Bouwsma_EvilGenius

Bouwsma_EvilGenius - DESCARTES’ EVIL GENIUS 0 K Bouwsma{é There was once an evil genius who promised the mother of us all that if she ate of the

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Unformatted text preview: . DESCARTES’ EVIL GENIUS* 0. K. Bouwsma {é There was once an evil genius who promised the mother of us all that if she ate of the fruit of the tree, she would be like God, knowing good and evil. He promised knowledge. She did eat and she learned, but she was disappointed, for to know good and evil and not to be‘ God is awful. Many an Eve later, there was rumor of another ev1l genius. This evil genius promised no good, promised no knowledge. He made .a boast, a boast so wild and so deep and so dark that those who heard it cringed in hearing it. And what was that boast? Well, that apart from a few, four or five, clear and distinct ideas, he could deceive any son of Adam about anything. So he boasted. And with some result? Some in- deed! Men going about in the brightest noonday would look and err- claim: “How obscure!” and if some careless merchant counting hlS apples was heard to say: “two and three are five,” a heater ‘of the boast would rub his eyes and run away. This evil genius still whispers, thun- dering, among the leaves of books, frightening people, whispering: “I can. Maybe I will. Maybe so, maybe not.” The tantalizer! In what follows I should like to examine the boast of this evil genius. I am referring, of course, to that evil genius of whom Descartes writes: I shall then suppose, not that God who is supremely good'and the fountain of truth, but some evil genius not less powerful than deceitful, has employed his whole energies in deceiving me; I shall cons1der that the heav- ens, the earth, the colors, figures, sound, and all other. external things are nought but illusions and dreams of which this evil genius has availed him- self, in order to lay traps for my credulity; I shall con51der myself as havmg no hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, nor any senses, yet falsely believing myself to possess all these things.1 This then is the evil genius whom I have represented as boasting that he can deceive us about all these things. I intend now to examine "‘ From The Philosophical Review, LVIII (.1949), 141—151. Reprinted by permission of the author and The Philosophical Review. 1 Philosophical Works of Descartes, I, 147. 26 Descartes’ Evil Genius 27 this boast, and to understand how this deceiving and being deceived are to take place. I expect to discover that the evil genius may very well deceive. us, but that if we are wary, we need not be deceived. He will deceive us, if he does, by bathing the word “illusion” in a fog. This then will be the word to keep our minds on. In order to accom- plish all this, I intend to describe the evil genius carrying out his boast in two adventures. The first of these I shall consider a thoroughly transparent case of deception. The word “illusion” will find a clear and familiar application. Nevertheless in this instance the evil genius will not have exhausted “his whole energies in deceiving us.” Hence we must aim to imagine a further trial of the boast, in which the “Whole energies” of the evil genius are exhausted. In this instance I intend to show that the evil genius is himself befuddled, and that if we too ex- haust some of our energies in sleuthing after the peculiarities in his diction, then we need not be deceived either. i Let us imagine the evil genius then at his ease meditating that very bad is good enough for him, and that he would let bad'enough' alone. All the old pseudos, pseudo names and pseudo statements, are doing very well. But today it was different. He took no delight/in common lies, everyday fibs, little ones, old ones. He wanted somethiiig’ new and something big. He scratched his genius; he uncovered ani " And he scribbled on the inside of his tattered halo, “Tomorrow, I will deceive,” and he smiled, and his words were thin and like fine wife. “Tomorrow I will change everything, everything, everything. I will change flowers, human beings, trees, hills, sky, the sun, and everything else into paper. Paper alone I will not change. There will be paper flowers, paper human beings, paper trees. And human beings will be deceived. They will think that there are flowers, human beings, and trees, and there will be nothing but paper. It will be gigantic. And it ought to work. After all men have been deceived with much less trouble. There was a sailor, a Baptist I believe, who said that all was water. And there was no more water then than there is now. And there was a pool-hall keeper who said that all was billiard balls. That’s a long time ago of course, a long time before they opened one, and listening, heard that it was full of the sound of a trumpet. My prospects are good. I’ll try it.” And the evil genius followed his own directions and did accord- ing to his words. And this is what happened. Imagine a young man, Tom, bright today as he was yesterday, approaching a table where yesterday he had seen a bowl of flowers?» Today it suddenly strikes him that they are not flowers. He states at»! 