Kupchan_The End of the West and Moisi_Reinventing the West

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Unformatted text preview: THE END OF lI'IIIE WEST 2720 next clam Mobilization; will be no! (Bantam {/29 HIE-rt and MT res-r out betwem [Inc United States and Ezrmpe—anr/Amm‘imm remain [w'gegy alt/inimit- he American cm appears to be alive and well. The U.S. economy is more than twice the size of the next biggest— Japan's—and the United States spends more on defense than the world‘s other major powers combined. China is regularly identified as America’s next challenger, but it is decades away From entering the top ranks. The terrorist attacks in New York and at least four other countries are ex- pected to join in 2004'). it will become a formidable counterweight to the United States on the world stage. The transatlantic rivalry that has already begun will inevitably Intensify. Centers of power by their nature compete for position. influence. and prestige. The coming clash between the United States and the Eu- E U R0 PE and Washin ton ccrtaml i to can Union will doubtless ' ‘IIIIIIS A. punctured the sense of secu- bear little Jcscmblancc to the Kuhn-lull rity that aiose from the end of the Cold War and the tri- umph of the West, but they have done little to compromise U.S. hegemony. Indeed. they have reawakcned America’s appetite for global engagement. At least for the foreseeable future. the United States will continue to ct'tjoy primacy. taking on Islamic terrorism even as it keeps a watchful eye on China. That encapsulates the conventional wisdom-and it is woefully off the mark. Not only is American primacy far less durable than it appears, but it is already beginning to diminish. And the rising challenger is not China or the Islamic world but the European Union. an emerging polity that is in the process of marshaling the impressive resources and historical ambitions of Europe’s separate nation-states. The Ellis annual economic output has reached about $8 trillion. compared with America’s $10 trillion. and the euro will soon threaten the dollar”s global dominance. Europe is strengthening its collective consciousness and character and forging a clearer sense of interests and values that are quite distinct from those of the United States. The EU’s member states are debating the adoption oi'a Europe-wide constitution (a move favored by two thirds of the union‘s population), building armed forces capable of operating independently of the U.S. military, and striving to project a single voice in the diplomatic arena. As the. EU fortifies its governmental institutions and takes in new members (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, 42 THE AtLANnC MONTHLY all-consuming standofi' of the Cold Wat: Although military confrontation remains a remote prospect, however. U.S.-EU competition will ex- tend far beyond the realm ol‘uadc. The US. Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank are destined to vie for control of the international monetary system. Washington and Brussels will just as likely lock horns over the Middle East. Europe will resist Hither than back- stop U.S. leadership, perhaps paralyzing the World Bank, the United Nations. and other institutions that since World War ll have relied on transatlantic coopera- tion to function effectively. An ascendant EU will surely test its muscle against America, especially if the. unilateralist bent in US. foreign policy continues. A oncc. united West appears well on its way to separating into competing halves. or the moment America remains largely oblivious to the challenges posed by a rising Europe. Policymakers in. Washington tend to view the EU as at best an impressive trade bloc. and at worst a collection of feckless allies that regularly complain about America‘s heavy hand even as they do little to bear the burdens of common defense. Moreover. most American foreign-policy experts presume that were the EU to realize its full potential as a political and economic power. the geopolitical consequences would be minimal: entity among the Atlantic democracies has been a well-entrenched fact of life, an apparently unalterablc product ofsharcd history and values. That the EU and the United States might part ways would seem to border on the unthinkable. These presumptions are dangerous illusions. To be sure. Europe is not a centralized federation. and its integra- tion is proceeding in fits and starts. But political entities that take shape by stitching together previously separate states always emerge tentatively. The. United States lmgan as a loose confed- eration in I781. After that formula proved tor) weak to sustain the Union, America opted for a tighter federation in 1789. It then took roughly a hundred years—not to mention a bloody civil war—for the Union to strengthen its governing bodies. nurture a national identity that transcendch state loyalties. and project a geopolitical voice beyond its neighborhood. Europe has been working at political union for about five. decades—and faces many hurdles in the years ahead. But the EU is already coming of age as a collective force; it is on. if not well ahead of. schedule. History also provides ample warning of the trouble likely to accompany a division such as the one that the West is now starting to experience. Consider the fate of the Roman Empire after Diocletian decided. at the end of the third century. to split the realm into eastern and westem halves. leading to the establislmtent ofa second capital. in