David Hoggan-The Forced War.pdf - The Forced War When Peaceful Revision Failed David L Hoggan 1961 First published as Der erzwungene Krieg Die Ursachen

David Hoggan-The Forced War.pdf - The Forced War When...

This preview shows page 1 out of 348 pages.

You've reached the end of your free preview.

Want to read all 348 pages?

Unformatted text preview: The Forced War When Peaceful Revision Failed David L. Hoggan 1961 First published as Der erzwungene Krieg Die Ursachen und Urheber des 2. Weltkriegs Verlag der deutschen Hochschullehrer-Zeitung Tübingen, Germany This edition being translated from English First English language edition Institute for Historical Review USA 1989 AAARGH Internet 2007 We are sorry to report that the footnotes are missing in this edition. THE FORCED WAR When Peaceful Revision Failed By David L. Hoggan Published by Institute for Historical Review 18221/2 Newport BI., Suite 191 Costa Mesa, CA 92627 ISBN 0-939484-28-5 1 Table of Contents Introduction Preface Chapter 1: The New Polish State The Anti-Polish Vienna Congress — The 19th Century Polish Uprisings — Pro-German Polish Nationalism — Pro-Russian Polish Nationalism — Pro-Habsburg Polish Nationalism — Pilsudski's Polish Nationalism — Poland in World War I — Polish Expansion After World War I — The Pilsudski Dictatorship — The Polish Dictatorship After Pilsudski's Death Chapter 2: The Roots Of Polish Policy Pilsudski's Inconclusive German Policy — The Career of Jozef Beck — The Hostility between Weimar Germany and Poland — Pilsudski's Plans for Preventive War against Hitler — The 1934 German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact — Beck's Position Strengthened by Pilsudski — Beck's Plan for Preventive War in 1936 — Hitler's Effort to Promote German-Polish Friendship — The Dangers of an Anti-German Policy Chapter 3: The Danzig Problem The Repudiation of Self-Determination at Danzig — The Establishment of the Free City Regime — The Polish Effort to Acquire Danzig — Danzig's Anguish at Separation from Germany — Poland's Desire for a Maritime Role — Hitler's Effort to Prevent Friction at Danzig — The Chauvinism of Polish High Commissioner Chodacki — The Deterioration of the Danzig Situation after 1936 — The Need for a Solution Chapter 4: Germany, Poland, And The Czechs The Bolshevik Threat to Germany and Poland — Hitler's Anti-Bolshevik Foreign Policy — Polish Hostility Toward the Czechs — Polish Grievances and Western Criticism — The Anti-German Policy of Benes — Neurath's Anti-Polish Policy Rejected by Hitler — The German-Polish Minority Pact of 1937 — The Bogey of the Hossbach Memorandum — Hitler's November 1937 Danzig Declaration — Austria as a Czech Buffer Chapter 5: The Road To Munich Hitler's Peaceful Revision Policy in 1938 — The January 1938 Hitler-Beck Conference — The Rise of Joachim von Ribbentrop — The Fall of Kurt von Schuschnigg — The Double Game of Lord Halifax — The Secret War Aspirations of President Roosevelt — The Peace Policy of Georges Bonnet — Litvinov's Hopes for a FrancoGerman War — The Reckless Diplomacy of Eduard Benes — The War Bid of Benes Rejected by Halifax — Hitler's Decision to Liberate the Sudetenland — The Sportpalast Pledge of September 26, 1938 — Hungarian Aspirations in Czechoslovakia — British Encouragement of Polish Defiance at Danzig — Polish Pressure on the Czechs — The Soviet Threat to Poland — The Failure of Benes to Deceive Beck — The Munich Conference — The Polish Ultimatum to Czechoslovakia — German Support to Poland Against the Soviet Union — AngloGerman Treaty Accepted by Hitler Chapter 6: A German Offer To Poland Germany's Perilous Position After Munich — The Inadequacy of German Armament — The Favorable Position of Great Britain — Hitler's Generous Attitude toward Poland — Further Polish Aspirations in Czecho-Slovakia — Continued Czech Hostility toward Poland and Germany — Polish Claims at Oderberg Protected by Hitler — The Failure of Czech-Hungarian Negotiations — Germany's Intentions Probed by Halifax — Beck's Failure to Enlist Rumania Against Czecho-Slovakia — Beck's Request for German Support to Hungary — Hitler's Suggestion