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Unformatted text preview: The following readings are permissible to distribute in this electronic format as they are located:
1) In the Public Domain, 2) Through Bellevue University’s subscription databases, or 3) As a
hyperlink freely accessible on the Internet. Contents Week 1-American Values
Thomas Paine-Common Sense
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. - I Have a Dream
Hector St. Jean de Crevecoeur - What is an American?
Henry David Thoreau - Civil Disobedience
Ralph Waldo Emerson - Self-Reliance
Mortimer Adler - The Pursuit of Truth
Week 2-The Origins of American Democracy
Plato-The Republic, Book VII
Plato-Crito
Aristotle-Politics: Book IV
John Locke-Two Treatises of Government
Thomas Jefferson-The Declaration of Independence
Week 3-The Constitution
James Madison-The Bill of Rights
James Madison-The Constitution
Benjamin Franklin-Speech in the Convention
Thomas Jefferson-Letter to James Madison
James Madison-The Federalist Papers #10, #47, #51
Keith E. Whittington - How to Read the Constitution
Scalia vs. Breyer on Supreme Court Judical Review
Michael C. Dorf-Who Killed the ‘Living Constituion?’
Jack M. Balkin-Alive and Kicking: Why No One Truly
Believes in a Dead Constitution Week 1
American Values Common Sense
by Thomas Paine CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
OF THE ORIGIN AND DESIGN OF GOVERNMENT IN GENERAL, WITH
CONCISE REMARKS ON THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION
OF MONARCHY AND HEREDITARY SUCCESSION
THOUGHTS ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AMERICAN AFFAIRS
APPENDIX INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the sentiments contained in the following pages, are not YET sufficiently fashionable to
procure them general favour; a long habit of not thinking a thing WRONG, gives it a superficial
appearance of being RIGHT, and raises at first a formidable outcry in defense of custom. But the
tumult soon subsides. Time makes more converts than reason.
As a long and violent abuse of power, is generally the Means of calling the right of it in question
(and in Matters too which might never have been thought of, had not the Sufferers been
aggravated into the inquiry) and as the King of England hath undertaken in his OWN RIGHT,
to support the Parliament in what he calls THEIRS, and as the good people of this country are
grievously oppressed by the combination, they have an undoubted privilege to inquire into the
pretensions of both, and equally to reject the usurpation of either.
In the following sheets, the author hath studiously avoided every thing which is personal among
ourselves. Compliments as well as censure to individuals make no part thereof. The wise, and
the worthy, need not the triumph of a pamphlet; and those whose sentiments are injudicious, or
unfriendly, will cease of themselves unless too much pains are bestowed upon their conversion.
The cause of America is in a great measure the cause of all mankind. Many circumstances hath,
and will arise, which are not local, but universal, and through which the principles of all Lovers
of Mankind are affected, and in the Event of which, their Affections are interested. The laying a
Country desolate with Fire and Sword, declaring War against the natural rights of all Mankind, and extirpating the Defenders thereof from the Face of the Earth, is the Concern of every Man to
whom Nature hath given the Power of feeling; of which Class, regardless of Party Censure, is the
AUTHOR.
P.S. The Publication of this new Edition hath been delayed, with a View of taking notice (had it
been necessary) of any Attempt to refute the Doctrine of Independance: As no Answer hath yet
appeared, it is now presumed that none will, the Time needful for getting such a Performance
ready for the Public being considerably past.
Who the Author of this Production is, is wholly unnecessary to the Public, as the Object for
Attention is the DOCTRINE ITSELF, not the MAN. Yet it may not be unnecessary to say,
That he is unconnected with any Party, and under no sort of Influence public or private, but the
influence of reason and principle.
Philadelphia, February 14, 1776 OF THE ORIGIN AND DESIGN OF GOVERNMENT IN
GENERAL, WITH CONCISE REMARKS ON THE ENGLISH
CONSTITUTION
Some writers have so confounded society with government, as to leave little or no distinction
between them; whereas they are not only different, but have different origins. Society
is produced by our wants, and government by our wickedness; the former promotes our
POSITIVELY by uniting our affections, the latter NEGATIVELY by restraining our vices. The
one encourages intercourse, the other creates distinctions. The first a patron, the last a punisher.
