Unformatted text preview: ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI RIZADA
Lexoterica: Compilation of SC Rulings SC RULINGS ON REMEDIAL LAW March 2014 Philippine Supreme
Court Decisions on Criminal law
and Procedure
Posted on April 16, 2014 by Dominador Maphilindo O. Carrillo • Posted in Criminal
Law, Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law, Remedial Law • Here are select March 2014 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines
on criminal law and procedure:
1. REVISED PENAL CODE
Conspiracy; liability of conspirators. Assuming that the prosecution
witnesses failed to identify exactly who inflicted the fatal wounds on Joey
during the commotion, Erwin’s liability is not diminished since he and the
others with him acted with concert in beating up and ultimately killing Joey.
Conspiracy makes all the assailants equally liable as co-principals by direct
participation. Since about 15 men, including accused Erwin, pounced on
their one helpless victim, relentlessly bludgeoned him on the head, and
stabbed him on the stomach until he was dead, there is no question that the
accused took advantage of their superior strength. The Supreme Court thus
affirmed the decision of the lower courts finding accused Erwin guilty of
murder. People of the Philippines v. Erwin Tamayo y Bautisa, G.R. No.
196960, March 12, 2014.
Rape; rape victim with a mental disability either deprived of reason or
demented. Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, provides for two circumstances when having carnal knowledge of
a woman with a mental disability is considered rape, to wit: paragraph 1(b) –
when the offended party is deprived of reason; and paragraph 1(d) – when
the offended party is demented. Under paragraph 1(d), the term demented
refers to a person who has dementia, which is a condition of deteriorated
mentality, characterized by marked decline from the individual’s former
intellectual level and often by emotional apathy, madness, or insanity. On ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI RIZADA
Lexoterica: Compilation of SC Rulings the other hand, under paragraph 1(b), the phrase deprived of reason has been
interpreted to include those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency,
or retardation. People of the Philippines v. Ernesto Ventura Sr., G.R. No.
205230, March 12, 2014. Rape; when rape victim is deprived of reason but not demented. Since AAA
is mentally deficient, she should properly be classified as a person who is
“deprived of reason,” and not one who is “demented.” Hence, carnal
knowledge of a mentally deficient individual is rape under subparagraph (b)
and not subparagraph (d) of Article 266-A(1) of the RPC, as amended.
Nevertheless, the erroneous reference to paragraph 1(d) in the Information
will not exonerate Ventura because he failed to raise this as an objection,
and the particular facts stated in the Information were protestation sufficient
to inform him of the nature of the charge against him. From the foregoing,
all that needs to be proven are the facts of sexual congress between the rapist
and his victim, and the latter’s mental retardation. People of the Philippines
v. Ernesto Ventura Sr., G.R. No. 205230, March 12, 2014.
Rape; exact date of rape incident not an essential element. AAA’s failure to
recall the exact date of the first rape and the number of times she was
sexually assaulted by Ventura prior to March 24, 2005, does not militate
against her credibility since rape victims are not expected to cherish in their
memories an accurate account of the dates, number of times and manner
they were violated. This is especially true in the case of AAA who obviously
cannot be expected to act like an adult who would have the courage and
intelligence to disregard the threat to her life and complain immediately that
she had been sexually assaulted. AAA’s testimony was clear that every time
Ventura would rape her, he would threaten her against revealing the offense.
Given AAA’s mental condition, it can well substitute for violence and
intimidation enough to cow her into submission. The Supreme Court had
repeatedly held that the exact date when the victim was sexually abused is
not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense
is carnal knowledge of a woman. Indeed, the precise time of the crime has
no substantial bearing on its commission. As such, the time or place of
commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated. Inconsistencies and
discrepancies as to minor matters which are irrelevant to the elements of the
crime cannot be considered grounds for acquittal. Hence, the allegation in ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI RIZADA
Lexoterica: Compilation of SC Rulings the information, which states that the rape was committed on or about March
24, 2005, is sufficient to affirm the conviction of Ventura in the said case.
People of the Philippines v. Ernesto Ventura Sr., G.R. No. 205230, March
12, 2014.
Statutory rape; elements; proof of force, intimidation or consent not
necessary. Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman
below 12 years of age regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the
sexual act. Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary as they are
not elements of statutory rape, considering that the absence of free consent is
conclusively presumed when the victim is below the age of 12. At that age,
the law presumes that the victim does not possess discernment and is
incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act. Thus, to convict an
accused of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution carries the burden of
proving: (a) the age of the complainant; (b) the identity of the accused; and
(c) the sexual intercourse between the accused and the complainant. People
of the Philippines v. Guillermo B. Candano Jr., G.R. No. 207819, March 12,
2014.
