘sundry persons of mean condition not fit to serve your majesty’ by Strafford’s influence, while the traditional elite had been ignored. Sir John Clotworthy, an Antrim planter, put the same criticism more forcibly in the English parliament of 1641 claiming that Wentworth was guilty of ‘some very high actions in his administration of that government in which the lives as well as the fortunes of men have been disposed out of the common road of justice’.23 While this state of affairs was of considerable concern to the New English it was of lesser concern to the native Irish who were more affected by other developments in the localities which can only be partially attributed to Wentworth’s administration. The economic problems of both Ulster settlers and natives in the 1630s gave rise to limited but appreciable sales of land which brought 198 ULSTER AND THE 1641 RISING a new class of men into the localities, many of whom had made their"money as merchants, lawyers and clerics. Old relationships within counties, especially the accommodations reached between New English settlers and native Irish lords over the previous twenty years, counted for little here. In many cases the status-conscious native Irish had difficulty in accepting these new men who were not, as many of the planters had been, landowners previously. It was the encounter which Hugh Mac Mahon had with one of these, Mr Aldrich, in Monaghan which prompted his joining the rebels. Aldrich, previously a vintner in Dublin, had acquired an estate in Monaghan but according to Mac Mahon ‘gave him [Mac Mahon] not the right hand of fellowship at the assize or session, he being also in the Commission of the Peace with him’.“ To some, these actions must have seemed culturally motivated since according to the event as recorded by Owen O’Connolly, a discourse followed with O’Connolly, who was Mac Mahon’s foster brother, about the status of the natives in the new order. In part, such cultural factors contributed to the discontent among the natives and to the raising of questions about their position in the new order. Indeed according to‘the anonymous, but native Irish turned Protestant, author of the War in Ireland one of the factors pushing O’Reilly in Cavan into rebellion was the abolition in 1637 of the Irish lectureship founded by Provost Bedell in Trinity College, Dublin, which previously existed ‘for the teaching of their youth’. It seemed that those welcomed into the new order as ‘deserving Irish’ under the Ulster plantation scheme were not now welcome either as ‘deserving’ or as ‘Irish’.25 The policies of Lord Deputy Wentworth provide the context for the actions of the conspirators of February 1641 but do not explain them since after all Wentworth’s strategy affected the New English as much as the natives. In fact the February conspiracy was only one of a number of plots which had been batched in 1640 and 1641. The meeting of the Irish parliament in March 1640, made necessary by the need for cash to support the king against the Scots, brought together most of Wentworth’s opponents under one roof. Within a matter of weeks a plot had been hatched by an anti-Wentworth faction consisting of Viscount Ranelagh, Sir William Parsons, Sir Adam Loftus, and others, to have Wentworth recalled.26 However, developments in England encouraged the planters to attempt impeachment instead. The plot was spectacularly successful. In November 1640 Wentworth was arrested to face impeachment proceedings before the English parliament. Fortunately for himself, perhaps, the Irish lord deputy, Christopher Wandesford, a nominee of Wentworth’s, died on 3 199 NATIVES AND NEWCOMERS December, allegedly from the shock of Wentworth’s imprisonment. The New English conspiracy ultimately succeeded on 10 February 1641 with the appointment of Parsons, a man noted for his ‘Puritan sympathies’, as lord justice. Attempts were made to have Lord Robert Dillon of Kilkenny West appointed as the second justice but these plans were thwarted and the elderly and ineffecual master of the ordnance, Sir John Borlase, was appointed instead. From the perspective of O’More and Maguire, Wentworth was bad but in terms of the interrelated issues of religious toleration and the ownership of land this ‘Puritan party’ was worse. Almost as soon as Parson’s appointment was known in December, rumours of a clamp down on Catholicism began to spread. John Barnwall, an Irish Franciscan, for example, writing to Louvain at the end of December expected new penal legislation daily.27 In dealing with a situation such as this the power of conspiracy had been effectively demonstrated in the fate of Strafford. If O’More and Maguire wanted fimher proof of the effectiveness of force ample evidence had also been provided by the Scots in the winter months of 1640 when they had gone to war against the king to oppose his attempt to impose an Anglican prayerbook and church government on Presbyterian Scotland. However, the fears of the February conspirators proved unfounded. The newly ascendant ‘Puritan party’ were, in the short term, more concerned with consolidating their position by introducing constitutional changes than with a purge on Catholics. Indeed from a pragmatic point of view it was unrealistic to attempt any sort of anti-Catholic campaign since a key element in the political manOuverings from the second session of the parliament was the position of the Catholic Old English party who had joined with the Protestant opposition to unseat Wentworth from power. Thus if Parsons and his colleagues wished to control the parliament and guarantee the appointment of a malleable lord deputy they had little option but to remain on good terms with the 'Old English group. A second factor which allayed the fears of the February conspirators was the waning power of the Parsons group within the Protestant opposition and the rise of a new party headed by Lord Maguire’s brother-in-law, Audley Mervin from Tyrone. Thus the February conspiracy lost some of its momentum, but the fact that the members maintained some contact was important since it provided a structure on which later plots could be built. For most of 1641 the parliamentary debate centred around an attempt to redefine the relationship between the king, the legislature, and the executive in Ireland in a way which would prevent a repetition of the experience of Wentworth’s 200 ‘r I ,_ y. 2;: $3 ULSTER AND THE 1641 RISING administration.28 The, aim was much the same as that which Sir Phelim O’Neill was to try to achieve by force of arms later that year. Thus it is not surprising that many of those who later became involved in the Ulster rising had also been prominent in the parliamentary proceedings of 1641. Sir Phelim himself sat on ten committees of the Commons in June and July and Philip O’Reilly and Rory Maguire, later prominent leaders of the rising in Cavan and Fermanagh, sat on twelve and nine committees respectively, mainly during February. Both O’Reilly and Maguire sat on key committees such as the committee on the tobacco monopoly, the committee on the agents and the committee which drew up the charges for the projected impeachment of the lord chancellor, Richard Bolton, who had been one of Wentworth’s main supporters. In the House of Lords, Lord Maguire attended regularly and it was he who put the motion for the impeachment of Bolton to the House. However the progress of constitutional change was painfully slow and when the parliament was prorogued in July it appeared that little had been achieved. Events in England, however, were moving with such speed that it appeared that any initiative by the Irish parliament could well be outflanked by developments there.” Thus even before the end of the session disillusionment had begun to set in among many Irish MPs. However before the session concluded a new factor was added to the equation of rebellion. Before its prorogation the parliament had begun to deal ,with the thorny problem of the largely Catholic army, raised by Wentworth in 1639 for service against the Scots, which was now proving to be a major drain on the Irish exchequer. Initially it was decided to disband this force and to allow Irish officers of the Spanish army to recruit the soldiers of the disbanded force under royal licence to bolster the Irish regiments in Spanish service. In May, a number of colonels, including Bryan O’Neill, Hugh Mac Phelim O’Byrne and Richard Plunkett, arrived in Ireland to begin recruiting. Their mission was still-born because in July the Commons, fearing the weakening of Ireland and the strengthening of Spain, stopped the recruitment. As a result there were a number of men with considerable military experience. in Ireland, many of whom were disillusioned with their continental experience. One such was Colonel Byrne who commented to his commander Owen Roe O’Neill before he left the Netherlands ‘we are to adventure our lives for the succouring of a scabbed town of the king of Spain’s where we may happily lose our lives and We can expect no worse than death if we go unto our own country’.” The continental experience had also exposed many of these men to the full force of c0unter-reformation Catholicism and 201 NATIVES AND NEWCOMERS they cannot but have been alarmed by the rumours which began circulating in Dublin shortly after their arrival that the Scots, fresh from their triumph in the Bishops’ Wars were intending to crush Catholicism, by force if necessary. The return of the Irish Agents from the English parliament in late August cannot but have fuelled this speculation since they had witnessed at first hand the religious debates at Westminster. If anything, the accounts of English developments they brought can only have strengthened the plotters’ resolve. The actions of the recruiter colonels and other Irish officers in _ the following weeks is unclear but by August a number of them, with Charles’ support according to a much later testimony by the earl of Antrim, had hatched a plot to seize Dublin Castle, independently from the O’More-Maguire plot. According to Maguire’s ‘Relation’ he was approached by one of the colonels who enquired if he would be prepared to join their plot but Maguire did not reveal this approach to his co-conspirators until early September by which stage the colonels had ‘fallen from their resolution’. It is unclear why their resolution had faltered. It would appear that the earl of Ormond used his influence against it but 7 it also seems that the colonels took soundings from other prominent Old English gentry and had not been encouraged by the response. Some of the colonels, notably O’Neill, Plunkett and Byrne, imbued with what Maguire described as ‘the glory of all our proceedings’ deserted the ailing plot and joined the Ulster conspirators becoming what Bellings was to describe as ‘turbulent spirits’ and ‘discontented persons’.“ ' Thus political disillusionment, rumour and other conspiracies ' helped the O’More-Maguire plot to regain some of the impetus it had lost since Febuary. Sir Phelim seems to have joined the plotters no earlier than July and no later than the end of August although he probably knew of its activities earlier since his brother had been one of the original plotters in February.32 Sir Phelim’s decision to become involved personally seems to have been the result of a loss of confidence in the ability of the Dublin parliament to make any progress in the deteriorating political climate of mid-1641. The alternative strategy for the defence of Old English and native Irish liberties, a direct appeal to the king in London over the head of the Dublin administration, was no longer viable given the political situation in England and the precariousness of Charles’ personal position. News arriving from England was of proclamations about to be made against Catholics there, which, if followed in Ireland, would have effectively destroyed any attempt to secure the political or economic position of the Catholic 202 ULSTER AND THE 1641 RISING communities there. The climate was not improved by the appointment of Robert Sidney, second earl of Leicester, a man with an undeserved reputation as a puritan sympathiser, as lord lieutenant of Ireland in June 1641. In this situation O’Neill was a ready convert to conspiracy and it was probably he who gave it much of its final shape, turning it from Rory O’More’s crude plot for the ‘regaining of their ancestors’ estates’ to a more s0phisticated political programme.33 The O’More—Maguire plot had not developed into any firm plan of action by August and it seems that much of the military thinking behind the eventual rising was the result of Maguire’s discussions with the colonels. Itwas the colonels, for example, who first proposed the taking of Dublin Castle, a plan in which according