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Unformatted text preview: I l _ ._ W_._I_—_..._..__H__._mu hm... Ah..." .w..___ ‘ After VIctory' INSTITUTIONS, STRATEGIC RESTRAINT, AND THE REBUILDING 0F ORDER AFTER MAJOR WARS G. film Ilembem PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON AND OXFORD JOUL Chapter One THE PROBLEM OF ORDER AT RARE historical junctures, states grapple with the fundamental problem of international relations: how to create and maintain order in a world of sovereign states. These junctures come at dramatic moments of upheaval and change within the international system, when the old order has been destroyed by war and newly powerful states try to reestablish basic organiz- ing rules and arrangements. The end of the Cold War after 1989 is seen by many contemporary observers as the most recent of these great historical moments. With the dramatic collapse of the bipolar world order, the ques- tion not asked since the 19403 has recently been posed anew: how do states build international order and make it last? Huh“ “Wamomfinternational-order building have tended to come after major wars, as winning states have undertaken to reconstruct the post- “mmtain years stand out as critical turning points: 1648, 1713, 181 S, 1919, and 1945. At these junctures, newly powerful states have been given extraordinary opportunities to shape world politics. In the chaotic aftermath of war, leaders of these states have found themselves in unusually advantageous positions to put forward new rules and principles of interna- tional relations and by so doing remake international order.I This book raises three fundamental questions about order building at these great junctures. First, _what is the essential lo ‘c of state choice at these postwar moments when the basic organization of international Eder ismm is, what is the strategic circumstance common to these ordering moments, and what are the choices that the leading states face in rebuilding postwar order? Secnnd, why has the specific 53111393ng _t_l_‘l€ problem of order changed or evolved across the great postwar settlements? In We explanationhi'or the growing resort to institutional strategies of order building, beginning with the 1815 settlement and most systematically pursued after 1945? Third, why has the 1945 postwar order among the advanced industrial cofimeen so durable, surviving the dramatic shifts in power that accompanied mfim‘arn‘e Cold War? The great postwar junctures share a set of characteristics that make them unusually important in previding opportunities for leading states to shape international order. The most important characteristic of interstate relations after a major war is that a new distribution of power suddenly ' For a list of Eumpean and global postwair settlements, see Appendix One. «rm—«nu» .s-m 'm- 4 CHAPTER ONE emerges, creating new asymmetries between powerful and weak states. These new power disparities are manifest precisely as the old order has been destroyed, and there are opportunities and incentives for states to confront each other over the establishment of new principles and rules of order. Major postwar junctures are rare strategic moments when leading or hegemonic states face choices about how to use their newly acquired power—choices that ultimately shape the character of posrwar interna- tional order. A state that wins a war has acquired what can usefiilly be thought of as a sort of “windfall” of power assets. The winning postwar state is newly powerfiJl—indeed, in some cases it is newly hegemonic, acquiring a pre- ponderance of material power capabilities. The question is: what does this state do with its new abundance of power? It has three broad choices. It eflfismcm over the distribution of gains. It can abandon—wash its hands of postwar disputes and return home. Or it 55%an its favorable postwar power position into a durable order that Maris the allegiance of the other states within the order. To achieve this outcome, it must overcome the fears of the weaker and defeated states that it will pur- sue the other options: domination or abandonment. Historically, the leading states at the great postwar junctures have had incentives to take the third course, but the means and ability of doing so has changed over time. I / _ 'I here are threWnts of this book. Firm e character of order after major wars has changedas‘fl‘fimapacities and mechanisms of states to restrain power has changed. The ability of these states to engage in what can be called “strate ’ esggint” has emfiver‘the'centuries, and ‘this as c ange mil? which leading states have been able to create and maintain international order. The earliesr postwar power re- straint strategies of states primarily entailed the separation and dispersion of state power and later the counterbalancing of power. More recently, postwar states have dealt with the uncertainties and disparities in state power with institutional strategies that—to varying degrees—bind states together and circurnscribe how and when state power can be exercised. An historical pattern can be identified. Beginning with the 1815 settle- ment and increasmg y 3 er and 1945, the leading state has resorted . . o . . . Haw-ism, n . t in uonal sn'ate es a_s__mechan1sms to establish restraints on indis- crirrniinate and arbitrary state power and “lamable'fifd'dfra‘ble postwar order. e postwar or er— ‘fiildm—‘afifendas‘pursfiedhyubritain after the Napoleonic wars and the United States after the two world wars entailed increasingly expansive proposals to establish mtergovernmental institutions that would bind the great powers together and institutionalize their relations after the