Unformatted text preview: SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
G.R. No. 128781 August 6, 2002 TERESITA N. DE LEON, ZENAIDA C. NICOLAS and
the HEIRS OF ANTONIO NICOLAS, petitioners,
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PABLO P.
INVENTOR and RAMON NICOLAS, respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court which prays that the Decision
dated February 28, 1997 and the Resolution dated April 3,
1997 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
42958,1 be set aside; and, that another judgment be
entered ordering the Presiding Judge of Branch 123 of the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City to give due course to
petitioners’ notice of appeal, to approve their record on
appeal and to elevate the records of Sp. Proc. No. C-1679
to respondent appellate court for further proceedings.
The factual background:
Herein petitioner Teresita N. de Leon was appointed
administratrix of the estate of Rafael C. Nicolas in
Sp. Proc. No. C-1679, entitled, "In the Matter of the
Intestate Estate of Rafael C. Nicolas". Said case was
subsequently consolidated with Sp. Proc No. C-18102 and
Civil Case No. C-17407.3 Deceased spouses Rafael and
Salud Nicolas were the parents of petitioner Teresita
N. de Leon, Estrellita N. Vizconde, Antonio Nicolas (deceased husband of petitioner Zenaida Nicolas and
predecessor of the petitioners Heirs of Antonio Nicolas),
Ramon Nicolas and Roberto Nicolas.
On September 19, 1994, private respondent Ramon G.
Nicolas, an oppositor–applicant in the intestate
proceedings, filed a "Motion for Collation," claiming
that deceased Rafael Nicolas, during his lifetime,
had given the following real properties to his
children by gratuitous title and that administratrixpetitioner Teresita failed to include the same in the
inventory of the estate of the decedent:
"1. Title No. T-36734 Title No. T-40333 Title No. T-36989
Title No. T-36987 T-33658 T-68554 T-10907
On September 27, 1994, the RTC issued an Order directing
Ramon "to submit pertinent documents relative to the
transfer of the properties from the registered owners
during their lifetime for proper determination of the court
if such properties should be collated, and set it for hearing
with notice to the present registered owners to show cause
why their properties may not be included in the collation
of properties."5
On October 10, 1994, respondent Ramon filed an
Amended Motion for Collation specifying the properties to
be collated and attaching to said motion, the documents
in support thereof, to
A comparison with the original motion for collation reveals
that the amended motion refers to the same real properties enumerated in the original except Nos. 6 and 7
above which are not found in the original motion.
On November 11, 1994, the RTC issued an Order, to wit:
"Acting on the Amended Motion for Collation filed by
oppositor-applicant Ramon G. Nicolas and the comment
thereto filed by petitioner-administratrix, the Court finds
the following properties to be collated to the estate
properties under present administration,
"Accordingly, the Administratrix is hereby ordered to
include the foregoing properties which were received from
the decedent for collation in the instant probate
proceedings.
"Amended Motion for Collation" were ordered included for
collation.
On November 18, 1994, petitioner Teresita N. de Leon
filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the
properties subject of the Order "were already titled
in their names years ago"8 and that titles may not
be collaterally attacked in a motion for collation. On
February 23, 1995, the RTC issued an Order denying
said motion, ruling that it is within the jurisdiction
of the court to determine whether titled properties
should be collated,9citing Section 2, Rule 90 of the
Rules of Court which provides that the final order
of the court concerning questions as to
advancements made shall be binding on the person
raising the question and on the heir. Petitioner Teresita N. de Leon filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order dated February 23,
199510 which respondent opposed.11
On July 18, 1995, the RTC issued an Order "that the issue
of collation of the properties of the deceased Rafael
Nicolas which were disposed by the latter long before his
death. The oppositor-applicant Ramon Nicolas should
prove to the satisfaction of the Court whether the
properties disposed of by the late Rafael Nicolas before
the latter’s death was gratuitous or for valuable
consideration. The Court believes that he or she who
asserts should prove whether the disposition of the
properties was gratuitously made or for valuable
consideration.
On November 4, 1996, the RTC removed petitioner
from her position as administratrix on ground of
conflict of interest considering her claim that she
paid valuable consideration for the subject
properties acquired by her from their deceased
father and therefore the same should not be
included in the collation;13 and, ordered the
hearing on the collation of properties covered by
TCT No. T-V-1211 and T-V-1210 only.14
On November 28, 1996, acting on the impression that the
collation of the real properties enumerated in the Order
dated November 11, 1994 is maintained by the RTC,
petitioner Teresita N. de Leon filed a Motion for
Reconsideration praying that her appointment as
administratrix be maintained; and that the
properties covered by TCT Nos. T-36989, T-33658, T-36987, T-40333, T-10907 and a portion of TCT
No. T-13206 described as Lot 4-A with 4,009
square meters be declared and decreed as the
exclusive properties of the registered owners
mentioned therein and not subject to collation.15
The RTC denied said motion in its Order dated December
23, 1996.16
Whether or not the decision of the RTC on collating the properties has already become final for failure of petitioners to appeal Whether the RTC & CA erred in finding that respondent is not unsuitable for appointment as guardian of the
persons and property of Julieta; Petitioners claim that: private respondent never presented
any document to prove that the properties transferred by
their deceased parents to petitioners are by gratuitous
title; private respondent never notified petitioner of any
hearing on said documents to give them opportunity to
show cause why their properties should not be collated;
the assailed Order dated November 11, 1994 is arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical, confiscatory, depriving them of due
process; the said order is interlocutory in nature and
therefore non-appealable; the properties acquired by
petitioner Teresita N. de Leon and her deceased brother
Antonio Nicolas, married to petitioner Zenaida C. Nicolas
and their children, were sold to them as evidenced by
public documents; and, the properties were already titled
in their respective names or sold to third persons.
