Ethics as Philosophy_A Defense of Ethical Nonnaturalism.pdf...

10
Ethics as Philosophy
A Defense of Ethical Nonnaturalism
Russ Shafer-Landau
It is early days in the Principia Ethica when Moore presents us with his famous
argument from elimination on behalf of ethical nonnaturalism. Moore
thought that there were three options when it came to a diagnosis of ethical
concepts. Ethical notions are either meaningless, susceptible of a naturalistic
analysis, or nonnatural. Neither of the first two options appealed. Ethical
nonnaturalism won by default.
It took only a long generation before nonnaturalism’s star began to fade. The
ascendancy of noncognitivist views, and the resurgence of naturalistic ones,
were prompted by the perception that nonnaturalism suffered from fatal flaws.
By century’s end, this perception had become so widespread as to be rightly
considered a bit of conventional philosophical wisdom. I think that this
critical, and often dismissive, attitude is mistaken—as mistaken as Moore’s
contention that he had identified a line of argument that proved, once and for
all, the falsity of ethical naturalism.
It is a commonplace that philosophical preferences are cyclical, and that the
runt of the litter in one era may elbow out its competition in later times. Ethical
nonnaturalism, for decades consigned to second-class status, is due a reappraisal.
The nonnaturalism I favor is a brand of moral realism. As I understand it,
moral realism is the view that says that most moral judgments are beliefs,
some of which are true, and, when true, are so by virtue of correctly repres-
enting the existence of truth-makers for their respective contents. Further,
and crucially, true moral judgments are made true in some way other than by
virtue of the attitudes taken towards their content by any actual or idealized
human agent.
My thanks to Paul Bloomfield, whose sense and gentle suasion I too frequently ignored in preparing the final
version of this paper. Thanks also to Terence Cuneo, who gave me a number of incisive criticisms and sug-
gestions for improvement.

Not all nonnaturalisms are realistic—Kantian views, for instance, reject the
assimilation of moral to natural properties, and yet also reject realism. I will
proceed on the assumption (unargued here) that realism is the best path for
nonnaturalists. ¹ After describing nonnaturalism, and identifying the most
serious worries that face it, I will undertake a partial defense against a number
of those problems. My preferred strategy for doing so invokes a parallel
between philosophy in general, and ethics in particular. My contention is that
once we pay special attention to this relationship, a number of the traditional
concerns about nonnaturalism begin to seem less pressing than they have for a
long while.
1. The nature of nonnaturalism
Ethical nonnaturalism is, first and foremost, a metaphysical doctrine. It claims
that there are instantiated moral properties that are not natural properties.