war. These postwar institutions did not simply solve :tates. :r has :es to les of iding uired erna- 055 we»; THE PROBLEM OF ORDER 5 functional problems or facilitate cooperation; they have also served as mechanisms of political control that allowed the leading state (at least to some extent) to lock other stares into a favorable set of postwar relations and establish some measure of restraint on its own exercise of power, thereb. ' 'tigating the fears of domination and abandonment. I Second the incentives and capacities of leading states to employ institu- tions as mechanisms of political control are sh_a_ped by twohfi‘r‘ia‘b‘la‘f the eEEntMWfigigfigfle war and thgfifpfisfifstagedsihat are ‘___._ puwent. The more extreme the power disparities after the war, the greater e capacity of the leading state to employ institutions to lock in a favorable order; it is in a more advantaged position to exchange restraints on its power for institutional agreements and to trade off short- term gains for longer-term gains. Also, the greater the power disparities, the greater the incentives for weaker and secondary states to establish insti- tutional agreements that reduce the risks of domination or abandonment. Likewise, democratic states have greater capacities to enter into binding institutions and thereby reassure the other states in the postwar settlement than nondemoeracies. That is, the “stickiness” of interlocking institutions is greater between democracies than between nondemocracies, and this makes them a more readily employable mechanism to dampen the implica- tions of power asymmetries. {13131, this institutional logic is useful in gglaining the remarkable sta» bill ' of the mar among the industrial democracies—an order that has perststc espite e end of the Cold'methFhuge asymme- tries of power. More than in 1815 and 1919, the circumstances in 1945 provided opportunities for the leading state to move toward an institution- alized settlement. Once_,ir_1_,place, the democratic character of the states has facilitated the further growth of intergovernmental institutions and commmmmmm made it hdeed;'mmogmhfposfii945ordwismfifl‘in explaining both the way the Cold War ended and the persistence of this order after the Cold War. It tells us why_the Soviet Union gave up with so little resis- tance and acquiesced in a united and more powerfiirC‘é‘rmany tied to NATQI'Sbviet leaHErE'appreciate-d ii] at Elie insntutioharaspects ofpolitical order m the West made it less fike_ly;§hat'ilfle§€s§ai§§wofild take advantage of the Soviets as they pursued reform and integration. The institutional structure of the an adverse shift in power disparities and the rise of a united Germany, and this gave the Soviets incentives to go forward with their fateful decisions sooner and on terms more favorable to the West than they would have otherwise been. And institutional logic helps account for why the major Western institutions continued to persist despite the collapse of bipolarity, Western countries gateEi'the security consequences of 6 CHAPTER ONE even if (in the case of NATO) there was no immediately apparent function for it to perform. These institutions continue to persist because they are part of the system of mutual commitments and reassurances whose logic predated and was at least partially independent of the Cold War. Behind du's argument about the changing character of postwar orders is an argument about how demoeracies—Wsdm- dons—can create an order that mutes the importance of power asymme- 5%; within international relations. To the extent that institutions play this role, the political order that results increasingly takes on “constitutional” characteristics. Fundamentally, constitutional political orders reduce the implications of “winning” in politics. Institutional limits are set on what a party or a state can do if it gains an advantage at a particular moment— for example, by winning an election or gaining disproportionately from economic exchange. In other words, constitutional orders “limit the re— turns to power.” Limits are set on what actors can do with momentary advantages. Losers realize that their losses are limited and temporary, and that to accept those loses is not to risk everything or to give the winners a permanent advantage. Seen in this way, it is possible to argue that the constitutional character of political orders—whether domestic or international—wan vary The de- gree to which the institutions within that order limit the returns to power vary, and therefore the overall constitutional character of the order can vary. Historically, international orders have exhibited very few institutional limits on the returns to power. Orders built simply on the balance of power or the coercive domination of a hegemonic state exhibit no constitutional characteristics whatever. But if institutions—wielded by democracies— play a restraining role that is hypothesized in this book, it is possible to argue that international orders under particular circumstances can indeed exhibit constitutional characteristics. This is a claim of considerable theoretical significance. It is widely un- derstood that domestic and international politics are rooted in very dif- ferent types of order. Domestic politics is governed by the rule of law and agreed-upon institutions, whereas international politics is governed by the exercise of state power. In domestic politics, power is “tamed” by a framework of institutions and rules, whereas, it is argued, international politics remains an untamed world of power politics. In the most influential formulation, the two realms have fundamentally different structures: one based on the principle