Byzantium—which Constantine elected to rename Constantinople in 324. De- spite their shared hctitage. Rome and Constantinople became rivals: a com- mon religion fell prey to lasting dis- putes over authority and doctrine, and imperial unity gave way to bloodshed and the demise of Roman role. As Byzantium did with Rome when it separated [loin its former overseer. the EU is making a run at the United States. And just as the Byzantines and the Romans parted ways over values and interests, so have the Europeans and the Americans. The two sides of the Atlantic follow different social models. Despite recent deregulation across Europe. Americas laissez—fairc capitalism NOVEM BER 2002 still contrasts sharply with Europe’s more centralized approach. Whereas Americans decry the. constraints. on growrh that stem. from the European model. Europeans look askance at Ameritst“s income inequalities. its con- sumerism. and its readiness to sacrifice social capital For material gain. The two have also parted company on matters ol'statecrali. Americans still live by the miles of realpolitik. viewing military threat. coercion. and war as essential tools of" diplomacy. in contrast. Europeans by and large have spent the past fifty years trying to tame. interna» tionai politics. settng aside guns in favor of the rule of law. On July 1, while the EU was celebrating the launch of the international Criminal Court. the Bush Administration was announcing its in- tention to withdraw US. Forces from Bosnia unless they were granted im- munity from the court‘s jurisdiction. Europeans see Americas reliance on the use of Force as simplistic. self-serving. and a product of its excessive power; Americans see the EUs firm commit- ment to multilateral institutions as naive. self-righteous, and a product of its militath weakness. Americans and Europeans still enjoy an afl‘uiity arising from historical ties and democratic traditions. But even this is wearing thin. As a mold-ethnic inimi' grant nation, America has begun to wonder about a Europe that remains hostile to immigrants despite its Sl'll'il'lii- ing population, and that Falls prey to bouts of intolerance and anti-Semitism. Europeans in turn. take a dim view of an America wedded to gun ownership and capital punishment. At root. America and Europe are driven by different po- litical cultures. And the cultural distance appears to be widening. not closing. putting the two sides of the Atlantic on diverging social paths. As the. EU continues to rise. its eco- nomic and political interests are likely to collide fi‘equently with those ofthe United States. intensifying the ill will. Airbus recently surpassed Boeing as the world‘s THE AGENDA leading supplier of commercial aircraft. and Nokia is the top producer of cell phones: they are only two of many European companies that are now hosting their US. competitors. in 2000 Britain and France each ranked ahead of the United States in the. value of corporate international acquisitions. German companies have. been expand- ing as well; in 1998 Bertelsmann bought Random House and Daimler-Benz bought Cluysler. Much of the investment capital that buoyed the US. economy in the IQQOS has lately been heading; to the other side of the Atlantic, enabling the euro to gain ground against the dollar and increasing the likelihood that the EU will soon enjoy substantial increases in produuivity and growth. These economic successes are im- pressive in their own right but there is more to them than meets the eye. From the outset European economic integra- tion has been a daring experiment aimed at politically binding together the Con- tit tent-s long-warring nations. And the intended effects are now visible. Driving across the border from Germany to France is like driving from Virginia to Maryland: no passport control. no cus- toms. no currency exchange. The EU in 1999 appointed its first foreign—policy thief. who has been busy overseeing" the creation of the uniorfs new military Forces even as he pursues diplomatic agendas in the Balkans, the Middle East. and other trouble spots. And the union decided earlier this year to construct its own satellite network. called Galileo— a move that will reduce European reliance on US. technology. All these initiatives enjoy strong public support. with more. than F'O percent of Europe‘s citizens favoringF for example. a single security policy for the EU as a whole. Even lithe. EU makes good on its military plans its defense capabilities will admittedly be modest compared with those of the United States. Its members are uninterested in projecting military power globally (not least for the costs associated with doing so). Accordingly. a division ol'labor is emerging. in which the EU manages Europe’s security while. US. forces focus on the rest of the world. This is not a recipe for a face-ol'i'hetween titans but it does spell the end oi'EuI‘opc's deference to its American protector and the potential muavcling of NATO. Britain’s decision to enhance its leadership role in Europe is moving the EU more quickly toward self—reliance. London For years kept its distance from the Continent, but Prime Minister Tony Blair has altered course. orchestrating the EUs push on the defense front and me ATLANTIC mommy 43 working to take his country into the euro zone. “We must be wholehearted, not hallltearted, partners in Europe," Blair told Britons late last year, warning them that c‘E’u'itain has no economic Future outside Europe?” Similarly, Germany’s growing comfort