Private respondent contends that: due process has been
afforded the petitioners when the RTC resolved the issue
of collation of the subject properties after hearing;
petitioner deliberately omitted certain material facts in the petition to mislead the Court because petitioners were
actually given at least three (3) times the opportunity to
ventilate and oppose the issue of collation; as stated by
the appellate court in the Resolution promulgated on
February 10, 1997, both parties affirmed that the RTC had
proceeded to conduct hearings on January 21 and 28,
1997 as originally scheduled; presentation of evidence had
been terminated and the twin issues of the appointment
of a new administratrix and the collation of two (2)
properties covered by TCT No. T-V-1210 and T-V-1211
were already submitted for resolution to the court
below;20 subject properties are collatable under Articles
1601 and 1071 of the Civil Code and Section 2 of Rule 90
of the Rules of Court and the ruling in Guinguing v. Abuton
and Abuton, 48 Phil. 144; petitioner failed to present
evidence that there was valuable consideration for these
properties and failed to rebut the evidence that petitioners
do not have the financial capability to pay for these
properties as evidenced by the testimony of credible
witnesses who are relatives of spouses decedents.
We find the petition partly meritorious.
Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals that the
Order of November 11, 1994 had become final for failure
of petitioners to appeal therefrom in due time, we hold
that said Order is interlocutory in nature. Our
pronouncement in Garcia v. Garcia supports this ruling:
"The court which acquires jurisdiction over the
properties of a deceased person through the filing
of the corresponding proceedings, has supervision
and control over the said properties, and under the
said power, it is its inherent duty to see that the inventory submitted by the administrator
appointed by it contains all the properties, rights
and credits which the law requires the
administrator to set out in his inventory. In
compliance with this duty the court has also
inherent power to determine what properties,
rights and credits of the deceased should be
included in or excluded from the inventory. Should
an heir or person interested in the properties of a
deceased person duly call the court’s attention to
the fact that certain properties, rights or credits
have been left out in the inventory, it is likewise the
court’s duty to hear the observations, with power
to determine if such observations should be
attended to or not and if the properties referred to
therein belong prima facie to the intestate, but no
such determination is final and ultimate in nature
as
to
the
ownership
of
the
said
21
properties." (Emphasis supplied)
A probate court, whether in a testate or intestate
proceeding,22 can only pass upon questions of title
provisionally.23 The rationale therefor and the
proper recourse of the aggrieved party are
expounded in Jimenez v. Court of Appeals:
"The patent reason is the probate court’s limited
jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title
or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion
from the inventory of the property, can only be
settled in a separate action. "All that the said court could do as regards said
properties is determine whether they should or
should not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator.
If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the
opposing parties and the administrator have to
resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title
because the probate court cannot do so."24
Further, In Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, we held:
"[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings
whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of
the estate and which are claimed to belong to
outside parties. All that the said court could do as
regards said properties is to determine whether they
should or should not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator. If
there is no dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the
parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have
to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of
the conflicting claims of title because the probate court
cannot do so."25
Guided by the above jurisprudence, it is clear that
the Court of Appeals committed an error in
considering the assailed Order dated November 11,
1994 as final or binding upon the heirs or third
persons who dispute the inclusion of certain properties in the intestate estate of the deceased
Rafael Nicolas. Under the foregoing rulings of the
Court, any aggrieved party, or a third person for
that matter, may bring an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims.
Private respondent’s reliance on Section 2, Rule 90 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
"SEC. 2. Questions as to advancement to be determined. –
Questions as to advancement made, or alleged to have
been made, by the deceased to any heir may be heard and
determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall
be binding on the person raising the question and on the
heir."
in support of his claim that the assailed Order is a final
order and therefore appealable and that due to petitioners’
failure to appeal in due time, they are now bound by said
Order, is not feasible.
What seems to be a conflict between the above-quoted
Rule and the afore–discussed jurisprudence that the
Order in question is an interlocutory and not a final
order is more apparent than real. This is because
the questioned Order was erroneously referred to
as an order of collation both by the RTC and the
appellate court. For all intents and purposes, said
Order is a mere order including the subject
properties in the inventory of the estate of the
decedent.