to Bellings ‘fancy and conjecture acted a principal part’. Sir Phelim was; not enthusiastic about the military plans of the colonels and wished, for example, not to be associated with the taking of Dublin Castle but preferred a provincial rising in Ulster. It is significant that a check by the main conspirators on their resources on the evening before the planned rising revealed that Sir Phelim had not sent an Ulster contingent to support the Dublin forces and there is no evidence that he ever intended to do so. Moreover although Sir Phelim was in regular contact with Owen Roe O’Neill on the continent, who was certainly aware of the plot, he does not appear to have solicited military help as he would have done had be anticipated a fiill-scale rising. Neither did Owen Roe O’Neill offer assistance in the early weeks of the rising as he did later when it developed into a full-scale war. Tales of imminent continental help recorded in the depositions were more wishful thinking by the insurgents than planned action. As Sir Phelim later told one Tyrone deponent, the aim of the provincial rising was not a radical overturning of political arrangements but ‘liberty of religion and for the recovery of those lands which should appear by the law of the land to be unjustly held from them the native Irish’.34 In Cavan the same attitude prevailed in the early weeks of the rising, the Remonstrance from Cavan referring to ‘lawful liberties’ which were lost and complaining of expulsion of land ‘without any just grounds’.35 The rising was not an attempt to overthrow the government but rather to reorganise the constitutional position thus ensuring that the natives would not be deprived of their rights under common law, as Wentworth had shown it was all to easy to do, by the ‘puritan’ faction which was rising to a position of influence in the English parliament. In this sense it was more akin to the moves in the Irish parliament during 1641 to readjust constitutional arrangements, which all groups felt had been thrown 203 NATIVES AND NEWCOMERS out of balance by Wentworth, than to a rebellion proper. The fact that the royal commission, which Sir Phelim produced in the early weeks of the rising to vindicate his action, was forged, is irrelevant; the fact that it was widely believed among the rebels to be genuine is the important point. As Clarke has argued, the rising was more in the tradition of protecting the king from evil counsellors than of overthrowing the king himself. 3" The final plan was agreed on 5 October and 23 October was fixed as the date of the rising. On the evening prior to the rising two events occurred which shaped its outcome. First, Owen O’Connolly, servant to Sir John Clotworthy, an Ulster settler, and foster brother to one of the plotters, Hugh Oge Mac Mahon, betrayed the plot to the lords justice who, after an emergency council meeting, arrested Maguire, MacMahon and about thirty others, effectively destroying any slight hope the insurgents had of taking an initiative in Dublin. Secondly, on the night of 22 - October, a day earlier than agreed, Sir Phelim, unaware that the Dublin plot had been destroyed, attacked and took Charlemont and other key Ulster centres. The Quinns seized Mountjoy castle in Tyrone, the O’Hanlons took Tandragee, and the Magennises and McCartans, Newry. The MacMahons also seized key centres in Monaghan. It may have been that Sir Phelim hoped to pre- empt the Dublin rising as he was less than enthusiastic about it, but in the long term his actions created more problems then they resolved. II When the lords justice had arrested the main conspirators in Dublin on the night of 22 October they felt the worst was over and the rising contained. They wrote to the lord lieutenant on 23 October that if the rising was confined to Ulster ‘we hope to make head against them in reasonable measure’.37 To this end they issued a proclamation requiring all loyal subjects to prepare to defend themselves. A few days later, on 28 October, non-residents were banished from Dublin so that the localities would not be deprived of their natural leaders and there was also an attempt to increase good will towards the government in the counties adjoining Ulster by freeing thieves. In fact, the evidence coming from men in Ulster, such as Viscount Ards, Lord Chichester, and Archibald Stewart, demonstrates that the lords justice had seriously misjudged the situation.38 They had omitted one vital element in their calculations: Ireland, even before October 1641 was an unsettled 204 ULSTER AND THE 1641 RISING c0untry. There had been, for example, severe disturbances in east Ulster in early 1641 as a result of poor harvests and the quartering of large numbers of soldiers there. It was this discontent rather than any formal plan which was to give the rising in Ulster its momentum, as will be seen from this section which will examine the rising from the perspective of the localities. The origins of the local discontent were primarily economic. The burden of royal demands on rural society had increased dramatically in the late 1630s. The royal subsidies granted by the parliament of 1640, for example, were significantly higher than any previous royal taxation, and royal, demands for men at the musters of 1639 and 1640 had been more frequent than hithterto. However, at a time of increasing demands on resources, Irish economic performance had shown a marked downturn. Customs revenues, for example, which had risen fairly steadily from the early 1630s, had by 1639-40 fallen by almost 10 per cent over the 1637-8 level, and to judge by the half-yearly returns for 1640-1, the fall in that year could have been as great as 35 per cent over the 1637-8 level.” In volume terms, exports were also down on earlier levels. According to some contemporary estimates exports of one of the main staples of Irish trade, cattle, were down in 1641 from the levels of the 1630s, and grain exports had also declined sharply.40 Money was scarce partly because the movement of the small supply of coin was retarded by the slowdown in trade and rents remained unpaid in many areas, causing considerable difficulties to landlords. It was this slowdown in trade which had prompted M.P.s to press for the relaxation of restrictions on corn exports in 1641, restrictions which were in force because of the shortage of grain following the harvest failures of 1639, 1640 and 1641. Unless there was some relaxation, they argued, ‘husbandry will decay and rents fall as they have done of late thrOugh scarcity of corn’.