of hierarchy and the other on anarchy? But it may be more accurate to say that domestic and international order can take many different forms. In some countries, policies can be extremely ruthless and coercive, whereas some areas of international politics are remarkably 2 Kenneth Waltz, Theory affirmations! Politics (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1979). THE PROBLEM OF ORDER 7 consensual and institutionalized. The domestic—international divide is not absolute.3 "When war or political upheaval results in the rise of a newly powerful srate or group of states—that is, where there exist. highly asymmetrical power relations in an international environment where the basic character of order is in transition—leading states will be presented with the choice to dominate, abandon, or institutionalize the postwar order. When the incentives and opportunities exist for the leading states to move in the direction of an institutionalized settlement that binds states together so as to limit and constrain state p0wer, including the power of the leading or hegemonic state, the postwar order begins to take on constitutional characteristics. The rest of this chapter looks more closely at the puzzles of postwar ogder that have eluded egplanation, the hypotheses and mat-immig- ment developed in this book, and the larger theoretical implications that are at stake in the debate Over how states create and maintain order. THE PUZZLES or ORDER Order formation in international relations has tended to come at dramatic and episodic moments, typically after great wars. These shifts in the SyStem areWchange,” moments when the genr- erning rules and institutions are rema e to suit the interests of the newly powerful states or hegemon.‘ The irregular and episodic pattern of interna- tional order formation is itself an important observation about the nature of change. The importance of war, breakdown, and reconstructiOn in rela- tions ameng states speaks to a central aspect of international change: that history is, as Peter Katzenstein argues, a “sequence of irregular big bangs.” 3 For other arguments along these lines, see Helen Milner, “The Assumption of Anarchy in International Theory: A Critique," Review finmmtimei Sflldifl, Vol. 17 (January 1991), pp. 67—85; David A. Lake, “Anarchy, Hierarchy and the Variety of International Relations,” Inter-mom! Organization, Vol. 50 (1997), pp. 1—33; Barry Buzan and Richard Little, “Recon- ceptualizing Anarchy,” European firm-m! (flatter-imitate! Relations, Vol. 2, No. 4 {1996), pp. 403—39; and Helen V. Millner, “Ralionalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis of Interna- tional, American, and Comparative Politics,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, eds., Expkmarim and Contemtion in tbe Study ofFT/Earld Politics (Cam- bridge: MIT Press, 1999), pp. 119—46. For a discussion see G.john Dsenberry, "Constitu- tional Politics in International Relations, ” European journal of International Reictiom, Vol. 4, No.2 (June 1993], pp. Mil—77. " Robert Gilpin, PHI?" mid Cbange in WW Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 4-1-44. This type of change is contrasted with “systems change,” which refers to change in the basic character of the actors within the global system; and it is contrasted with “interaction change,” which refers to change in the political, economic, and other processes among actors. ‘ 5Peter J. Katzenstein, “International Relations Theory and the Analysis of Change," in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds, Global Change: and Hemmer! Cde- 8 CHAPTER ONE World politics is marked by infrequent discontinuities that rearrange the relations between states. Although the most consequential reordering moments in international relations have occurred after major wars, the specific character of the or- ders these settlements produced have changed over the centuries. The set- tlements grew increasineg global in scope. The Westphalia settlement in 1648 was primarily a continental European settlement, whereas the Utrecht settlement in 1712 saw the beginning of Britain’s involvement in shaping the European state system. The Vienna settlement in 1815 brought the wider colonial and non~European world into the negotiations. In the twentieth century, the settlements were truly global. The peace agreements also expanded in scope and reach. They dealt with a widening range of security, territorial, economic, and functional issues and they be- came increasingly intrusive, entailing greater involvement in the internal structures and administration of the defeated states; they culminated in 1945 with the occupation and reconstruction of Germany and Japan.‘S Mosr important, in the settlements of 1815, 1919, and 1945, the leading states made increasingly elaborate efforts to institutionalize the postwar security relations between the major powers. Rather than rely simply on balance-of—power strategies or preponderant power, they sought to restrain power, reassure weaker potential rivals, and establish commitments by cre- ating various types of binding institutions. The strategy was to tie poren- tially rival and mutually threatening states together in alliance and other institutions. Robert Jervis notes this logic in the Vienna settlement: “The conception of self-interest expanded, and statesmen came to believe that Imger (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1989), p. 296. For a recent survey of alternative conceptions of change within international relations theory, see Michael Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, eds, New Tbinlemg in International Relations Theory (Boulder, Colo: Wesnriew