The Court held in Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of
Appeals26 that the order of exclusion (or inclusion) is not a final order; that it is interlocutory in the sense
that it did not settle once and for all the title to the
subject lots; that the prevailing rule is that for the
purpose of determining whether a certain property
should or should not be included in the inventory,
the probate court may pass upon the title thereto
but such determination is not conclusive and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action
regarding ownership which may be instituted by
the parties.
In the Rodriguez case, the Court distinguished between an
order of collation and an order of exclusion from or
inclusion in the estate’s inventory, thus:
"We hold further that the dictum of the Court of Appeals
and the probate court that the two disputed lots are not
subject to collation was a supererogation and was not
necessary to the disposition of the case which merely
involved the issue of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
inventory of the testator’s estate. The issue of collation
was not yet justiciable at that early stage of the testate
proceeding. It is not necessary to mention in the order of
exclusion the controversial matter of collation.
"Whether collation may exist with respect to the two lots
and whether Mrs. Rustia’s Torrens titles thereto are
indefeasible are matters that may be raised later or may
not be raised at all. How those issues should be resolved,
if and when they are raised, need not be touched upon in
the adjudication of this appeal. "The intestate and testate proceedings for the settlement
of the estates of the deceased Valero spouses were
consolidated, as ordered by the lower court on November
21, 1974, so that the conjugal estate of the deceased
spouses may be properly liquidated, as contemplated in
section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court and Act No. 3176.
"We have examined the expedientes of the two cases. We
found that the proceedings have not yet reached the stage
when the question of collation or advancement to an heir
may be raised and decided. The numerous debts of the
decedents are still being paid. The net remainder
(remanente liquido) of their conjugal estate has not yet
been determined. On the other hand, up to this time, no
separate action has been brought by the appellants to
nullify Mrs. Rustia’s Torrens titles to the disputed lots or to
show that the sale was in reality a donation.
"In this appeal, it is not proper to pass upon the question
of collation and to decide whether Mrs. Rustia’s titles to
the disputed lots are questionable. The proceedings below
have not reached the stage of partition and distribution
when the legitimes of the compulsory heirs have to be
determined."27
In the light of the foregoing, Section 2, Rule 90 should be
interpreted in the context of Section 1 of the same Rule,
to wit:
"Section 1. When order for distribution of residue made. –
When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of
administration, the allowance to the widow, and
inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in
accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the
application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice,
shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons
entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or
parts, to which each is entitled, and such person may
demand and recover their respective shares from the
executor or administrator, or any other person having the
same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the
court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person
or as to the distributive shares to which each person is
entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and
decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment
of the obligations above mentioned has been made
or provided for, unless the distributes, or any of
them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court,
conditioned for the payment of said obligations
within such time as the court directs."
Based thereon, we find that what the parties and the lower
courts have perceived to be as an Order of Collation is
nothing more than an order of inclusion in the inventory
of the estate which, as we have already discussed, is an
interlocutory order. The motion for collation was filed with
the probate court at the early stage of the intestate estate
proceedings. We have examined the records of the case
and we found no indication that the debts of the decedents
spouses have been paid and the net remainder of the
conjugal estate have already been determined, and the
estates of the deceased spouses at the time filing of the
motion for collation were ready for partition and
distribution. In other words, the issue on collation is still
premature. And even if we consider, en arguendo, that said assailed
Order is a collation order and a final order, still, the same
would have no force and effect upon the parties. It is a
hornbook doctrine that a final order is appealable. As such,
the Order should have expressed therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the laws on which it is based as
mandated by Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, which
provides:
"SEC. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a
decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied
without stating the legal basis therefore."
An examination of the subject Order as quoted
earlier,28 readily reveals that the presiding Judge failed to
comply with the said constitutional mandate. The assailed
Order did not state the reasons for ordering the collation
of the properties enumerated therein. The Order simply
directed the inclusion of certain real properties in the
estate of the deceased. It did not declare that the
properties enumerated therein were given to the children
of the deceased gratuitously, despite the title in the
children’s names or deeds of sale in their favor. Moreover,
in his Comment, private respondent makes mention of the
testimonies of his witnesses but these were not even
mentioned in the Order of November 11, 1994. Petitioner
would have been deprived of due process as they would
be divested of the opportunity of being able to point out
in a motion for reconsideration or on appeal, any errors of facts and/or law considering that there were no facts or
laws cited in support of the assailed Order of collation. As
a final Order, it is, on its face patently null and void. It
could have never become final. A void judgment is not
entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment, but
may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any
tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it.29 For it
to be considered as a valid final order, the RTC must then
first rule and state in its order whether the properties
covered by TCT Nos. T-36734, T-36989, T-33658, T36987, T-40333, T-10907 and the 4,009 square meter lot
were acquired by petitioners from th...
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