“ The problem of falling yields was not confined to customs revenue. All payments to the Irish exchequer fell drastically in the months before the rebellion. Composition money in 1640, for instance, was only yielding about half what it had done twenty years earlier, and ecclesiastical dues, first fruits and twentieth parts, were less than half their 1620 level in 1640. In short, the economic problems of the late 1630s and early 1640s undid most of Wentworth’s work in raising Irish revenue, so that in 1640 revenue had fallen to about the 1632 level, despite a rise in the intervening years.42 Even the extraordinary revenue of the subsidies granted in the tightly managed first session of the 1640 parliament remained unpaid because of poverty in the localities, and in July 1641 Sir 205 NATIVES AND NEWCOMERS Adam Loftus complained that the mere third of the subsidy which had been paid was ‘so contemptible a sum as is not worthy the acceptation of his Maiesty.’43 ‘ The impact of the recession was not uniform over the country. The share of the customs in the half year to Lady Day 1641 as compared to the same period in 1632-3, for example, fell most dramatically in Ulster with smaller falls in Munster and Connacht. I Table 1 Provincial shares in Irish customs (%) f a b 1632-33 1640-41 Ulster 12.3 16.5 Munster 44.8 42.2 %; Connacht 4.8 3.9 Leinster 37.6 47.1 1 l Sources: a. 3.1.. Harley 2048, ff26-51; Sources: b. P.R.O., S.P. 63/259/46 The relative distribution of wealth, also affected by the crisis, shows a similar pattern. The share of the subsidies apportioned to Ulster, and Connacht had fallen between 1634 and 1640. Table II Provincial shares in Irish subsidies (%) a b 1634 1640 Ulster 24.3 22.3 Munster 27.3 27.7 Connacht - 16.6 16.3 Leinster 31.7 33.6 Sources: 2. Commons In]. Ire. i, pp 106-7 b. P.R.O., S.P. 63/273/8-9 While the impact of the recession of the late 1630s was felt all over the country it is clear that Ulster was the worst affected area. There the general economic problems were compounded by 206 ULSTER AND THE 1641 RISING political events. The heavy quartering of soldiers on the province by Wentworth in an attempt to impose the oath of allegiance, the Black Oath, on the Presbyterians had placed considerable burdens on the local population. Many were unable to carry on their normal farming as they had been summoned to the muster as part of the campaign. The oath itself caused much alarm among Ulster Presbyterians, many of whom fled to Scotland leaving their crops unharvested and depleting the pool of labour so that it was difficult for others to harvest their grain. Fears of a Scottish invasion of Ulster as part of the campaign against Charles in 1640 also had an unsettling effect. As a result land values fell dramatically — up to 50 per cent in south Antrim and in many areas rents remained unpaid.“ Archbishop Ussher, whose church land lay in south and west Ulster, complained in September 1640 ‘the troubles of these times are such that my rents cannot be received in Ireland and the events so uncertain that I know not whether so much will be left as may . . . maintain myself and my family.’45 Problems also emerged for the soldiers quartered in Ulster. There was no grain to spare for provisions, the army was not being paid and credit was almost unobtainable locally because of the difficult economic circumstances. As a result there was considerable friction between the garrisons and local inhabitants in the summer of 1641. Sporadic disturbances were reported from Ulster throughout 1641, the most serious being rioting in county Down early in the year.46 - Such economic difficulties placed considerable strain on the relationships between the various communities within Ulster. Native and settler had succeeded in reaching an accommodation in the early years of the century but it was an unstable arrangement liable to crack if too much strain, such as that generated by Wentworth’s methods of government, were placed on it. These stresses were magnified by the economic difficulties and the political atmosphere of the late autumn of 1641. There can be little doubt that the situation in Ulster was considerably destabilised by the rumours which were circulating widely in 1641. According to the evidence of the depositions one current rumour among the native Irish was that a general massacre of Catholics was intended by the Dublin ‘puritans’ and the natives felt they must strike first. A milder version of the same rumour said that the Scots were insisting on uniformity of the Presbyterian religion and would implement it by force if necessary. One deponent also recorded a rumour that King Charles had been executed in Scotland.“7 An important agency for the spread of such rumours was the clergy in Ulster, especially the Franciscans who were growing in 207 NATIVES AND NEWCOMERS number rapidly in the 16305 -—— by 1636 there may have been about two hundred in Ulster. The Franciscans were an important link between the political life of Dublin and the lower orders among whom they worked in the localities. The Franciscan order was politically active and when war broke out it was prominent in organising the native forces. At the provincial assembly at Multy- farnham in early October 1641 there had been a lengthy debate as to the position the order should adopt in the event of trouble in Ireland. Two factions emerged clearly : those who wished to expel settlers by violence and those who wished for a more peaceful solution arguing that the settlers should simply be banished!