Unformatted text preview: CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ O N WAR
Edited and Translated by MICHAEL HOWARD and PETER PARET
Introductory Essays by PETER PARET,
MICHAEL HOWARD, and BERNARD BRODIE;
with a Commentary by BERNARD BRODIE
Index by ROSALIE WEST PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
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Edited and Translated by MICHAEL HOWARD and PETER PARET
Introductory Essays by PETER PARET,
MICHAEL HOWARD, and BERNARD BRODIE;
with a Commentary by BERNARD BRODIE
Index by ROSALIE WEST PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
PRINCETON, N E W JERSEY Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street,
Princeton, New Jersey 08540
In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, Chichester, West Sussex
Copyright O 1976 by Princeton University Press
Index copyright O 1984 by Princeton University Press
All Rights Reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Clausewitz, Carl von, 1780-183 1.
On war.
Translation of: Vom Kriege.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Military art and science. 2. War. I. Howard, Michael Eliot, 192211. Paret, Peter. 111. Title.
U102.C65 1984 355 84-3401
ISBN 0-691-05657-9
ISBN 0-691-01854-5 (pbk.)
First Princeton Paperback printing, 1989
Princeton University Press books are printed on acid-free paper
and meet the guidelines for permanence and durability of
the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book
Longevity of the Council on Library Resources Printed in the United States of America pbk. ISBN-10: 0-691-01854-5 (pbk.) CONTENTS Editors' Note xi Note for the 1984 Edition xii Introductorv Essays
The Genesis of On War
PETER PARET The Influence of Clausewitz
MICHAEL HOWARD The Continuing Relevance of On War
BERNARD BRODIE On War
Author's Preface
Author's Comment
Preface
MARIE VON CLAUSEWITZ Two Notes by the Author BOOK ONE On the Nature of War
I What is War? 2 Purpose and Means in W a r 3 On Military Genius
4 On Danger in W a r 5 On Physical Effort in War
6 Intelligence in W a r
7 Friction in War
8 Concluding Observations on Book One CONTENTS BOOK TWO On the Theory of War
I Classifications of the Art of War 2 On the Theory of War 3 Art of War or Science of War
4 Method and Routine 5 Critical Analysis
6 On Historical Examples
BOOK THREE On Strategy in General
Strategy
Elements of Strategy
Moral Factors
The Principal Moral Elements
Military Virtues of the Army
Boldness
Perseverance
Superiority of Numbers
Surprise
Cunning
Concentration of Forces in Space
Unification of Forces in.Time
The Strategic Reserve
Economy of Force
The Geometrical Factor
The Suspension of Action in W a r
The Character of Contemporary Warfare
Tension and Rest CONTENTS BOOK FOUR The Engagenlent
I Introduction 2 The Nature of Battle Today 3 The Engagement in General
4 The Engagement in General-Continued 5 The Significance of the Engagement
Duration of the Engagement
Decision of the Engagement
Mutual Agreement to Fight
The Battle: Its Decision
The Battle-Continued: The Effects of Victory
The Battle-Continued: The Use of Battle
Strategic Means of Exploiting V ~ C ~ O N
Retreat after a Lost Battle
Night Operations
BOOK FIVE Military Forces
1 General Survey 3 The Army, the Theater of Operations, the Campaign 3 Relative Strength 4 Relationship between the Branches of the Service
5 The Army's Order of Battle 6 General Disposition of the Army 7 Advance Guard and Outposts
8 Operational Use of Advanced Corps
9 Camps
10 Marches vii CONTENTS
11 Marches-Continued 12 Marches-Concluded 13 Billets 14 Maintenance and Supplv 15 Base of Operations 16 Lines of Communication 17 Terrain
18 The Command of Heights
BOOK SIX Defense
Attack and Defense
The Relationship between Attack and Defense in Tactics
The Relationship between Attack and Defense in Strategy
Convergence of Attack and Divergence of Defense
The Character of Strategic Defense
Scope of the Means of Defense
Interaction between Attack and Defense
Types of Resistance
The Defensive Battle
Fortresses
I I Fortresses-Continued 12 Defensive Positions I3 Fortified Positions and Entrenched Camps 14 Flank Positions 15 Defensive Mountain Warfare 16 Defensive Mountain Warfare-Continued
17 Defensive Mountain Warfare-Concluded 18 Defense of Rivers and Streams
19 Defense of Rivers and Streams-Continued CONTENTS A. Defense of Swamps
B. Inundations
Defense of Forests
The Cordon
The Key to the Country
Operations on a Flank
Retreat to the Interior of the Country
The People in Amls
Defense of a Theater of Operations
Defense of a Theater of Operations-Continued