Society in every state is a blessing, but government even in its best state is but a necessary evil;
in its worst state an intolerable one; for when we suffer, or are exposed to the same miseries
BY A GOVERNMENT, which we might expect in a country WITHOUT GOVERNMENT, our
calamity is heightened by reflecting that we furnish the means by which we suffer. Government,
like dress, is the badge of lost innocence; the palaces of kings are built on the ruins of the bowers
of paradise. For were the impulses of conscience clear, uniform, and irresistibly obeyed, man
would need no other lawgiver; but that not being the case, he finds it necessary to surrender up
a part of his property to furnish means for the protection of the rest; and this he is induced to do
by the same prudence which in every other case advises him out of two evils to choose the least.
WHEREFORE, security being the true design and end of government, it unanswerably follows,
that whatever FORM thereof appears most likely to ensure it to us, with the least expense and
greatest benefit, is preferable to all others. In order to gain a clear and just idea of the design and end of government, let us suppose a
small number of persons settled in some sequestered part of the earth, unconnected with the
rest, they will then represent the first peopling of any country, or of the world. In this state of
natural liberty, society will be their first thought. A thousand motives will excite them thereto, the
strength of one man is so unequal to his wants, and his mind so unfitted for perpetual solitude,
that he is soon obliged to seek assistance and relief of another, who in his turn requires the same.
Four or five united would be able to raise a tolerable dwelling in the midst of a wilderness, but
one man might labour out of the common period of life without accomplishing any thing; when
he had felled his timber he could not remove it, nor erect it after it was removed; hunger in the
mean time would urge him from his work, and every different want call him a different way.
Disease, nay even misfortune would be death, for though neither might be mortal, yet either
would disable him from living, and reduce him to a state in which he might rather be said to
perish than to die.
Thus necessity, like a gravitating power, would soon form our newly arrived emigrants into
society, the reciprocal blessings of which, would supersede, and render the obligations of law
and government unnecessary while they remained perfectly just to each other; but as nothing but
heaven is impregnable to vice, it will unavoidably happen, that in proportion as they surmount
the first difficulties of emigration, which bound them together in a common cause, they will
begin to relax in their duty and attachment to each other; and this remissness will point out the
necessity of establishing some form of government to supply the defect of moral virtue.
Some convenient tree will afford them a State-House, under the branches of which, the whole
colony may assemble to deliberate on public matters. It is more than probable that their first laws
will have the title only of REGULATIONS, and be enforced by no other penalty than public
disesteem. In this first parliament every man, by natural right, will have a seat.
But as the colony increases, the public concerns will increase likewise, and the distance at which
the members may be separated, will render it too inconvenient for all of them to meet on every
occasion as at first, when their number was small, their habitations near, and the public concerns
few and trifling. This will point out the convenience of their consenting to leave the legislative
part to be managed by a select number chosen from the whole body, who are supposed to have
the same concerns at stake which those who appointed them, and who will act in the same
manner as the whole body would act, were they present. If the colony continues increasing,
it will become necessary to augment the number of the representatives, and that the interest
of every part of the colony may be attended to, it will be found best to divide the whole into
convenient parts, each part sending its proper number; and that the ELECTED might never form
to themselves an interest separate from the ELECTORS, prudence will point out the propriety of
having elections often; because as the ELECTED might by that means return and mix again with
the general body of the ELECTORS in a few months, their fidelity to the public will be secured by the prudent reflection of not making a rod for themselves. And as this frequent interchange
will establish a common interest with every part of the community, they will mutually and
naturally support each other, and on this (not on the unmeaning name of king) depends the
STRENGTH OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE HAPPINESS OF THE GOVERNED.
Here then is the origin and rise of government; namely, a mode rendered necessary by the
inability of moral virtue to govern the world; here too is the design and end of government, viz.
freedom and security. And however our eyes may be dazzled with show, or our ears deceived by
sound; however prejudice may warp our wills, or interest darken our understanding, the simple
voice of nature and of reason will say, it is right.
