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Unformatted text preview: I l _ ._ W_._I_—_..._..__H__._mu hm... Ah..." .w..___ ‘ After VIctory' INSTITUTIONS, STRATEGIC RESTRAINT, AND THE REBUILDING 0F ORDER AFTER MAJOR WARS G. film Ilembem PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON AND OXFORD JOUL Chapter One THE PROBLEM OF ORDER AT RARE historical junctures, states grapple with the fundamental problem of international relations: how to create and maintain order in a world of sovereign states. These junctures come at dramatic moments of upheaval and change within the international system, when the old order has been destroyed by war and newly powerful states try to reestablish basic organiz- ing rules and arrangements. The end of the Cold War after 1989 is seen by many contemporary observers as the most recent of these great historical moments. With the dramatic collapse of the bipolar world order, the ques- tion not asked since the 19403 has recently been posed anew: how do states build international order and make it last? Huh“ “Wamomfinternational-order building have tended to come after major wars, as winning states have undertaken to reconstruct the post- “mmtain years stand out as critical turning points: 1648, 1713, 181 S, 1919, and 1945. At these junctures, newly powerful states have been given extraordinary opportunities to shape world politics. In the chaotic aftermath of war, leaders of these states have found themselves in unusually advantageous positions to put forward new rules and principles of interna- tional relations and by so doing remake international order.I This book raises three fundamental questions about order building at these great junctures. First, _what is the essential lo ‘c of state choice at these postwar moments when the basic organization of international Eder ismm is, what is the strategic circumstance common to these ordering moments, and what are the choices that the leading states face in rebuilding postwar order? Secnnd, why has the specific 53111393ng _t_l_‘l€ problem of order changed or evolved across the great postwar settlements? In We explanationhi'or the growing resort to institutional strategies of order building, beginning with the 1815 settlement and most systematically pursued after 1945? Third, why has the 1945 postwar order among the advanced industrial cofimeen so durable, surviving the dramatic shifts in power that accompanied mfim‘arn‘e Cold War? The great postwar junctures share a set of characteristics that make them unusually important in previding opportunities for leading states to shape international order. The most important characteristic of interstate relations after a major war is that a new distribution of power suddenly ' For a list of Eumpean and global postwair settlements, see Appendix One. «rm—«nu» .s-m 'm- 4 CHAPTER ONE emerges, creating new asymmetries between powerful and weak states. These new power disparities are manifest precisely as the old order has been destroyed, and there are opportunities and incentives for states to confront each other over the establishment of new principles and rules of order. Major postwar junctures are rare strategic moments when leading or hegemonic states face choices about how to use their newly acquired power—choices that ultimately shape the character of posrwar interna- tional order. A state that wins a war has acquired what can usefiilly be thought of as a sort of “windfall” of power assets. The winning postwar state is newly powerfiJl—indeed, in some cases it is newly hegemonic, acquiring a pre- ponderance of material power capabilities. The question is: what does this state do with its new abundance of power? It has three broad choices. It eflfismcm over the distribution of gains. It can abandon—wash its hands of postwar disputes and return home. Or it 55%an its favorable postwar power position into a durable order that Maris the allegiance of the other states within the order. To achieve this outcome, it must overcome the fears of the weaker and defeated states that it will pur- sue the other options: domination or abandonment. Historically, the leading states at the great postwar junctures have had incentives to take the third course, but the means and ability of doing so has changed over time. I / _ 'I here are threWnts of this book. Firm e character of order after major wars has changedas‘fl‘fimapacities and mechanisms of states to restrain power has changed. The ability of these states to engage in what can be called “strate ’ esggint” has emfiver‘the'centuries, and ‘this as c ange mil? which leading states have been able to create and maintain international order. The earliesr postwar power re- straint strategies of states primarily entailed the separation and dispersion of state power and later the counterbalancing of power. More recently, postwar states have dealt with the uncertainties and disparities in state power with institutional strategies that—to varying degrees—bind states together and circurnscribe how and when state