Hw6 - BUAD 351 Economic Analysis for Business Decisions Homework 6 due Tue PART(i multiple choice please provide the answers in the following box

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BUAD 351 - Economic Analysis for Business Decisions Homework 6 due: Tue 04/29/2009 PART (i): multiple choice please provide the answers in the following box: question answer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 1. In the Bertrand model with symmetric costs, the Nash Equilibrium occurs when d. none of the above 2. The Cournot model a. is useful for analyzing situations where &rms make capacity or inventory decisions that deter- mine the quantity available for sale. b. implies that price will exceed marginal cost. c. has a Nash Equilibrium. d. all of the above 3. Antitrust laws address two issues a. collaboration among competitors b. exclusion from the market c. both a and b d. none of the above d. A and B 5. Firms engage in tacit collusion when a. They predict what the other will do and attempt to undercut them b. They collude without communicating, sustaining a price above the noncooperative price that would arise in a single competitive interaction c. They communicate to reach an agreement about the prices they will charge d. They communicate what type of good they will produce 1
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6. In the Cournot model of oligopoly a. Firms produce di/erentiated products and set their prices simultaneously
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This note was uploaded on 04/19/2009 for the course BUAD 351 taught by Professor Eastin during the Spring '07 term at USC.

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Hw6 - BUAD 351 Economic Analysis for Business Decisions Homework 6 due Tue PART(i multiple choice please provide the answers in the following box

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