28 M eta-M editations: Studies in Descartes them troubled, looks away, and looks again. Are they flowers? He Shakes his head. He chuckles to himself. “Huh! that’s funny. Is this a trick? Yesterday there certainly were flowers in that bowl.” He smffs suspiciously, hopefully, but smells nothing. His nose gives no assur— ance. He thinks of the birds that flew down to peek at the grapes in the picture andof the mare that whinnied at the likeness of Alexanders horse. Illusions! The picture oozed no juice, and the likeness was. still. He walked slowly to the bowl of flowers. He looked, and he sniffed, and he raised his hand. He stroked a petal lightly, lover of flowers, and he drew back. He could scarcely believe his fingers. They were not flowers. They were paper. As he stands, perplexed, Milly, friend and dear, enters the room. Seeing him occupied with the flowers, she is about to take up the bowl and offer them to him, when once again he is overcome With feelings of strangeness. She looks just like a great big. doll. He looks more closely, closely as he dares, seeing this may be Milly after all. Milly, are you Milly? -—that wouldn’t do. Her mouth clicks as she opens it, speak- ing, and it shuts precisely. Her forehead shines, and he shudders at the thought of Mme Tussaud’s. Her hair is plaited, evenly, perfectly, like Milly’s but as she raises one hand to guard its order, touching it, preen— ing, it whispers like a newspaper. Her teeth are white as a genteel monthly. Her gums are pink, and there is a clapper in her mouth. He thinks of mama dolls, and of the rubber doll he used to pinch; it hada misplaced navel right in the pit of the back, that whistled. Galatea in paper! Illusions! He noted all these details, flash by flash by flash. He reaches for a chair to steady himself and just in time. She approaches With the bowl of flowers, and, as the bowl is extended towards him, her arms jerk. The suppleness, the smoothness, the roundness of. life is gone. Twitches of a smile mislight up her face. He extends his hand to take up the bowl and his own arms jerk as hers did before. He takes the bowl, and as he does so ‘sees his hand. It is pale, fresh, snowy. Trem- bling, he drops the bowl, but it does not break, and the water does not run. What a mockery! He rushes to the window, hoping to see the real world. The scene is like a theatre—set. Even the pane in the window is drawn very thin, like cellophane. In the distance are the forms of men walking about and tossing trees and houses and boulders and hills upon the thin cross section of a truck that echoes only echoes of chugs as it moves. He looks into the sky upward, and it is low. There is a patch straight above him, and one seam is loose. The sun shines out of the blue like a Descartes’ Evil Genius 29 drop of German silver. He reaches out with his pale hand, crackling the cellophane, and his hand touches the sky. The sky shakes and tiny bits of it fall, flaking his white hand with confetti. Make-believe! He retreats, crinkling, creaking, hiding his sight. As he moves he misquotes a line of poetry: “Those are perils that were his eyes,” and he mutters, “Hypocritical pulp!” He goes on: “I see that the heavens, the earth, colors, figures, sound, and all other external things, flowers, Milly, trees and rocks and hills are paper, paper laid as traps for my credulity. Paper flowers, paper Milly, paper sky!” Then he paused, and in sudden fright he asked “And what about me?” He reaches to his lip and with two fingers tears the skin and peels off a strip' of newsprint. He looks at it closely, grim. “I shall consider myself as. hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, or any senses.” He lidsfh'i eyes and stands dejected. Suddenly he is cheered. He exclaimS: g, me papyrum esse, ergo sum.” He has triumphed over paperdom- . - I have indulged in this phantasy in order to illustrate the situation which Descartes’ words might be expected to descri , evil genius attempts to deceive. He tries to mislead Tom into ~ , ' what is not. Tom is to think that these are flowers, that this is theM' that was, that those are trees, hills, the heavens, etc. And he idoesthi‘sy by creating illusions, that is, by making something that looks likefl‘o’w? ers, artificial flowers; by making something that looks like and sounds ‘ like and moves like Milly, an artificial Milly. An illusion is something that looks like or sounds like, so much like, something else that ydu either mistake it for something else, or you can easily understand how someone might come to do this. So when the evil genius creates illu- sions intending to deceive he makes things which might quite easily be mistaken for what they are not. Now in the phantasy as I discovered it Tom is not deceived. He does experience the illusion, however. The intention of this is not to cast any reflection upon the