Phl 200 9.13.07 - 1 when the person is coerced 2 when the...

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Phl 200 9.13.2007 I. Chisholm’s response to the “I don’t do things to my brain” objection II. Accident objection to Chisholm III. What is the real difference between A just happening and a person agently causing A to happen? IV. Frankfurt Step one: Objection to chisholms view that says agent causation can’t be distinguished from something just happening I am not going to be able to point to anything different in the agent that agently caused it Person is not responsible morally when:
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Unformatted text preview: 1. when the person is coerced 2. when the person is impelled by hypnotic suggestion 3. when an inner compulsion (pathological) drives the person to do what they do Person is responsible when: An important Distinction: 1. what brings about an action (Jones decision) 2. what prevents the person from doing otherwise (Black’s presence) Method of Counterexample: Responsible: Could have done otherwise: Goal: Yes No Jones1 Yes Yes Jones2 No No Jones3 Yes No Jones4 Yes No...
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This note was uploaded on 03/29/2008 for the course PHL 200 taught by Professor Dowell during the Fall '08 term at Michigan State University.

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