“3 The latter won the day but the debate illustrates that feelings were running high among the Franciscan community in Ireland which was deeply imbued with a continenally forged nationalism, as described in Bernadette Cunningham’s essay. Whatever the political and religious forces operating on the Franciscans in mid-1641, there were also economic pressures. As mendicants, and therefore dependent on the surplus from rural society, the Franciscan clergy were badly hit by the poor harvests and grain shortages of the early 1640s. Thus the frequency with which friars appear in the later depositions as encouragers of the rebels need not be surprising. In this context of strained economic and religious relationships it was not difficult to find men prepared to fight when the rising began in Ulster on the evening of 22 October. While discontent clearly existed the problem was how it was to be marshalled into an orderly, limited rising as envisaged by Sir Phelim O’Neill. There was clearly a considerable degree of control by the rebel leaders in the early weeks of the rising. Key centres were seized quickly and the Scots settlers were, in the main, left untouched for fear of rousing a force which Sir Phelim could not hope to defeat.49 In achieving this control Sir Phelim had two assets. First, his own personal prestige was an important factor. As juStice of the peace and member of parliament Sir Phelim was an important figure in Tyrone and Armagh society. It is significant that his ruse to capture Charlemont was to call for dinner : Sir Phelim was clearly on visiting terms with the gentry of west Ulster.50 According to the depositions such was Sir Phelim’s local power that the Tyrone rebels wanted to make him king, whereas in other areas other local lords were favoured.“ The rapid spread of the campaign in the early weeks of the rebellion was confined to the areas near Sir Phelim’s lands at Caledon and Armagh, and was no doubt helped by Sir Phelim’s local status. In contrast, the rebellion in Fermanagh progressed more slowly, not because the settlers were any better 208 ULSTER AND THE I641 RISING prepared but more probably because of the absence of the main native Irish figure of county society — Lord Maguire. The second organisational vehicle which Sir Phelim could draw on was the traditional kin and territorial structure of Gaelic Ulster. The plantation of Ulster had not destroyed the basic structure of Gaelic society, rather it had tended to rationalise it with many natives being given grants of land which they had previously held as freeholders under native lords. The shortage of settler tenants also compelled many settler landlords to keep natives as tenants to make their estates economically viable. Many even preferred to take natives as tenants because they were often prepared to pay higher rents than the newcomers. This was particularly the case in the crucible of the rising, east Tyrone, which had been set aside for servitors who were allowed to take native Irish tenants under the terms of the plantation scheme. As a result this territory, which was relatively inaccessible from the main ports anyway, was settled mainly by natives in the 1630s. Thus many families were left relatively undisturbed and in the case of the Donaghmore area in south-east .Tyrone, studies have shown that those who rose in 1641 were the descendants of the sixteenth-century inhabitants of the area.52 Thus Sir Phelim had at his command a complex network of kin groups many of whom regarded him as in some way their own lord. As late as 1670, for example, Archbishop Oliver Plunkett commented that the ‘ancient vassals’ of that area, ‘although themselves paying rents to Protestants are none the less so well disposed to their former overlords that they always give them some contribution.”3 It seems from the pattern of the early weeks of the rising that the kin structure was used to organise the Irish forces. Families such as the Quinns and O’Hagans took strongpoints on their own family lands and in the case of the movement of convoys of captured settlers they were passed from captain to captain, each of whom were the descendants of the sixteenth-century septs of the areas they now controlled. The pattern was not confined to Tyrone and it can also be shown for Monaghan that the senior Mac Mahon became the colonel of local septs.54Bellings was later to describe the principle of recruitment of conspirators, many of whom were local commanders, as ‘ties of friendship or kindred’. While kinship and family loyalties were powerful forces, they were not always cohesive ones. In Fermanagh, for example, the two main branches of the Maguire family split on the issue of whether or not to rebel. The split occurred along old lines of animosity and Brian Maguire of Tempo passed information on the plot to Sir William Cole, the planter landlord of 209 NATIVES AND NEWCOMERS Enniskillen.55 Using local power groups to organise and execute the rising had a second drawback in that it made what was intended to be a provincial rising into a series of local ones. It is noticeable that according to the deponents the only areas in which the rebels mentioned the Dublin conspiracy were the areas in which the conspirators had immediate command. The rebels of Londonderry, Donegal, Antrim or Down do not seem to have been aware of the Dublin conspiracy, or if they were they attached little significance to it. One group of Donegal rebels and some in Cavan attributed the rising not to the conspirators but to the agents sent to London with the parliamentary grievances in early 1641. Even with the advantages of personal prestige and a local organisational machine there were considerable problems in maintaining sufficient control to achieve the kind of limited rising envisaged by the leaders of the rebellion. The kind of situation which existed in Ulster in 1640-41 was the nightmare of every military commander in early modern Europe: religious and political fears coupled with economic distress could make any body of men difficult to control. The early weeks of the rising were emotionally highly charged. The rebels felt a new departure had been made and sought to justify their actions by appeals to the past. Prophecy was widely used to prove that what was being done was inevitable. Patrick and Columcille’s prophecies that the Irish would reconquer Ireland from the invader were often quoted by the rebels according to the deponents and in one case in Tyrone a friar read Hanmer’s Chronicle in order to encourage the Irish to rebel. Other less specific prophecies also circulated, such as one conveniently found at Newry in the first few days of the rising and another that Sir Phelim O’Neill would drive the English from Ireland.