Defense of a Theater of Operations-Continued:
Phased Resistance
Defense of a Theater of Operations-Concluded:
Where a Decision Is Not the Objective BOOK SEVEN The Attack
Attack in Relation to Defense
The Nature of Strategic Attack
The Object of the Strategic Attack
The Diminishing Force of the Attack
The Culminating Point of the Attack
Destruction of the Enemy's Forces
The Offensive Battle
River Crossings
Attack on Defensive Positions
Attack on Entrenched Camps
Attack on a Mountainous Area
Attack on Cordons
Maneuver
Attacks on Swamps, Flooded Areas, and Forests CONTENTS 5 Attack on a Theater of War: Seeking a Decision
16 Attack on a Theater of War: Not Seeking a Decision 545 17 Attack on Fortresses 55l i 548 18 Attack on Convoys
19 Attack on an Enemy Armv in Billets 5 57 20 Diversions 5 6 ~ 21 Invasion 565 22 The Culminating Point of Victory 566 BOOK EIGHT W a r Plans
1 Introduction 5 77 2 Absolute War and Real War 5 79 582
3 A. Interdependence of the Elements of W a r
B. Scale of the Military Objective and of the Effort T o Be Made 585
4 Closer Definition of the Military Objective:
The Defeat of the Enemy 5 Closer Definition of the Military Objective-Continued: Limited Aims 6 A. The Effect of the Political Aim on the Military Objective
B. War Is an Instrument of Policy 7 The Limited Aim: Offensive W a r
8 The Limited Aim: Defensive War
9 The Plan of a War designed to Lead to the Total
Defeat of the Enemv A Commentary
A Guide to the Reading of On War
BERNARD l3RODIE Index
ROSALIE WEST 60 1
603
60 5 The reader may wonder why another English translation of Vom Kriege
is needed when two already exist. The first, made by Colonel J. J.
Graham in 1874, was republished in London in 1909. The second, by
Professor 0. J. Matthijs Jolles, appeared in New York in 1943. But
Graham's translation, apart from its dated style, contains a large number of inaccuracies and obscurities; and while Jolles' translation is more
precise, both his version and Graham's were based on German texts that
contained significant alterations from the first edition published in 1832.
The growing interest in Clausewitz's theoretical, political and historical writings in recent years suggested that the time had come for an
entirely new translation. W e have based our work on the first edition of
1832, supplemented by the annotated German text published by Professor Werner Hahlweg in 1952, except where obscurities in the original
edition-which Clausewitz himself never reviewed-made it seem advisable to accept later emendations.
In all but one respect we have followed the original arrangement of
the text. The first edition printed four notes by Clausewitz on his theories, dating from various periods between 1816 and 1830, as introductions to On War itself-a practice adopted by most subsequent German
and foreign editions. W e have abandoned the haphazard arrangement in
which these have always appeared, and instead print them in the order
in which we believe the notes to have been written. Read consecutively
they help to indicate how On W a r took shape in Clausewitz's mind, and
suggest how it might have further developed had he lived to complete it.
W e have also included Marie von Clausewitz's Preface to the first edition
of Clausewitz's posthumous works, which adds information on the genesis of On War, and on the manner in which the manuscript was prepared
for publication. A brief note she inserted at the beginning of the third
volume of Clausewitz's Works, immediately preceding Book Seven of On
War, has been deleted since its primary concern is not with On War but
with other historical and theoretical writings.
W e have attempted to present Clausewitz's ideas as accurately as possible, while remaining as close to his style and vocabulary as modern English usage would permit. But we have not hesitated to translate the same
term in different ways if the context seemed to demand it. For instance,
we have translated Moral and moralische Kraft variously as "morale," EDITORS' NOTE "moral," and "ps~~chological."Clausewitz himself was far from consistent in his terminology, as might be expected of a writer who was less
concerned with establishing a formal system or doctrine than with
achieving understanding and clarity of expression. At times he writes
Geisteskrafte, Seelenkrafte, even Psychologie instead of moralische
Kraft or moralische Grossen, and a similar flexibility characterizes
his use of such terms as "means," "purpose," "engagement," "battle,"
etc. As he writes in Book Five, Chapter Seven: "Strict adherence to
terms would clearly result in little more than pedantic distinctions."