Press, 1997). "' Sec Redvers Opie er al. The Searrb for Peace Selfiemmtr (Washington, D.C.: Brook— ings Institution, 1951), pp. 2—5. For surveys of die major postwar settlements, see Robert Randle, The Origin: sf Peace: A Sim} of Pearmling and the Strut-mar qf Peace Semi:an New York; Free Press, 1973); Charles F. Doran, The Patina qum'milanm (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971); Kalevi J. Holstl, Pears and Hér:Amed Csnflftrs and Interna- riona! Order, 1643—1989 (New York; Cambridge University Press, 1991); and Charles W Keg- ley, Jr., and Gregory A, Raymond, Hm Nation: Make Peace New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999). ' ? RobertJervis, “A Political Science Perspective on the Balance of Power and the Concert,” American Hitter-ital Review, Vol. 97, No. 3 (june 1992), p. 723. MW-“ -___.,—.._._... ._____.__..___._ _.. . w.» .-.=.-v = -. .. 2.. "uh-.5“. wm'VFl—W-‘T.WF.“V=I" .‘range the emational of the or- . The set- lement in areas the rement in in 1815 'otiations. ‘he peace widening they be- : internal inated in part.“ e leading postwar Inply on lternau've l G. John Weswiew : Brook- e Robert arimmm re: Johns forema- VV. Keg— .'5 Press, oncert,” THE PROBLEM OF ORDER 9 an alternative to a simple balance-of-power order, and reappeared in even more extensive form after the two world wars, is an important historical and theoretical puzzle.s After 1945, the United States pursued a strategy of postwar order build- ing that involved the unprecedented creation of new mtergovernmental institutions. In the aftermath of World War H, the prewar order was in ruins, the European great powers were beaten down, and the United States was poised to dominate world politics. From this commanding position, between 194-4 and 1951, the United States led the way in establishing the Bretton Woods institutions, the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the U.S.-]apan security treaty, and other alliances in Asia. Postwar institutions came in many guises—regional, global, eco- ' nomic, security, multilateral, and bilateral. There have been many great wars and many moments when newly pow- erful states were in a position to organize the postwar order. But never has a single state emerged so dominant after so consequential a war; and never has there been a great power that has sought to institutionalize the postwar order so thoroughly. The Specific contrast can be made between American and British hegemonic periods, for the United States has made much more extensive use of institutions than Britain did in the nineteenth century.9 Why would the United States, at the height of its hegernoru‘c power after World War II, agree to “institutiorialize” its power? The United States did attempt to lock other states into these institutions while simultaneously leaving itself as unencumbered as possible. But the postwar institutions inevitably also set some limits on how America could exercise its hege- monic power. Why would it agree to these institutional limits? It is also a puzzle why weaker and secondary states would agree to become more rather than less entangled with such a powerful hegemonic state. To do so is to risk domination, and if these weaker states believe that the hegemon’s power will ultimately decline, they might argue that it is better not to lock themselves in, and wait until they can get a better deal later. It is also a puzzle that the 1945 order has been so durable. One of the great surprises of the post-Cold War period is the remarkable stability of relations between the United States and the other advanced industrial 5 Robert Jervis argues in his study of the 1815 concert system that scholars “don’t know enough about why this practice emerged." Ibid., p. 724. 9 For comparisons of American and British hegemony, see Robert Gilpin, US. Power and tbs Malnhariam! Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1975); David Lake, “British and American Hegemony Compared: Lessons for the Current Era of Decline," in Michael Fry, ed., Hirrmy, the White Home, and the Knmk'n: Statesman es Historians (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 106-22 ; and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Noam qumen'ran Power (New York: Basic Books, 1992} ted States, Europe relatively open, reciprocal, legitimate, and ins ' E m E— ('D H ‘8 E}— (D E. ,1. 8. U3 a-r a) 8 as r? 3:: CL. to THE DEBATE ABOUT 01mm The debate about the sources of international order is typically waged be- tween those who stress thy—fl e importance 0 Bower and those who stress the impor ' s 'tutions and ideas.‘ This 13 a false dichotomy. State power and its dis ' ' ' ' ‘ panties determne the bastc dilemmas that states face in th . . . . . ’bipolar- me to be * observ- relations itutions, )y Japan ohesion ibution cs leads a in the power, balance puzzle = in the istence ed be- :ss the State ace in :ions” . The tes to iding ;tates rrder. Play I the antal ellec- Tater: 'ress, 3711's?