Statutory rape; elements; proof of force, intimidation or consent not
necessary. A judicious review of the records of this case would reveal that
the aforementioned elements of statutory rape are present. First, the
presentation of AAA’s Certificate of Live Birth showing that she was born
on July 25, 1998 has proven that she was below 12 years of age when the
three (3) rape incidents happened on December 26 and 27, 1996, and in June
2000, respectively. Second, the prosecution proved that Cadano indeed had
carnal knowledge of AAA on three (3) separate occasions through the
latter’s positive, categorical, and spontaneous testimony, as corroborated by
the medico-legal report. People of the Philippines v. Guillermo B. Candano
Jr., G.R. No. 207819, March 12, 2014.
2. SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
Alias; defined. An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to
be used by him publicly and habitually, usually in business transactions, in
addition to the real name by which he was registered at birth or baptized the
first time, or to the substitute name authorized by a competent authority; a
man’s name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI RIZADA
Lexoterica: Compilation of SC Rulings designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him, but sometimes
a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases.
An alias is thus a name that is different from the individual’s true name, and
does not refer to a name that is not different from his true name. Revelina
Limson v. Eugenio Juan Gonzalez, G.R. No. 162205, March 31, 2014.
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(g); private persons acting in
conspiracy with public officers may be indicted. The only question that
needs to be settled in the present petition is whether herein respondent, a
private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of
R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have
conspired, has died prior to the filing of the Information. Respondent
contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public
officer who was charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution against
respondent may not prosper. The Supreme Court was not persuaded. It held
that, it is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile’s death, there is no longer
any public officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation of
R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy
between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is
already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary
Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did
it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private
respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean
that there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found
probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3(e)
and (g) of R.A. 3019. Were it not for his death, he should have been
charged. People of the Philippines v. Henry T. Go, G.R. No. 168539, March
25, 2014.
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(g); private persons acting in
conspiracy with public officers may be indicted. The requirement before a
private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019,
among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in
conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not require that
such person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public
officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be
charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already
died, the private person may be indicted alone. People of the Philippines v. ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI RIZADA
Lexoterica: Compilation of SC Rulings Henry T. Go, G.R. No. 168539, March 25, 2014.
Chain of custody rule. The Supreme Court has time and again spoken on the
chain of custody rule, a method of authenticating evidence which requires
that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it
to be. This would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such
a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and
from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in
the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had
been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone
not in the chain to have possession of the same. People of the Philippines v.
Freddie Ladip y Rubio, G.R. No. 196146, March 12, 2014.
Chain of custody rule; buy-bust situation. From the testimonies of the police
officers in the case at bench, the prosecution established that they had
custody of the drugs seized from the accused from the moment he was
arrested, during the time he was transported to the police station, and up to
the time the drugs were submitted to the crime laboratory for examination.
The same witnesses also identified the seized drugs with certainty when
these were presented in court. With regard to the handling of the seized
drugs, there are no conflicting testimonies or glaring inconsistencies that
would cast doubt on the integrity thereof as evidence presented and
scrutinized in court. It is therefore safe to conclude that, to the unprejudiced
mind, the testimonies show without a doubt that the evidence seized from
the accused at the time of the buy-bust operation was the same one tested,
introduced, and testified to in court. In short, there is no question as to the
integrity of the evidence against the accused. People of the Philippines v.
Freddie Ladip y Rubio, G.R. No. 196146, March 12, 2014.
Chain of custody; buy-bust situation. The following links must be
established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation: first, the seizure
and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused
by the apprehending officer; second, the turn over of the illegal drug seized
by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turn over
by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI RIZADA
Lexoterica: Compilation of SC Rulings laboratory examination; and fourth, the turn over and submission of the
marked illegal drugs seized from the forensic chemist to the court. People of
the Philippines v. Hermanos Constantino, Jr. y Binayug, a.k.a. “Jojit”, G.R.
No. 199689, March 12, 2014.
Chain of custody; buy-bust situation. After a careful scrutiny of the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the Supreme Court found glaring
inconsistencies affecting the integrity of the shabu purportedly confiscated
from Constantino. The inconsistent testimonies of PO3 Domingo, PO3
Hernandez, and P/SInsp. Tulauan as to who, when, and where the two
plastic sachets of shabu were marked lead the court to question whether the
two plastic sachets of shabu identified in court were the very same ones
confiscated from Constantino. The doubtful markings already broke the
chain of custody of the seized shabu at a very early stage. To recall, the first
crucial link in the chain of custody is seizure and marking of the illegal drug.
In this case, PO3 Domingo, as poseur-buyer, received two plastic sachets of
shabu from Constantino in exchange for P1,000. However, PO3 Domingo
himself did not put any markings on the two plastic sachets of shabu.
Instead, upon arrival of the buy-bust team with Constantino at the police
station, PO3 Domingo turned over the two plastic sachets of shabu to the
investigator, SPO2 Tamang, who was also a member of the buy-bust team.