deceptive powers of the evil genius. With such refinements in the paper art as we now know, the evil genius might very well have been less unsuccessful. And that in spite of his rumored lament: “And I made her of the best paper!” No, that Tom is not deceived, that he detects the illusion, is introduced in order to remind ourselves how illusions are detected. That the paper flowers are illusory is revealed by the recognition that they are paper. As soon as Tom realizes that though they look like flowers but are paper, he is acquainted with, sees through the illusio ‘ and is not deceived. What is required, of course, is that he know difference between flowers andpaper, and that when presented , 30 Meta-Meditations: Studies in Descartes one or the other he can tell the difference. The attempt of the evil genius also presupposes this. What he intends is that though Tom knows this difference, the paper will look so much like flowers that Tom will not notice the respect in which the paper is different from the flowers. And even though Tom had actually been deceived and had not recognized the illusion, the evil genius himself must have been aware of the difference, for this is involved in his design. This is cru- cial, as we shall see when we come to consider the second adventure of the evil genius. As you will remember I have represented the foregoing as an illustration of the sort of situation which Descartes’ words might be expected to describe. Now, however, I think that this is misleading. For though I have described a situation in which there are many things, nearly all of which are calculated to serve as illusions, this ques— tion may still arise. Would this paper world still be properly described as a world of illusions? If Tom says: “These are flowers,” or “These look like flowers” (uncertainly), then the illusion is operative. But if Tom says: “These are paper,” then the illusion has been destroyed. Descartes uses the words: “And all other external things are nought but illusions.” This means that the situation which Descartes has in mind is such that if Tom says: “These are flowers,” he will be wrong, but he will be wrong also if he says: “These are paper,” and it won’t matter What sentence of that type he uses. If he says: “These are rock”—-or cotton or cloud or wood—he is wrong by the plan. He will be right only if he says: “These are illusions.” But the project is to keep him from recognizing the illusions. This means that the illusions are to be brought about not by anything so crude as paper or even cloud. They must be made of the stuff that dreams are made of. Now let us consider this second adventure. The design then is this. The evil genius is to create a world of illusions. There are to be no flowers, no Milly, no paper. There is to be nothing at all, but Tom is every moment to go on mistaking nothing for something, nothing at all for flowers, nothing at all for Milly, etc. This is, of course, quite different from mistaking paper for flowers, paper for Milly. And yet all is to be arranged in such a way that Tom will go on just as we now do, and just as Tom did before the paper age, to see, hear, smell the world. He will love the flowers, he will kiss Milly, he will blink at the sun. So he thinks. And in thinking about these things he will talk and argue just as we do. But all the time he will be mistaken. There are no flowers, there is no kiss, there is no sun. Illusions all. This then is the end at which the evil genius aims. Descartes’ Evil Genius 31 How now is the evil genius to attain this end? Well, it is clear that a part of what he aims at will be realized if he destroys everything. Then there will be no flowers, and if Tom thinks that there are flowers he Will be wrong. There will be no face that is Milly’s and no tumbled beauty on her head, and if Tom thinks that there is Milly’s face and Milly’s hair, he will be wrong. It is necessary then to see to it that there are none of these things. So the evil genius, having failed with “aner destroys even all paper. Now there is nothing to see, nothing torhterar’ nothing to smell, etc. But this is not enough to deceive. For thouvli Tom sees nothing, and neither hears nor smells anything, he may .an think that he sees nothing. He must also be misled into thinking that he does see something, that there are flowers and Milly, and hands, eyes flesh, blood, and all other senses. Accordingly the evil genius restores to Tom his old life. Even the memory of that paper day is blotted out, not a scrap remains. Witless Tom lives on, thinking, hoping, loving as he used to, unwitted by the great destroyer. All that seems so solid so touchable to seeming hands, so biteable to apparent teeth, is so flimsy that were the evil genius to poke his index at it, it would curl away save for one tiny trace, the smirch of that index. 