with leadership is strengthening the union’s political will. As part of its postwar policy of reassur— ance and reconciliation, Bonn for decades Headed lightly on diplomacy and de- fense. Since 1999, however, when the seat of government moved back to Berlin, symbolizing a renewed selllconfidencu Germany has been actively guiding the EUS evolution, marking out a pathway for building a federal Europe. This new enthusiasm for Europe’s collective enterprise is partly a product of domestic politics. For most of the post- war era, politicians sold integration to their constituents by arguing that it of- fared the only way for Europe to escape its bloody past. But the younger genera- tion of Europeans has lived through neither World War ll nor the Cold War, and therefore has no past from which to escape. As a result, a new political discourse is emerging—one that sees integration as a vehicle for enhancing Europe‘s power and achieving, rather than checking, international ambitions. The French used to be alone in looking to the EU as a counterpoise to America, but the other members have now joined in. Tony Blair has asserted, “Whatever its origin, Europe today is no longer just about peace. it is about projecting collective power.” Gennany’s Chancellor Gerhard Schrtider called For a “more integrated and enlarged Eu rope.” to offset U.S. hegemony. Ac- cording to Romano Prodi, the President of the European Commission, the EU‘s executive body, one of the chief goals of the union is to create “a superpower on the European continent that stands equal to the United States.” Goran Persson, the Prime Minister of Sweden, 3 country that long ago renounced power politics, recently remarked that the EU is “one of the few institutions we can develop as a balance to U.S. world domination." The Bush Administration, like the Clinton Administration before it, has been none too pleased about Europe’s growing assertiveness, but Washington‘s dismissive attitude toward the EU up to now has only strengthened Europe’s re- solve. Bush‘s penchant for unilateralism, in particular, has provoked European pique. As Bush hacks away from the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, with- draws From the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and distances the United States From a host of multilateral institutions Europe grows ever more convinced that it must both diallcnge America and chart its own course. After September 11 Europeans hoped that an America confronted wilh the threat of terrorism might rediscover the virtues of' multilateralism. But soon Bush was unilaterally declaring lraq. Iran, and North Korea an “axis of evil“ and indicating that he intended to topple Saddam Hussein with or without the approval of US. allies. Germany’s Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer then cautioned Washington that “alliance partners are not satellites.“ The Bonito Zeitzrrzg lamented that far from renouncing its go—it-alone ways, the United States had “used the opportunity to strengthen its selfish superpower position.” “Never has a president of'the United States been so foreign to us.” the newspaper proclaimed in an editorial, “and never have German citizens been so skeptical about the policies of their most powerful of allies.” With America and Europe squabbling over the sources of' terrorism as well as how best to fight it, this new threat promises to exacer- bate rather than repair the widening transatlantic divide. he consequences of the growing rift between the Uruted States and Europe are only just becoming apparent. The two sharply disagree on the Middle East: the EU opposes both America‘s steady support of Israel and its insistence on isolating, rather than engaging, Iraq and lran. Trade disputes are heating up. especially over steel and agriculture. De- spite America’s defection From the Kyoto Protocol, the EU moved forward with more than a hundred countries partici- pating, leaving Washington a lonely and, from all appearances, an environmentally irresponsible bystander. Last year EU member states took the lead in voting the United States off two UN conunissions— payback for America’s unilateral ways. As Europe increasingly holds its own and the United States continues to shrug of? compromise the international institu~ tions that have helped to promote peace and prosperity since World War II will inevitably Falter. As the EU enlarges eastward, it will come to dominate the geopolitics of Eurasia, gradually replac- ing America as the arbiter of the globc‘s strategic heartland. As capital flows to Europe and a rising euro competes with the dollar as a reserve currency. the monetary stability of recent decades will give way to a self-interested jockey— ing more reminiscent of the 19305. The order that has come with a single cap- tain at the helm will be no more. History is coming full circle. After breedting away fiorn the British Empire, the United States came. together as a unitary Federation, emerged as a leading nation, and eventually eclipsed Europe’s Great Powers. It is now Europe’s mm to ascend and break away from an America that re- liises to surmnderr'tr privileges of primacy. Europe will inevitably rise up as America's principal competitor. Should Washington and Brussels begin to recognize the dangers of the growing gulf between them, they may be able to contain their budding rivalry. Should they l'ail, however, to prepare for life after Pax Americana, they will ensure that the coming clash of civilizations will be not between the West and the rest but within a West divided against itself. 