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cpsc180bcase - Case #: 1 Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal and...

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Unformatted text preview: Case #: 1 Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal and Mining Company Keywords: Land Stripping Case, Garland Won't Restore for Economic Reasons Plaintiff: Lucille and Willie Peevyhouse Defendant: Garland Coal & Mining Company Location: Supreme Court of Oklahoma Type of Law: Common Law Breach of contract Issue: Garland Coal and Mining Company wishes to strip portion of Peevyhouse land for coal mining. Say they will restore land to its original condition when finished. Garland company strips land, mines for coal, gives Peevyhouse part of profits, and is done. At the end, Garland refuses to restore land to original condition, saying it makes no economic sense. Land is only worth $300 less in stripped condition than it would be worth in restored condition. Would cost $29,000 to restore. Laws Involved: Breach of contract is illegal, damages must be paid. Finding: Plaintiff. Defendant agrees that they breached contract, willing to pay damages in amount of $5,000. Plaintiff appeals, say it is still illegal to breach a contract, want $29,000. Appellate finding for Plaintiff in amount of $300. Reasons for finding: Make up for the difference in value of the land caused by the stripping. Only damage done by Garland is about $300 worth. Precedents Set: Lawyers generally believe that the more economically sound thing is always the right thing. It is OK not to follow through on a contract. Case #: 2a Guardianship of Phillip B Keywords: Afflicted Phillip, "Necessities of Life," Heart Operation Plaintiff: B's suing the state saying they have no right to decide whether or not Phillip gets heart operation Defendant: State Location: Criminal Court of California Type of Law: Common statute says state can step in if child has not been provided with "necessities of life" Issue: Phillip needs a heart operation. State recognizes horrible condition of Phillip's life, the fact that his parents ain't shit, and wish to step in and to declare Phillip a child of the court, so that he can get the operation he needs. In criminal court, unlike in district court, things have to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Appellate court had said in past that parental autonomy is fundamental, but state can step in if it's for the best interest of the child. Laws Involved: Statute says state can step in if child has not been provided with "necessities of life" Finding: For Plaintiff B family. Court says that the fact that the operation is in the child's best interest has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, because there is a 5 to 10% mortality risk in the operation. DECISION IS- NO OPERATION. Reasons for finding: Court says that the fact that the operation is in the child's best interest has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, because there is a 5 to 10% mortality risk in the operation. Precedents Set: None really, just the fact that original parents will usually have the last word in court, no matter how bad the conditions of the child's life. Child's life has to be reeaal fucked up in order for state to take over. Case #: 2b Guardianship of Phillip B Continued Keywords: Afflicted Phillip, "Best Interests of Child," Deadbeat Ass Parents H's were good guys whereas B's, Phillip's original family were the bad guys Plaintiff: B's suing the H's to get their child back Defendant: H's thought they had every right to make Phillip a part of their family Location: Court of Appeal of California Type of Law: Common concerning the best interests of the child Issue: H's wish to take Phillip into their family, and see no problem, as Phillip's original family, the B's don't seem to care about him at all. B's get mad and find out, so the two families take it to court to let judge decide who should get him. (Why is it common law, not statutory). Laws Involved: Statute that whatever is best for the child is what should be done. Common law in that the court must make its own interpretation of this law. Finding: Original judgment for H family. B's appeal so as to prolong process of actually getting Phillip. In appellate court, H family wins again, so gets Phillip. Reasons for finding: Basically because being with the H family is what was best for Phillip. As to the original parents' rights, judge basically find that they surrendered these rights upon abandoning Phillip. Precedents Set: We must always do what is best for the child. Case #: 3 Raffles v. Wichelhaus Keywords: Raffles, Wichelhaus Plaintiff: Raffles Defendant: Wichelhaus Location: Type of Law: Issue: Laws Involved: Finding: Reasons for finding: Precedents Set: Case #: 4 Batsakis v. Demotsis Keywords: Batsakis, Demotsis, Consideration, Was loan of one currency based on another currency a real loan, or more a sale? Plaintiff: George Batsakis Defendant: Eugenia Demotsis Location: Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, El Paso Type of Law: Contract Law- an offer was made by Batsakis and accepted by Demotsis Issue: Batsakis in America loans Demotsis money during WWII. Demotsis was in one of the warring countries, and banks weren't available. The loan is for about $25 American, but Batsakis makes Demotsis sign a contract to pay back $2,000 American in return for the money. Laws Involved: Contract Laws, acceptance of a contract, breach of a contract and grounds of a loan or a sale Finding: For the Plaintiff in the amount of $2,000. Reasons for finding: Court says if Demotsis signed a contract saying she would pay Batsakis $2,000 for $25, she must do it. CONSIDERATION. Court says that the agreement was equal, she got $25 and his willingness to give it to her, so he should get $2,000 for all of that. Court says that it was more of a sale than a loan. A sale with unequal consideration, but which is balanced out by his actions. Apparently, his actions were worth $1,975. Sales don't really consider consideration. Loan instrument was just used as part of a sale. No duress because no force used. Not fraud because she knew it was a legally binding contract. Precedents Set: Stuff about CONSIDERATION. Consideration is madd fuzzy. Basically agreeing to do something BECAUSE OF something else. She would be paying him the $2,000 because of the $25 and his willingness to give the same. For if it were just for the $25, the court would never agree to the plaintiff's $2,000 request. Case #: 4 Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store Keywords: Offer, Acceptance, Contract Plaintiff: Lefkowitz Defendant: Great Minneapolis Surplus Store Location: Supreme Court of Minnesota Type of Law: Contract Law Issue: The store made a claim in an advertisement that they would sell certain items for $1 to the first customer on a certain day. Lefkowitz showed up and was told that there is a house rule that those garments could only be sold to women. Law states that if one offers something in an advertisement in a way in which nothing is left open to negotiation, the advertisement is considered an offer, the acceptance of which constitutes a contract. Laws Involved: Law states that if one offers something in an advertisement in a way in which nothing is left open to negotiation, the advertisement is considered an offer, the acceptance of which constitutes a contract. The offeror, the storeowner in this case, has the right to modify the offer before its acceptance, but can in no way alter the conditions of the offer after it has been accepted Finding: For the Plaintiff in the amount of the stated values of the advertised garments. Reasons for finding: See Laws Involved Precedents Set: None really. An advertisement that leaves nothing to negotiation is considered an offer. One who reads the advertisement and goes to the store with the intention to take advantage of the conditions stated therein is thus accepting said offer, at which time a contract has been made. The offeror has no right to change the conditions of a contract made as such. Case #: 5 Mesaros v. U.S. Keywords: Coins, Mint, Terms of Contract, What constitutes an Offer, Limit of Production as condition of agreement Plaintiff: Mesaros Defendant: U.S. Location: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT Type of Law: Contract Law Issue: Mary and Anthony C. Mesaros and a lot of people got an advertisement in the mail to buy Statue of Liberty coins, their money would be used to renovate the statue and parts of the city. The couple attempted to pay via credit card but the company handling the credit for the U.S. Mint, the Mellon Bank, had much trouble processing the orders, as they were swamped with applications. Coins sold out before the Mesaros' application could be processed. Mesaros figured was breach of contract. Thought they were accepting an offer and thus completing the contract in sending in the order form. Laws Involved: What constitutes completing a contract? Finding: Finding for the U.S. Mint. Reasons for finding: Found that advertisement that Mint sent was an offer to make a offer, not an offer in itself. Said that in sending application back to Mint was making an offer, and was only a contract should the Mint choose to accept. The Mint didn't accept, so no contract was made, therefore no contract to be breached. Precedents Set: Its OK not to come through on an offer if its not totally made into an offer. Case #: 6 Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. v. The Software Link, Inc. Keywords: Shrinkwrap Licenses, ARS, TSL, offer to modify contract Plaintiff: Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. Defendant: The Software Link, Inc. Location: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA Type of Law: Contract Law Issue: ARS buys software from TSL to be used on systems they sell to their own customers. ARS adds the software to their systems and sells them. They get complaints that the software is causing many problems, tell TSL, TSL sends more software to fix. The new software causes more and more problems. Cycle continues, ARS quits and sues. Want compensation for all the trouble they went through repairing the systems and the damages caused to both them and the customers. Products had affixed user agreements that were basically disclaimers for TSL. Affixed label said that upon opening software, one accepts the License Agreement, part of which disclaims TSL for any problems. Laws Involved: Use of a subsequent piece of information as only proposals to modify a contract, not as part of the actual effective contract. Basically contract law and what is classified as part of the contract. Finding: For the Plaintiff Arizona Retail Systems. Reasons for finding: Court says that affixed License Agreements could only be put in effect after software was purchased. As a result of this only being able to be read and accepted after the original contract was given, court says this is merely an offer to modify the contract, not part of the actual contract. Court says that TSL is responsible for all damages. TSL DIDN'T SAY SHIT ON THE OUTSIDE BINDING CUSTOMER TO MATERIAL ON THE INSIDE. Precedents Set: Any documents exchanging hands at a time after the initial contract are only offers to modify the original contract until agreed upon by receiving party Case #: 7 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenburg Keywords: Shrinkwrap Licenses, offer to modify contract, ARBITRAGE legal price discrimination, such as selling air tickets at a higher price to business travelers Plaintiff: ProCD, Inc - Appellant. Defendant: Matthew Zeidenberg and Silken Mountain Web Services, Inc. - Appellees Location: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT Type of Law: Contract Law Issue: Matthew Zeidenburg buys three copies ProCD's product, the SelectPhone, which is a huge phone directory with millions and millions of people. The software is only to be used for non-commercial purposes, as is stated on its shrinkwrap license. Zeidenburg forms Silken Mountain Web Services, Inc. to sell information online for a lower price than that for which ProCD sold it. ProCD sues Zeidenburg. Laws Involved: Zeidenburg says that the Licensing Agreements are ineffective because they are not on the outside of the product. Say that it is also legal to disseminate the two other copies he bought because the agreements in those MAY HAVE been different from those in the first copy. Basically saying its OK for him to open and use all three copies because in all three, agreement was on the inside of the package. Zeidenburg says that putting product on shelf is an offer. His taking it from the shelf was accepting the offer and completing the contract, only on the given circumstances, in other words not agreeing to any hidden conditions, such as those in the box. Finding: For Plaintiff ProCD. Reasons for finding: District court ORIGINALLY AGREES WITH ZEIDENBURG. But Appellate Court says that buying product from shelf is not only accepting the offer and thus completing the contract involved in buying stuff, but is also accepting the offer of following the license agreements that are on the inside of the product. Should you refuse to follow these, there is always an option to take the product back. As Zeidenburg both didn't take it back and didn't follow the license agreement, he broke the law and was ripping off ProCD. Precedents Set: Shrinkwrap agreements must be followed, as buying the product is equivalent to participating in a contract to the effect that one follows the license agreements Case #: 8 Keywords: Hill v. Gateway 2000 Plaintiff: Rich Hill and Enza Hill basically Rich and Enza Defendant: Gateway 2000 Computer Corporation Location: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT Type of Law: Issue: Rich and Enza order a computer, with certain clauses in the user agreement on the inside. Says these clauses and laws govern unless computer is returned in 30 days. They acknowledge the agreement, but don't really read it. Keep the computer for 30 days. Sometime after 30 days, computer messes up. But arbitration clause goes in effect after 30 days, meaning some uninvolved party has to fix the shit, not Gateway. Or, if u want to take Gateway to court, you can't have to go to arbitrators, three random people to decide who is right. Rich and Enza demand that Gateway fix it. Gateway is like fuck yall, we aren't bound anymore. Rich and Enza say that they thought Gateway was because they never read the agreements inside. Argue first that agreements were invalid because not on outside of box, the invalid because not really explicit with arbitration clause, then for a whole lot of other reasons why ProCD shouldn't apply to their case. Laws Involved: Same contract law stuff as ProCD Finding: For Gateway Reasons for finding: After all, they did have the agreement in the box, which apparently said they weren't obligated to pay any damages, and after all, as was seen in the final ProCD decision, buying the product is an agreement to follow the terms outlined on all documents therein. Precedents Set: Again, shrinkwrap agreements must be followed, as buying the product is equivalent to participating in a contract to the effect that one follows the license agreements Case #: 9 Gordon v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hospital Association Keywords: