SILASI_SIMINA_migration,_mobility_and_human_rights_2008 -...

Download Document
Showing page : 1 of 414
This preview has blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version! View Full Document
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

Unformatted text preview: Migration, Mobility and Human Rights at the Eastern Border of the European Union Space of Freedom and Security ISBN (13) 9789731251608 Copyright, 2008, Editura Universitii de Vest Toate drepturile asupra acestei ediii sunt rezervate. Reproducerea integral sau parial, pe orice suport, fr acordul scris al editurii, este interzis. Editura Universitii de Vest 300223 -- Timioara, Bd. V. Prvan nr. 4, BCUT, 010 B, tel./fax: 0256 592 253 Space of Freedom and Security Migration, Mobility and Human Rights at the Eastern Border of the European Union Edited by Grigore Silai and Ovidiu Laurian Simina Editura Universitii de Vest Timioara, 2008 Grigore SILAI, PhD is Jean Monnet Professor at West University of Timisoara, and director of Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence. Between 1998 and 2006 Prof. Silasi was director of The School of High Comparative European Studies (SISEC) within the West University of Timisoara. After graduation from Bucharest Academy of Economic Sciences (Economics), Prof. Silasi studied at Bucharest University (Faculty of International Relations), ISVE (Institute for studies of Economical Development, Naples, Italy), World Economy Research Institute (Warsaw School of Economics, Poland) and at Universit des Sciences et Technologies de Lille (France), its PhD in Economics being awarded by West University of Timisoara (1975, thesis: International Financial Co-operation). The professional experience allows him to have both a diplomatic vision (as former diplomat with UNESCO and Bucharest Foreign Office) and a scientific rigor (academic expertise: the Polytechnic Institute of Timisoara lecturer; West University of Timisoara different positions form senior lecturer to professor and consultant professor; Universit des Sciences et Technologies de Lille, France and University of Poitiers, France visiting lecturer; doctoral adviser in Economics and International Economics since 1990; head of "European Studies - International Relations" and "Economic Intelligence - Management of Informational Resources" Master programmes; Jean Monnet European Economic Integration Chair). Key qualification: Regional Economics, Diplomacy, European Economy, Euro-Regional Environment: Norms, Regulations, Policies. Specific Eastern countries experience: Romania and Poland. Books authored both in Romania and abroad. Prof. Silasi is the co-ordinator of the Editorial Board Secretariat of the Romanian Journal of European Studies, co-edited by the British Council in Bucharest and the West University of Timisoara. Contact: Ovidiu Laurian SIMINA, PhD candidate in Economics at the West University of Timisoara, is law graduate (Law Faculty of the Bucharest Police Academy, speation: border police, immigration, asylum and refugees) and holds an MA in High European Studies from the School of High Comparative European Studies (SISEC), West University of Timisoara. Five years experience as immigration and border police officer (both at the Border Police checkpoints and at the "green" border Romanian border with Serbia and Hungary) and one year as legal adviser (Legal Department of Ministry of Interior). Currently, Mr. Simina is personal adviser to the state secretary for liaison with the Parliament and European Affairs, Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reform, Romanian Government. His project aims at promoting the inclusion of the migration and mobility studies in the Romanian academic curricula. Mr. Simina is member of World Jurist Association (WJA) and European Economic Association (EEA). E-mail:, web: 2 Summary From the Editors / 5 Foreword / 7 Peter Van Krieken Part I. A Survey of the European Migration Space The Post-Enlargement Migration Space / 11 Paolo Ruspini The Social Context of European East-West Migration / 29 Liliana Hiri Managing Migration for an Enlarging Europe Inter-Governmental Organizations and the Governance of Migration Flows / 51 Martin Geiger Actors, Networks and Solidarity in Migration / 71 Simona Wersching On the New European Borders: The New Geography of the European Migration / 79 Ovidiu Laurian Simina A Survey of Immigration Problems of the European Union and a Comparison with Those of the United States / 99 Samuel Jay Levine Returning to the Law of the Jungle and Its Consequences / 111 Wolfgang P. Schulz Part II. European Migration Experiences Employment of Immigrants in the Finnish Labour Markets / 121 Elli Heikkil and Maria Pikkarainen Labour Migration and Economic Development: The Case of Denmark / 139 Mete Feridun Assessing the Determinants of Emigration Intentions in Latvia after the EU Enlargement / 155 Artjoms Ivlevs International Migration and Mobility of the EU Citizens in the Visegrad Group Countries: Comparison and Bilateral Flows / 171 Radka Bicanov, Zuzana Fglov and Eva Kacerov 3 German Trade Unions and Migration Affairs: Strengthening Cross Border Cooperation and Campaigning for the Ratification of the U.N. Conventions on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families / 189 Rdiger Ltzer Human Trafficking: Component of the Illegal Migration. Western Balkan Perspective / 197 Teofil Parasca Navigating Migrants into the Greek Labour Market: The Role of Migrant Associations The Case of Eastern European Migrants Associations / 205 Dimitria Groutsis Exclusion and