for a Comprehensive Settlement — Beck's Delay of the Polish Response — Beck Tempted by British Support Against Germany Chapter 7: German-Polish Friction In 1938 The Obstacles to a German-Polish Understanding — The Polish Passport Crisis —Persecution of the German 2 Minority in Poland — Polish Demonstrations Against Germany — The Outrages at Teschen — The Problem of German Communication with East Prussia — Tension at Danzig — The November 1938 Ribbentrop-Lipski Conference — German Confusion about Polish Intentions — Secret Official Polish Hostility toward Germany — A German-Polish Understanding Feared by Halifax — Poland Endangered by Beck's Diplomacy Chapter 8: British Hostility Toward Germany After Munich Hitler's Bid for British Friendship — Chamberlain's Failure to Criticize Duff Cooper — The British Tories in Fundamental Agreement — Tory and Labour War Sentiment — Control of British Policy by Halifax — Tory Alarmist Tactics — Tory Confidence in War Preparations — Mussolini Frightened by Halifax and Chamberlain — Hitler's Continued Optimism Chapter 9: Franco-German Relations After Munich France an Obstacle to British War Plans — Franco-German Relations After Munich — The Popularity of the Munich Agreement in France — The Popular Front Crisis a Lesson for France — The 1935 Laval Policy Undermined by Vansittart — The Preponderant Position of France Wrecked by Leon Blum — The Daladier Government and the Czech Crisis — The Franco-German Friendship Pact of December 1938 — The Flexible French Attitude After Munich Chapter 10: The German Decision To Occupy Prague The Czech Imperium mortally Wounded at Munich — The Deceptive Czech Policy of Halifax — The Vienna Award a Disappointment to Halifax — New Polish Demands on the Czechs — Czech-German Friction After the German Award — The Czech Guarantee Sabotaged by Halifax — Czech Appeals Ignored by Halifax — Hitler's Support of the Slovak Independence Movement — President Roosevelt Propagandized by Halifax — Halifax Warned of the Approaching Slovak Crisis — Halifax's Decision to Ignore the Crisis — The Climax of the Slovak Crisis — The Hitler-Hacha Pact — Halifax's Challenge to Hitler — Hitler's Generous Treatment of the Czechs after March 1939 — The Propaganda Against Hitler's Czech Policy Chapter 11: Germany And Poland In Early 1939 The Need for a German-Polish Understanding — The Generous German Offer to Poland — The Reasons for Polish Procrastination — Hitler's Refusal to Exert Pressure on Poland — Beck's Deception Toward Germany — The Confiscation of German Property in Poland — German-Polish Conversations at the End of 1938 — The BeckHitler Conference of January 5, 1939 — The Beck-Ribbentrop Conference of January 6, 1939 — German Optimism and Polish Pessimism — The Ribbentrop Visit to Warsaw — Hitler's Reichstag Speech of January 30, 1939 — Polish Concern About French Policy — The German-Polish Pact Scare at London — Anti-German Demonstrations During Ciano's Warsaw Visit — Beck's Announcement of His Visit to London Chapter 12: The Reversal Of British Policy Dropping the Veil of an Insincere Appeasement Policy — British Concern about France — Hitler Threatened by Halifax — Halifax's Dream of a Gigantic Alliance — The Tilea Hoax — Poland Calm about Events in Prague — Beck Amazed by the Tilea Hoax — Chamberlain's Birmingham Speech — The Anglo-French Protest at Berlin — The Withdrawal of the British and French Ambassadors — The Halifax Offer to Poland and the Soviet Union Chapter 13: The Polish Decision To Challenge Germany The Impetuosity of Beck — Beck's Rejection of the Halifax Pro-Soviet Alliance Offer — Lipski Converted to a Pro-German Policy by Ribbentrop — Lipski's Failure to Convert Beck — Beck's Decision for Polish Partial Mobilization — Hitler's Refusal to Take Military Measures — Beck's War Threat to Hitler — Poland Excited by Mobilization — Hitler's Hopes for a Change in Polish Policy — The Roots of Hitler's Moderation Toward Poland Chapter 14: The British Blank Check To Poland Anglo-French Differences — Bonnet's Visit to London — Franco-Polish Differences — Beck's Offer to England — Halifax's Decision Beck's