Defamation, letters, conspiracy as group, multiple intentions, LIBEL Plaintiff: C. Ivan Gordon, Appellant former Pathologist of LOH Defendant: Lancaster Osteopathic Hospital Association, Appellee Location: Superior Court of Pennsylvania Type of Law: Defamation Issue: Doctors on board at LOH state that they are completely unconfident in Ivan Gordon and do not with to renew his contract for another year. Gordon alleges that defamation letters and other communications to the Executive Board were written in retaliation for his attempts to improve the quality of medical care provided by LOH. Laws Involved: Finding: Letters are not defamatory. Gordon has no right to employment because no public policy violated. Court agrees with lower court that there was no outrageous conduct, because nothing was that outrageous. Court agrees though, that lower court erred in holding that his complaint in intentional interference with prospective contractual relations was insufficient as a matter of law. Court goes on to agree with rest of counts of conspiracy to interfere with contractual relations, conspiracy to defame and conspiracy in restraint of trade. Reasons for finding: Say letters not defamatory because do not defame him specifically. Letters just say that his conduct has caused them to lose confidence in him, do not go into specifics on conduct. Court holds that communications which may annoy or embarrass a person are not sufficient as a matter of law to create an action in defamation. Court agreed with intentional interference with contractual relations though because letters were obviously sent for this purpose. Court agrees with conspiracy counts basically because group formed against Gordon constitutes a conspiracy (even though LOH claims their defense is based on LOH as a "singular entity") with purposes obviously to destroy Gordon. Precedents Set: Case #: 10 Carl Sagan v. Apple Computer, Inc. Keywords: Defamation, LIBEL Plaintiff: Carl Sagan Defendant: Apple Computer Location: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA Type of Law: Defamation Issue: Apple Computer uses the name, "Carl Sagan," as the name for one of their computers. Had been using this name as a codename for one of their up and coming machines. The real Carl Sagan finds out and asks them to cease use of the name. Apple Ceases use of this name, and uses "Butt-Head Astronomer" instead. Sagan says this is defamation of him as an astronomer, and that this name calling calls for emotional and economic damages Laws Involved: Finding: Defendant's motion to dismiss, motion for a more definite statement, and motion to strike came on regularly for hearing before this Court on June 27, 1994. After reviewing the materials submitted by the parties, argument of counsel, and all other matters presented to the Court, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's motion to dismiss claims six and seven in Plaintiff's complaint is GRANTED, and that Defendant's motions for a more definite statement and to strike are DENIED. Reasons for finding: Defamation claims dismissed because first of all, the name had no connection to the real man anyway. Apple had been using it around the office, and when they came out with advertisements, someone with that name for real just happened to pop up. Second of all, Apple did not directly imply that Sagan was a bad astronomer or discredit his work in any direct way, just thought he was a "Butt-Head Astronomer." Laws of publicity and free speech apply here. Sagan claims laws of privacy, but they have already been cancelled here by laws of free speech and publicity. "Butt-head Astronomer" is not considered libel or defamy here basically because it says nothing about Sagan or his character directly. Motion by Apple to eliminate redundancies in request for economic and emotional damages was denied because these two things are definitely separate. Court deems that these two causes of action state a single cause of action for common law misappropriation. Precedents Set: Can a reasonable factfinder conclude that the statements imply an assertion of fact? Case #: 11 Blumenthal v. Drudge (and AOL) Keywords: Defamation Plaintiff: Sidney Blumenthal and Jacqueline Jordan Blumenthal Defendant: Matt Drudge and America Online, Inc. Location: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Type of Law: Defamation Issue: Matt Drudge publishes a political gossip section known as the Drudge report for Wired magazine. Licensing with Wired expires, so Drudge signs one year deal with AOL, agreeing to publish it for AOL customers and to follow AOL's Terms of Service agreements. Drudge publishes story in his "Drudge Report" saying that assistant to the President, Sidney Blumenthal, in the past, has been convicted of beating his wife. He says that Democrat enemies would bring this out were the Democratic Party to attack them. Gets a letter from defendant, prints a retraction in the next section. Laws Involved: Finding: AOL'S motion to dismiss all charges ACCEPTED. Drudge's motion to dismiss on grounds of lack of jurisdiction was DENIED. Reasons for finding: The COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT OF 1996 says that no provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider, AOL in this case is a mere provider. Some would say they and Drudge are dual providers, but nothing provides for this in the Act, because saying this would mean that AOL is always on the lookout for bad content. This would make AOL have to work too hard and charge and restrict too much. Drudge's motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction was thrown out because it was found that, through travel to Washington DC and his making at least $250 from the residents there, he had sufficient enough contact with the district to be considered under the laws there. Precedents Set: Case #: 12 Keywords: Zeran v. America Online, Inc. Plaintiff: Kenneth M. Zeran Defendant: America Online, Inc. Location: Type of Law: Liability for the Conduct of Others Issue: Some anonymous person used his Kenneth Zeran's name and phone number to advertise tshirts glorifying the bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Building. Zeran received many threatening and nasty phone calls concerning the ad, as expected. He tells AOL about it and they remove the advertisement, thought print no retraction. He wants to sue AOL for allowing such a thing to happen. Zeran had a business which he operated from his home and home phone, so could not change the number. New notices went on being put up after other ones were taken down. Radio station gets hold of advertisement, broadcasts to everyone to call this dude and give him a piece of your mind. He was forced to take the harassment for business purposes. He is suing AOL for negligence in handling the whole situation. Laws Involved: Communications Decency act of 1996 that would give AOL immunity as it was not the information provider and as it was the immune "internet provider" described therein. Court says that this law doesn't even apply to his claim though. ALSO, simple laws that in cases such as this where nothing is left to guess, and all of the facts are given, things are seen in the light of the non-moving party, or the defendant (Zeran would lose). Congressional (Supreme Court) Law can only supercede State law when this ability is expressly stated in the law. This is not the case for the Communications Decency act of 1996. QUESTION: Does imposing the State's law that it is illegal to distribute material one knows is libelous go against the Federal Law (CDA), which basically states that AOL is not the publisher and is thus not responsible for what it distributes??? Tacket v. GM finds that failure to remove content that one knows is libelous or defamatory is considered publishing such material. Internet providers subjected to distributor liability are thus less likely to undertake any editing or blocking efforts because such efforts can provide the basis for liability. Finding: For the defendant, America Online Company Reasons for finding: AOL followed the procedures described in the Communications Decency act of 1996, and was held to the rules therein. These rules and procedures preempted any State Laws on liability, saying that the provider or distributor was only liable if he knew or had reason to know about the libelous or defamatory materials he was distributing. Precedents Set: See reasons for finding, preemptions of State Law by Constitutional Law. Case #: 12 Keywords: Smith v. California Plaintiff: Smith, bookstore proprietor Defendant: State of California for the actions of its courts Location: SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Type of Law: Liability for the Conduct of Others Issue: Smith was convicted in a California Municipal court for having obscene books in a place in which books are for sale. Laws Involved: California State Law that one cannot have obscene books in his bookstore in California, no matter whether or not he knew of the presence or contents of said book. Finding: Supreme Court finds for the Plaintiff, Smith. Thus, two previous decisions by the California Municipal Court and the Appellate court were reversed. Reasons for finding: The ordinance, though aimed at obscene matter, had, because not requiring scienter on the part of the bookseller, such a tendency to inhibit constitutionally protected expression that it could not stand under the Federal Constitution. Goes against laws of free speech and free press. Said California Courts were wrong because they threw out the case without even considering common Constitutional Law, thus breaking the law in not giving him due process. They say that he had no need to screen what he sold as a result of laws for free press. Constitutional Law preempts State Law. Also, the trial judge turned aside every attempt by appellant to introduce evidence bearing on community standards, which had the effect of depriving appellant of the opportunity to offer any proof on a constitutionally relevant issue. On this ground I would reverse the judgment below, and remand the case for a new trial. Precedents Set: Case #: 13 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc. Keywords: Everything about Copyrightability, Copyrightability of FACT, sufficient originality warranting copyrightability, ORINGINALITY Plaintiff: FEIST PUBLICATIONS, INC Defendant: RURAL TELEPHONE SERVICE CO., INC. Location: SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Type of Law: Copyright Issue: Rural Telephone publishes a phone book. Feist Publishing asks if they can get information from this phone book to make a phonebook covering a larger area, says they will pay Rural for the copyrights. Rural refuses the request. Feist uses the information anyway. Rural says this is copyright infringement and sues Feist for damages. US District Court of Kansas gives Rural summary judgement for damages, holding that courts in the past have always said that phone book information IS IN FACT copyrightable. Appellate court agrees too. Feist publications disagrees, sues in d Laws Involved: Finding: Alphabetical listings of names, accompanied by towns and telephone numbers, in telephone book white pages held not copyrightable; thus, nonconsensual copying of listings held not to infringe on copyright. Reasons for finding: Supreme Court reverses other decisions saying that the information taken was not original to the telephone company. The only original material in the book is foreword and cover and things that the company actually made. The information was not stuff that they had made up, it wasn't artistic or anything. The telephone company has not selected, coordinated, or arranged these uncopyrightable facts in an original way sufficient to satisfy the minimum standards for copyright protection. This being so, the information was not copyrightable, so the telephone company had no right to protect the information in their book. The information was simple fact, not a creation of any one person's mind. The court decided that the refusal was motivated by an unlawful purpose "to extend its monopoly in telephone service to a monopoly in yellow pages advertising." Rural said Feist could go door to door to get numbers, Feist contends this is not economical, and we know court always thinks of economy. Precedents Set: FACTS ARE NOT COPYRIGHTABLE!!!!!!!!!!!! Unless a sufficient amount of originality is shown. Aim of copyright is for advancement, so it's ok to use another person's labor without compensation. Case #: 14 Walt Disney Productions v. The Air Pirates Keywords: Copyrights, Parody, Infringement, Parody + Infringement relationship Plaintiff: WALT DISNEY PRODUCTIONS, Appellee Defendant: The AIR PIRATES, Appellants. Owners of a comic book company Location: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, NINTH CIRCUIT Type of Law: Copyright Issue: Defendant used certain Disney cartoon characters in a comic book actually spoofing Disney shows. The comic books contained Disney screenshots or photos with speech balloons for each character. While Disney sought only to foster "an image of innocent delightfulness," defendants supposedly sought to convey an allegorical message of significance. The essence of defendants' argument is that characters are never copyrightable and therefore cannot in any way constitute a copyrightable component part. Defendants don't claim they didn't infringe, instead claim that this infringement should be excused through the application of the fair use defense, since it purportedly is a parody of Disney's cartoons. Defendants proceed on the assumption that comparing their characters with plaintiff's involves a comparison not only of the physical image but also of the character's personality, pattern of speech, abilities, and other traits. Apparently this issue has not been addressed previously, and neither position is without merit. Laws Involved: Copyright is to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. Unfair Competition, trade disparagement and interference with business Finding: Find for Plaintiff on copyright Infringement. Defendant is guilty Reasons for finding: Defendant took more than was needed for Parody, and more than was allowed to avoid infringement charges. Court left unfair competition, trade disparagement and business interference alone, because its Disney. Who the fuck is interfering with Disney's sales? Precedents Set: DON'T TAKE MORE THAN NEEDED FOR PARODY. COURT WILL NOT FIND FOR YOU IF THEY DON'T FIND YOUR ACTIONS FUNNY. AIR PIRATES SHIT WAS JUST WEAK Case #: 15 Keywords: Sega Enterprises, Ltd. V. Accolade, Inc. Plaintiff: SEGA ENTERPRISES LTD., a Japanese corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee Defendant: ACCOLADE, INC., a California corporation, Defendant-Appellant Location: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT Type of Law: Copyright Issue: Sega licenses its copyrighted computer code and its "SEGA" trademark to a number of independent developers of computer game software. Those licensees develop and sell Genesiscompatible video games in competition with Sega. Accolade is not and never has been a licensee of Sega. Prior to rendering its own games compatible with the Genesis console, Accolade explored the possibility of entering into a licensing agreement with Sega, but abandoned the effort because the agreement would have required that Sega be the exclusive manufacturer of all games produced