power can be exercised. An historical pattern can be identified. Beginning with the 1815 settle- ment and increasmg y 3 er and 1945, the leading state has resorted . . o . . . Haw-ism, n . t in uonal sn'ate es a_s__mechan1sms to establish restraints on indis- crirrniinate and arbitrary state power and “lamable'fifd'dfra‘ble postwar order. e postwar or er— ‘fiildm—‘afifendas‘pursfiedhyubritain after the Napoleonic wars and the United States after the two world wars entailed increasingly expansive proposals to establish mtergovernmental institutions that would bind the great powers together and institutionalize their relations after the war. These postwar institutions did not simply solve :tates. :r has :es to les of iding uired erna- 055 we»; THE PROBLEM OF ORDER 5 functional problems or facilitate cooperation; they have also served as mechanisms of political control that allowed the leading state (at least to some extent) to lock other stares into a favorable set of postwar relations and establish some measure of restraint on its own exercise of power, thereb. ' 'tigating the fears of domination and abandonment. I Second the incentives and capacities of leading states to employ institu- tions as mechanisms of political control are sh_a_ped by twohfi‘r‘ia‘b‘la‘f the eEEntMWfigigfigfle war and thgfifpfisfifstagedsihat are ‘___._ puwent. The more extreme the power disparities after the war, the greater e capacity of the leading state to employ institutions to lock in a favorable order; it is in a more advantaged position to exchange restraints on its power for institutional agreements and to trade off short- term gains for longer-term gains. Also, the greater the power disparities, the greater the incentives for weaker and secondary states to establish insti- tutional agreements that reduce the risks of domination or abandonment. Likewise, democratic states have greater capacities to enter into binding institutions and thereby reassure the other states in the postwar settlement than nondemoeracies. That is, the “stickiness” of interlocking institutions is greater between democracies than between nondemocracies, and this makes them a more readily employable mechanism to dampen the implica- tions of power asymmetries. {13131, this institutional logic is useful in gglaining the remarkable sta» bill ' of the mar among the industrial democracies—an order that has perststc espite e end of the Cold'methFhuge asymme- tries of power. More than in 1815 and 1919, the circumstances in 1945 provided opportunities for the leading state to move toward an institution- alized settlement. Once_,ir_1_,place, the democratic character of the states has facilitated the further growth of intergovernmental institutions and commmmmmm made it hdeed;'mmogmhfposfii945ordwismfifl‘in explaining both the way the Cold War ended and the persistence of this order after the Cold War. It tells us why_the Soviet Union gave up with so little resis- tance and acquiesced in a united and more powerfiirC‘é‘rmany tied to NATQI'Sbviet leaHErE'appreciate-d ii] at Elie insntutioharaspects ofpolitical order m the West made it less fike_ly;§hat'ilfle§€s§ai§§wofild take advantage of the Soviets as they pursued reform and integration. The institutional structure of the an adverse shift in power disparities and the rise of a united Germany, and this gave the Soviets incentives to go forward with their fateful decisions sooner and on terms more favorable to the West than they would have otherwise been. And institutional logic helps account for why the major Western institutions continued to persist despite the collapse of bipolarity, Western countries gateEi'the security consequences of 6 CHAPTER ONE even if (in the case of NATO) there was no immediately apparent function for it to perform. These institutions continue to persist because they are part of the system of mutual commitments and reassurances whose logic predated and was at least partially independent of the Cold War. Behind du's argument about the changing character of postwar orders is an argument about how demoeracies—Wsdm- dons—can create an order that mutes the importance of power asymme- 5%; within international relations. To the extent that institutions play this role, the political order that results increasingly takes on “constitutional” characteristics. Fundamentally, constitutional political orders reduce the implications of “winning” in politics. Institutional limits are set on what a party or a state can do if it gains an advantage at a particular moment— for example, by winning an election or gaining disproportionately from economic exchange. In other words, constitutional orders “limit the re— turns to power.” Limits are set on what actors can do with momentary advantages. Losers realize that their losses are limited and temporary, and that to accept those loses is not to risk everything or to give the winners a permanent advantage. Seen in this way, it is possible to argue that the constitutional character of political orders—whether domestic