The task of translation was initially undertaken by Mr. Angus
Malcolm, formerly of the British Foreign Office, who to the deep regret
of his many friends died while he was still engaged on the project. He
had however already done much valuable preliminary work, for which
we are greatly in his debt. \Ye should like to thank Mrs. Elsbeth Lewin,
editor of World Politics, and Professor Bernard Brodie of the University
of California at Los Angeles for checking the manuscript and helping us
resolve many ambiguities, and Messrs. Herbert S. Bailey, Jr. and Lewis
Bateman of Princeton University Press for the care they took in preparing the manuscript for publication. Financial assistance by the Center of
International Studies of Princeton University facilitated the early phases
of our work. Finally, it is a pleasure to express our gratitude to Professors
Klaus Knorr of Princeton University and Gordon Craig of Stanford
University, without whose interest and encouragement this task would
never have been undertaken. We have corrected some errors and attempted to remove a few infelicities in
our translation of Clausewitz's text. As in the past, however, we believe that
this work demands translators who combine a deep respect for the author
with the willingness to seek equivalents whenever too close a correspondence
with the original would lead to artificiality.
In the introductory essays, minor changes were made in "The Genesis of
War," and two paragraphs on the Marxist interpretation of Clausewitz were
added to "The Influence of Clausewitz." The only other change from our
original edition is the inclusion of an index, which Mrs. Rosalie West has
compiled on the model of the index in Professor Werner Hahlweg's 1952,
1972, and 1980 German editions of On War.
MICHAEL
HOWARD
Oxford University PETERPARET
Stanford University I N T R O D U C T O R Y ESSAYS By Peter Paret, Michael Howard,
and Bernard Brodie PETER PARET The Genesis of On W/ar Despite its comprehensiveness, systematic approach, and precise style,
On War is not a finished work. That it was never con~pletedto its author's satisfaction is largely explained by his ways of thinking and writing. Clausewitz was in his early twenties when he jotted down his first
thoughts on the nature of military processes and on the place of war in
social and political life. A pronounced sense of reality, skeptical of contemporary assumptions and theories, and an equally undoctrinaire fascination with the past, marked these observations and aphorisms and lent
them a measure of internal consistency; but it would not be inappropriate to regard his writings before 1806 as essentially isolated insightsbuilding-blocks for a structure that had not yet been designed.
The presence of a few of his earliest ideas in On War suggests the consequentiality with which his theories evolved, though in the mature work
these ideas appear as components of a dialectical process that Clausewitz
had mastered in the course of two decades and adapted to his own purposes. An example is his concept of the role genius plays in war, which
lies near the source of his entire theoretical effort. Survivors of a somewhat different kind are his definitions of strategy and tactics, which h e
first formulated when he was twenty-four, or the characteristic all!^ unromantic comparison of war to commercial transactions, dating from the
same time. Most of his early thoughts, however, expanded and acquired
new facets in the years between Napoleon's defeat of Prussia and the
Russian campaign. Clausewitz was a member of the loose alliance of
reform-minded civilians and soldiers who attempted with some success
to modernize Prussian institutions at this time, and his manifold activities as staff officer, administrator, and teacher further stimulated his intellectual interests and his creativity. Numerous passages from memoranda, lectures, and essays written during the reform era reappear, barely
changed, in On War.After 1815, by which time his lnanuscripts on politics, history, philosophy, strategy, and tactics ran into thousands of
pages, Clausewitz set to work on a collection of essays analyzing various
aspects of war, which gradually coalesced into a comprehensive theor).
that sought to define universal, permanent elements in war on the basis
of a realistic interpretation of the present and the past. In the course of PETER PARET a decade, he wrote six of eight planned parts, and drafted the remaining
two. By 1827, however, he had developed a new hypothesis on what he
called the "dual" nature of war, the systematic exploration of which demanded a far-reaching revision of the entire manuscript. H e died before
he could rewrite more than the first chapters of Book One.'
On War thus presents its author's thoughts in various stages of coinpletion. They range from the magnificent opening sequence of logically
unfolding propositions to the rich but at times one-sided or contradictory
discussions of Books Two through Six, to the essayistic chapters of the
last two books, which suggest with brilliant strokes what a final version
might have contained. Nothing can take the place of this unwritten version; but we should remember that Clausewitz's decision in 1827 to revise his manuscript had not implied a rejection of earlier theories-he
only meant to expand and refine them. As we read the present text of On
War, we can at least approximate Clausewitz's intention by keeping his
closely related hypotheses of the dual nature of war and of its political
character clearly in mind. It will be useful, at the end of this discussion,
to return to his ultimate hypotheses and outline their most significant
aspects, the more so since h e never fully developed their implications to
theory.