- was le t0 Jcial iical THE PROBLEM OF ORDER ll realist claim is that order is created and maintained by state power, and shifts in order are ultimately driven by shifts in the distribution of state power. Built on this view, realism—and its neorealist revisions—offer two relatively distinct images of order formation in world politics: balance of power and hegemony. ' Balaggg—QWWer—and the rules and institutions that emerge—as the product of an ongoing process of balancing and adjust- ment of opposing power concentrations or threats among states under con- ditions of anarchy.12 Balancin can be ursued both internal] and externally: through domestic mobmporary 311' onwme - dim [WWW go as temporary expedients, states “dB—Weir autonomy, and enmngfing in- stitutions will be resisted. Balance-of-power realists differ greatly over how explicit and self-conscious the rules of balance tend to be. The order that emerges is thus either the unintended outcome of balancing pressures or a reflection of learned and formalized rules of equilibrium and balance. A second neorealist theory holds that order is created and maintained by a hegemonic state, which uses power W115 swig—The preponderance of power by a state allows it to offer incentives, both positive and negative, to the other states to agree to ongo- ing participation within the hegemonic order. According to Robert Gilpin, an international order is, at any particular moment in history, mum of the underlying distribution of power of states within the system. Over time, this distribution of power shifts, leading to conflicts and ruptures in the system, hegemonic war, and the eventual reorganization of order so as to reflect the new distribution of power capabilities. It is the rising hege- monic state or group of states, whose power position has been ratified by war, that defines the terms of the postwar settlement and the character of the new order. These neorealist theories are helpful in identifying the strategic dilemmas that emerge at postwar junctures: the problem of creating order in highly asymmetrical power relations. But neither version of neorealism can make sovereign. See Parsons, The Summer ofSoa'a! Anion (New York: McGraw-Hill, 193 7), pp. 89—94. Albert I-Iirschman shows that the modern intellectual response to Hobbes, leading to Adam Smith’s Week}: ofNan'om, was to cast doubt on Hobbes’s problem of order by sug- gesting that certain human motivations kept others under control and, most importantly, that the pursuit of political and economic self-interest was not typically an uncontrollable “pas— sion” but a civilized, gentle activity. See I-Iirschman, The Passion: and the Intermi- (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 197?). 12Sec Waltz, Theory {if International Poliritr. For extensions and debates, see Robert O. Keohane, ed., Nearesiism and In Critics New York; Columbia University Press, 1986). '3 See Gilpin, %?‘flfld Change in World Politics. CHAPTER ONE the Soviet threat, balance~of— Early the security organizations such as return to a pattern of strategic rivalry.” Neorealist theories 0 pp. 1—32; and Robertjervis “ onic order built simply around bifities. Robert Keohane, for example, notes that “theories of IUnhn J. Mearsheimcr, “ International Sawfly, Vol. 15 (Summer 1990), pp. 5—5 7; Mearsheimer, Miss the Cold War,” Atlantic, No. 266 (August 1990), pp. 35-— “VVhy We “fill Soon “The Future ofthe West ” 50; Conor Cruise O’Brien, , National 133mm, No. 30 Winter 1992.03), pp. 3—10; and Stephen M. Walt, “The Ties That Fray: Why Eumpe and America An: Drifting Apart,” National Interest, No. 54 (Wmtcr 199899), pp. 3—11. er build- ‘ed. Nei- le in the at, hege- ’induce- a.» state, aver raw .ological states—- e world wer and inciples wielding :r chal- : end of :articu- ritually emony interna- ist tradi— :ling the y 1997), :ling the 'around ories of in rule— dership nacy of r: Coop- . 1984-), an is in :gh the 1prem— r other ght be reories Hege— War,” Soon Brien, ephen trims! THE PROBLEM or ORDER 13 have argued that the extreme preponderance of American power will trig- ger counterbalancing reactions by Asian and European allies, or at least a loosening of the political and security ties that marked the Cold War era.1s Some neorealist accounts have been advanced to explain the absence of European or Asian balancing responses in the face of renewed American hegemony. One such explanation looks at American post-Cold War grand strategy and its seeming ability to use material resources to coopt and teas- sure allies, thereby forestalling balancing and resistance.19 Another realist answer is that contemporary American power is so much greater than that of other states that counterbalancing would not wor .20 Nonetheless, the basic thrust of these neorealist theories is that the ad- vanced industrial states will again have to deal with the problems of anarchy after the Cold War: economic rivalry, security dilemmas, institutional decay, and balancing alliances. The external threat of the Cold War is gone, and even if the United States remains predominant, it has lost a critical source of cohesion among the allies. Thefact that post-Cold War relations among the Western industrial countries have remained stable and open, and institutionalized cooperation in some areas has actually expanded, is a puzzle that can only be explained by going beyond neorealism?I Liberal theories are also relevant but incomplete in understanding the politics of order building after major wars.” These theories provide partic~ ularly promising leads in explaining aspects of the 194-5 postwar order, but they do not provide a full explanation of its features or the sources of its ”’ See, for example, Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar lllusion: Why New Great Powers lWill Arise,” International Security; Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5—5 I; Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy,” International Sem- r‘ity, Vol. 22, No. I (Summer 1997), pp. 86—124; and Josef Ioffe, “ ‘Bismarck‘ or ‘Britain’? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolar-1'97,” international Seaway, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 94—117. ‘9 See Niichael Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US. Grand Strategy after the Cold War,” International Serenity, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 49—83; and Robert F. Lieber, response to Walt, “The Ties That. Fray,” in National Interest, No. 55 (Spring 1999), p. 114. 