or international—wan vary The de- gree to which the institutions within that order limit the returns to power vary, and therefore the overall constitutional character of the order can vary. Historically, international orders have exhibited very few institutional limits on the returns to power. Orders built simply on the balance of power or the coercive domination of a hegemonic state exhibit no constitutional characteristics whatever. But if institutions—wielded by democracies— play a restraining role that is hypothesized in this book, it is possible to argue that international orders under particular circumstances can indeed exhibit constitutional characteristics. This is a claim of considerable theoretical significance. It is widely un- derstood that domestic and international politics are rooted in very dif- ferent types of order. Domestic politics is governed by the rule of law and agreed-upon institutions, whereas international politics is governed by the exercise of state power. In domestic politics, power is “tamed” by a framework of institutions and rules, whereas, it is argued, international politics remains an untamed world of power politics. In the most influential formulation, the two realms have fundamentally different structures: one based on the principle of hierarchy and the other on anarchy? But it may be more accurate to say that domestic and international order can take many different forms. In some countries, policies can be extremely ruthless and coercive, whereas some areas of international politics are remarkably 2 Kenneth Waltz, Theory affirmations! Politics (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1979). THE PROBLEM OF ORDER 7 consensual and institutionalized. The domestic—international divide is not absolute.3 "When war or political upheaval results in the rise of a newly powerful srate or group of states—that is, where there exist. highly asymmetrical power relations in an international environment where the basic character of order is in transition—leading states will be presented with the choice to dominate, abandon, or institutionalize the postwar order. When the incentives and opportunities exist for the leading states to move in the direction of an institutionalized settlement that binds states together so as to limit and constrain state p0wer, including the power of the leading or hegemonic state, the postwar order begins to take on constitutional characteristics. The rest of this chapter looks more closely at the puzzles of postwar ogder that have eluded egplanation, the hypotheses and mat-immig- ment developed in this book, and the larger theoretical implications that are at stake in the debate Over how states create and maintain order. THE PUZZLES or ORDER Order formation in international relations has tended to come at dramatic and episodic moments, typically after great wars. These shifts in the SyStem areWchange,” moments when the genr- erning rules and institutions are rema e to suit the interests of the newly powerful states or hegemon.‘ The irregular and episodic pattern of interna- tional order formation is itself an important observation about the nature of change. The importance of war, breakdown, and reconstructiOn in rela- tions ameng states speaks to a central aspect of international change: that history is, as Peter Katzenstein argues, a “sequence of irregular big bangs.” 3 For other arguments along these lines, see Helen Milner, “The Assumption of Anarchy in International Theory: A Critique," Review finmmtimei Sflldifl, Vol. 17 (January 1991), pp. 67—85; David A. Lake, “Anarchy, Hierarchy and the Variety of International Relations,” Inter-mom! Organization, Vol. 50 (1997), pp. 1—33; Barry Buzan and Richard Little, “Recon- ceptualizing Anarchy,” European firm-m! (flatter-imitate! Relations, Vol. 2, No. 4 {1996), pp. 403—39; and Helen V. Millner, “Ralionalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis of Interna- tional, American, and Comparative Politics,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, eds., Expkmarim and Contemtion in tbe Study ofFT/Earld Politics (Cam- bridge: MIT Press, 1999), pp. 119—46. For a discussion see G.john Dsenberry, "Constitu- tional Politics in International Relations, ” European journal of International Reictiom, Vol. 4, No.2 (June 1993], pp. Mil—77. " Robert Gilpin, PHI?" mid Cbange in WW Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 4-1-44. This type of change is contrasted with “systems change,” which refers to change in the basic character of the actors within the global system; and it is contrasted with “interaction change,” which refers to change in the political, economic, and other processes among actors. ‘ 5Peter J. Katzenstein, “International Relations Theory and the Analysis of Change," in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds, Global Change: and Hemmer! Cde- 8 CHAPTER ONE World politics is marked by infrequent discontinuities that rearrange the relations between states. Although the most consequential reordering moments in