“ A further indication of the tensions of the early weeks of the rebellion was the appearance of ghosts to both settlers and natives all over Ulster and the emergence of allegations of witchcraft which feature in at least two depositions. Significantly, one deponent reported the story that a vision seen at Dungannon had also been seen before the rebellion of the earl of Tyrone in 1594.57 Such supernatural phenomena are not recorded in Ulster before 1641, and their appearance at this juncture is an indication of the fears and tensions experienced by both sides. This would have been a difficult situation for even an experienced commander, yet Sir Phelim had no military experience and few of his force had much experience either. The composition of Sir Phelim’s force has been little studied but according to the evidence of the depositions the main recruiting grounds were the ‘creats’ or cattle-herders and the followers of the heads of the local septs. 210 ULSTER AND THE 164] RISING Turlough O’Quinn, for example, deposed that his force comprised of his ‘sept or kindred’. Within this force O’Neill’s command structure was weak and his authority was not enhanced by the general breakdown of normal county administrative machinery. Much of the business of day to day command was left to the local captains, who were also the leaders of the local native Irish sept in many cases, and thus action could vary dramatically over a small area. The drowning of a convoy of settlers at Portadown on their way to Newry, for example, seems to have been largely on the initiative of the local captain, Toole McCann, who had taken over the convoy from the neighbouring captain, Manus O’Cane. Initiatives such as this, whatever their motive, usually incurred the wrath of more senior officers.58 Sir Phelim, for example, hanged eight or nine of the rebels who had been involved in the massacre of some of his tenants at Kinnard, at least one of the rebels being drunk on the occasion of the massacre. In north Antrim, a similar massacre of Gilladuff O’Cahan’s tenants resulted in Gilladuff cursing his son for being involved.” It is clear that both rebel and settler armies were ill-disciplined. Owen Roe O’Neill’s estimation of the Irish forces in 1642 was poor: ‘no obedience among the soldiers if one can call men soldiers who behave nothing better than animals’ and ‘unless I saw it I would not believe it; for on both sides there is nothing but burning, robbing in cold blood and cruelties such as are not usual even among the Moors and Arabs’. From the settler side there were also complaints of discipline problems in the hastily raised force. James MacDonnell wrote to the commander of the settler forces in north Antrim in early 1641 that ‘those captains of yours whom you may rather call cow boys were every day vexing ourselves and our tenants of purpose to pick quarrels which no flesh was able to endure.”0 In addition to dealing with military discipline there was also the problem of attempting to maintain some order among the civilian population in the face of the collapse of the normal machinery of dealing with law breakers. There was a large stock of an’ns in the Ulster countryside as a result of the recent quartenng of the army there and this was increased by the looting _of the arsenals at Newry and other places. The suspension of recruitment by the colonels of the soldiers of Wentworth’s Catholic army in August 1641 also meant that there was a sizeable body of unemployed soldiers in the region, and as one commentator put it ‘this revolt has been greatly accelerated by the discharge of .a levy that was made for Spain . . . who for despite do this mischief.“ As a result, under cover of the military act1v1ty many 211 NATIYES AND NEWCOMERS tensions in rural society, exacerbated by the difficult economic position, boiled over. Old scores were settled and debts were cancelled by murder. In Armagh, for example, Neil and William O’Halligan killed Richard Poer ‘because he had caused some of their friends to be hanged’. In a county Down case, Cormac Maguire fled from his home in Lecale at the outbreak of rebellion because he feared that a dispute between himself and a brother of Thomas Dixon of Bishopscourt could degenerate into violence. He was persuaded to return but his fears were well justified as he was murdered by Thomas a fortnight later.62 Army commanders disliked this type of disorder. As James MacDonnell, commander of the Scots in north Antrim, noted ‘as for the killing of women none of my soldiers dares do it . . . but the common people that are not under rule do it in spite of our teeth’. His sentiments were shared by other commanders: the O’Neills apologised to Sir William Stewart in Tyrone that ‘we are sorry that some lewd people have spoiled without authority’ and in Cavan O’Reilly referred to ‘the mischief and inconveniences that have already happened through disorder of the common sort of people’.63 The main motive for these disorders was economic. According to the evidence from the depositions robbery was common in the early weeks of the rising, one Scotsman, John Beaton, even began robbing settlers in Fermanagh under cover of the confusion. The stripping of settlers, often referred to in depositions, was as much for economic as other reasons as many deponents later recognised their clothes being worn by rebels and one imprisoned tailor’in Armagh spent much of his time recutting captured clothes to fit new wearers. The rising also provided cover for the bandits of the Irish countryside, the woodkern, whose activities usually increased in times of tension and economic difficulty, to operate more freely. The attack on Edward More in Cavan, for example, was probably by kern. He was assaulted on the road to Drogheda and his clothes and a small sum of money taken. His attackers made off into the woods daring him to report them as O’Reillys —— an act of highway robbery rather than of rebellion.64 III Thus the rising of the native Irish in 1641 was not a simple or predictable event. Many later-seventeenth century' commentators saw it as foretold in the writings of Archbishop Ussher but they had the advantages of hindsight and the absence of Ussher. The 212 ULSTER AND THE 1641 RISING rising solved little but the mere fact that the Irish were in rebellion was in itself significant. It marked the natives off from the New English settlers and the Old English of the Pale, who were not to be forced into rebellion until late November. In drawing the lines between these groups with such clarity the aCt of rebellion itself gave the natives a sense of identity. One result of this was the opening of divisions within Irish society which had been glossed over in the preceding years and, according to many deponents, the rebels cursed the Old English openly. The new sense of distinctiveness brought with it the resort to prophecy and also produced a new genre of Gaelic literature —- the accentual political poem. Given this set of circumstances, it is not surprising that the longer the rising lasted the more radical it became. Within months it had changed course; it was no longer the short sharp blow intended to put its leaders in a position to negotiate favourable terms as the Scots had been able to do in the Bishops’ Wars 2 year earlier. By mid-1642 however the rising was flagging, the settler forces were making considerable gains and it appeared that the rebels would be easily crushed in a matter of weeks and might have been had not Owen Roe O’Neill and Thomas Preston arrived to reorganise the forces of what one historian has described as ‘Catholic Ireland’.