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Unformatted text preview: Could the state rationally attack now? 3. Identify the Nash Equilibrium for each of the following games: a) b) State B C D State A C (5,8) (4,3) D (0,10) (6,7) c) State B C D State B C D State A C (5,5) (0,10) D (10,0) (1,1) State A C (8,11) (2,1) D (3,0) (0,11) 5. Find the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria for the following games: a) (40 , 30) (10 ,30) (0 , 45) (20, 10) US USSR USSR Continued Buildup Major Cuts Delay Nuclear Cuts Major Nuclear Cuts Continued Buildup Accelerated Buildup b) (40 , 30) (10 ,30) (20, 10) US USSR USSR Continue Buildup Major Cuts Delay Nuclear Cuts Major Nuclear Cuts Continue Buildup Accelerate Buildup US Accelerate Buildup Accept USSR Advantage (0 , 45) (30 , 0)...
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 Spring '08
 SIMONELLI
 International Relations, Equilibrium, Game Theory, Utility, USSR, Nuclear Cuts

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