2” W'illiam C. Wohlfor‘th, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), PP; 5—41. 11 See Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikcnberry, “The Nature and Sources of Liberal Inter- national Order,” Review ty‘ International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Spring 1999), pp. 179—96. 23 Theories of the democratic peace, pluralistic security communities, complex interdepen- dence, and international regimes all identify important features of international relations, and they are particularly useful in explaining aspects of relations among the Western indusrrial countries in the posrwar period. For overviews of liberal theories, see Mark W Zacher and Richard A. Mathew, “Liberal International Relations Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands,” in Charles W Kegley, ed., Cmmmies in Internationo! Relatim Theory: Realism and the Neolibeml Challenge New York: St. Martin’s, 1995). For an important synthetic state- ment of liberal theory, see Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal The- ory of International Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 5 13—5 3. Andreas Hasenclcver, lambridge: Cambridge theory, see Lisa f In temationa] Institutions,” . Kramer, eds. Expfomrfon and e seminal statement of neoIiberaI nmetries of are engen- Fldlng Prac- t which the national in- retries. ional func- ation, mod- ursue their mportance Its or con- rights and SBut there 3 strategies overcome r of theorists .egacies, and On security ' (New York: 5e North Ar- }: of domes- Convergence integraan Jrgmizetion re of power «fence (Bos- lsenclever, iambridge v, see Lisa citations,” ration and neolibcral ent of In- ter 1991), re: and the : Corinne: Chicago ..—._._— .. THE. PROBLEM OF ORDER l5 incentives to balance. Liberal theories grasp the ways in which institutions can channel and constrain state actions, but they have not explored a more far-reaching view, in which leading states use intergovernmental institu— tions to restrain themselves and thereby dampen the fears of domination and abandonment by secondary states. The approach to institutions thatI am proposing can be contrasted with two alternative theories: the neoliberal (or “unsticky”) theory and the con» structivist (or “disembodied”) theory. Neoliberal theory sees institutions as agreements or contracts between actors that function to reduce uncer- tainty, lower transaction costs, and solve collective action problems. They provide information, enforcement mechanisms, and other devices that allow states to realize joint gains.”S Institutions are employed as strategies to mitigate a range of opportunistic incentives that states will otherwise respond to under conditions of anarchy.” Institutions are thus explained in terms of the problems they solve; they are constructs that can be traced to the actions of self-interested individuals or groups.28 Constructivist theory sees institutions as diffuse and socially constructed worldviews that bound and shape the strategic behavior of individuals and states. Institutions are seen as overarching patterns of relations that define and reproduce the interests and actions of individuals and groups. They prOvide normative and cognitive maps for interpretation and action, and they ultimately affect the identities and social purposes of the actors.29 I“ See Keohane, Afier Hegmory. The general theoretical position is sketched in Keohane, “Lntemational Institutions: Two Approaches,” ImmationaISmdz'er anefly, Vol. 32 (Decem- her 1988), pp. 379-»96, and Keohane and Lisa Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist The— ory,” International Search); Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 39—5 1. See also Lisa Martin, Coercive Cooperation: ExpiainingMuitiiatet-rd Economic Sanctions (Princeton: Princeton Univer- sity Press, 1992). 2? See Lisa Martin, “An Instimtionalist Vlew: International Institutions and State Strate- gies,” in T. V. Paul and John A. Hall, eds., formrionai Order and the Future-e oberld Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 23 The neoliberal approach argues that institutions are essentially functional or utilitarian “solutions” to problems encountered by rational actors seeking to organize their environment in a way that advances their interests. Kenneth A. Shepsle describes institutions as “agreements about a structure of cooperation” that reduces transaction costs, opportunism, and other forms of “slippage.” Sheplse, “Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institu- tions,” in Herbert F. Weisberg, ed., Political Science: The Science ofPoIitits (New York: Agathon, 1986). p. 74. 2° AS Alex Wendt argues, “Consuuctivists are interested in the construction ofidenfity and interests and, as such, take a more sociological than economic approach” to theory. Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 2 (June 1994-), pp. 384-385. Adopting a similar view, Peter]. Katzenstein argues that “institutionalized power can be seen to mold the identity of the states themselves and thus the interests they hold.” Katrenstein, “United Germany in an Integrating Europe,” in Kateenstein, ed., Tamed Power: Germany in Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 5. 