Exam 3 ECON.pdf - Name Student Pawprint MICROECONOMICS 1014...

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Exploring Microeconomics
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Chapter 7 / Exercise 010
Exploring Microeconomics
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Name: ___________________ Student #_____________ Pawprint ___________ MICROECONOMICS 1014 EXAM 3 4/18/2018 VERSION: 191 xDo not open the exam until you are told to. xFill in name, student # and pawprint on top of this cover sheet and the scantron sheet. Fill all answers on your scantron. No answers will be accepted unless they have been filled into the scantron. xOnly pencils, erasers, one page of 8.5 x 11 cheat sheet, and a non-graphic calculator may be used on this exam. No other devices are allowed. You cannot use your cell phone during the exam for any reason. Tear this front sheet off and turn it in with your scantron together to the proctor after completing your exam!!! You can keep the exam questions for your own record.
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Exploring Microeconomics
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Chapter 7 / Exercise 010
Exploring Microeconomics
Sexton
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2
3 Version: 191TWAG!!1. Ten farmers, in a society with 100 people, would collectively gain $100,000 from a farm subsidy. All 100 people would pay the $300,000 cost of the subsidy program. Are the farmers willing to lobby the government in support of the subsidy?
2. Which of the following is an example of statistical discrimination?
3. A possible source of why cartels break down is the growth potential of the industry. Although industries with a lot of potential are more willing to invest in the time to form a collusive agreement, such growth potential also deters them from making this investment. Why would that be?
4. Table: Jim, Dan Payoff Table Dan Ice Cream Cake Jim Ice Cream (5, 5)(1, 1) Cake (2, 2)(6, 6) Refer to the table. Jim and Dan are trying to decide on what to have for dessert tonight. What are the Nash Equilibrium strategies for this game? A) Jim and Dan both eat ice cream. B) Jim and Dan both eat ice cream OR Jim and Dan both eat cake. C) Jim and Dan both eat cake. D) Jim eats cake and Dan eats ice cream OR Jim eats ice cream and Dan eats cake.
5. Which of the following is an example of the tragedy of the commons?

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