PO3 Domingo testified that it was SPO2 Tamang who put the marking
“NBT” on the said sachets of shabu. However, PO3 Hernandez, another
member of the buy-bust team, categorically pointed to SPO2 Taguiam, also
a member of the buy-bust team, as the one who put the marking “NBT” on
the plastic sachets upon the team’s return to the police station. To complicate
things even further, P/SInsp Tulauan, the Forensic Chemist, also declared
before the trial court that the marking “NBT” on the two plastic sachets of
shabu were made by SPO3 Nelson B. Tamaray, the duty officer who
received the specimens at the crime laboratory. On cross-examination,
P/SInsp. Tulauan confirmed her previous declaration that SPO3 Tamaray
had claimed making the marking on the sachets of shabu. Herein, the
prosecution is completely silent as to why PO3 Domingo, the poseur-buyer,
despite having immediate custody of the two plastic sachets of shabu
purchased from Constantino, failed to immediately mark the seized drugs
before turning over the custody of the same to another police officer. This
lapse in procedure opened the door for confusion and doubt as to the identity
of the drugs actually seized from Constantino during the buy-bust and the
ones presented before the trial court, especially considering that three ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI RIZADA
Lexoterica: Compilation of SC Rulings different people, during the interval, supposedly received and marked the
same. People of the Philippines v. Hermanos Constantino, Jr. y Binayug,
a.k.a. “Jojit”, G.R. No. 199689, March 12, 2014.
Illegal use of aliases. On the issue of the alleged use of illegal aliases, the
Supreme Court observed that respondent’s aliases involved the names
“Eugenio Gonzalez”, “Eugenio Gonzales”, “Eugenio Juan Gonzalez”,
“Eugenio Juan Gonzalez y Regalado”, “Eugenio C.R. Gonzalez”, “Eugenio
J. Gonzalez”, and – per Limson – “Eugenio Juan Robles Gonzalez.” But
these names contained his true names, albeit at times joined with an
erroneous middle or second name, or a misspelled family name in one
instance. The records disclose that the erroneous middle or second names, or
the misspelling of the family name resulted from error or inadvertence left
unchecked and unrectified over time. What is significant, however, is that
such names were not fictitious names within the purview of the Anti-Alias
Law; and that such names were not different from each other. Considering
that he was not also shown to have used the names for unscrupulous
purposes, or to deceive or confuse the public, the dismissal of the charge
against him was justified in fact and in law. Revelina Limson v. Eugenio
Juan Gonzalez, G.R. No. 162205, March 31, 2014.
Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty; procedure
lapses in handling of shabu negates presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty. The Supreme Court ruled that the lower courts
erred in giving weight to the presumption of regularity in the performance
that a police officer enjoys in the absence of any taint of irregularity and of
ill motive that would induce him to falsify his testimony. The regularity of
the performance of the police officers’ duties leaves much to be desired in
this case given the lapses in their handling of the allegedly confiscated
shabu. The totality of all the procedural lapses effectively produced serious
doubts on the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti, especially in the
face of allegations of frame-up. The Supreme Court had previously held that
these lapses negate the presumption that official duties have been regularly
performed by the police officers. Any taint of irregularity affects the whole
performance and should make the presumption unavailable. Indeed, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself
overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof beyond
reasonable doubt. It should be noted that the presumption is precisely just
that – a presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, it cannot ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI RIZADA
Lexoterica: Compilation of SC Rulings be regarded as binding truth. People of the Philippines v. Jerry Caranto y
Propeta, G.R. No. 193768, March 5, 2014.
R.A. 3019; Section 3(e); proof of the extent of damage is not essential. The
third element of the offense – that the act of the accused caused undue injury
to any party, including the Government, or gave any private party
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of the
functions of the accused – was established here. Proof of the extent of
damage is not essential, it being sufficient that the injury suffered or the
benefit received is perceived to be substantial enough and not merely
negligible. In the present case, the prosecution’s evidence duly proved that
petitioners, using their official positions, by dishonesty and breach of sworn
duty, facilitated the approval and release of government funds amounting to
P20,000,000 supposedly for the purchase of combat clothing and individual
equipment (CCIE) items of PNP personnel. However, the recipients of the
P20,000,000 turned out to be fictitious PNP personnel, and up to now the
P20,000,000 remains unaccounted for. Thus, petitioners should be made
liable for their deceit and misrepresentation and should compensate the
government for the actual damage the government has suffered. Danilo O.
Garcia and Joven SD. Brizuela v. Sandiganbayan and People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 197204, March 26, 2014.
R.A. 9165; Section 21(a) of the IRR of R.A. 9165; inventory and marking
of seized items in warrantless seizures. From a cursory reading of Section
21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165, it can be
gleaned that in cases of warrantless seizures, as in this case, inventory and
marking of the seized item can be conducted at the nearest police station or
office of the apprehending authorities, whichever is practicable, and not
necessarily at the place of seizure. As held in People v. Resurreccion,
“marking upon immediate confiscation” does not exclude the possibility that
marking can be done at the police s...
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