15.docx - 15-1 To Vote or Not to Vote Mr and Mrs Ward...

This preview shows page 1 - 2 out of 3 pages.

15-1 To Vote or Not to Vote Mr. and Mrs. Ward typically vote oppositely in elections and so their votes “cancel each other out.” They each gain two units of utility from a vote for their positions (and lose two units of utility from a vote against their positions). However, the bother of actually voting costs each one unit of utility. Diagram a game in which they choose whether to vote or not to vote. Game Diagram Mrs. Ward Vote Don’t Vote Mr. Ward Vote -1, -1 1,-2 Don’t Vote -2, 1 0,0 The Nash Equilibrium of this diversion is for both Mr. and Mrs. Ward to vote. The table matches the Prisoners Dilemma. It expresses the most exceedingly bad of all potential outcomes as all effectiveness is limited here. If the Wards both choose not to vote it will be the highest return for both of them. 15-3 Compatibility Microsoft and a smaller rival often have to select from one of two competing technologies. The rival always prefers to select the same technology as Microsoft (because compatibility is

  • Left Quote Icon

    Student Picture

  • Left Quote Icon

    Student Picture

  • Left Quote Icon

    Student Picture