Acceptance of the British Guarantee — The Approval of the Guarantee by the British Parties — The Statement by Chamberlain — The Challenge Accepted by Hitler — Beck's Visit to London 3 — Beck's Satisfaction Chapter 15: The Deterioration Of German-Polish Relations Beck's Inflexible Attitude — Hitler's Cautious Policy — Bonnet's Coolness toward Poland — Beck's Displeasure at Anglo-French Balkan Diplomacy — The Beck-Gafencu Conference — The Roosevelt Telegrams to Hitler and Mussolini — Hitler's Assurances Accepted by Gafencu — Gafencu's Visit to London — Hitler's Friendship with Yugoslavia — Hitler's Reply to Roosevelt of April 28, 1939 — Hitler's Peaceful Intentions Welcomed by Hungary — Beck's Chauvinistic Speech of May 5, 1939 — Polish Intransigence Approved by Halifax Chapter 16: British Policy And Polish Anti-German Incidents Halifax's Threat to Destroy Germany — The Terrified Germans of Poland — Polish Dreams of Expansion — The Lodz Riots — The Kalthof Murder — The Disastrous Kasprzycki Mission — Halifax's Refusal to Supply Poland — Halifax's Contempt for the Pact of Steel — Wohlthat's Futile London Conversations — Polish Provocations at Danzig — Potocki's Effort to Change Polish Policy — Forster's Attempted Danzig Détente — The Axis Peace Plan of Mussolini — The Peace Campaign of Otto Abetz — The Polish Ultimatum to Danzig — Danzig's Capitulation Advised by Hitler — German Military Preparations — Hungarian Peace Efforts — The Day of the Legions in Poland — The Peaceful Inclination of the Polish People Chapter 17: The Belated Anglo-French Courtship Of Russia Soviet Russia as Tertius Gaudens — Russian Detachment Encouraged by the Polish Guarantee — The Soviet Union as a Revisionist Power — The Dismissal of Litvinov — Molotov's Overtures Rejected by Beck — A RussoGerman Understanding Favored by Mussolini — Strang's Mission to Moscow — Hitler's Decision for a Pact with Russia — The British and French Military Missions — The Anglo-French Offer at the Expense of Poland — The Ineptitude of Halifax's Russian Diplomacy Chapter 18: The Russian Decision For A Pact With Germany The Russian Invitation of August 12, 1939 — The Private Polish Peace Plan of Colonel Kava — The Polish Terror in East Upper Silesia — Ciano's Mission to Germany — The Reversal of Italian Policy — Italy's Secret Pledge to Halifax — Soviet Hopes for a Western European War — The Crisis at Danzig — Russian Dilatory Tactics — The Personal Intervention of Hitler — The Complacency of Beck — Ribbentrop's Mission to Moscow — Henderson's Efforts for Peace — Bonnet's Effort to Separate France from Poland — The Stiffening of Polish Anti-German Measures — The Decline of German Opposition to Hitler — Hitler's Desire for a Negotiated Settlement Chapter 19: German Proposals For An Anglo-German Understanding Chamberlain's Letter an Opening for Hitler — Hitler's Reply to Chamberlain — The Mission of Birger Dahlerus — Charles Buxton's Advice to Hitler — The Confusion of Herbert von Dirksen — Hitler's Appeal to the British Foreign Office — Polish-Danzig Talks Terminated by Beck — Confusion in the British Parliament on August 24th — The Roosevelt Messages to Germany and Poland — The German Case Presented by Henderson — Kennard at Warsaw Active for War — The August 25th Göring Message to London — Hitler Disturbed about Italian Policy — Hitler's Alliance Offer to Great Britain — Hitler's Order for Operations in Poland on August 26th — The Announcement of the Formal Anglo-Polish Alliance — Military Operations Cancelled by Hitler Chapter 20: The New German Offer To Poland Halifax Opposed to Polish Negotiations with Germany — The Polish Pledge to President Roosevelt — Hitler's Failure to Recover Italian Support — Halifax Hopeful for War — British Concern About France — The HitlerDaladier Correspondence — Hitler's Desire for Peace Conveyed at London by Dahlerus — Kennard Opposed to German-Polish Talks — The Deceptive British Note of August 28th — Hitler's Hope for a Peaceful Settlement — New Military Measures Planned by Poland — The German Note of August 29th — The German Request for Negotiation with Poland Chapter 21: Polish General