13 Multilateralism and Collective Action

13 Multilateralism and Collective Action - Multilateral vs...

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Unformatted text preview: Multilateral vs. Unilateral Solutions to National Security & Political Economy: The Dilemma of Collective Goods The Question of the day: Is it better to pursue ones national security or political economy by ,,going it alone, or through cooperation with other states? What are the pros and cons of unilateral and multilateral approaches? In order to answer these properly, we first need to think about the abstract problem of collective action. Collective Action: A Paradox As individuals we care about a good But we fail to organize as a group to provide for that good We may fail to provide a public good even if all of the interested parties prefer having the public good to not having it. Dismantling the Social Trap How do we define a collective good? Non-excludability Jointness of supply Excludable vs. non-excludable goods. How can we think of security as a collective good? How can we think of non-security collective goods? Logic of collective action and provision of collective goods: If Ci is the costs, GBi is the gross benefits to individual i, then the utility to i for contributing is: NBi = GBi Ci. There is an incentive to contribute to the group when: NBi > 0 More importantly, there is an incentive to join the group when the benefits outweigh going it alone: NBi(c)> NBi(a) Where NBi(a) = B(a)i-C(a)I Free Riding But, there is also an incentive to "freeride" if there is an expectation of receiving the collective good without contributing: NBi + Ci = GBi What are some examples? The Classic Tragedy of the Commons Global Warming (Kyoto Protocol) Collective Security (Sudan) Overcoming the Problem & Explaining Unexpected Public Goods Compulsion/Leadership Hegemonic Stability after World War II Californias adoption of Kyoto Protocol Standards U.S. Foreign Aid Budget European Union Seems to require a bit of Compulsion/Leadership too Small Groups vs. Large Groups Selective Incentives Entrepreneurship Group Size ...
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This note was uploaded on 03/31/2008 for the course POLI 150 taught by Professor Mosley during the Spring '08 term at UNC.

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