80 once more the evil genius has done according to his word. And now let us examine the result. ‘ I should like first of all to describe a passage of Tom’s life. ‘Tom is all alone, but he doesn’t know it. What an opportunity for methodo- logico-metaphysico-solipsimo! I intend, in any case, to disregard the mcenes of his being so alone and to borrow his own words, with the warning that the evil genius smiles as he reads them. Tom writes: fl Todayi1 as usual, I came into the room and there was the bowl of owers ' them I at: tkeéatzlleé I went up, to them, caressed them, and smelled ’over H . an I 0 or flowers. There s nothing so real to me as flowers. ere the genuine essence of the world’s substance, at its gayest and most hilarious speaks to me. It seems unworth even t th' k h i ’ ‘ and waving on pillars of sap. Sap! Sap! y o m Of t em as met, There was more in the same vein, which we need not bother to record. I might say that the evil genius was a bit amused, snickered in fact as he read the words “so real,” “essence,” “substance,” etc., but laterthe frowned and seemed puzzled. Tom went on to describe how Milly came into the room, and how glad he was to see her. They talked about the flowers. Later he walked to the window and watchedf‘the gardener clearing a space a short distance away. The sun was but there were a few heavy clouds. He raised the window, extended I . WWWEW<W¢WW-wyavwwm i («a 32 M eta-M editations: Studies in Descartes his hand and four large drops of rain wetted his hand. He returned to the room and quoted to Milly a song from The Tempest. He got all the words right, and was well pleased with himself. There was more he wrote, but this is enough to show how quite normal everything seems. And, too, how successful the evil genius is. ' And the evil genius said to himself, not quite in solipsrmo, “Not 0- 9- ll ” 50, not 30, “0|. fit. an 30. The evil genius was, however, all too human. Admiring himself but unadmired, he yearned for admiration. To deceive but to be un— suspected is too little glory. The evil genius set about then to plant the seeds of suspicion. But how to do this? Clearly there was no suggestive paper to tempt Tom’s confidence. There was nothing but Tom 5 mind, a stream of seemings and of words to make the seemings seem no seem- ings. The evil genius must have words with Tom and must engage the same seemings with him. To have words with Tom 15 to have the words together, to use them in the same way, and to engage the same seemings is to see and to hear and to point to the same. 'And so the ev1l genius, free spirit, entered in at the door of Tom’s pineal gland and lodged there. He floated in the humors that flow, glandw1se and sense- wise, everywhere being as much one with Tom as diflerence will al- low. He looked out of the same eyes, and when Tom pomted with his finger, the evil genius said “This” and meant what Tom, hearing, also :meant, seeing. Each heard with the same ear what the other heard. For every snifling of the one nose there were two identical smells, and there were two tactualities for every touch. If Tom had had a toothache, to- gether they would have pulled the same face. The twinsomeness of two monads finds here the limit of identity. Nevertheless there was other- ness looking out of those eyes as we shall see. ' It seems then that on the next day, the evil genius “gomg to and fro” in Tom’s mind and “walking up and down in it,” Tom once again, as his custom was, entered the room where the flowers stood on the table. He stopped, looked admiringly, and in a caressing voice said: “Flowers! Flowers!” And he lingered. The evil genius, more subtle “than all the beasts of the field," whispered “Flowers? Flowers?” For the first time Tom has an intimation of company, of some intimate partner in perception. Momentarily he is checked. He looks again at the flowers. “Flowers? Why, of course, flowers.” Together they look out of the same eyes. Again the evil genius whispers, “Flowers?” The seed of suspicion is to be the question. But Tom now raises the flowers nearer to his eyes almost violently, as though his eyes were not his own. Descartes’ Evil Genius '33 He is, however, not perturbed. The evil genius only shakes their head. “Did you ever hear of illusions?” says he. Tom, still surprisingly good—natured, responds: “But you saw them, didn’t you? Surely you can see through my eyes. Come, let us bury my nose deep in these blossoms, and take one long breath to— gether. Then tell whether you can recognize these as flowers.” So they dunked the one nose. But the evil genius said “Huh!” as much as to say: What has all this seeming and smelling to do with it? Still he explained nothing. And Tom remained as confident of the flowers as he had been at the first. The little seeds of doubt, “Flowers? Flowers?” and again “Flowers?” and “Illusions?” and now this stick in the spokes, “Huh!” made Tom uneasy. He went on: “Oh, so you are one of these seers that has to touch everything. You’re a tangibilite. Very well, here’s my hand, let’s finger these flowers. Careful! They’re tender.” The evil genius was amused. He smiled inwardly and rippled in a shallow humor. To be taken for a materialist! As