PAM 200 Final Key Pointers

PAM 200 Final Key Pointers - response By analyzing lets say...

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I.Basics of budget constraints and Indifference curves c. How to solve mathematically for initial and final optimal points Income = PxX + PyY Px/Py = MUx/MUy From first equation you get Y (get y on one side) and plug it into second d. Solve for income and substitution effects Equivalent and compensating variation versus consumer surplus How much willing to maintain price, how much willing to pay for cheaper price e. Be able to analyze diagrammatically basic applications In-kind transfers II. Edgeworth Box Review IV. Time value of money d. The theory of the mine: X. Applications of game theory to duopoly a. Bertrand equilibrium; Price competition down to P=MC w. zero profits b. Cartel solution; Decide to work together to avoid Bertrand but prisoner dilemma arrises c. Cournot equilibrium; in the nash cournot model; firms see other firm productions and select their own output levels. They incorrectly assume the other firm wont adjust output in
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Unformatted text preview: response. By analyzing lets say the equation is P= 120- Q so MR is 120 – 2q, and firm A is producing 60 therefore the new firm B will produce P = 120 – (60 + 2Q), so in order to maximize revenue B produces 30 Then because b is at 30, a does 45, then A and B continuously change till the equilibrium is at A=B which is at 40, to verify this we plug 40 into each RF and price is 40 dollars, total profits 3200; two firms would have been better off if they split the 3600 `d. Stackelberg equilibrium; which firm is more brave and doesn’t want to change; similar to the game of chicken, when you realize that cournot will happen if another firm happens and one firm holds price and hopes the other firm wont change it For normal goods, Compensating Variation, <CS, <Equivalent Variation For inferior goods Equivalent < CS < Compensating Compensating is steeper than ordinary if its normale...
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PAM 200 Final Key Pointers - response By analyzing lets say...

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