Inclusion of Moroccan Migrants: Empirical Evidences from Almera, Spain / 217 Martin Geiger Repressive Functions of Social Networks in Migratory Process: Case of Moldovan Migrants in Istanbul / 239 Bayram Unal Part III. Between Scylla and Charibdis Migration Policies for a Romania within the European Union: Navigating Between Scylla and Charybdis / 257 Martin Baldwin-Edwards Romania, Part of the European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Legal Aspects / 289 Alexandru Mircea and Anca Cristina Pristavu Labour Market Distortions as New Challenges Beyond the EU Enlargement: The Romanian Case / 317 Grigore Silai and Ovidiu Laurian Simina Social-Cultural Challenges to Romania's External Migration in the Perspective of Accession to the European Union / 351 Daniela Luminia Constantin Economic and Social Aspects of Romanians' Migration within the European Union / 365 Ioana Vdsan and Laura Cisma The Impact of Free Movement of Persons and Services on the Migration from Romania / 377 Florin Oprea and Ada Iuliana Popescu Traditions of the Human Rights Institutions in Romania: History of the Asylum Management before 1990 / 387 Anca Cristina Pristavu Mechanisms to Protect Human Rights and to Combat Discrimination: The Romanian Mechanism / 395 Adrian Vasile Cmran and Gabriela Elena Petrescu 4 From the Editors This edited collection of migration papers would like to emphasise the acute need for migration related study and research in Romania. At this time, migration and mobility are studied as minor subjects in Economics, Sociology, Political Sciences and European Studies only (mostly at post-graduate level). We consider that Romanian universities need more `migration studies', while research should cover migration as a whole, migration and mobility being analysed from different points of view social, economical, legal etc. Romania is part of the European Migration Space not only as a source of labourers for the European labour market, but also as source of quality research for the European scientific arena. Even a country located at the eastern border of the European Union, we consider Romania as part of the European area of freedom, security and justice, and therefore interested in solving correctly all challenges incurred by the complex phenomena of migration and workers' mobility at the European level. The waves of illegal immigrants arriving continuously on the Spanish, Italian and Maltese shores, and the workers' flows from the new Member States from Central and Eastern Europe following the 2004 accession, forced the EU officials and the whole Europe to open the debate on the economical and mostly social consequences of labour mobility. This study volume is our contribution to this important scientific debate. Starting with the spring of 2005, the Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence and the School of High Comparative European Studies (SISEC), both within the West University of Timioara, have proposed a series of events in order to raise the awareness of the Romanian scientific environment on this very sensitive issues: migration and mobility in the widen European Space. An annual international event to celebrate 9 May - The Europe Day was already a tradition for SISEC (an academic formula launched back in 1995 in order to prepare national experts in European affairs, offering academic post-graduate degrees in High European Studies). With the financial support from the Jean Monnet Programme (DG Education and Culture, European Commission), a first migration panel was organised in the framework of the international colloquium `Romania and the European Union in 2007' held in Timisoara between 6 and 7 of May 2005 (panel Migration, Asylum and Human Rights at the Eastern Border of the European Union). Having in mind the positive welcoming of the migration related subjects during the 2005 colloquium, a second event was organised on 5 May 2006 in the framework of the European Year of Workers' Mobility: the international colloquium Migration and Mobility: Assets and Challenges for the Enlargement of the European Union. In the same period, the Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence, SISEC and The British Council in Bucharest have jointly edited two special issues of The Romanian Journal of European Studies, no.4/2005 and 5-6/2006, both dedicated to migration and mobility. Preliminary versions of many of the chapters of this volume were presented at the above mentioned international events. The papers were chosen according to their scientific quality, after an anonymously peer-review selection. The authors debate both theoretical issues and practical results of their research. They are renowned experts at international level, members of the academia, PhD students or experienced practitioners involved in the management of the migration flows at the governmental level. This volume was financed by the Jean Monnet Programme of the Directorate General Education and Culture, European Commission, throughout the Jean Monnet European Centre 5 of Excellence (C03/0110) within the West University of Timisoara, Romania, and is dedicated to the European Year of Workers' Mobility 2006. Timioara, December 2006 6 FOREWORD Dr. Peter van Krieken By finally inviting Bulgaria and Romania into the European House, the enlargement process has come to a relative standstill (with the judges still being out on Croatia, Turkey, Serbia and others). A Union with 27 members is a sizeable one and urges Commissions, Governments, academics and citizens to re-think the free movement principles. It