though the grand illusionist was not a spirit! Nevertheless, he realized that though decep= tion is easy where the lies are big enough (where had he heard that before?), a few scattered, questioning words are not enough to make guile grow. He was tempted to make a statement, and he did. He said, “Your flowers are nothing but illusions.” “My flowers illusions?” exclaimed Tom, and he took up the bowl and placed it before a mirror. “See,” said he, “here are the flowers and here, in the mirror, is an illusion. There’s a difference surely. And you with my eyes, my nose, and my fingers can tell what that difference is. Pollen on your fingers touching the illusion? Send Milly the flowers in the mirror? Set a bee to suck honey out of this glass? You know all this as well as I do. I can tell flowers from illusions, and my flowers, as you now plainly see, are not illusions.” The evil genius was now sorely tried. He had his make-believe, but he also had his pride. Would he now risk the make-believe to save his pride? Would he explain? He explained. “Tom,” he said, “notice. The flowers in the mirror look like flowers, but they only look like flowers. We agree about that. The flowers before the mirror also look like flowers. But they, you say, are flowers because they also smell like flowers and they feel like flowers, as though they would be any more flowers because they also like flow- ers multiply. Imagine a mirror such that it reflected not only the looks of flowers, but also their fragrance and their petal surfaces, and then 34 M eta-M editations: Studies in Descartes you smelled and touched, and the flowers before the mirror would be just like the flowers in the mirror. Then you could see immediately that the flowers before the mirror are illusions just as those in the mir- ror are illusions. As it is now, it is clear that the flowers in the mirror are thin illusions, and the flowers before the mirror are thick. Thick illusions are the best for deception. And they may be as thick as you like. From them you may gather pollen, send them to Milly, and fool— ish bees may sleep in them.” But Tom was not asleep. “I see that what you mean by thin illu- sions is what I mean by illusions, and what you mean by thick illusions is what I mean by flowers. So when you say that my flowers are your thick illusions this doesn’t bother me. And as for your mirror that mirrors all layers of your thick illusions, I shouldn’t call that a mirror at all. It’s a duplicator, and much more useful than a mirror, provided you can control it. But I do suppose that when you speak of thick illusions you do mean that thick illusions are related to something you call flowers in much the same way that the thin illusions are related to the thick ones. Is that true?” The evil genius was now diction—deep in explanations and went on. “In the first place let me assure you that these are not flowers. I destroyed all flowers. There are no flowers at all. There are only thin and thick illusions of flowers. I can see your flowers in the mirror, and I can smell and touch the flowers before the mirror. What I cannot smell and touch, having seen as in the mirror, is not even thick illusion. But if I cannot also cerpicio what I see, smell, touch, etc., what I have then seen is not anything real. Esse est cerpici. I just now tried to cerpicio your flowers, but there was nothing there. Man is after all a four— or five- or six-sense creature and you cannot expect much from so little.” Tom rubbed his eyes and his ears tingled with an eighteenth—cen— tury disturbance. Then he stared at the flowers. “I see,” he said, “that this added sense of yours has done wickedly with our language. You do not mean by illusion what we mean, and neither do you mean by flowers what we mean. As for cerpicz'o I wouldn’t be surprised if you’d made up that word just to puzzle us. In any case what you destroyed is what, according to you, you used to cerpicio. So there is nothing for you to cerpz'cio any more. But there still are what we mean by flowers. If your intention was to deceive, you must learn the language of those you are to deceive. I should say that you are like the doctor who pre- scribes for his patients what is so bad for himself and is then surprised at the health of his patients.” And he pinned a flower near their nose. Descartes" Evil Genius 35 The evil genius, discomfited, rode off on a corpuscle. He had failed. He took to an artery, made haste to the pineal exit, and was gone. Then “sun by sun” he fell. And he regretted his mischief. I have tried in this essay to understand the boast of the evil genius. His boast was that he could deceive, deceive about “the heav- ens, the earth, the colors, figures, sound, and all other external things.” In order to do this I have tried to bring clearly to mind what deception and such deceiving would be like. Such deception involves illusions and such deceiving involves the creation of illusions. Accordingly I have tried to imagine the evil genius engaged in the practice