international relations have occurred after major wars, the specific character of the or- ders these settlements produced have changed over the centuries. The set- tlements grew increasineg global in scope. The Westphalia settlement in 1648 was primarily a continental European settlement, whereas the Utrecht settlement in 1712 saw the beginning of Britain’s involvement in shaping the European state system. The Vienna settlement in 1815 brought the wider colonial and non~European world into the negotiations. In the twentieth century, the settlements were truly global. The peace agreements also expanded in scope and reach. They dealt with a widening range of security, territorial, economic, and functional issues and they be- came increasingly intrusive, entailing greater involvement in the internal structures and administration of the defeated states; they culminated in 1945 with the occupation and reconstruction of Germany and Japan.‘S Mosr important, in the settlements of 1815, 1919, and 1945, the leading states made increasingly elaborate efforts to institutionalize the postwar security relations between the major powers. Rather than rely simply on balance-of—power strategies or preponderant power, they sought to restrain power, reassure weaker potential rivals, and establish commitments by cre- ating various types of binding institutions. The strategy was to tie poren- tially rival and mutually threatening states together in alliance and other institutions. Robert Jervis notes this logic in the Vienna settlement: “The conception of self-interest expanded, and statesmen came to believe that Imger (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1989), p. 296. For a recent survey of alternative conceptions of change within international relations theory, see Michael Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, eds, New Tbinlemg in International Relations Theory (Boulder, Colo: Wesnriew Press, 1997). "' Sec Redvers Opie er al. The Searrb for Peace Selfiemmtr (Washington, D.C.: Brook— ings Institution, 1951), pp. 2—5. For surveys of die major postwar settlements, see Robert Randle, The Origin: sf Peace: A Sim} of Pearmling and the Strut-mar qf Peace Semi:an New York; Free Press, 1973); Charles F. Doran, The Patina qum'milanm (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971); Kalevi J. Holstl, Pears and Hér:Amed Csnflftrs and Interna- riona! Order, 1643—1989 (New York; Cambridge University Press, 1991); and Charles W Keg- ley, Jr., and Gregory A, Raymond, Hm Nation: Make Peace New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999). ' ? RobertJervis, “A Political Science Perspective on the Balance of Power and the Concert,” American Hitter-ital Review, Vol. 97, No. 3 (june 1992), p. 723. MW-“ -___.,—.._._... ._____.__..___._ _.. . w.» .-.=.-v = -. .. 2.. "uh-.5“. wm'VFl—W-‘T.WF.“V=I" .‘range the emational of the or- . The set- lement in areas the rement in in 1815 'otiations. ‘he peace widening they be- : internal inated in part.“ e leading postwar Inply on lternau've l G. John Weswiew : Brook- e Robert arimmm re: Johns forema- VV. Keg— .'5 Press, oncert,” THE PROBLEM OF ORDER 9 an alternative to a simple balance-of-power order, and reappeared in even more extensive form after the two world wars, is an important historical and theoretical puzzle.s After 1945, the United States pursued a strategy of postwar order build- ing that involved the unprecedented creation of new mtergovernmental institutions. In the aftermath of World War H, the prewar order was in ruins, the European great powers were beaten down, and the United States was poised to dominate world politics. From this commanding position, between 194-4 and 1951, the United States led the way in establishing the Bretton Woods institutions, the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the U.S.-]apan security treaty, and other alliances in Asia. Postwar institutions came in many guises—regional, global, eco- ' nomic, security, multilateral, and bilateral. There have been many great wars and many moments when newly pow- erful states were in a position to organize the postwar order. But never has a single state emerged so dominant after so consequential a war; and never has there been a great power that has sought to institutionalize the postwar order so thoroughly. The Specific contrast can be made between American and British hegemonic periods, for the United States has made much more extensive use of institutions than Britain did in the nineteenth century.9 Why would the United States, at the height of its hegernoru‘c power after World War II, agree to “institutiorialize” its power? The United States did attempt to lock other states into these institutions while simultaneously leaving itself as unencumbered as possible. But the postwar institutions inevitably also set some limits on how America could exercise its hege- monic power. Why would it agree to these institutional limits? It is also a puzzle why weaker and se...
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