16 CHAPTER ONE Behind state interests and power are state identities—prevailing norms and ideas about the purposes and orientation of the state as an entity and as an actor in the wider international system. In this view, the organization of postwar order, in each historical instance, reflects the prevailing thinking among those party to the settlements about what the proper principles and purposes of international order should be. This prevailing thinking, in turn, is rooted in the principles and purposes that shape the fundamental identities of the states themselves.” A third position holds that institutions are both constructs and con- straints. Institutions are the formal and informal organizations, rules, rou- tines, and practices that are embedded in the wider political order and define the “landscape” in which actors operate.31 As such, institutional structures influence the way power is distributed across individuals and groups within a political system, providing advantages and resources to some and constraining the options of others. This approach gives attention to the ways in which institutions alter or fix the distribution of power within a political order. It offers a more sticky theory of institutions than the ratio- Jujohn Ruggie makes an argument of this sort about the relationship between the territo- rial state, sovereignty, and international institutions. Ruggie argues that multilateralism be- came the basic organizing principle that allowed the emerging interstate system to cope with dination and collaboration problems. SeeJohn G. Ruggie, “The Anatomy of an Institution,” in Ruggie, ed., Mnlriieteraiim Maxim: The Tb»:on and Prim} qf an Imitation New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 3—47. See also Christian Reus-Smit, “The Constitu- tional So-ucture of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions,” Inter- mriamu’ Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 555—89. 3] This theoretical view—often called “historical institutionalism"—makes several claims. First, state policy and orientations are mediated in decisive ways by political strucmres—such as institutional configurations of government. The structures of a polity shape and constrain the goals, opportunities, and actions of the groups and individuals operating within it. Second, to understand how these institutional constraints and oppornmin'es are manifest, they must be placed within an historical process—timin , sequencing, tmintended consequences, and policy feedback matter. Third, instimtions have path-dependent characteristics—institutions are es— tablished and tend to persist until a later shock or upheaval introduces a new moment of institutional structures have an impact because they facthtate or linut the acoons of groups and individuals—which means that institutions are never offered as a complete explanation of outcomes. The impacts of institutions, there- fore, tend to be assessed as they interact with other factors, such as societal interests, culture, ideology, and new policy ideas. For surveys of the theoretical claims of this perspective, see PeterA. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutional- isms," Political Studies, Vol. 4-4, No. ,5 (Decemeber 1996); pp. 936—37; Kathleen Thelen, “His— torical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” Annual Review quoiirica! Stieme (Palo Alto: Annual Reviews, Inc, 1999), pp. 369—404; and Sven Steinmo, cl: 3]. SmringPoIitio‘: Histori- cal Initiatinin in ComparatiueAmlg/rir New York; Cambridge University PreSs, I992). )rms and Ind as an :ation of thinking I pies and king, in amental 1d con- es, rou- ler and utional sis and rces to :ention within ratio- territo- 3111 be- )e wide Yr gem lefined Fcoor- ition," ' York.- isoto- Inter- THE PROBLEM OF ORDER 1? nalist account, but unlike constructivism, it locates institutional stickiness in the practical interaction between actors and formal and informal organi- zations, rules, and routines. Because of the complex causal interaction be- tween actors and institutions, attention to historical timing and sequencing is necessary to appreciate the way in which agency and structure matter. The key focus of neoliberal institutional theory is the way in which insti- rations previde information to states and reduce die incentives for cheat- ing.33 But this misses the fundamental feature of the prevailing order among the advanced industrial countries: the structures of relations are now so deep and pervasive that the kind of cheating that these theories worry about either cannot happen, or if it does it will not really matter because cooperation and the institutions are not fragile but profoundly robust. Moreover, it is a question not only of how institutions matter but of when they matter. Neoliberal infimgWEfifions matter m05t affer hegemony; when hegemony declines, institutions sustain order and cooperation. But institutions are also critical at the beginning of hegemony—or “after victo ”—in establishing order and securing cooper- ation between unequal states.33 The theory of institutions advanced in this book incorporates assumptions about path dependency and increasing re- turns to institutions to explain their potential significance in overcoming or mitigating anarchy, balance, and strategic rivalry. THE ARGUMENT This book argues that the basigpmblcnlnflotdenfomdgn is a problem of copin with the newly emerged asymmetries of power. This is the classic problem of political order: H ow canm bit-mmmally acceptable sys- tem of relations be established between strong and weak states? Max Weber took this roblem asW‘dinmin raw power into le 'tirnate auEhority. Wars create winners and losers, they magnifiz the dimstrong and weak, and they destroy the old rules and institutions of order. In this situation, as has been said, leading or hege- n The more general claim of the neoliberal approach, embodied in Keohane’s pathbreak— ing work, is that states—in the rational pursuit of their selfwinterest—often find incentives and opportunities to establish institutions that reduce transaction costs and overcome other obstacles to cooperation. The argument advanced here builds on this seminal insight and attempts to extend it in two directions—where institutions matter and how nmdoioonal con- straints are manifest. 