of deception, busy in the creation of illusions. In the first adventure everything is plain. The evil genius employs paper, paper making believe it’s many other things. The effort to deceive, ingenuity in deception, being de- ceived by paper, detecting the illusion—all these are clearly under- stood. It is the second adventure, however, which is more crucial. For in this instance it is assumed that the illusion is of such a kind that no seeing, no touching, no smelling, are relevant to detecting the illusion. Nevertheless the evil genius sees, touches, smells, and does detect the illusion. He made the illusion; so, of course, he must know it. How then does he know it? The evil genius has a sense denied to men. He senses the flower—in-itself, Milly-in—herself, etc. So he creates illusions made up of what can be seen, heard, smelled, etc., illusions all because when seeing, hearing, and smelling have seen, heard, and smelled all, the special sense senses nothing. So what poor human beings sense is the illusion of what only the evil genius can sense. This is formidable. Nevertheless, once again everything is clear. If we admit the special sense, then we can readily see how it is that the evil genius should have been so confident. He has certainly created his own illusions, though he has not himself been deceived. But neither has anyone else been deceived. For human beings do not use the word “illusion” by relation to a sense with which only the evil genius is blessed. I said that the evil genius had not been deceived, and it is true that he has not been deceived by his own illusions. Nevertheless he was deceived in boasting that he could deceive, for his confidence in this is Jased upon an ignorance of the difference between our uses of the ords, “heavens,” “earth,” “flowers,” “Milly,” and “illusions” of these things, and his own uses of these words. For though there certainly is an analogy between our own uses and his, the difference is quite sufli- cient to explain his failure at grand deception. We can also understand i how easily Tom might have been taken in. The dog over the water 36 M eta-M editations: Studies in Descartes ' er dropped his meaty bone for a picture on the water. Tom, howev , ' “'llusion” is a trap. d ed nothin at all. But the word h “ rOPPI began tlIis essay uneasily, looking at my hands and saying no ' ' ' “ ’ ' .” Everything I saw h ds,” blinkm my eyes and saying no eyes . 5::med to me hie something Cheshire, a piece of cheese, fti: lnS‘tQXZC‘i appearing and disappearing in the leaves of the tree. Poor my. now? Well. . . . DESCARTES , MATHEMATICS, AND GOD* Leonard G. Miller {E In Descartes’ first Meditation the propositions of mathematics survive the criticism of the perception and dream arguments, but they do so only to be unsettled by the demon argument. Could not an all-power- ful demon make me believe these propositions are true when, as a mat- ter of fact, they are not? As Descartes suggests, “How do I know that I am not myself deceived every time I add two and three, or count the sides of a square, or judge of things yet simpler, if anything simpler can be suggested?”1 Now this is a puzzling statement. If someone tells me that I may always be mistaken about such simple matters, I imme- diately think he is not talking about the sort of mistake I occasionally make, and so I expect some explanation. In this case I expect Descartes to tell me what a square would be like if it did not have four sides, and What the sum of three and two would be if it was not five. Unfortu— nately, however, although he insists that the propositions of mathe- matics are not reliable unless their truth is guaranteed by God, he is not at all clear about how it is possible for them to be false, or what may be the case if they are. This is a crucial matter, for upon it hinges the meaning and significance of his basic contention, the contention that clear and distinct ideas require metaphysical support. In this paper I am going to delve into this matter by examining what Descartes does say or imply about the nature of the necessity associated with mathe- matical truths in particular and the eternal verities in general. I must start by making it clear that Descartes really does adopt a skeptical attitude toward even the simplest propositions of mathe- matics, and I must do this because he sometimes argues that his readers have done him an injustice on this point. When he is accused of argu- ing in a circle in the third Meditation, he replies to the effect that ‘* From The Philosophical Review, LXVI (1957), 451—465. Reprinted by permission of the author and The Philosophical Review. ‘ 1Norman Kemp Smith, Descartex’ Philotophical Writing: (London, 1952;, r 37‘ hereafter written K.S.), p. 199. l I l ! ...
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Bouwsma_EvilGenius - DESCARTES’ EVIL GENIUS 0 K Bouwsma{é There was once an evil genius who promised the mother of us all that if she ate of the

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