by Accolade. Accolade used a two-step process to render its video games compatible [*5] with the Genesis console. First, it "reverse engineered" Sega's video game programs in order to discover the requirements for compatibility with the Genesis console. As part of the reverse engineering process, Accolade transformed the machine-readable object code contained in commercially available copies of Sega's game cartridges into human-readable source code using a process called "disassembly" or "decompilation". n2 Accolade purchased a Genesis console and three Sega game cartridges, wired a decompiler into the console circuitry, and generated printouts of the resulting source code. Accolade engineers studied and annotated the printouts in order to identify areas of commonality among the three game programs. They then loaded the disassembled code back into a computer, and experimented to discover the interface specifications for the Genesis console by modifying the programs and studying the results. At the end of the reverse engineering process, Accolade created a development manual that incorporated the information it had discovered about the requirements for a Genesiscompatible game. According to the Accolade employees who created the manual, the manual contained only functional [*6] descriptions of the interface requirements and did not include any of Sega's code. Genesis changes system to detect fakes, Accolade copies some Genesis code into its games so they will work with new Genesis. Sega files suit against Accolade alleging trademark infringement and false designation of origin. Accolade next contends that disassembly of computer [*22] object code does not violate the Copyright Act because it is necessary in order to gain access to the ideas and functional concepts embodied in the code, which are not protected by copyright. Say that gaining understanding can't be copyright violation Laws Involved: Copyright Infringment with a little bit of trademark stuff Finding: Nothing changes, nobody wins Reasons for finding: Court says that Accolade has good point about understanding code, and that the games they made didn't resemble Genesis' games at all, so everything was fine. No competition. Case #: 16 Keywords: Lone Ranger Television, Inc. v. Program Radio Corporation Plaintiff: LONE RANGER TELEVISION, INC., a corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee Defendant: PROGRAM RADIO CORPORATION, a California corporation, JL PRODUCTIONS, INC., a business entity, and WESTON E. LEWIS, JR. aka JIM LEWIS, Defendants-Appellants Location: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT Type of Law: Copyright Infringement Issue: Around 1953, a Michigan company called The Lone Ranger, Incorporated owned 15 copyrighted scripts from the radio show, the Lone Ranger. It made copies of these on a magnetic tape, then sold the originals and their copyrights to a company of the same name in California. New company merges with Wrather, which joins Lone Ranger TV. Copyrights still good. Throughout copyright history, always been a licensing agreement saying its OK to lease the copyright to those who lease the scripts. Charles Michelson had this license. Random dude Jim Lewis gets copies of the programs from collectors and leases them out to his own radio companies. Lone Ranger TV sues them. District Court grants judgment to Lone Ranger TV. Lone Ranger TV did not have copyrights to the tapes though, only to the scripts. 1909 Law gives copyright holder right to all derivatives of his work though. Audio version being sold was a "derivative work" being sold for someone else's profit without permission, so does count as infringement. Laws Involved: Copyright Act of 1909. 1909 because that was what was in effect when Lone Ranger Actually came on. Unfair Competition. Finding: Given the history of this litigation, the appellate court cannot say the district court clearly erred in finding bad faith in the methods Program Radio's counsel used to prosecute its motion. "While the presence of merit in a claim or defense may well negate any notion of bad faith in its filing it certainly cannot justify abuse of the judicial process in the methodology of its prosecution." Reasons for finding: Audio version being sold was a "derivative work" being sold for someone's profit, so does count as infringement. As Russell makes clear, the protection of derivative rights extends beyond mere protection against unauthorized copying to include the right to "make other versions of, perform or exhibit the work." Precedents Set: Case #: 17 Keywords: RealNetworks v. Streambox Plaintiff: RealNetworks Defendant: Streambox Location: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON Type of Law: Copyrights Issue: RealNetworks claims that Defendant Streambox has violated provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act by distributing and marketing products known as the Streambox VCR and the Ripper. RealNetworks also contends that another Streambox product, known as the Ferret, is unlawfully designed to permit consumers to make unauthorized modifications to a software program on which RealNetworks holds the copyright. RealNetworks has software allowing customers to Stream certain material (ability to only stream enacted by a Copy Switch). They make software for other companies to allow people to listen or watch their material without illegal downloading or copying. These companies say that if RealNetworks' products could be circumvented, then the companies would most likely not put their VCR allows users to pass by companies' wishes and to download materials that the company does not want downloadable. Streambox ripper allows users to switch between RealMedia and mp3, wav, etc. Ferret allows users to use Streambox instead of Real's company Snap to search for music, which takes away from Snap's customer base and ad money. To download stuff, one must show or fake "Secret Handshake" created by Real for Real. Streambox claims the "effective" protection offered by the DMCA is lacking because an enterprising end-user could potentially use other means to record streaming audio content as it is played by the end-user's computer speakers. This argument fails because the Copy Switch, in the ordinary course of its operation when it is on, restricts and limits the ability of people to make perfect digital copies of a copyrighted work. Laws Involved: Finding: ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Reasons for finding: The DMCA prohibits the manufacture, import, offer to the public, or trafficking in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof that: (1) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a technological measure that effectively "controls access to" a copyrighted work or "protects a right of a copyright owner;" (2) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent such technological protection measures; or (3) is marketed for use in circumventing such technological protection measures (Secret Handshake and Copy Switch). WOULD MAKE MADD PEOPLE LOSE MONEY OFF ADVERTISEMENTS AND SELLING OF THE MATERIAL basically. Precedents Set: CAN'T MAKE THINGS THAT WILL HELP OTHER PEOPLE INFRINGE ON A COMPANY'S COPYRIGHTS. ABILITY TO CIRCUMVENT REAL'S COPYRIGHTS IS WHAT MADE STREAMBOX SHIT ILLEGITIMATE. Case #: 18 Keywords: New York Times Company, et. Al v. Jonathan Tasini, et. al Plaintiff: Jonathan New York Times Company, et. al Defendant: Jonathan Tasini, et. Al Location: SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Type of Law: Copyright Issue: Freelance authors submit articles to the New York Times. Authors had gotten copyrights for the articles. New York Times allows a publisher of a web-page to post these articles for anyone to see. Take it to district court, who finds for New York Times saying that electronic version was revision of a former compilation, so OK. Appellate court finds for freelancers, saying that articles were not part of any type of compilation covered by Copyright Law, and were not part of any sort of revision. Laws Involved: Finding: Reproduction of freelance authors' magazine and newspaper articles in computer databases, without authors' permission, held to infringe authors' copyrights and not to be privileged Reasons for finding: Court holds that (1) the electronic publishers infringed the freelancers' copyrights by reproducing and distributing the freelancers' articles in a manner not authorized by the freelancers and not privileged by 201(c), and (2) the print publishers infringed the freelancers' copyrights by authorizing the electronic publishers to place the articles in the databases and by aiding the electronic publishers in that endeavor. Precedents Set: HAVE TO CHANGE SHIT TO CALL IT A REVISION NUMBER ONE. NUMBER TWO, JUST BECAUSE IT'S A REVISION OF SOME SHIT YOU DID THAT INCLUDED MATERIAL SOMEBODY ELSE HAS THE COPYRIGHT TO, DOESN'T MEAN YOU DON'T HAVE TO STILL HONOR THE INDIVIDUAL COPYRIGHT OF THE PERSON. Case #: 19 Keywords: Greenberg v. National Geographic Society Plaintiff: Jerry GREENBERG, Idaz Greenberg, Plaintiffs-Appellants Defendant: NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC SOCIETY, a District of Columbia Corporation, National Geographic Enterprises, Inc., a corporation, Mindscape, Inc., a California corporation, Defendants-Appellees Location: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT Type of Law: Copyright Law Issue: Jeery Greenberg takes pictures for national Geographic. For first set (1962) National Geographic returns all copyrights to Jerry. For second set (1990) Netional Geographic only claims copyrights for 60 days, then after 60-day period the rights are Jerry's again. National Geographic asks Mindscape to make a compilation (CNG) of all issues for them in 1996 (30 cds, crazy). Compilation just happens to have some of Greenberg's pics in it. Society says they have right to the pics because they owned the copyrights to the magazines the pics were in because when the magazine was published, Nat'l G owned the rights. Nat'l G says it should be OK because final work is compilation, which THEY would own the copyright to by Copyright Act of '62. Whether the CNG is considered a "joint work" or a "collective work" makes no difference in our analysis because under each definition, a work results that is copyrightable as an entity separate and distinct from its constituent, pre-existing, separately copyrightable contributions Laws Involved: Copyright Act of 1962 Finding: For Plaintiff Reasons for finding: APPELLATE FINDS FOR PLAINTIFF. In this copyright infringement case, the district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that the allegedly infringing work was a revision of a prior collective work that fell within the defendants' privilege under 201(c). Because we find that the defendants' product is not merely a revision of the prior collective work but instead constitutes a new collective work that lies beyond the scope of 201(c), Court REVERSES Precedents Set: HAVE TO CHANGE SHIT TO CALL IT A REVISION NUMBER ONE. NUMBER TWO, JUST BECAUSE IT'S A REVISION OF SOME SHIT YOU DID THAT INCLUDED MATERIAL SOMEBODY ELSE HAS THE COPYRIGHT TO, DOESN'T MEAN YOU DON'T HAVE TO STILL HONOR THE INDIVIDUAL COPYRIGHT OF THE PERSON. Case #: 10 Keywords: Coca-Cola Bottling Company, Ltd. v. Coca-Cola Company Plaintiff: Coca-Cola Bottling Company, Ltd Defendant: Coca-Cola Company Location: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE Type of Law: Trade Secrets Issue: The formula for Merchandise 7X, the secret formula for Coca-Cola has been tightly guarded since Coca-Cola was first invented and is known by only two persons within The CocaCola Company. Coca-Cola bottling claims that it wants the secret formula for Diet Coke because it feels that oca-Cola Company owes it that for breach of contract and some other shit. Coca-Cola says that this would hurt the company. Court has to decide whether the Company is liable enough for stuff that it has to give up the recipe. Coca-Cola Company sells syrup to bottlers who add carbonated water and sell it. The two parties have contracts (1921) with each other about the price of the syrup, will go up and down with price of sugar. Sales drop so 90% of bottlers agree ro amend contract to consider "sugar element," which is a new sugar. Bottling company wants recipes for proof that the two syrups are different, to see why Coca-Cola is charging two different prices or some shit. Laws Involved: Trade secret laws, how important it is to know whether or not the two sodas are the same Finding: For Plaintiff, Coca-Cola company must release the recipes Reasons for finding: It has been held that defendant must disclose its complete formulae, including secret ingredients, for diet Coke, old Coke, new Coke, caffeine free Coke, and certain experimental low calorie colas, but not the formulae for TAB and caffeine free diet Coke. In addition, it has been held that defendant must disclose certain taste test results. Given the proprietary nature of the formula information, however, a more stringent protective order than the one currently in effect is warranted to prevent public disclosure of the formulae. For example, it may be advisable to limit [**40] the disclosure of the formulae to plaintiffs' trial counsel and independent experts. For example, if tests show that more consumers can detect differences between caffeine free Coke and Coke than can detect differences between diet Coke and Coke, that fact, coupled with Dr. Amon's testimony, would tend to show that diet Coke is the same product as Coke. This relevance and necessity outweighs the slight harm that would result if these test results were disclosed. Precedents Set: None really, was just some case by case shit. IF YOU ARE GOING TO CHANGE THE PRICE AND SAY THE PRODUCT IS DIFFERENT, YOU NEED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, MAY JUST NEED TO RELEASE TRADE SECRETS. Case #: 20 Keywords: MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc Plaintiff: MAI SYSTEMS CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee Defendant: PEAK COMPUTER, INC., a California corporation; VINCENT CHIECHI, an individual; ERIC FRANCIS, an individual, Defendants-Appellants Location: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT Type of Law: Trade Secrets Issue: MAI makes computers and operating systems. Peak Computer maintains MAI computers for a lot of its customers. Not contracted with MAI though. Four employees go from MAI to Peak, at which time a lot of MAI's customers switch to Peak. MAI sues Peak for many things, one of which is misappropriation of trade secrets. I deserve b Laws Involved: Trade Secret Laws about employees jumping ship but still working with old firm's stuff. Finding: For PLAINTIFF on counts concerning the Customer Databases and the Field Information Bulletins. But for DEFENDANT concerning software. However, defendance PEAK CANNOT FUCK WITH MAI'S COMPUTERS AT ALL ANYMORE, must surrender all customers. Reasons for finding: Employees took Customer Databases with them, which court considers trade secrets. Court agrees that the Field Information Bulletins (FIBs) \ constitute trade secrets. It is uncontroverted that they contain technical data developed by MAI to aid in the repair and servicing of MAI computers, and that MAI has taken reasonable steps to insure that the FIBs are not generally known to the public. Court recognizes that computer software