1:] Clark-u}. Kupcfiau it a pmfim w‘ (.‘cmgcmwn Uni- twrig and a Jmiarfiliow a: (it: Charred! on Foreign Evictions. Hair avail The End of the American Era: US. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the 'lhvcnryiirst Century will? as pubt'irfird niis monrll. run": IJHED '1an Reinventing the West Dominique Moiii WHITHER THE WEST? Does “TH E WEST" still exist? Have we moved from a world with two Europes and one West to a world with one Europe and two Wests? Transatlantic tensions of the past—the Suez debacle, the French departure from NATO in 1966, the Vietnam War, and the Eurornissiles crisis in the 198os—were contained by painful memories of World War II and the unifying effects of the Soviet threat. But if the long- term cause of today’s emotional estrangement was November 9, 1989, the day the Berlin Wall came down, the short—term catalyst was Sep- tember n, 2001. For the past two years, the United States has been at war, but attempts to elevate America’s foe to a new common enemy, to redefine the West in purely negative terms, have been largely divisive. Islamic fundamentalism, international terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have not had the same unifying effect as yes— terday’s Soviet threat because Europe and the United States have increasingly diifered on how to confront them. It is ironic that since September 11, the United States has adopted the Bismarckian approach to foreign policy, dominant in late—nineteenth—century Europe, placing dramatic displays of military might at the heart of its strategy. Europeans, meanwhile, have behaved more like early—twentieth—century American idealists, advocating measured and principled foreign interventions. This role reversal has profound causes, underpinned by political and social changes on both sides of the Atlantic and, like September 1.1 itself, by deep—rooted geopolitical trends. The challenge is to accept that DOMINIQUE Moisr is Senior Adviser to the Institut Francais des Rela— tions Internationales. A longer version of this essay will appear as a report of the Trilateral Commission. [67] Dominique Mufti although Europeans and Americans have different interests, values, and sensibilities, both sides still need one other and must work toward a new modus operandi. TWO WESTS, TWO MISUNDERSTANDINGS E U ROPEAN s have always found it difficult to understand Americans. This is particularly true today, when less savory sides of the American character—its nationalist religiosity, its intolerant suspicion of others— have returned to the fore. These forces, moreover, are no longer counter- balanced by the deep understanding of Europe that American elites possessed in the past. Who today could write so patient and sensitive an account of French rural life as Laurence Wylie’s Village in [be Vauduse? “We recognize the American wherever we meet him as a practical idealist,” wrote the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal in 1944. Yet today’s leaders no longer resemble former Secretaries of State Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles, with their deep personal knowledge of Europe and its heritage. Perhaps this is because the United States has lost its cultural infe— riority complex. After all, the best universities in the world—the places where the brightest students from China,]apan, even Germany, want to go—are now in the United States. Sociological and political factors have also undermined Americans’ interest in Europe. As His— panics and Asian-Americans have become more prominent and the political center of gravity has shifted from the East Coast to Texas and the Midwest, European studies have increasingly been consigned to the fringes of university syllabuses. Today, in the eyes of many Ameri- cans, Europe is neither a subject nor an object of history. It has become a theme park, a museum, a charming place to visit, an interesting experiment in collective sovereigntye-and, above all, a growing source of irritation. Europe’s View of America has changed too. If the United States has not become an empire in the way that France and Britain were a century ago, an American imperial project of sorts has emerged in the past few years, focused on the Middle East. And this fact has become increasingly irksome to Europeans. In confronting a revisionist Soviet Union, the West—Europe and the United States both—favored the [68] FOREIGN AFFAIRS- VolumegzNa.6 Reinventing #33 West status quo. Today, however, it is the U.S. West that is revisionist, while Europe’s West remains mired in introspection and is mistrustful of change. What, Europeans ask, will the geography of their continent look like in the future? What sort of institutions will emerge from the work of the European constitutional convention? Is Turkey to be more Western than European; Russia more European than Western? As Europe’s identity crisis plays out, it is unsurprising that a new brand of anti-Americanism should emerge. It is as if, divided over its institutional and geographic future, Europe feels that it must exist as an alternative to the United States—a different and better West. European intellectuals, such as Jfirgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, see in the recent antiwar demon— strations the emergence of a European civil society that chooses to define itself negatively against the United States. It is unfortunate that Europeans have not chosen to define themselves positively