I draw my idea of the form of government from a principle in nature, which no art can overturn,
viz. that the more simple any thing is, the less liable it is to be disordered; and the easier repaired
when disordered; and with this maxim in view, I offer a few remarks on the so much boasted
constitution of England. That it was noble for the dark and slavish times in which it was erected,
is granted. When the world was overrun with tyranny the least remove therefrom was a glorious
rescue. But that it is imperfect, subject to convulsions, and incapable of producing what it seems
to promise, is easily demonstrated.
Absolute governments (tho’ the disgrace of human nature) have this advantage with them, that
they are simple; if the people suffer, they know the head from which their suffering springs,
know likewise the remedy, and are not bewildered by a variety of causes and cures. But the
constitution of England is so exceedingly complex, that the nation may suffer for years together
without being able to discover in which part the fault lies; some will say in one and some in
another, and every political physician will advise a different medicine.
I know it is difficult to get over local or long standing prejudices, yet if we will suffer ourselves
to examine the component parts of the English constitution, we shall find them to be the base
remains of two ancient tyrannies, compounded with some new republican materials. FIRST - The remains of monarchial tyranny in the person of the king.
SECONDLY - The remains of aristocratical tyranny in the persons of the peers.
THIRDLY - The new republican materials in the persons of the commons,on whose virtue
depends the freedom of England. The two first, by being hereditary, are independent of the people; wherefore in a CONSTITUTIONAL SENSE they contribute nothing towards the freedom of the state.
To say that the constitution of England is a UNION of three powers reciprocally CHECKING
each other, is farcical, either the words have no meaning, or they are flat contradictions.
To say that the commons is a check upon the king, presupposes two things:
FIRST - That the king is not to be trusted without being looked after, or in other words, that a
thirst for absolute power is the natural disease of monarchy.
SECONDLY - That the commons, by being appointed for that purpose, are either wiser or more
worthy of confidence than the crown.
But as the same constitution which gives the commons a power to check the king by withholding
the supplies, gives afterwards the king a power to check the commons, by empowering him to
reject their other bills; it again supposes that the king is wiser than those whom it has already
supposed to be wiser than him. A mere absurdity!
There is something exceedingly ridiculous in the composition of monarchy; it first excludes
a man from the means of information, yet empowers him to act in cases where the highest
judgment is required. The state of a king shuts him from the world, yet the business of a king
requires him to know it thoroughly; wherefore the different parts, by unnaturally opposing and
destroying each other, prove the whole character to be absurd and useless.
Some writers have explained the English constitution thus: The king, say they, is one, the people
another; the peers are a house in behalf of the king, the commons in behalf of the people; but
this hath all the distinctions of a house divided against itself; and though the expressions be
pleasantly arranged, yet when examined, they appear idle and ambiguous; and it will always
happen, that the nicest construction that words are capable of, when applied to the description
of some thing which either cannot exist, or is too incomprehensible to be within the compass of
description, will be words of sound only, and though they may amuse the ear, they cannot inform
the mind, for this explanation includes a previous question, viz. HOW CAME THE KING BY
A POWER WHICH THE PEOPLE ARE AFRAID TO TRUST, AND ALWAYS OBLIGED TO
CHECK? Such a power could not be the gift of a wise people, neither can any power, WHICH
NEEDS CHECKING, be from God; yet the provision, which the constitution makes, supposes
such a power to exist.
But the provision is unequal to the task; the means either cannot or will not accomplish the end,
and the whole affair is a felo de se; for as the greater weight will always carry up the less, and as
all the wheels of a machine are put in motion by one, it only remains to know which power in the constitution has the most weight, for that will govern; and though the others, or a part of them,
may clog, or, as the phrase is, check the rapidity of its motion, yet so long as they cannot stop it,
their endeavours will be ineffectual; the first moving power will at last have its way, and what it
wants in speed, is supplied by time.
That the crown is this overbearing part in the English constitution, needs not be mentioned, and
that it derives its whole consequence merely from being the giver of places and pensions, is selfevident, wherefore, though we have been wise enough to shut and lock a door against absolute
monarchy, we at the same time have been foolish enough to put the crown in possession of the
key.