Mobilization And German-Polish War Hitler Unaware of British Policy in Poland — General Mobilization Construed as Polish Defiance of Halifax — 4 Hitler's Offer of August 30th to Send Proposals to Warsaw — Hitler's Sincerity Conceded by Chamberlain — Henderson's Peace Arguments Rejected by Halifax — A Peaceful Settlement Favored in France — The Unfavorable British Note of August 30th — The Absence of Trade Rivalry as a Factor for War — The Tentative German Marienwerder Proposals — Hitler's Order for Operations in Poland on September 1st — Beck's Argument with Pope Pius XII — Italian Mediation Favored by Bonnet — The Marienwerder Proposals Defended by Henderson — The Lipski-Ribbentrop Meeting — The Germans Denounced by Poland as Huns Chapter 22: British Rejection Of The Italian Conference Plan And The Outbreak of World War II The German-Polish War — Italian Defection Accepted by Hitler — Polish Intransigence Deplored by Henderson and Attolico — Hitler's Reichstag Speech of September 1, 1939 — Negotiations Requested by Henderson and Dahlerus — Hitler Denounced by Chamberlain and Halifax — Anglo-French Ultimata Rejected by Bonnet — Notes of Protest Drafted by Bonnet — The Italian Mediation Effort — Hitler's Acceptance of an Armistice and a Conference — The Peace Conference Favored by Bonnet — Halifax's Determination to Drive France into War — Ciano Deceived by Halifax — The Mediation Effort Abandoned by Italy — Bonnet Dismayed by Italy's Decision — British Pressure on Daladier and Bonnet — The Collapse of French Opposition to War — The British and French Declarations of War Against Germany — The Unnecessary War Conclusion Appendix Notes Bibliography Index Neither the notes, nor the bibliography nor the index are present in this edition. We apologize for it. aaargh 5 Introduction Shortly after midnight on July 4, 1984, the headquarters of the Institute for Historical Review was attacked by terrorists. They did their job almost to perfection: IHR's office were destroyed, and ninety per cent of its inventory of books and tapes wiped out. To this day the attackers have not been apprehended, and the authorities -- local, state, and federal -- have supplied little indication that they ever will be. The destruction of IHR's offices and stocks meant a crippling blow for Historical Revisionism, the world-wide movement to bring history into accord with the facts in precisely those areas in which it has been distorted to serve the interests of a powerful international Establishment, an Establishment all the more insidious for its pious espousal of freedom of the press. That one of the few independent voices for truth in history on the planet was silenced by flames on America's Independence Day in the year made infamous by George Orwell must have brought a cynical smile to the face of more than one enemy of historical truth: the terrorists, whose national loyalties certainly lie elsewhere than in America, chose the date well. Had IHR succumbed to the arsonists, what a superb validation of the Orwellian dictum: "Who controls the past controls the future. Who controls the present controls the past."! One of the chief casualties of the fire was the text of the book you now hold in your hands. Too badly charred to be reproduced for printing plates, over six hundred pages of The Forced War had to be laboriously reset, reproofed, and recorrected. That this has now been achieved, despite the enormous losses and extra costs imposed by the arson, despite the Institute's dislocation and its continued harassment, legal and otherwise, by the foes of historical truth, represents a great triumph for honest historiography, for The Forced War, more than a quarter century after it was written, remains the classic refutation of the thesis of Germany's "sole guilt" in the origins and outbreak of the Second World War. By attacking one of the chief taboos of our supposedly irreverent and enlightened century, David Hoggan, the author of The Forced War, unquestionably damaged his prospects as a professional academic. Trained as a diplomatic historian at Harvard under William Langer and Michael Karpovich, with