Ziring, et al

Ziring, et al - Oatley, POLI 86 Spring 2000 A Very Short...

Info iconThis preview shows pages 1–2. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Oatley, POLI 86 Spring 2000 1 A Very Short Note On Iterated Prisoners ’ Dilemmas and Cooperation The literature on cooperation suggests that cooperation can emerge in the prisoners ’ dilemma if three conditions are met. First, while it is true that cooperation is unlikely in a prisoners ’ dilemma if it is played once, a considerable body of research has suggested that if the same actors play the prisoners = dilemma repeatedly, that is if the game is iterated , they can reach and sustain the cooperative outcome. Cooperation can emerge in an iterated prisoners ’ dilemma in part because iteration changes the nature of the reward structure. Rather than facing a game in which they make one choice and receive one payoff, in an iterated game governments face repeated choices and receive a stream of payoffs over time. Two additional conditions are important if cooperation is to emerge in an iterated prisoners ’ dilemma. First, governments must use reciprocity strategies when playing an iterated prisoners ’ dilemma.
Background image of page 1

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
Image of page 2
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

This note was uploaded on 03/31/2008 for the course POLI 150 taught by Professor Mosley during the Spring '08 term at UNC.

Page1 / 2

Ziring, et al - Oatley, POLI 86 Spring 2000 A Very Short...

This preview shows document pages 1 - 2. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Ask a homework question - tutors are online