“ It was Owen Roe who was the originator of rebellion proper rather than the whipping boy of the nineteenth- century propagandists — Sir Phelim O’Neill. The rising had an importance far beyond the events of the 1640s. Politically it confirmed in the minds of contemporaries the fear of Catholicism and it ensured that native Irishmen would never again be part of the political establishment as some had been in 1640. For the natives it marked the end of an era. For the settler - community it also marked the end of an era since the rising and the subsequent war destroyed much of the colonial settlement in early seventeenth-century Ireland. The shape of the society was to be remoulded in the 1650s and reshaped again under the Restoration so that an eighteenth century observer would hardly have recognised it as the precursor of his own society. The rising also had a constructive side for the settlers since it forced them to choose between their homeland and their adopted country. Families such as the B0yles, Trevors and Montgomeries had all maintained close contacts with their homelands in the early seventeenth century and had often expressed an interest in returning there. The war forced them to choose to which of the three kingdoms they belonged. Many chose Ireland and can perhaps be regarded as the first true ‘Anglo-Irish’. For them it was only the beginning of an era. 213 NOTES TO PAGES 183-190 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 234 1598-9, p. 324; T.C.D., MS 822, f. 10; Boyle’s books of receipts and disbursements (see note 25); tenures: N.L.1., MSS 6139, 6239—41. For Ulster buildings see Philip Robinson, The plantation of Ulster (Dublin, 1984), chap. 6. The total of 376 houses within the walls is incomplete since part of the southwest quarter is missing; using the 1653 civil survey and the 1659 census returns, Cork‘s population for city and suburbs was about 5500 in 1641: Seamus Pender (ed), A census ofIreland, c. 1659 (Dublin, 1939). Civil survey, vi, pp 399-497; Caulfield, Cor/a, pp xxi, 102. Limerick’s population in 1641 was about 3500; Kilmallock’s, 1500 (Civil survey, iv); maps of these are in P.R.O., M.P.F. 96; T.C.D., MS 1209, nos 57, 62. Civil survey, vi, p. 4, passim. Grosart, Lismore papers, 2nd series, i, p. 132, ibid., lst series, iv, p. 218; Chatsworth house, Lismore papers, 20/135, 22/85; N.L.1., MS 6243, Apr. 1639. N.L.1., MS 7861, f. 175. Leeke’s activities can be glimpsed throughout the Boyle papers, and F.P. Verney (ed.), Memoirs of the Verney family (4 vols, 1892-9). The garden alone had a circumference of nearly 6000 yards (N.L.1., MS 6897); Grosart, Lismore papers, 1st series, ii, pp 175, 185, 191, 215-6, 224. Grosart, Lismore papers, 1st series, v, pp 64, 67-8, 70-71, 79, 81-84, 102, 114—5, 137, 152, 163; Roy Strong, The renaissance garden in England (London, 1979), pp 134, 164. There is no proof of his claim that De Caus provided a garden plan for Stalbridge. Grosart, Lismore papers, 1st series, iv, pp 218; ibid., v, 40; N.L.1., MSS 6898-9; Chatsworth House, Lismore papers, 19/62, 69; N.L.1., MS 13237 (26) Whalley to Boyle, 16 July 1641; Charles Smith, Antient and present state of the county and city of Waterford (Dublin, 1746), p. 52; Strong, Renaissance garden, chaps 4, 6. N.L.1., MS 6897-9, 6243; Chatsworth House, Lismore papers, 22/1; Verney, Verney family, i, p. 211; Grosart, Lismore papers, 1st series, ii, p. 299; Smith, Waterford, pp 62, 78; P.R.O., E. 190. B.L., Add. MS 49621, f. 38; T.C.D., MS 829, f. 288; Chatsworth House, Lismore papers, 20/93; Bandon leases in N.L.1., MS 6139; Robert Day (ed.), ‘Regnum Corcagience or a description of the Kingdom of Cork . by Sir Richard Cox’ in Cor/e Hist. Soc. jn., vii (1902), p. 172. Civil Survey, iv, p. 6 passim. Morley, Ire. under Eliz., pp 386, 415, 420; N.L.1., MS 6897, Mar. 1627; T.C.D., MS 829, f. 199. Grosart, Lismore papers, 1st series, ii, p. 206: ibid., iv, p. 205; Civil survey, iv, pp 77, 353, 385; ibid., vi, pp 80, 103, 168, 179, 291, 442; M.D. Jephson, An Anglo-Irish miscellany (Dublin, 1964), p. 34; N.L.1., MS 6139, p. 95; H.F. Berry, ‘The English settlement in Mallow under the Jephson family’ in Cor/e Hist. Soc. jn., xii (1906), p. 16; Mallow green might have belonged to the Jephsons but was probably the town’s. NOTES TO PAGES 191-196 8. THE END OF AN ERA: ULSTER AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE 1641 REBELLION 1. 10. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. Raymond Gillespie S.W. Singer (ed.), The state letters of Henry Hyde, earl of Clarendon (2 vols, Oxford, 1765), i, pp 303, 352; Bodleian Library, Rawlinson MS D 424, ff 4-7; Oliver MacDonagh, States of mind (London, 1983), pp 3-6. Compare J.I. Casway, Owen Roe O’Neill and the snuggle for Catholic Ireland (Philadelphia, 1984); WJ. Lowe (ed.), Letter book of the earl of Clanrickarde (Dublin, 1983), pp xvii-XXV and LA. Murphy, ‘The politics of the Munster protestants 1641-9’ in Cork Hist. Soc. jn, 1xxvi (1971). Michael Perceval-Maxwell, ‘The Ulster rising of 1641 and the depositions’ in I.H.S., xxi (1978-9), pp 162-4. Aidan Clarke, ‘The genesis of the Ulster rising of 1641’ in Peter Roebuck (ed.), Plantation to partition (Belfast, 1981), pp 2945. Mary Hickson, Ireland in the seventeenth century (2 vols, London, 1884), ii, pp 341-54. T.C.D., MS 831, f. 165; on Viscount Mayo see Raymond Gillespie, ‘Mayo and the 1641 rising’ in Cathair na Mart, v (1985), pp 3844 Philip Robinson, The plantation of Ulster (Dublin, 1984), pp 86-9. Nicholas Canny, ‘Hugh O’Neill, earl of Tyrone, and the