3’ See Keohane, After Hegmony. For a discussion of how neoliberal institutional theory is useful in explaining dlsn‘ibun've struggles and competitive security relations between unequal states, see Keohane, “Institutionalist Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War,” in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealzim and Neoliberoh'sm: The Contemporary Debate [New York: Columbia University Press, 1993}, pp. 269—3 00, and Keohane and Martin, “The Promise of Institutional Theory," in International Sammy. ances of power, ' Faced with simi recurring problem of order. Chapter Two specifies the book’s dependent variables: the order- building strategies of am ariations in - acter of postwar order ' ' e C at . e Bmefllcal focus is on the choices and olicies of 3m 6mm newlh- owerful postwar statmfififilar, Variations in estahI-rh t to w [ch these states emp eyed institutions as mecHa-Higms to ...£L£9_T£1_I_11,I_Unents an restraints; e secondary-empirical focus is s ‘ ' ' states can seek security in b I al~ or states can create more institun'onalized political orders lar postwar strategic situations in 1648, 1713, 1815 1919 is made between th constitutional. The: tib'n 0 state poweri explain systematica looks for variations which institutional fully pursued by tht These arguments ations in its manife; are made at the out in rebuilding order rise of new power as simplifications are I and choices. Explaii gies—and the grow that emerges from t Over time, postw tutionalized order, a Power in exercised— tional rules and prat cise power in arbitr: rages to gain a per: postwar institution settlements fully co; for the identificatior. in the settlements o in the 1945 settlemf Five, and Six examir ture provided Britaii of binding institutio states involved. The because of the inab: merits. Russian Tsar icy was the most visi the leading state att restraint, and there 2 also reveals the limi institutions. In 1919 postwar powers pro Woodrow Wilson a] leaders did worry ab: did seek to draw the tional bargain was w in bal- )rders. 1919, settle- of the singly over— ;b00k 1d the it has nnfib :ional d and rder— 3 211’- ; and as in 18 to us is :Iion :cre— jam: irger , The n mail and im- had am not 3113' 19 is made between three types of order: balance of ower he emonic, and non 0 state power is organized and restrained. This book does not seek to explain systematically variations in these three types of order. Rather, it 10015 for variations in the character of order as evidence of the extent to which institutional strategies of order building are advanced and success- fully pursued by the leading postwar state. These arguments about the institutional logic of order building and vari- ations in its manifestation are developed in Chapter Three. Assumptions are made at the outset about the basic “problems” that leading states face in rebuilding order after major wars: the breakdown of the old order, the rise of new power asymmetries, and the basic choices that they face. These simplifications are made so as to clarify the basic strategic circumstances and choices. Explaining variations in the choice of order-building strate- gives—and the growing embrace of institutional strategies—is the puzzle that emerges from this construction of the problem. Over time, postwar settlements have moved in the direction of an insti- tutionalized order, and have begun to take on‘ constitutional characteristics. P0wer in exercised—at least to some extent—through agreed-upon institu- tional rules and practices, thereby limiting the capacities of states to exer- cise power in arbitrary and indiscriminate ways or use their power advan- tages to gain a permanent advantage over weaker states. This model of postwar institution building is an ideal type. None of the major postwar settlements fully conforms to its ideal logic. The model allows, however, for the identification of a logic of order building that is more or less present in the settlements of 1815, 1919, and 1945, and that is most fully evident in the 1945 settlement among the industrial democracies. Chapters Four, Five, and Six examine these major modern postwar cases. The 1815 junc- ture provided Britain with a leading power position, but the establishment of binding institutions was limited by the nondemocratic character of the states involved. The proposed general security guarantee failed primarily because of the inability to the states involved to make binding commit- ments. Russian Tsar Alexander’s highly personal and eccentric foreign pol- icy was the most visible expression of this constraint. The 1815 case shows the leading state attempting to use institutions as a mechanism of power restraint, and there are some traces of constitutional order, but the episode also reveals the limits to which nondemocratic states can create binding institutions. In 1919, the prevalence of democracies among the Western postwar powers provided opportunities for institutional agreement, and Woodrow ‘Wilson articulated ambitious institutional proposals. European leaders did worry about American domination and abandonment, and they did seek to draw the United States into a security commitment. An institu- tional bargain was within reach, and the reasons for failure are more idio- fiflflELFROBLEhdIDFIDRDER ...
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