in the name of a clear project from Europe. Unlike anti—American sentiments in the past, this breed of anti-Americanism is not so much a reaction to what the United States does as a reaction to what it represents. Although French President Jacques Chirac was clearly not speaking in the name of most European governments when he spectacularly opposed the United States over the war in Iraq, he was in tune with European public opinion. NEEDING ONE ANOTHER IT Is ALL too easy for Washington to View Europe with a mixture of indifference, commiseration, and derogatory paternalism. But the United States still badly needs Europe—although not for the reasons it thinks. Washington seems to view Europe as being somewhere between its deputy sheriff and its cleaning lady. “America fights, Europe fimds, the UN feeds,” the drinking goes. The problem with this vision is that it does not fit today’s geopolitical realities. In our complex, interdependent world, “hard” and “soft” power are increasingly intertwined. The clear— cut definition of military force has disappeared, and classical notions of territory and boundary have become a thing of the past. In this context the United States needs Europe—and not just for its intelligence networks, sophisticatedjudicial systems, humanitarian FOREIGN AFFAIRS-Novem[rer/Decrmber;2003 Damin iqua Moi’ri efforts, or police. Europe is the best protection that the United States has against its inner evils: its isolationist narcissism, its ignorance of the way others feel and think. To remain truly internationalist in a positive, constructive—and republican—way, the United States must be reminded of the best aspects of its past. How, otherwise, will Americans achieve idealism without illusion, realism without cynicism? Learning from past European empires is also vital to the success of the American imperial enterprise today. One of the first of these lessons— a particularly pertinent one for American administrators in Iraq—is that no power should ever define what is good for others without those people being involved. Ironically, a multipolar world less dominated by American hege- mony might well be better for the United States. But such aworld could well be more dangerous for everyone else, including Europe. Yesterday, the United States directly guaranteed Western Europe’s security against the Soviet threat. With today’s diverse threats, Europe needs the United States at least as much. Europe should never rely solely on the US. military machine, and it must have a credible military instrument if it wants to be taken seriously by Washington. But the not-so-secret dream of the French government to counterbalance US. military power would be a nightmare for a majority of the gov— ernments in the new Europe of 25 member states. Trying to match American hard power with European soft power is also likely to provoke American ire and thereby damage European interests. Although in recent months the war of words has greatly abated between the two sides of the Atlantic—even between the Americans and the French—thoughts and feelings have not really changed. False perceptions and deliberate distortions of each other’s position continue. The United States’ tendency to use Europe’s past against Eu— rope’s present, as if a Munich or a Vichy were just around the corner, is vexing. Europe is not doomed to be a continent of betrayal and antisemitism, a view too often trumpeted in popular American magazines such as Vanity Fair. Antisemitic acts in modern Europe are perpetuated by individuals, not states, and have nothing to do with Europe’s past. There is an equally dangerous tendency, on both sides of the Atlantic, to believe that in today’s Europe, Jews are the primary target of discrimination and, in America, an insidious source [70] FOREIGN AFFAIRS'VolumeSzNao Reinventing the West of influence. This dichotomy must be resisted, as neither assertion is true. Muslims are far more likely to sufier prejudice and discrim— ination in Europe, and Jewish power in America has always been greatly exaggerated. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s division between “new” and “old” Europe has also bedeviled transatlantic relations. That categorization is not only intellectually false, but also politically offensive. If anything, new Europe—the Europe of the European Union—has been driven by the Franco—German condominium. Old Europe, by contrast, consists of the Balkans or the eastern—most parts of Europe, first and foremost Russia—countries that continue to strive for more democratic institutions. To assume, as some Americans do, that a country’s degree of modernity is determined by its standing with Washington is misguided and narcissistic in the extreme. And Europe’s obsession with the United States should not be an obstacle to the already difficult European integration process. It is unfortunate that popular anti-Americanisrn has been encouraged by some European governments; as if the most conservative, ideological, religious, and nationalist elements of the Bush administration’s thinking were the only ideas found in the United States. Both sides’ tendency to focus on the most extreme discourse of the other has been one of the most frustrating aspects of the transatlantic relationship. The truth is that for many Europeans, America is still a land of opportunity, exw cellence, and economic dynamism. A more balanced assessment, rather than today’s overwhelmingly negative caricature, is essential in con- structing the new