can qualify for trade secret protection under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. However, a plaintiff who seeks relief for misappropriation of trade secrets must identify the trade secrets and carry the burden of showing that they exist. Here, while MAI asserts that it has trade secrets in its diagnostic software and operating system, and that its licensing agreements constitute reasonable efforts to maintain their secrecy, MAI does not specifically identify [**32] these trade secrets. MUST IDENTIFY WHAT THE SECRETS ARE OR CONCERN IN ORDER TO GET DAMAGES. Precedents Set: MUST IDENTIFY WHAT THE SECRETS ARE OR CONCERN IN ORDER TO GET DAMAGES. NO ASSUMPTIONS TAKEN IN TRADE SECRETS CASES. Case #: 21 Keywords: Jordache Enterprises v. Hogg Wyld Ltd. Plaintiff: Jordache Enterprises, Inc., Appellant Defendant: Hogg Wyld, Ltd., Susan Duran, Marsha Stafford and Oink, Inc., Appellees Location: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Type of Law: Trademark Issue: This case, a trademark infringement action brought against a manufacturer that identifies its blue jeans for larger women with a smiling pig and the word "Lardashe" on the seat of the pants, reminds us that "you can't make a silk purse out of a sow's ear." Appellant Jordache Enterprises, Inc., alleges error in a district court decision finding no likelihood of confusion between the Jordache and Lardashe trademarks and finding no violation of New Mexico's antidilution statute. Independent company of two women advertises jeans as Lardashe, saying that the name stemmed from one of the women's childhood nicknames. Laws Involved: The Lanham Act prohibits the unauthorized use of a reproduction, copy, or imitation of a registered trademark in a way that "is likely to cause confusion" with the registered mark. Finding: Reasons for finding: The DISTRICT court found that the Jordache mark and the Lardashe mark are not confusingly similar. Trademarks may be confusingly similar if they suggest the same idea or meaning. This argument mischaracterizes the findings of the district court. The court found the words "Jordache" and "Lardashe" similar, but not the horse and pig designs. DISTRICT court says that Lardashe was more to make fun of Jordache than to take their sales. Doesn't count. Jordache also raises a claim under New Mexico's antidilution statute which provides likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a trademark or trade name is a ground for injunctive relief notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of goods or services. In the present case, the district court found that "because of the parody aspect of Lardashe, it is not likely that public identification of JORDACHE with the plaintiff will be eroded. COURT SAYS THAT THERE IS NOT ENOUGH CONFUSION, SO BECAUSE PEOPLE WOULDN'T THINK LARDASHE WAS ASSOCIATED WITH JORDACHE, JORDACHE'S IMAGE COULD NOT BE TARNISHED THEREBY. Precedents Set: CAN'T SAY THAT IT IS TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT IF THERE WOULD NOT BE SIGNIFICANT CONFUSION, OR IF IT DOESN'T HAVE ANY EFFECT AT ALL ON THE SALES OF YOUR PRODUCT. This was a close one. Case #: 21 Keywords: Lucasfilm v. High Frontier Plaintiff: LUCASFILM LTD., Plaintiff Defendant: HIGH FRONTIER, ET AL. , COMMITTEE FOR A STRONG, PEACEFUL AMERICA, ET AL. Location: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Type of Law: Trademark Issue: George Lucas comes up with idea of Star Wars, comes out with 3 movies. Many political leaders and everybody label Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) "Star Wars." Both defendants use this term to talk about SDI in public and on the news and in the media. Except for their viewpoint, defendants' television messages are similar; both focus on a child's response to space defenses against a nuclear attack. Plaintiff wishes only to protect its business interest in the STAR WARS trademark. Plaintiff fears that associating STAR WARS with this political controversy will injure the valuable goodwill it has achieved. Plaintiff seeks to enjoin defendants' use of the phrase star wars alleging trademark infringement, unfair competition, misappropriation, disparagement and a number of other similar business torts. Plaintiff has no property right in the use of words commonly found in the English language. Only has right for purposes to compete with products sold by trademark owner. No competition here. Laws Involved: A trademark is not property in the ordinary sense, but only a word or symbol indicating the origin of a commercial product. The owner of a mark acquires the right to prevent the goods to which the mark is applied from being confused with those of others and to prevent his own trade from being diverted to competitors through their use of misleading marks. There are no rights in a trademark beyond these. The purpose of trademark regulation is to prevent unfair competition and protect consumers from fraud and deception. Finding: For defendant Reasons for finding: Star Wars are common words. Can't reserve rights for public discourse, words not used for competition. Precedents Set: CAN'T SAY THAT IT IS TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT IF THEY ARE USING YOUR SHIT IN COMMON CONVERSATION, OR IF IT DOESN'T HAVE ANY EFFECT AT ALL TO THE SALES OF YOUR PRODUCT. Case #: 22 Keywords: Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Plaintiff: PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES, INC., Plaintiff Defendant: NETSCAPE COMMUNICATIONS CORP. , EXCITE, INC. Location: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, SOUTHERN DIVISION Type of Law: Trademark Issue: Netscape has search engine provided by Excite. With certain words come search results and related advertisements. Plaintiff has a trademark on "Playboy(R)" and "Playmate(R)." Plaintiff contends that defendants are infringing and diluting its trademarks (1) by marketing and selling the group of over 450 words, including "playboy" and "playmate," to advertisers, (2) by programming the banner ads to run in response [**4] to the search terms "playboy" and "playmate" (i.e., "keying"), and (3) by actually displaying the banner ad on the search results page. As a result, plaintiff contends, Internet users are diverted from plaintiff's official web site and web sites sponsored or approved by plaintiff, which generally will be listed as search results, to other adult entertainment web sites. Plaintiff further argues that defendants intend to divert the users to the non-PEI sites. Plaintiff does not contend, however, that defendants infringe or dilute the marks when defendants' search engines generate a list of Web sites related to "playboy" or "playmate." Laws Involved: As English words, "playboy" and "playmate" cannot be said to suggest sponsorship or endorsement of either the web sites that appear as search results (as in Brookfield) or the banner ads that adorn the search results page. Finding: Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's motion is denied. The Court hereby adopts and issues the parties' proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, as modified, appended hereto. The Court grants defendants' Request for Judicial Notice. Reasons for finding: Can't call infringement on words, court says that customers would not be steered away from Playboy if that's what they were searching for. Precedents Set: None really, just because a search engine brings up certain things when people put in certain words, it does not mean that the trademarks associated with the words people may use are being sold to the companies advertised when these words are entered. Case #: 23 Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen Plaintiff: PANAVISION INTERNATIONAL, L.P., a Delaware Limited Partnership, Appellee Defendant: DENNIS TOEPPEN; NETWORK SOLUTIONS, INC., a District of Columbia Corporation, Defendants-Appellants Location: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT Type of Law: Trademark Issue: Panavision accuses Dennis Toeppen of being a "cyber pirate" who steals valuable trademarks and establishes domain names on the Internet using these trademarks to sell the domain names to the rightful trademark owners. Toeppen appeals. He argues that the district court erred in exercising personal jurisdiction over him because any contact he had with California was insignificant, emanating solely from his registration of domain names on the Internet, which he did in Illinois. Toeppen further argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because his use of Panavision's trademarks on the Internet was not a commercial use and did not dilute those marks. Laws Involved: Domain name registration with NSI, must make sure (1) the applicant's statements are true and the applicant has the right to use the requested domain name; (2) the "use or registration of the domain name . . . does not interfere with or infringe the rights of any third party in any jurisdiction with respect to [**5] trademark, service mark, trade name, company name or any other intellectual property right"; and (3) the applicant is not seeking to use the domain name for any unlawful purpose, including unfair competition. Toeppen purposefully registered Panavision's trademarks as his domain names on the Internet to force Panavision to pay him money. Finding: Affirm district court's decision for Panavision. Toeppen engaged in a scheme to register Panavision's trademarks as his domain names on the Internet and then to extort money from Panavision by trading on the value of those names. Toeppen's actions were aimed at Panavision in California and the brunt of the harm was felt in California. The district court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over Toeppen. We also affirm the district court's summary judgment in favor of Panavision under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(c), and the California [**35] Anti-dilution statute, Cal.Bus. & Prof. Code 14330. Toeppen made commercial use of Panavision's trademarks and his conduct diluted those marks. Reasons for finding: Toeppen engaged in a scheme to register Panavision's trademarks as his domain names for the purpose of extorting money from Panavision. His conduct, as he knew it likely would, had the effect of injuring Panavision in California where Panavision has its principal place of business and where the movie and television industry is centered. Under the "effects test," the purposeful availment requirement necessary for specific, personal jurisdiction is satisfied. Toeppen did considerably more than simply register Panavision's trademarks as his domain names on the Internet. He registered those names as part of a scheme to obtain money from Panavision. Pursuant to that scheme, he demanded $ 13,000 from Panavision to release the domain names to it. Toeppen made commercial use of Panavision's trademarks and his conduct diluted those marks. Precedents: CAN'T BUY DOMAIN NAMES FOR EXTORTION!!! Case #: 24 Keywords: Plaintiff: Katz Katz v. US. Defendant: UNITED STATES Location: SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Type of Law: Legal Primer IV: Right of Privacy Issue: Petitioner was convicted under an indictment charging him with transmitting wagering information by telephone across state lines in violation of 18 U. S. C. 1084. Evidence of petitioner's end of the conversations, overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the telephone booth from which the calls were made, was introduced at the trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that there was no Fourth Amendment violation since there was "no physical entrance into the area occupied by" petitioner. Laws Involved: Right of privacy. Basically, it was illegal for court to use information that only one inside the booth would have, as doing so would make it as if they were inside the booth, which is an invasion of privacy Finding: FOR KATZ. Defendant was convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California of transmitting wagering information by telephone. At trial the government was permitted, over the defendant's objection, to introduce evidence of his end of telephone conversations, overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public telephone booth from which he placed his calls. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. On certiorari, the SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES REVERSED. In an opinion by Stewart, J., expressing the views of seven members of the court, it was held that antecedent judicial authorization, not given in the instant case, was a constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance involved. Reasons for finding: The government's activities in attaching an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of a public telephone booth from which a suspect placed his calls constitutes a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The Government stresses the fact that the telephone booth from which the petitioner made his calls was constructed partly of glass, so that he was as visible after he entered it as he would have been if he had remained outside. But what he sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not the intruding eye -- it was the uninvited ear. we have expressly held that the Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements, overheard without any "technical trespass under . . . local property law." Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511. Once this much is acknowledged, and once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people -- and not simply "areas" -- against unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure. Precedents Set: If device can give you specific information about goings-on of inside the place, is invasion of privacy. Device hear was a bug that let them know what happened INSIDE booth. Case #: 25 Keywords: California v. Greenwood Plaintiff: State of California Defendant: Greenwood Location: SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Type of Law: Right of Privacy Issue: Police investigator suspects Greenwood of selling drugs. Tells the trash man to give the police officer all of Greenwood's trash. Police officer finds drug paraphernalia in the trash, gets a search warrant for Greenwood's home, finds drugs, and arrests Greenwood. District court says that seizure of trash is impermissible because under state precedent such a warrantless trash search violates the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and similar provisions of the state constitution, and the police would not have had probable cause to search the home without the evidence obtained from the trash searches. Have to find Greenwood innocent. Appellate court says same, because federal law was violated law. Only Federal government can intervene. Federal government says use of trash was OK, because trash was left outside the house, basically was stuff from Greenwood handed over to the public. Laws Involved: although the accused may not have expected that the contents of their garbage bags would become known to the public, such a search violates the Fourth Amendment only if the accused have manifested a subjective expectation of privacy that society accepts as objectively reasonable. Finding: For the State of California. It was OK to go through the trash outside Greenwood's house Reasons for finding: It was OK to go through Greenwood's trash because he sat it outside expecting no sort of privacy. He got no privacy, which is exactly what he expected. Even though new California amendment said that it was illegal to suppress the use of evidence (was OK to use evidence) that was obtained supporting state law, but not federal law, they said that this was OK because though it violated the state law about warrantless trash seizure, it didn't violate the fourth amendment, nor the new state amendment. Precedents Set: If you let out certain information or evidence in a means accessible to the public, expecting no sort of privacy, the police can use it as fair evidence against you. Case #: 26 KYLLO v. UNITED STATES Keywords: Weed grower, heat from roof monitored by thermal imaging device Plaintiff: DANNY LEE KYLLO Defendant: UNITED STATES Location: SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Type of Law: Right of Privacy Issue: On the basis of a suspicion that marijuana was being grown inside a home, an agent of the US department of the interior used a thermal imaging device to scan a dude's home from the front and back. Saw that it was really hot at the top, so got a warrant, went in, and arrested the dude. Dude was convicted on weed-growing charges. After the United States District Court for the District of Oregon denied the homeowner's motion to suppress the seized evidence, the homeowner entered a conditional guilty plea. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the homeowner's conviction and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing regarding the intrusiveness of thermal imaging. On remand, the District Court upheld the validity of the warrant and reaffirmed the denial of the motion to suppress, finding that the particular device used (1) was a non-intrusive device which emitted no rays or beams, (2) showed a crude visual image of the heat being radiated from the outside of the house, (3) did not show any people or activity within the walls of the structure, (4) could not penetrate walls or windows to reveal conversations or human activities, and (5) did not allow observation of intimate details of the home. Laws Involved: Finding: For the United States Reasons for finding: The Supreme Court holds that a warrantless use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a private home from a public street to detect relative amounts of heat within the home was an unlawful search within the meaning of the Federal Constitution's Fourth Amendment. Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that (1) the homeowner had shown no subjective expectation of privacy, as he had made no attempt to conceal the heat escaping from his home; and (2) there was no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy, because the thermal imaging device did not expose any intimate details of the homeowner's life, but rather only amorphous hot spots on the roof and exterior wall. SEARCH without a warrant was sort of unlawful, but OK because NOT A SEARCH BECAUSE NO PRIVACY EXPECTATION SHOWN CUZ DIDN'T STOP HEAT FROM ESCAPING THE HOME. Precedents Set: The thermal imager here disclosed only the relative amounts of heat radiating from the house; it would be as if, in Katz, the listening device disclosed only the relative volume of sound leaving the booth, which presumably was discernible in the public domain. IF DEVICE CAN GIVE YOU NO SPECIFIC INFORMATION ABOUT WHAT IS GOING ON INSIDE THE HOUSE, DOES NOT QUALIFY AS INVASION OF PRIVACY. Case #: 27 Keywords: Plaintiff: Smith Smith v. Maryland Defendant: State of Maryland Location: SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Type of Law: Right of Privacy Issue: Man robs woman. Woman gets irritating phone calls from man identifying himself as the robber. Police insert "pen register" into phone system to monitor all of the calls being made from a suspect's house. Find that calls HAVE been made to the woman's house. Indict and convict suspect as the robber. Robber says that inserting pen register is a search requiring a warrant. Maryland State Court says its OK, Maryland Appellate Court agrees. Laws Involved: Finding: Phone company's installation and use, at police request, of pen register to record numbers dialed from suspect's home phone, held not to be "search" requiring warrant under Fourth Amendment. STATE NOT GUILTY. Reasons for finding: Court maintains installation and use of the pen register at the telephone company's central offices did not constitute a "search" requiring the issuance of a warrant under the Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, where the suspect did not have the necessary "legitimate expectation of privacy" regarding the numbers dialed from his home telephone in that (1) in all probability he entertained no actual expectation of privacy, since (a) it is doubtful that any such expectation is held by telephone users in general who typically know that they must convey numerical information to the phone company, that the company has facilities for recording this information, and that the company, in fact, does so for a variety of legitimate business purposes, and (b) although the fact that the suspect used his home telephone to the exclusion of other telephones may have been calculated to keep the contents of his conversations private, his conduct could not have been intended to protect dialed numbers which he voluntarily conveyed to the telephone company, and (2) even if the suspect had entertained an actual expectation of privacy, such expectation was not one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable, the suspect, by voluntarily turning over dialed information to the telephone company, having assumed the risk that the company would reveal the information to the police, even though telephone companies normally do not record numbers dialed for local calls. Precedents Set: Should expect no privacy in dialing numbers and calling people using a telephone system with parts outside of your house, essentially all telephone systems. Case #: Keywords: Plaintiff: Defendant: Location: Type of Law: Issue: Laws Involved: Finding: Reasons for finding: Precedents Set: Raffles v. Wichelhaus Case #: 28 Keywords: U.S. v. Poulsen Plaintiff: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellant Defendant: KEVIN L. POULSEN, et al., Defendant-Appellee Location: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT Type of Law: Right of Privacy Issue: Guy rents a locker, using it to store computer tapes that, if let out, reveal him as some sort of criminal. Guy is overdue on rent, so manager of Menlo Storage sends him a letter to tell him. Says he has 14 days to pay the rent. Letter comes back as undeliverable, address was fake. He comes in after the 14 day period, and pays 70 of the owed $150. Same day, Menlo Storage sends him another lein letter, to his new address. Letter comes back again, because address is false. Manager seizes all materials, tells police he may have found stolen property. Manager gives materials to police, indict and convict the former owner of the locker. District court says evidence is inadmissible because Poulson had some expectation of privacy to the contents in the locker. Laws Involved: Finding: REVERSED. Tapes are fair game in any case against Poulson. Reasons for finding: Poulson had no expectation of privacy for the property in the locker as a result of his failure to pay the rent for it. Computer tapes became public property as soon as the lease was up, the day after his last day to pay the rent. As public property, police were free to search it, and found the incriminating information. Precedents Set: A RENTER DOES NOT HAVE A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN THE CONTENTS OF A RENTAL UNIT IF THE RENT IS NOT PAID Case #: 28 Keywords: Parnell v. Booth Newspapers, Inc. Plaintiff: Teresa Parnell Defendant: Booth Newspapers Location: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN, SOUTHERN DIVISION Type of Law: Right of Privacy Issue: Plaintiff in this diversity action alleges that photographs of her were published in connection with two newspaper articles on the subject of prostitution in Muskegon Heights, Michigan. The articles and accompanying photographs appeared on page 1B of the September 20, 1981 edition of The Muskegon Chronicle, a newspaper owned and published by Defendant. Plaintiff claims that as a result of the publication, in which she was allegedly recognizable to relatives, friends and acquaintances, she was falsely imputed to be a prostitute, and has consequently suffered damages. Specifically, Plaintiff's Complaint alleges four counts of liability against Defendant: defamation, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy. Laws Involved: Defamation, negligence, right of privacy Finding: For PLAINTIFF on Right of Privacy Point. Basic decision was that everyone's summary judgment case was denied. Court agreed that newspaper implicated her in the story as if she was a prostitute and that another court would have to be used in order to judge truth of this matter. Reasons for finding: It is conceded for the purpose of this motion that the implication of the publication was that Plaintiff was soliciting for prostitution; the truth of the publication has been contested by Plaintiff in her affidavit, and presents a jury question. The fact that Plaintiff's photograph was taken in public does not preclude her false light claim Precedents Set: Case #: 28 Keywords: McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission Plaintiff: JOSEPH MCINTYRE, EXECUTOR OF ESTATE OF MARGARET MCINTYRE, DECEASED Defendant: OHIO ELECTIONS COMMISSION Location: SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Type of Law: Right of Privacy Issue: Man distributes certain information for upcoming vote, trying to sway voters on a certain issue. The materials are all anonymous. Elections official finds out and reports the distributor, Distributor is fined $100. Franklin county court reverses, saying it is unconstitutional to impose antianonymity laws, as they violate the first amendment. Ohio Court of Appeals reinstates the fine. Supreme Court of Ohio, in affirming, concluded that for purposes of the Federal Constitution's First Amendment, the burdens imposed by the antianonymity provision were counterbalanced by the state's interests in (1) providing voters with a mechanism by which the validity of the campaign literature's message might be better evaluated, and (2) identifying those who engage in fraud, libel, or false advertising. Laws Involved: Finding: For Plaintiff, McIntyre, because laws were inefficient in filtering material. Reasons for finding: Ohio statute banning distribution of anonymous political campaign literature held not justified, for First Amendment purposes, by state interest in (1) preventing fraud and libel, or (2) informing electorate. Say that antianonymity laws only served to help state regulate the flow of fraudulent material, was unconstitutional because it disallowed the unfraudulent true material to come out. Was for this reason unjustified. State had not shown how such a system caught disseminators of false information while leaving alone those disseminating true information. The provision was not justified by the state's interest in providing the electorate with relevant information, as the identity of the speaker was no different from other components of the document's content that the author was free to include or exclude, the interest in providing information did not justify a state requirement that a writer make statements or disclosures that the writer would otherwise omit, and in the case of a handbill written by a private citizen not known to the recipient, disclosure of the author's name and address would add little, if anything, to the reader's ability to evaluate the document's message. NAME AND ADDRESS OF AUTHOR IS IRRELEVANT, IT IS THE CONTENT THAT COUNTS. OHIO'S SYSTEM DID NOTHING TO MONITOR OR FILTER BAD CONTENT. Precedents Set: LAWS MUST HAVE A GOOD BACKGROUND IN BEING FOR THE GOOD GUYS AND AGAINST THE BAD GUYS, OR JUST FOR THE GOOD GUYS. YOU CAN'T MAKE THE GOOD GUYS SUFFER JUST TO GET THE BAD GUYS. Case #: 29 Keywords: Vanna White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc. Plaintiff: VANNA WHITE, Plaintiff-Appellant Defendant: SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., a New York corporation, and DAVID DEUTSCH ASSOCIATES, INC., a New York corporation Location: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT Type of Law: Right of Publicity Issue: Samsung makes funny advertisements concerning the future success of their products. They use objects of today, and present them as being found for another, better use in the future. EX: Steak being discovered as health food. One is, "Wheel of Fortune as the longest running game show ever" with a robot playing the host, which obviously resembles Vanna White. Hair and outfit and everything resemble her. Ad labeled "Vanna White." Vanna White sues in district court, unsuccessfully, Laws Involved: California Civil Code 3344- any person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, . . . for purposes of advertising or selling, . . . without such person's prior consent . . . shall be liable [**4] for any damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof." California common law right of publicity - "may be pleaded by alleging (1) the defendant's use of the plaintiff's identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff's name or likeness to defendant's advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury." Lanham Act- any person who shall . . . use, in connection with any goods or services . . . any false description or representation . . . shall be liable to a civil action . . . by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or designation. Finding: DISTRICT: For defendants on all charges. For Calif. Code 3344, court says Samsung used a robot, which no one could ever mistake for Vanna White. Common law right of publicity- court says NO, because didn't use defendant's "name or likeness." Court says NO to Lanham Act, because the robot could not be confused with Vanna White. APPELLATE: Agreed on Code 3344. Disagree on Right of Publicity, say violated because a blond wig, and glamorous clothing are not characteristics unique to the current hostess of Wheel of Fortune. Not using her fame to get profits from anything in her market, publicizing her further to sell a VCR, something in a COMPLETELY DIFFERENT MARKET. Reasons for finding: The protection of intellectual property presents the courts with the necessity of balancing competing interests. On the one hand, we wish to protect and reward the work and investment of those who create intellectual property. In so doing, however, we must prevent the creation of a monopoly that would inhibit the creative expressions of others. [**43] We have traditionally balanced those interests by allowing the copying of an idea, but protecting a unique expression of it. Samsung clearly used the idea of a glamorous female game show hostess. Just as clearly, it avoided appropriating Vanna White's expression of that role. Samsung did not use a likeness of her. The performer in the television commercial is unmistakably a lifeless robot. Vanna White has presented no evidence that any consumer confused the robot with her identity. Indeed, no reasonable consumer could confuse the robot with Vanna White or believe that, because the