The prejudice of Englishmen in favour of their own government by king, lords, and commons,
arises as much or more from national pride than reason. Individuals are undoubtedly safer in
England than in some other countries, but the WILL of the king is as much the LAW of the land
in Britain as in France, with this difference, that instead of proceeding directly from his mouth, it
is handed to the people under the more formidable shape of an act of parliament. For the fate of
Charles the First hath only made kings more subtle—not more just.
Wherefore, laying aside all national pride and prejudice in favour of modes and forms, the plain
truth is, that IT IS WHOLLY OWING TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE, AND
NOT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT, that the crown is not as oppressive
in England as in Turkey.
An inquiry into the CONSTITUTIONAL ERRORS in the English form of government is at this
time highly necessary; for as we are never in a proper condition of doing justice to others, while
we continue under the influence of some leading partiality, so neither are we capable of doing it
to ourselves while we remain fettered by any obstinate prejudice. And as a man, who is attached
to a prostitute, is unfitted to choose or judge a wife, so any prepossession in favour of a rotten
constitution of government will disable us from discerning a good one. OF MONARCHY AND HEREDITARY SUCCESSION
Mankind being originally equals in the order of creation, the equality could only be destroyed
by some subsequent circumstance; the distinctions of rich, and poor, may in a great measure be
accounted for, and that without having recourse to the harsh, ill-sounding names of oppression
and avarice. Oppression is often the CONSEQUENCE, but seldom or never the MEANS of
riches; and though avarice will preserve a man from being necessitously poor, it generally makes
him too timorous to be wealthy. But there is another and greater distinction, for which no truly natural or religious reason can
be assigned, and that is, the distinction of men into KINGS and SUBJECTS. Male and female
are the distinctions of nature, good and bad the distinctions of heaven; but how a race of men
came into the world so exalted above the rest, and distinguished like some new species, is worth
inquiring into, and whether they are the means of happiness or of misery to mankind.
In the early ages of the world, according to the scripture chronology, there were no kings; the
consequence of which was, there were no wars; it is the pride of kings which throw mankind into
confusion. Holland without a king hath enjoyed more peace for this last century than any of the
monarchial governments in Europe. Antiquity favours the same remark; for the quiet and rural
lives of the first patriarchs hath a happy something in them, which vanishes away when we come
to the history of Jewish royalty.
Government by kings was first introduced into the world by the Heathens, from whom the
children of Israel copied the custom. It was the most prosperous invention the Devil ever set on
foot for the promotion of idolatry. The Heathens paid divine honours to their deceased kings,
and the Christian world hath improved on the plan, by doing the same to their living ones. How
impious is the title of sacred majesty applied to a worm, who in the midst of his splendor is
crumbling into dust!
As the exalting one man so greatly above the rest cannot be justified on the equal rights of
nature, so neither can it be defended on the authority of scripture; for the will of the Almighty,
as declared by Gideon and the prophet Samuel, expressly disapproves of government by kings.
All anti-monarchical parts of scripture have been very smoothly glossed over in monarchical
governments, but they undoubtedly merit the attention of countries which have their
governments yet to form. RENDER UNTO CAESAR THE THINGS WHICH ARE CAESAR’S
is the scripture doctrine of courts, yet it is no support of monarchical government, for the Jews at
that time were without a king, and in a state of vassalage to the Romans.
Now three thousand years passed away from the Mosaic account of the creation, till the Jews
under a national delusion requested a king. Till then their form of government (except in
extraordinary cases, where the Almighty interposed) was a kind of republic administered by a
judge and the elders of the tribes. Kings they had none, and it was held sinful to acknowledge
any being under that title but the Lord of Hosts. And when a man seriously reflects on the
idolatrous homage which is paid to the persons of kings, he need not wonder that the Almighty,
ever jealous of his honour, should disapprove of a form of government which so impiously
invades the prerogative of heaven.
Monarchy is ranked in scripture as one of the sins of the Jews, for which a curse in reserve is
denounced against them. The history of that transaction is worth attending to. The children of Israel being oppressed by the Midiani...
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