transatlantic partnership. BUILDING BRIDGES To ACT TOGETHER, Europe and the United States do not need to think the same way, but they must understand the other’s way of doing things. To ensure this, the future European foreign affairs min— ister (should this position ever be created) should have at his or her disposal firstficlass resources for analysis and prediction as well as strong institutional links with his or her American counterpart. Connections should be established between civil societies in Europe and those in the United States. And intergovernmental “contact groups” should FOREIGN AFFAI RS -N0wmber/Derember2003 [71] Dominique Moiti be set up to extend cooperation in the war against terror to other vital issues, such as Iran and WMD proliferation. On the American side, the United States does not have the luxury of ignoring the UN. At the outset of the Cold War, Americans decided to give power to NATO. As the world faces similarly momentous debates, the time has come for the United States to give the UN genuine clout. From Iraq to North Korea to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the best long-term solutions will involve the international community. By the same token, Europeans should not think of the UN simply as a tool to restrain the United States. Instead of using the UN as a pawn in their rivalry, Americans and Europeans should pool their resources and think of the best possi— ble ways to reform an institution confronted by the gulf between its missions and its means and by changing legal norms. We live in a world where military interventions to combat failed and rogue states are becoming increasingly necessary. Europe is the best In this interdependent world, where we are _ _ no longer ignorant of one another's problems, pmtecuon the Umth we need to work together. States has against Reconciling the international legal order with the reality of American hegemony will be difficult. Europe will have to accept that, at times, the revisionist instincts of the United States can be legitimate, that the world’s status quo cannot simply be taken for granted. The United States, meanwhile, will have to accept an implicit division of labor and be willing to defer to Europe in some cases, just as it expects Europe to defer to it in others. The result might amount to something like the acceptance of two Monroe Doctrines, with the transatlantic partner-s each holding sway in certain areas, and on certain issues, that reflect their de facto spheres of interest. Europeans would concentrate on Europe, with a special emphasis on the Balkans and the Mediterranean, and the United States would have priority in the Arnerieas and in Asia. Both Wests would support moderate leaders and promote the rule of law in their respec- tive spheres of influence. They would collaborate in the Middle East, attempting to close the emotional gap between them over the Israeli~ its inner evils. [72] FOREIGN AFFAIRS-mumszrva.6 Reinventing ti): West Palestinian dispute. And the two sides would also come together over a new doctrine of enlightened interventionism in Africa. In building a new model of cooperation, Europe should learn from the United States’ ambition, and the United States from Europe’s mod— esty. America still dreams and makes people dream, and its revisionist instinct can be used to positive effect. But the United States badly needs Europe’s postmodern instincts about the limits of power and its reflec— tions on the imperial experience if it wants to avoid getting stuck in quagmires abroad. Responsible revisionism—a better alternative to imperial revisionism—can only be achieved if Americans and Europeans start thinking and planning together. The debate between unilateralism and multilateralism will remain artificial if it simply masks Europe’s refusal to act or America's refusal to consult with its allies. The worst-case scenario would be for America’s West to turn into an oversized Prussia—bullying, brooding, and obsessed with military might—and Europe’s West into an oversized Switzerland—selfish and parochial, wrapped in neutrality. To avert this result, positive, rather than negative, definitions of transatlantic identity must be invoked by leaders on both continents. In constructing a new partner— ship, the unique legitimacy conferred by the international community will be key. To this end, both sides together must lead the way in reforming the UN, so that it becomes an institution with teeth, genuinely respected by the international community. Rather than competing for global influence or attempting to outdo one another in hard or soft power, the United States and Europe must accept a de facto division between their spheres of influence: a new Monroe Doctrine for a changed world. Finally, both sides must make a determined eliort to transcend their natural prejudices, overcoming petty inferiority or superiority complexes. Europeans must accept the United States’ unique international status and Americans must rediscover the virtues of modesty and self—restraint. To future historians, November 9, 1989, will mark the end of the old West—and the beginning of a dissonance between Euro- pean and American interests. Let us hope that the bitter rivalry witnessed in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, will go down as a temporary emotional rupture, rather than as the end of a constructive transatlantic partnershipfi FOREIGN AFFAIRS - Naveméer/Deremfirrmq; ...
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