robot appeared in the advertisement, Vanna White endorsed Samsung's product. Precedents Set: Case #: 30 Keywords: Plaintiff: Ward et. Al. Ward v. Rock against Racism Defendant: Rock against Racism Location: SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Type of Law: First Amendment in Cyberspace Issue: City has policy, whereas anyone wishing to perform in a certain park must use sound amplification provided by the city, as it produces good sound, but does not disturb surrounding people. Rock against Racism says this is unconstitutional because it restricts free speech. New York District Court Agrees. RAR does concert, gets a lot of complaints. Tries to sue for damages caused by complaints. US Court of Appeals reverses, finding for the City, saying that it did not restrict what was said, just worked for protected speech. They also based this on the fact that groups in the past were all happy with the system, so they said apparently it did not restrict speech to a point where it was unlawful or overbearing. US Supreme court agrees with US Appeals, finds for City. Laws Involved: Finding: City's guideline requiring sponsors of park bandshell concerts to use soundamplification equipment and sound technician provided by city held valid under First Amendment as reasonable regulation of place and manner of speech. Reasons for finding: held that the guideline was valid under the First Amendment as a reasonable regulation of the place and manner of expression, because (1) the guideline was content-neutral, since (a) the city's desire to control noise levels had nothing to do with content and its concern with sound quality extended only to the goals of insuring adequate sound amplification and mix, (b) the guideline was not invalid on its face as placing unbridled discretion in the hands of city officials charged with enforcing it, where the guideline forbade city officials purposely to select inadequate sound systems or to vary the sound quality or volume based on the message being delivered by performers, and (c) the city's narrowing construction of the guideline, such as by making it a practice to confer with the sponsor before turning the volume down, would remedy any facial inadequacy; (2) the guideline was narrowly tailored to serve significant governmental interests, since (a) the city has a substantial interest in protecting it citizens from unwelcome noise and in insuring the sufficiency of sound amplification for concert audiences, and (b) the guideline, by having no material impact on any performer's artistic control, was not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the city's legitimate ends; and (3) the guideline left open ample alternative channels of communication, since it (a) did not attempt to ban any particular manner or type of expression at a given place or time, (b) permitted expressive activity in the bandshell, and (c) had no effect on the quantity or content of that expression beyond regulating its amplification. Precedents Set: Case #: 31 Keywords: FCC v. Pacifica Foundation Plaintiff: FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Defendant: PACIFICA FOUNDATION ET AL. Location: SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Type of Law: First Amendment in Cyberspace Issue: Guy on radio has 12-minute monologue about dirty words you couldn't say on the radio. Man in car with his son listening to this program complains. FCC says if we get any more complaints, we'll probably bring action. FCC determined that the "Filthy Words" monologue, as broadcast, was indecent within the meaning of 1464 in view of the facts that it had been deliberately broadcast at a time when children were undoubtedly in the audience and contained words which depicted sexual and excretory activities in a patently offensive manner. District court agrees with FCC. Appellate court disagrees, thought 3 judges can's come to decision, one of the judges concluded that the order not only represented "censorship" over radio communications, which the Commission was expressly prohibited from engaging in under 326 of the Communications Act (47 USCS 326), but was the functional equivalent of a rule and was "overbroad," and another judge, although finding that 326's prohibition against censorship was inapplicable to broadcasts forbidden by 18 USCS 1464, which he felt covered only language that was obscene or otherwise unprotected by the First Amendment, was of the view that the Commission's order abridged the First Amendment (556 F2d 9). Appellate: TOO MUCH CENSORSHIP. Laws Involved: Finding: US Supreme court reverses Appellate's decision. Say that MAKING PACIFICE LIABLE IS NOT TOO MUCH CENSORSHIP. Reasons for finding: Five members of the Court agreed that the order did not violate the First Amendment. 1) the scope of the Supreme Court's judicial review was limited to the Commission's determination that the monologue, as broadcast, was "indecent" within the meaning of 18 USCS 1464; (2) the Commission's order did not constitute "censorship" under 326 of the Communications Act, 326 not limiting the Commission's authority to impose sanctions on licensees who engaged in obscene, indecent, or profane broadcasting; and (3) the monologue, as broadcast, was "indecent" within the meaning of 18 USCS 1464, which statutory provision was not limited solely to restricting "obscene" language. NO OVERBREADTH OF USE OF FIRST AMENDMENT, JUST INDECENCY ON PACIFICA'S PART FOR PUTTING ON SUCH A SHOW WHILE KIDS WERE LISTENING. Precedents Set: Case #: Keywords: Plaintiff: Defendant: Location: Type of Law: Issue: Laws Involved: Reno v. ACLU Finding: The United States Supreme Court will sever the term "or indecent" from 47 USCS 223(a)--a provision of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) which criminally prohibits the knowing transmission, by means of a telecommunications device, of "obscene or indecent" communications to any recipient under 18 years of age--and leave the rest of 223(a) standing, pursuant to 47 USCS 608, a severability provision applicable to the CDA, where (1) the application of 223(a) to obscene speech was not challenged, and (2) the restriction of "obscene" material under 223(a) enjoys a textual manifestation separate from 223(a)'s restriction for "indecent" material, which the Supreme Court holds unconstitutional as an abridgment of the freedom of speech protected by the Federal Constitution's First Amendment. Reasons for finding: Precedents Set: Case #: 33 Keywords: Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of the Loudoun County Library Plaintiff: MAINSTREAM LOUDOUN, et al., Plaintiffs Defendant: BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE LOUDOUN COUNTY LIBRARY Location: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION Type of Law: First Amendment in Cyberspace Issue: Whether a public library may enact a policy prohibiting the access of library patrons to certain content-based categories of Internet publications. Plaintiffs are a Loudoun County nonprofit organization, suing on its own behalf and on behalf of its members, and individual Loudoun County residents who claim to have had their access to Internet sites blocked by the defendant library board's Internet policy. The background of this action is fully summarized in this Court's April 7, 1998 Memorandum Opinion and will not be repeated in depth here. On October 20, 1997, defendant passed a "Policy on Internet Sexual Harassment" ("Policy") stating that the Loudoun County public libraries would provide [**3] Internet access to its patrons subject to the following restrictions: (1) the library would not provide e-mail, chat rooms, or pornography; (2) all library computers would be equipped with site-blocking software to block all sites displaying: (a) child pornography and obscene material; n1 and (b) material deemed harmful to juveniles; (3) all library computers would be installed near and in full view of library staff; and (4) patrons would not be permitted to access pornography and, if they do so and refuse to stop, the police may be called to intervene. See Pls. Ex. 1. It is the second restriction in the Policy that lies at the heart of this action. The internet users, along with plaintiff-intervenors ("intervenors"), individuals and other entities who claim that defendant's Internet policy has blocked their websites or other materials they placed on the Internet, allege that this policy infringes their right to free speech under the First Amendment. Defendant, the Board of Trustees of the Loudoun County Library, contends that a public library has an absolute right to limit what it provides to the public and that any restrictions on Internet access do not implicate the First Amendment. Laws Involved: Finding: For Plaintiffs Reasons for finding: The court finds that not allowing internet users to view certain content is a First Amendment violation against those who post this content. It is sort of putting restraint on internet site owners who want to get their content out, the figurative free speaking. Precedents Set: Case #: 35 Keywords: Plaintiff: Miller Defendant: California Miller v. California Location: SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Type of Law: Pornography Issue: After a jury trial in a California state court, the defendant, who had mailed unsolicited advertising brochures containing pictures and drawings explicitly depicting sexual activities, was convicted of violating a California statute making it a misdemeanor to knowingly distribute obscene matter. On appeal, the Appellate Department, Superior Court of California, County of Orange, affirmed. Laws Involved: state statute required showings that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appealed to a prurient interest in sex, (b) the material was patently offensive because it affronted contemporary standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters, and (c) the material was utterly without redeeming social value; and the jury was instructed to apply contemporary community standards of the state in determining whether the materials were obscene. Finding: On appeal, the United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded. Reasons for finding: (1) obscene material was not protected by the First Amendment; (2) the proper First Amendment standards to be applied by the states in determining whether particular material was obscene and subject to regulation, were (a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appealed to the prurient interest, (b) whether the work depicted or described, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacked serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value; (3) there was no requirement that the material must be shown to be "utterly without redeeming social value;" (4) the requirement that state law, as written or construed, must specifically define the sexual conduct as to which depiction or description was proscribed, provided fair notice as to what public and commercial activities would bring prosecution, and (5) obscenity was to be determined by applying "contemporary community standards," not "national standards"--there thus having been no constitutional error in instructing the jury in the instant case to apply state community standards. Precedents Set: Cannot freely distribute obscene material under First Amendment. Case #: 36 Keywords: United States v. Thomas Plaintiff: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee Defendant: ROBERT ALAN THOMAS (94-6648) and CARLEEN THOMAS (94-6649), Defendants-Appellants Location: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Type of Law: Pornography Issue: Robert Thomas and his wife Carleen Thomas operate the Amateur Action Computer Bulletin Board System ("AABBS") Robert uses scanner to scan obscene photos onto bulletin board system. Also purchased and sold video tapes to customers. Postal inspector gets complaint from couple in Tenn. He goes undercover, becomes a member and orders stuff. Illegal to transport more than 2 copies of obscene stuff at a time by law. Postal Inspector gets search warrant for Thompson house. TRANSPORTING OBSCENE MATERIALS. Defendants say they didn't know individuals would download the stuff, just posted, did not send. Laws Involved: Section 1465: Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce for the purpose of sale or distribution, or knowingly travels in interstate commerce, or uses a facility or means of interstate commerce for the purpose of transporting obscene material in interstate or foreign commerce, any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, film, paper, letter, writing, print, silhouette, drawing, figure, image, cast, phonograph recording, electrical transcription or other article capable of producing sound or any other matter of indecent or immoral character, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. The transportation as aforesaid of two or more copies of any publication or two or more of any article of the character described above, or a combined total of five such publications and articles, shall create a presumption that such publications or articles are intended for sale or distribution, but such presumption is rebuttable. 42 U.S.C.A. 1465 (West 1995 Supp.). Defendants' challenge to their convictions under counts 1-7, rests on two basic premises: 1) Section 1465 does not apply to intangible objects like the computer GIF files at issue here, n2 and 2) Congress did not intend to regulate computer transmissions such as those involved here because 18 U.S.C. 1465 does not expressly prohibit such conduct. Finding: AFFIRM Robert and Carleen Thomas' convictions and sentences. Reasons for finding: Electronic signals in this context are the means by which funds are transported. The beginning of the transaction is money in one account and the ending is money in another. The manner in which the funds were moved does not affect the ability to obtain tangible paper dollars or a bank check from the receiving account. The same rationale applies here. Defendants focus on the means by which the GIF files were transferred rather than the fact that the transmissions began with computer-generated images in California and ended with the same computer-generated images in Tennessee. The manner in which the images moved does not affect their ability to be viewed on a computer screen in Tennessee or their ability to be printed out in hard copy in that distant location. Court also finds that the "we didn't know people would download our stuff" argument was bullshit. Precedents Set: Sending pornography via the net is the same as illegal interstate transport. Case #: 37 Keywords: New York v. Ferber Plaintiff: NEW YORK Defendant: FERBER Location: SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Type of Law: Pornography Issue: The proprietor of a Manhattan bookstore was convicted in the Supreme Court, New York County of promoting a sexual performance of a child by selling two films which depicted young boys masturbating, in violation of a New York criminal statute prohibiting persons from knowingly promoting sexual performances by children under 16 by distributing material which depicts such performances, even if the materials were produced out of state; defining such promotion as producing, directing, or promoting any performance which includes sexual conduct by a child under 16; and defining sexual conduct to mean actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sado-masochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of the genitals. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction (424 NYS2d 967), but the New York Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the statute violated the First Amendment Laws Involved: was held that (1) child pornography, like obscenity, is unprotected by the First Amendment if it involves scienter and a visual depiction of sexual conduct by children without serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, (2) the New York statute sufficiently described a category of material the production and distribution of which was not entitled to First Amendment protection, and (3) the statute was not overbroad as forbidding the distribution of material with serious literary, scientific or educational value, or material not threatening the harms sought to be combated by the state. Finding: For New York again Reasons for finding: See Laws Involved. A state criminal statute is neither unconstitutionally underinclusive nor unconstitutionally overbroad in prohibiting persons from knowingly promoting sexual performances by children under 16 by distributing material which depicts such performances, even if the materials were produced out of state; defining such promotion as producing, directing, or promoting any performance which includes sexual conduct by a child under 16; and defining sexual conduct to mean actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sado-masochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of the genitals. Precedents Set: Case #: 38 Keywords: Free Speech Coalition v. Reno Plaintiff: THE FREE SPEECH COALITION, BOLD TYPE, INC.; JIM GINGERICH; RON RAFFAELLI, Plaintiffs Appellants Defendant: RENO, Attorney General, US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Defendants-Appellees Location: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT Type of Law: Issue: The question presented in this case is whether Congress may constitutionally proscribe as child pornography computer images that do not involve the use of real children in their production or dissemination. In this appeal, Free Speech argues the district court was mistaken in its determination that the legislation is content neutral. They also argue that the district court was wrong to hold that the Act is not unconstitutionally vague. The argument is that where the statute fails to define "appears to be" and "conveys the impression," it is so vague a person of ordinary intelligence cannot understand what is prohibited. Free Speech also questions the district court's holding that the affirmative defense provided in the Act is constitutional. Finally, Free Speech appeals the lower court's determination that the Act does not impose a prior restraint on protected speech and that it does not create a permanent chill on protected expression. Laws Involved: Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 ("CPPA" or the "Act") Court says content-neutral, was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, and did not constitute an improper prior restraint of speech. The district court also found that the Child Pornography Prevention Act's affirmative defense did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof to a defendant by virtue of an unconstitutional presumption. District court says content-neutral, but APPELLATE SAYS CONTENT BASED, but OK, because protects children. Finding: While court agrees that the plaintiffs have standing to bring this case and that the Act is not an improper prior restraint of speech, the balance of the district court's analysis does not comport with what we believe is required by the Constitution. We find that the phrases "appears to be" a minor, and "conveys the impression" that the depiction portrays a minor, are vague and overbroad and thus do not meet the requirements of the First Amendment. Consequently we hold that while these two provisions of the Act do not pass constitutional muster, the balance of the Child Pornography Prevention Act is constitutional when the two phrases are stricken. Whether the statutory affirmative defense is constitutional is a question that we leave for resolution in a different case Reasons for finding: We hold that the First Amendment prohibits Congress from enacting a statute that makes criminal the generation of images of fictitious children engaged in imaginary but explicit sexual conduct. Precedents Set: Case #: 38 Keywords: BATES ET AL. v. STATE BAR OF ARIZONA Plaintiff: BATES ET AL. Defendant: State Bar of Arizona Location: SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Type of Law: Advertising Issue: Two lawyers open up a low-cost law firm for people with not much money. Does pretty good, but it not really surviving. Two lawyers decide they need to advertise in order to get more business and survive. AGAINST THE LAW FOR LAWYERS TO PUBLICIZE by "commercial" means in Arizona. They do it anyway. State Bar brings suit against them, wins in district court. Bates and them say that anti-advertising law is unconstitutional, goes against Sherman Act and limits competition, and also infringes Free Speech shit from First Amendment Laws Involved: State Law that it's illegal for lawyers to advertise. Sherman Act: Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court Finding: Court Holds that (1) the disciplinary rule prohibiting commercial advertising of legal services did not violate 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, since the rule imposing the restraint was an act of government, imposed by the state of Arizona acting in a sovereign capacity, and was therefore an act not prohibited by the Sherman Act, the court thus affirming the Supreme Court of Arizona's judgment in this regard; and (2) the blanket suppression of advertising by attorneys violated the free speech clause of the First Amendment, since lawyers may constitutionally advertise the prices at which certain routine legal services will be performed, the court thus reversing the Supreme Court of Arizona's judgment in this regard. Reasons for finding: The court rejected arguments that such advertising would have an adverse effect on professionalism, would be inherently misleading, would have an adverse effect on the administration of justice, would produce undesirable economic effects, and would have an adverse effect on the quality of legal services, and that the blanket suppression was justified because a rule permitting limited advertising would be difficult to enforce; but the court did hold that such advertising, if false, deceptive, or misleading, could continue to be restrained, and that, as with other varieties of speech, such advertising could be made subject to reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of such advertising. Precedents Set: Case #: 39 Keywords: Coca-Cola v. Tropicana Products, Inc. Plaintiff: The COCA-COLA COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant Defendant: TROPICANA PRODUCTS, INC., Defendant-Appellee Location: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT Type of Law: Advertising Issue: In mid-February of 1982 defendant Tropicana Products, Inc. (Tropicana) began airing a new television commercial for its Premium Pack orange juice. The commercial shows the renowned American Olympic athlete Bruce Jenner squeezing an orange while saying "It's pure, pasteurized juice as it comes from the orange," and then shows Jenner pouring the freshsqueezed juice into a Tropicana carton while the audio states "It's the only leading brand not made with concentrate and water." Soon after the advertisement began running, plaintiff CocaCola Company (Coke, Coca-Cola), maker of Minute Maid orange juice, brought suit against Tropicana for false advertising in violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Which provides that anyone who uses a false description or representation in connection with goods placed in commerce "shall be liable to a civil action by [anyone] who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of such false description or representation." Coke claimed the commercial is false because it incorrectly represents that Premium Pack contains unprocessed, fresh-squeezed juice when in fact the juice is pasteurized (heated to about 200 degrees Fahrenheit) and sometimes frozen prior to packaging. Laws Involved: Lanham Act against false representation of shit, which would put someone else at any sort of disadvantage in same market. Finding: Reverses district court's decision, FINDS FOR COCA-COLA. Injunction against the commercial, can't show it anymore. Reasons for finding: Because Tropicana has made a false representation in its advertising and Coke is likely to suffer irreparable harm as a result, we reverse [**18] the district court's denial of plaintiff's application and remand this case for issuance of a preliminary injunction preventing broadcast of the squeezing-pouring sequence in the Jenner commercial. Precedents Set: Commercials by one company that can is more meant to hurt other businesses than to help their own are illegal. Case #: 39 INTERNATIONAL SHOE CO. v. STATE OF WASHINGTON ET AL. Plaintiff: INTERNATIONAL SHOE CO. Defendant: STATE OF WASHINGTON ET AL. Location: SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Type of Law: Jurisdiction Issue: Basically, In order to try certain companies like foreign ones or ones working from different states, the court must declare them in a certain state. Does so in many ways, such as if it has most customers in one state, using that state, or if it has certain associations with a state. Laws Involved: A foreign corporation may be deemed present in a state, so as to make it constitutionally liable to be sued there, when the activities of the corporation in the state have not only been continuous and systematic but also give rise to the liability sued on, even though no consent to be sued or authorization to an agent to accept service of process has been given. The criteria by which is marked the boundary line between those activities which justify the subjection of a foreign corporation to suit and those which do not are not simply mechanical or quantitative; but whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it is the purpose of the due process clause to insure. CONSITUTIONAL LAW: due process -- action in state court against foreign corporation for contribution to state unemployment compensation fund. A foreign corporation which systematically and continuously employs a force of salesmen, residents of the state, to canvass for orders therein, may, consistently with due process, be sued in the courts of the state to recover unpaid contributions to the state unemployment compensation fund in respect of such salesmen. Finding: Activities within a State of salesmen in the employ of a foreign corporation, exhibiting samples of merchandise and soliciting orders from prospective buyers to be accepted or rejected by the corporation at a point outside the State, were systematic and continuous, and resulted in a large volume of interstate business. A statute of the State requires employers to pay into the state unemployment compensation fund a specified percentage of the wages paid for the services of employees within the State. In view of 26 U. S. C. 1606 (a), providing that no person shall be relieved from compliance with a state law requiring payments to an unemployment fund on the ground that he is engaged in interstate commerce, the fact that the corporation is engaged in interstate commerce does not relieve it from liability for payments to the state unemployment compensation fund. P. 315. The activities in behalf of the corporation render it amenable to suit in courts of the State to recover payments due to the state unemployment compensation fund. P. 320. The activities in question established between the State and the corporation sufficient contacts or ties to make it reasonable and just, and in conformity to the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, for the State to enforce against the corporation an obligation arising out of such activities. P. 320. In such a suit to recover payments due to the unemployment compensation fund, service of process upon one of the corporation's salesmen within the State, and notice sent by registered mail to the corporation at its home office, satisfies the requirements of due process. P. 320. The tax imposed by the state unemployment compensation statute -construed by the state court, in its application to the corporation, as a tax on the privilege of employing salesmen within the State -- does not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 321. Case #: 39 Minnesota v. Granite Gate Resorts Plaintiff: State of Minnesota by its Attorney General Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Respondent Defendant: Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., d/b/a On Ramp Internet Computer Services, Appellants Location: COURT OF APPEALS OF MINNESOTA Type of Law: Jurisdiction in Cyberspace Issue: On Ramp is a website, which advertises various internet gambling sites. One of these sites is to be called WagerNet. On Ramp posts and advertisement to WagerNet, and some official guy from Minnesota finds out. He calls the number provided, and is told that internet gambling is legal and everything is legit and should be up within a month. In July 1995, the attorney general filed a complaint alleging that appellants had engaged in deceptive trade practices, false advertising, and consumer fraud by advertising in Minnesota that gambling on the Internet is lawful. In October 1995, Janacek subscribed to the WagerNet mailing list under a fictitious name and received an on-line confirmation stating that he would be sent updates on the WagerNet service. Appellants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court allowed limited discovery to determine the quantity and quality of appellants' contacts with the state. Rogers refused to produce the names of the persons on the WagerNet mailing list, claiming that the information is the sole property of a Belizian corporation. As a sanction, the court found that it is established as a fact for this action that the WagerNet mailing list contains the name and address of at least one Minnesota resident. In December 1996, the district court denied appellants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Appellants allege that the district court erred in denying their motion to dismiss because a nonresident defendant that places information on the Internet has not purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within every state from which that information may be accessed. The assertion of personal jurisdiction in Minnesota, appellants argue, would not comport with the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Court considers quality and quantity of contacts. Laws Involved: To satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that the defendant has "minimum contacts" with the forum state "such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional [**7] notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" There must be "some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Finding: Court AFFIRMS for Minnesota. Reasons for finding: Appellants, through their Internet advertising, have demonstrated a clear intent to solicit business from markets that include Minnesota and, as a result, have had multiple contacts with Minnesota residents, including at least one successful solicitation. The cause of action here arises from the same advertisements that constitute appellants' contacts with the state and implicates Minnesota's strong interest in maintaining the enforceability [**19] of its consumer protection laws. Appellants have not demonstrated that submission to personal jurisdiction in Minnesota would subject them to any undue inconvenience. For these reasons, we hold that appellants are subject to personal jurisdiction in Minnesota because, through their Internet activities, they purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of doing business in Minnesota to the extent that the maintenance of an action based on consumer protection statutes does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Case #: 40 Keywords: California Software, Inc. v. Reliability Research, Inc. Plaintiff: CALIFORNIA SOFTWARE, INC. and RELIACOMM CORP Defendant: RELIABILITY RESEARCH, INC., JAMES J. WHITE, and LARRY MARTIN Location: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR CENTRAL CALIFORNIA Type of Law: Jurisdiction Issue: On October 4, 1985, plaintiffs California Software, Inc. and Reliacomm, Inc. filed a complaint alleging that defendants Reliability Research, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "RRI"), James White and Larry Martin made false statements through the use of the telephone, the mails, and a nationwide computer network concerning plaintiffs' right to market a software program. Both plaintiffs are California corporations having their principal places of business in California. White and Martin made phone calls to various prospective California Software companies telling them that RRI and Cal Software were in legal disputes and that if RRI won, Ca; Software licensees would be held liable for stuff. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The issue presented is whether defendants' utilization of the foregoing means of communicating with plaintiffs' prospective customers both in and out of California for the purpose stated supports an exercise of jurisdiction in this forum. Laws Involved: Limited and Personal Jurisdiction. In order for this Court to assert jurisdiction, the non-resident defendants' contacts with the forum state, though minimal, must be of such quality and quantity that "maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." For limited jurisdiction: 1. The non-resident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction within the forum or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the protections and benefits of its laws. (2) The claim must be one which arises out of or results from the defendant's forum-related activities. (3) Exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable. General : defendant may be haled into a forum state's courts to defend against causes of action unrelated to his conduct there if his activities in the state are "substantial" or "continuous and systematic." Finding: By this Order, the Court finds limited jurisdiction over two of these defendants. Accordingly, defendants RRI and White's motion is denied and defendant Martin's motion is granted. Reasons for finding: The evidence submitted indicates that neither the corporate defendant nor the two individual defendants maintain sufficient contacts with the State of California to support a finding of general jurisdiction. RRI is not licensed to do business in California and has no offices, agents, employees, telephone listings, bank accounts, or property within the State. In the present case, defendants RRI and White's intentional conduct which gives rise to this litigation justifies assertion of limited jurisdiction over those two defendants. Precedents Set: Case #: 41 Keywords: Compuserve, inc. v. Patterson Plaintiff: COMPUSERVE, INCORPORATED, Plaintiff-Appellant Defendant: RICHARD S. PATTERSON and FLASHPOINT DEVELOPMENT, Appellees. Location: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Type of Law: Jurisdiction Issue: In a case that requires us to consider the scope of the federal courts' jurisdictional powers in a new context, a computer network giant, CompuServe, appeals the dismissal, for lack of personal jurisdiction, of its complaint in which it sought a declaratory judgment that it had not infringed on the defendants' common law copyrights or otherwise engaged in unfair competition. The district court held that the electronic links between the defendant Patterson, who is a Texan, n1 and Ohio, where CompuServe is headquartered, were "too tenuous to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction." Patterson, for his part, stated that he has sold less than $ 650 worth of his software to only 12 Ohio residents via CompuServe.The district court also denied CompuServe's motion for reconsideration. Laws Involved: Personal jurisdiction: Did CompuServe make a prima facie showing that Patterson's contacts with Ohio, which have been almost entirely electronic in nature, are sufficient, under the Due Process Clause, [**10] to support the district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over him? Finding: REVERSE the district court's dismissal and REMAND this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Says that courts DO HAVE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER Ohio- Texas relation b/w Compuserve and Patterson. Reasons for finding: Because we believe that CompuServe made a prima facie showing that the defendant's contacts with Ohio were sufficient to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Because we believe that Patterson had sufficient contacts with Ohio to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him, we REVERSE the district court's dismissal and REMAND this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Precedents Set: Case #: Keywords: Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King Plaintiff: BENSUSAN RESTAURANT CORPORATION, Plaintiff Defendant: RICHARD B. KING, individually and d/b/a THE BLUE NOTE, Defendant Location: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK Type of Law: Jurisdiction Issue: Plaintiff Bensusan Restaurant Corp. ("Bensusan") brought this action against defendant Richard King, individually and doing business as The Blue Note, alleging that King is infringing on Bensusan's rights in its trademark "The Blue Note." King has moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). The issue raised by that motion is whether the existence of a "site" on the World Wide Web of the Internet, without anything more, is sufficient to vest this Court with personal jurisdiction over defendant pursuant to New York's long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Bensusan has a jazz restaurant in NY, has all trademark rights to name "The Blue Note." Richard King owns a restaurant of the same name in Missouri. King promotes his restaurant on a website on the net, and Bensusan tries to sue IN A NEW YORK COURT for trademark infringement. Laws Involved: Can any state court just say they have jurisdiction over the whole net? Prima facie proof of personal jurisdiction: Bensusan is entitled to have its complaint and affidavits interpreted, and any doubts resolved, in the light most favorable to it. Finding: Motion to dismiss case is GRANTED, NO PERSONAL JURISDICTION. Reasons for finding: Because the two restaurants had no interstate relationship with one another. The fact that a restaurant in another state posts a site on the web promoting a restarant with the same name has nothing to do with commerce. Def take that shit to Fed court. Precedents Set: State court has no jurisdiction over web-related trademark disputes if the two companies have no effect on each others' markets, and have no interstate relationship. Bensusan only wanted to sue cuz NY court would more likely find in their favor, assholes. Case #: 42 Keywords: Cody v. Ward Plaintiff: COLIN M. CODY Defendant: KEVIN M. WARD Location: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT Type of Law: Jurisdiction Issue: Plaintiff Colin M. Cody, a resident of Connecticut, alleges that he invested almost $ 200,000 in common stock of E. N. Phillips Company ("ENP"), an installer of video bingo games in casino-style bingo halls in Louisiana, in reliance on fraudulent misrepresentations by defendant Kevin M. Ward, a resident of California. Claiming that the stock is now worthless, he seeks damages and other relief against the defendant under the Connecticut Uniform Securities Act. n1 The defendant has moved to dismiss the action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction on the ground that he engaged in no activities that would make him susceptible to suit in Connecticut [doc. # 25]. Defendant had madd conversations with Plaintiff, telling him how good the stock was, giving him false information, and encouraging him to buy it and keep it. Laws Involved: Connecticut's long arm statute on the ground that a person who sends false representations into Connecticut by wire "commits a tortious act within the state" as that phrase is used in Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-59b(a)(2), the subsection of the statute applicable to nonresident individuals. Defendant contends that the long arm statute does not apply to him because he was not physically present in Connecticut when the alleged misrepresentations were made. Finding: Motion to dismiss is DENIED. CONNECTICUT COURT HAS JURISDICTION Reasons for finding: Connecticut Long Arm jurisdiction laws about sending false information via wire. That's exactly what Ward did. Questions? Precedents Set: A nonresident's transmission of fraudulent misrepresentations to a Connecticut resident by telephone and electronic mail for the purpose of inducing him to buy and hold securities renders the nonresident subject to suit in Connecticut in an action based on the misrepresentations. Case #: 42 Keywords: Inset Systems, inc. v. Instruction Set Plaintiff: INSET SYSTEMS, INC., Plaintiff, v. INSTRUCTION SET, INC., Defendant. Defendant: INSTRUCTION SET, INC. Location: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT Type of Law: Jurisdiction Issue: The plaintiff, Inset Systems, Inc. ("Inset"), is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Connecticut, with its office and principal place of business in Brookfield, Connecticut. Inset develops and markets computer software and other related services throughout the world. The defendant, Instruction Set, Inc. ("ISI"), is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Massachusetts, with its office and principal place of business in Natick, Massachusetts. ISI provides computer technology and support to thousands of organizations throughout the world. ISI does not have any employees, nor offices within Connecticut, and it does not conduct business in Connecticut on a regular basis. On August 23, 1985, Inset filed for registration as the owner of the federal trademark INSET. On October 21, 1986, Inset received registration number 1,414,031. INSET HAS TRADEMARK TO "INSET", INSTRUCTION SET USES "INSET" FOR ITS' DOMAIN NAME AND FOR PART OF ITS PHONE NUMBER. As a result of great size and all that bullshit about internet, court has always said confusion in the marketplace could develop. Laws Involved: Connecticut Long Arm clause. (see last case) Finding: The court concludes, therefore, that the provisions of 1391(b)(1) having been [**15] complied with, Connecticut venue is proper. Reasons for finding: The use of the trademarked term in a domain name and phone number by a company outside of Connecticut can definitely effect the business of a company inside Connecticut, as Connecticut citizens have access to the net, and as it is a matter of interstate business. Precedents Set: The use of a trademarked term in a domain name and phone number by a company in one state can definitely effect the business of a company in another state, as citizens of both states have access to the net, and as it is a matter of interstate business. Case #: 43 Keywords: Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc. Plaintiff: CYBERSELL, INC., an Arizona corporation Defendant: CYBERSELL, INC., WEBHORIZONS, INC.,WEBSOLVERS, INC., all Florida corporations; SAMUEL and JANE DOE CERTO; MATT and JANE DOE II CERTO; CYBERGATE, INC., a corporation; SPRINTNET, a corporation, Location: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT Type of Law: Jurisdiction Issue: We are asked to hold that the allegedly infringing use of a service mark in a home page on the World Wide Web suffices for personal jurisdiction in the state where the holder of the mark has its principal place of business. Cybersell, Inc., an Arizona corporation that advertises for commercial services over the Internet, claims that Cybersell, Inc., a Florida corporation that offers web page construction services over the Internet, infringed its federally registered mark and should be amenable to suit in Arizona because cyberspace is without borders and a web site which advertises a product or service is necessarily intended for use on a world wide basis. The district court disagreed. Laws Involved: Finding: AGREE WITH DISTRICT COURT, ARIZONA COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT VIA A NON-ARIZONA COMPANY USING AN ARIZONA COMPANY'S TRADEMARK IN A DOMAIN NAME. Reasons for finding: Applying our normal "minimum contacts" analysis, we conclude that it would not comport with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice," for Arizona to exercise personal jurisdiction over an allegedly infringing Florida web site advertiser who has no contacts with Arizona other than maintaining a home page that is accessible to Arizonans, and everyone else, over the Internet. We therefore affirm. We conclude that the essentially passive nature of Cybersell FL's activity in posting a home page on the World Wide Web that allegedly used the service mark of Cybersell AZ does not qualify as purposeful activity invoking the benefits and protections of Arizona. As it engaged in no commercial activity and had no other [**22] contacts via the Internet or otherwise in Arizona, Cybersell FL lacks sufficient minimum contacts with Arizona for personal jurisdiction to be asserted over it there. Accordingly, its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was properly granted. Precedents Set: The opposite of the last case BECAUSE OF RELATIVE DISTANCE!!!! IF THE TWO COMPANIES ARE CLOSE TO ONE ANOTHER, CAN SAY HAD MINIMAL CONTACTS WITH LESS EVIDENCE. SINCE SOOOOO FAR IN THIS CASE, NO MINIMAL CONTACTS SO NO JURISDICTION. Case #: Keywords: Plaintiff: Defendant: Location: Type of Law: Issue: Laws Involved: Finding: Reasons for finding: Precedents Set: Raffles v. Wichelhaus Case #: Keywords: Plaintiff: Defendant: Location: Type of Law: Issue: Laws Involved: Finding: Reasons for finding: Precedents Set: Raffles v. Wichelhaus Case #: Keywords: Plaintiff: Defendant: Location: Type of Law: Issue: Laws Involved: Finding: Reasons for finding: Precedents Set: Raffles v. Wichelhaus Case #: Keywords: Plaintiff: Defendant: Location: Type of Law: Issue: Laws Involved: Finding: Reasons for finding: Precedents Set: Raffles v. Wichelhaus Case #: Keywords: Plaintiff: Defendant: Location: Type of Law: Issue: Laws Involved: Finding: Reasons for finding: Precedents Set: Raffles v. Wichelhaus ...
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