That, despite the unevenness of its execution, On War offers an essentially consistent theory of conflict is indicative of the creative power of
Clausewitz's method and ideas. Anyone prepared to enter into his man1 Much of the older literature on the different phases of the writing of On War
is based on inadequate sources and can be disregarded. Still valuable today is the
short book by R. v. Caemmerer, Clause~vitz(Berlin, 1905), and the suggestive article
by H. Rosinski, "Die Entwicklung von Clausewitz' Werk 'Vom Kriege' im Lichte
seiner 'Vorreden' und 'Nachrichten,"' Historische Zeitschrift, 151 ( 1 9 3 5 ) ~pp.
278-293, which was amended in important respects by E. Kessel's response "Zur
Entstehungsgeschichte von Clausewitz' Werk vom Kriege," Historische Zeitschrift,
152 (1935), pp. 97-100. W . M. Schering's speculations in his anthology of Clausewitz's writings, Geist und Tat (Stuttgart, 1 9 4 1 ) ~are full of contradictions and
factual errors; but since Schering was familiar with Clausewitz's unpublished drafts
and seems to have been the last scholar to work on them before they disappeared
at the end of the Second World War, his interpretations cannot be ignored. In a
knowledgeable essay "Clausewitz," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. E. M. Earle
(Princeton, 1943), PP. 93-113, H . Rothfels writes (p. 108, n. 65): "Clausewitz
revised Book Eight and parts at least of Book One (probably Chapters One-Three)
and of Book Two (certainly Chapter Two)." But he adds that Clausewitz regarded
only Book One, Chapter One as complete. I believe that Rothfels considerably overstates the extent of Clausewitz's revisions after 1827. He gives no reason for his views
other than internal evidence, but the passage from Book Eight he cites as proof of a
late revision can be found in almost identical form in Clausewitz's manuscript on
strategy of 1804. The best-informed evaluation of the entire question, incorporating
the findings of a century of scholarship, is contained in E. Kessel's brilliant "Zur
Genesis der modernen Kriegslehre," Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 3 ( 195 3 ) ,
"0. 9, pp. 405-423 4 T H E GENESIS OF On War ner of reasoning will grasp his thoughts on the timeless aspects of war.
But our reading of On War can only benefit from an awareness of
its genesis and intellectual context. What political and military experiences
influenced its author? What were the assumptions and theories he reacted
against? What, in his view, were the methodological requirements of sound
analysis? Even a brief consideration of these questions will cast light on
the development of Clausewitz's ideas and on the forms his ideas assumed
in the various strata of On War.z Clausewitz, the son of a retired lieutenant who held a minor post in the
Prussian internal revenue service, first encountered war in 1793 as a
twelve-year-old lance corporal. In the previous year the French legislative assembly had declared war on Austria, with whom Prussia had
recently concluded a defensive alliance. T h e French action was caused
less by considerations of national interest than by internal politics, but
it opened twenty-three years of conflict between revolutionary and later
imperial France and the rest of Europe. Aside from the Duke of Brunswick's initial invasion, which came to a halt at Valmy, the Prussians did
reasonably well in a war to which the): never committed more than part
of their military resources. They defeated the French repeatedly in
Alsace and the Saar, and captured thousands of prisoners; when the
fighting ended in 1795,.they controlled the line of the Rhine. But these
achievements brought no political returns. As inight be expected, the war
with its exertions, bloodshed, and unspectacular outcome made a strong
impression on the young Clausewitz; he himself later wrote of its impact
on his emotions and thought. In the following years, while stationed in
a small provincial garrison, he drew some tentative conclusions from
these early experiences, three of which in particular were to have a lasting influence: There was no single standard of excellence in war. The
rhetoric and policies of the French Republic, which proclaimed the coming of a new age, by no means overpowered the armies of the ancien
rkgime. Mercenaries and forcibly enrolled peasants, led by officers whose
effectiveness still rested as much on aristocratic self-esteem as on professional expertise, proved a match for the levke en masse. On the other
"ny
interpretation of the genesis of Clausewitz's thought on war must rest not
only on his works on military theory and history but also on his extensive writings
on such subjects as education, politics, the theory of art, and on his correspondence.
Especially valuable analyses of aspects of his broad intellectual development are
H. Rothfels' Carl von Clause~vitz:Politik und Krieg (Berlin, 1920), and E. Kessel's
introduction to C. v. Clausewitz, Strategie aus dem jahr 1804 (Hamburg, 1937).
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