changing face of Gaelic Ulster’ in Studio Hibernica, x (1970), pp 13—18; Padraig O Gallachair, ‘The first Maguire of Tempo’ in Clogher Record, ii (1957-60), pp 469-87. The basic material on Strafford’s deputyship is H.F. Kearney, Strafford in Ireland, 1633-41 (Manchester, 1959) and Terence Ranger, ‘Strafford in Ireland: a revaluation’ in Trevor Aston (ed.), Crisis in Europe 1560-1660 (London, 1965), pp 271-94. Raymond Gillespie, ‘Harvest crises in early seventeenth century Ireland’ in Irish Economic and Social History, xi (1984), pp 11-13, 18. J.T. Gilbert (ed.), .The history of the war and confederation in Ireland 1641-9 (7 vols, Dublin, 1882-91), i, p. 7. Inquisitionum in officio rotulorum cancellart'ae Hiberniae asservatarum repertorium (2 vols, Dublin, 1826-9), ii: Armagh: Charles I, nos 38-9; Charles II, nos 2, 5, 8; Tyrone: Charles II, no. 3; T.C.D., Ms 836, if 57, 130, 141. R]. Hunter, ‘The Ulster plantation in the counties of Armagh and Cavan’ (M. Litt., University of Dublin, 1969), pp 288-97, 312, 324-31; Raymond Gillespie, Colonial Ulster (Cork, 1985), pp 138-42; E.S. Shuckburgh (ed.), Two biographies of William Bedell (Cambridge, 1982), p. 169 where Mulmory O’Reilly, one of the main Cavan conspirators, is'described as , of ‘small fortune’. P.R.O.N.I. D 671lD8/1/55A; B.L., Add. MS 46922, f. 94; ThomagBirch (ed.), A collection of state papers of john Thurloe (7 vols, London, 1742), iii, p. 690; George O’Brien, The economic history of Ireland in the seventeenth century (London, 1919), pp 11, 38, 40. Aidan Clarke, The Old English in Ireland 1625-42 (London, 1966), pp 141-42, 145-6. 235 NOTES TO PAGES 196—205 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 236 P.R.O.I., R.C. 12/1-2; R.C. 6/1-2; T.C.D., MSS 2512-3. Cecile O’Rahilly (ed.), Five seventeenth~century political poems (Dublin, 1977), p. 8, 73. T.C.D. MS 836, f. 172. John Hagan (ed.),_ ‘Miscellanea Vaticano-Hibernica’ in Archivium Hibernicum, v (1916), p. 105; Shuckburgh, Two lives, p. 165. R.D. Edwards, ‘Church and state in the Ireland of Michel O Cleirigh’ in Sylvester O’Brien (ed.),/Measgra Mhichi’l Ui Chle’irrgh (Dublin, 1944), pp 15-17. Patrick Corish, The Catholic community in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Dublin, 1981), p. 26; Benignus Millett, The Irish Franciscans (Rome, 1962), pp 96, 98, 102, 103. Cal. S.P. Ire., 1647-60, p. 241; W.D. Macray (ed.), Lord Clarendon, History of the rebellion and civil war in England (6 vols, Oxford 1888), i, p. 224. T.C.D., MS 840, f. 1. Edmund Hogan (ed.), The history of the wars in Ireland (Dublin, 1873), p. 15. Michael Perceval-Maxwell, ‘Protestant faction, the impeachment of Strafford and the origins of the Irish civil war’ in Canadian journal of History, xvi (1982), pp 235-55. Brendan Jennings (ed.), Louvain papers (Dublin, 1968), p. 132. Clarke, Old English, pp 139-40. For the English background, see Anthony Fletcher, The outbreak of the English civil war (London, 1981), pp 158-191. J.T. Gilbert (ed.), A contemporary history of affairs in Ireland from 1641 to 16.52 (6 vols, Dublin, 1879-80), 1, pp 396-7; Bodleian Library, Carte MS 1, ff395-403, 431. ‘ Gilbert, War and confederation, i, p. 7. Hickson, Ireland in the seventeenth century, ii, pp 190, 347-8. Clarke, ‘Genesis of the Ulster rising’, pp 36-8. T.C.D., MS 839, f. 3. Gilbert, Contemporary history, i, p. 364. Clarke, ‘Genesis of the Ulster rising’, passim; Robert Dunlop, ‘The forged commission of 1641’ in English Historical Review, ii (1887), pp 527-33. Historical Manuscripts Commission, Ormonde MSS (ll vols, London, 1895-1920), new series, ii, p. 4. Cal. S.P. Ire., 1632-47, pp 341-45. 'Cal. S.P. Ire., 1632—47, pp 273, 299; P.R.O., S.P. 63/256/129. P.R.O., CO 388/85/A15; Robert Dunlop, ‘A note on the export trade of Ireland in 1641, 1665 and 1669’ in English Historical Review, xxii (1907), p. 755; Donald Woodward, ‘The Anglo-Irish livestock trade of the seventeenth century’ in I.H.S., xviii (1972-3), pp 493—4; ibid, ‘The overseas trade of Chester’ in Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, cxxii (1970) pp 34-6 5 E i 1 1 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. NOTES TO PAGES 205.213 Cal. S.P. Ire., 1647-60, p. 239. B.L., Add. MS 4756, if 59-60; Cal. S.P. Ire., 1647-60, p. 235; William Knowler (ed.), The earl of Strafforde ’s letters and despatches (2 vols, London, 1799), i, p. 190. Cal. S.P. Ire., 1632-47, pp 316, 324. Raymond Gillespie, Colonial Ulster (Cork, 1985), pp 81-83; Cal. S.P. Ire, 1632-47, pp 187, 228. CR. Elrington and J.H. Todd (eds), The whole works of. . . j’ames Ussher (11 vols, Dublin, 1849), vi, p. 64; Historical Manuscripts Commission, Hastings MSS (4 vols, London, 1928-47), iv, pp 86-8. Bodleian Library, Carte MS 1, ff42, 357, 367, 373, 379, 385; P.R.O., S.P. 63/258/55. For example, T.C.D., MS 839, ff 3, 91. Hickson, Ireland in the seventeenth century, ii, pp 355-8; Canice Mooney, ‘The Irish sword and the Franciscan cowl’ in Irish Sword, 1 (1949), pp 80-87. Perceval Maxwell, ‘Ulster rising’, pp 148-51. Clarke, ‘Genesis of the Ulster rising’, p. 35. T.C.D., MS 835, f. 8; MS 836, ff40, 59, 72. Eamon O Doibhlin, Domhnach Mor (Omagh, 1969), pp 103-5, 114-17. John Han1y(ed.), The letters of Saint Oliver Plunkett (Dublin, 1979), p. 74. Pilib O Mordha, ‘The MacMahons of Monaghan’ in Clogher Record, ii (1957-60), pp 490, 498-9; Gilbert, Contemporary history, 1. Padraig O Gallachair, ‘The first Maguire of Tempo’, pp 469-84, 487-9. T.C.D., MS 835, f. 206; MS 839, f 3-4, 125; Historical Manuscripts Commission, Ormonde MSS, new series, ii, p. 245. T.C.D., MS 836, f. 228; 837, ff 79-114; references to ghosts are fairly common, the most famous being those at Portadown: T.C.D., MS 836, ff89, 92, 94, 103, 112. Hilary Simms, ‘The 1641 depositions for county Armagh’ (B.A. dissertation, University of Dublin, 1973), pp 15-22. T.C.D., MS 836, ff157-8; ibid, 838, ffZ4-6. James Hogan (ed.), Letters and papers relating to the Irish rebellion 1642-46 (Dublin, 1936), p. 6; Bodleian Library, Carte MS 2, f. 203. Historical Manuscripts Commission, Fransciscan MSS (London, 1906), p. 109. T.C.D., MS 836, f. 71; ibid., MS 838, f. 273; Simms, ‘1641 depositions’, pp 62-9. Gilbert, Contemporary history, 1, p. 365; Cal. S.P. Ire., 1647-60, p. 252; Hogan, Letters and papers, p. 7. T.C.D., MS 839, if 58, 112. Casway, Owen Roe O’Neill, passim. 237 I ...
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