rare linguistic qualifications, Hoggan never obtained tenure. Such are the rewards for independent thought, backed by thorough research, in the "land of the free." The Forced War was published in West Germany in 1961 as Der erzwungene Krieg by the Verlag der Deutschen Hochschullehrer-Zeitung (now Grabert Verlag) in Tübingen. There it found an enthusiastic reception among Germans, academics and laymen, who had been oppressed by years of postwar propaganda, imposed by the victor nations and cultivated by the West German government, to the effect that the German leadership had criminally provoked an "aggressive" war in 1939. Der erzwungene Krieg has since gone through thirteen printings and sold over fifty thousand copies. The famous German writer and historian Armin Mohler declared that Hoggan had brought World War II Revisionism out of the ghetto" in Germany. While Der erzwungene Krieg was considered important enough to be reviewed in more than one hundred publications in the Bundesrepublik, West Germany's political and intellectual Establishment, for whom the unique and diabolical evil of Germany in the years 1933-1945 constitutes both foundation myth and dogma, was predictably hostile. A 1964 visit by Hoggan to West Germany was attacked by West Germany's Minister of the Interior, in much the same spirit as West Germany's President Richard von Weizsäcker attempted to decree an end to the so-called Historikerstreit (historians' debate) due to its Revisionist implications in 1988. More than one influential West German historian stooped to ad hominem attack on Hoggan's book, as the American was chided for everything from his excessive youth (Hoggan was nearly forty when the book appeared) to the alleged "paganism" of his German publisher. The most substantive criticism of The Forced War was made by German historians Helmut Krausnick and Hermann Graml, who, in the August 1963 issue of Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht (History in Scholarship and Instruction), attacked the book on grounds of a number of instances of faulty documentation. A Revisionist historian, Professor Kurt Glaser, after examining The Forced War and its critics' arguments in Der Zweite Weltkrieg und die Kriegsschuldfrage (The Second World War and the Question of War Guilt), found, that while some criticisms had merit, "It is hardly necessary to repeat here that Hoggan was not attacked because he had erred here and there -- albeit some of his errors are material -- but because he had committed heresy against the creed of historical orthodoxy." Meanwhile, in the United States, Hoggan and Harry Elmer Barnes, Hoggan's mentor and the most influential American Revisionist scholar and promoter, became embroiled in a dispute over Hoggan's failure to revise The Forced War in the face of the few warranted criticisms. Hoggan, proud and somewhat temperamental, refused to yield, despite a substantial grant arranged for him by Barnes. Barnes's death in 1968 and financial difficulties created an impasse with the original publisher which blocked publication until IHR obtained the rights; IHR's difficulties have been mentioned above. Habent sua fata libelli. Whatever minor flaws in Hoggan's documentation, The Forced War, in the words of Harry Elmer Barnes, written in 1963, "In its present form, ... it not only constitutes the first thorough study of the responsibility for the 6 causes of the Second World War in any language but is likely to remain the definitive Revisionist work on this subject for many years." Hoggan prophesied well: the following quarter century has produced no Revisionist study of the origins of the war to match The Forced War; as for the Establishment's histories regarding Hitler's foreign policy, to quote Professor H.W. Koch of the University of York, Engla...
View Full Document

  • Left Quote Icon

    Student Picture

  • Left Quote Icon

    Student Picture

  • Left Quote Icon

    Student Picture

Stuck? We have tutors online 24/7 who can help you get unstuck.
A+ icon
Ask Expert Tutors You can ask You can ask You can ask (will expire )
Answers in as fast as 15 minutes