is herewith recalled that the Union is above all about the free movement of goods, capital, services and individuals. It is about competition, but also about social cohesion, inclusion and togetherness. Indeed, it is about building a stable, roomy and developmentprone house, in which everyone will feel at home. With 27 nation states on board, the migration debate should continue. Not just about the internal migratory movements, that is from one EU-member state to another, but also from outside the Union to one of the Union-states. That debate should include issues like education, productivity, demography, effectiveness and value-sharing. It is, after all, often forgotten that a migrant spends utmost 22% of his/her time working. The rest is about commuting, free time, religion, cultural identity, political interests, the Diaspora and sleep/recuperation. With this in mind a collection of contributions on migration, mobility and human rights at the new Eastern border it is timely and highly welcome. The editors should be commended to have been able to get such a diverse, yet highly qualified group of experts. Paying attention to the European migration space and the often inherent law of the jungle, in spite of the many rules and regulations is worth the while. At least as relevant is to share Western European experiences. During the many enlargement discussions and debates, it was often implied that the EU was constantly setting good examples and that `best practices' should be copied by the candidate countries. In fact, the `old' EU was utterly incompetent when it came to migration as it had been governed and dominated by a `politically correct' lobby. Sometimes, somehow true experts suggested the members-to-be not to follow the old EU-practices, but to learn from the many mistakes made, and to set new, pragmatic examples themselves. 7 Indeed the new EU-members often find themselves between Scylla and Charybdis, as the choices available are not necessarily believed to be as benefiting as hoped. Most fortunately, though, the EU has come, to some extent, to its senses and the related directives would in law and in fact appear to be quite realistic and workable. A proper European Migration Express is now in making and about to take off. Yet, trafficking and illegal migration will continue to exist. Also, the debate on the need for migrants from outside the Union continues unabated, but it is now realized that the focus should be on the highly qualified ones, rather than the uneducated ones. The new Member States will hence be confronted with (a) EU-based migration (read: the departure of many of their most qualified sons and daughters to Western European EU-members); (b) a challenging demography; as well as (c) the influx of illegals or rather irregulars who may wish to test the new waters. Many tasks and policy decisions would appear to be ahead of us, challenging ones indeed as basic human rights should always be upheld. This Volume greatly contributes to the debate and the alternate solutions and is hence a useful source for academics, students, politicians and members of the executive alike. Dr. Peter VAN KRIEKEN UNDP Chief Technical Adviser with the Lao PDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vientiane, Lao PDR Dr. Van Krieken is an international law expert who already in 1976 published his first book on asylum (and desertion in the context of the Vietnam War). He pursued a distinguished career with UNHCR and later joined his Government and Webster University. Many of his publications focus on asylum and migration (e.g. the well reputed and widely used Acquis Handbooks) but also his Terrorism and the International Legal Order (2002) as well as his The Hague, legal capital of the World (2005) deserve to be mentioned. 8 PART I: A SURVEY OF THE EUROPEAN MIGRATION SPACE THE POST-ENLARGEMENT MIGRATION SPACE Paolo Ruspini1) This paper is a preliminary attempt to look at the link between the post EU enlargement migration space and the ongoing process of setting up a common EU immigration policy, which has entered its second phase with the `Hague Programme' agreed upon in November 2004. Our main argumentation is built upon a series of juxtapositions resulting from the interrelation of the national and supranational level of the EU policymaking: `enlargement(s) and restrictions', `visible and invisible borders', `pendulum and pillar' so as to define the area of Justice, Freedom and Security being implemented since the meeting of the European Council in Tampere in October 1999. The theoretical framework relies upon the `pendulum model' developed by Helen Wallace while studying the EU policymaking process. The model shows how this process results in an uninterrupted oscillation between two dimensions of governance national and supranational particularly in the field of immigration where the prerogatives of national sovereignty are hard to be left behind. Our conclusive argument advances that the EU should involve all the qualified actors either from old, new members or neighbouring countries in an effective `open method of coordination' while attempting at harmonising immigration and asylum policy. Keywords: immigration, EU enlargement, borders, policymaking, European identity 1) PhD, Research Fellow, ISMU Foundation Initiatives and Studies on Multi-ethnicity, Via Copernico 1, 20125 Milan, Italy, e-mail:; ph. +39 02 6787791; fax + 39 02 67877979. The author is also Associate Fellow, Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, United Kingdom, email:, web pages: What is Europe? Is it a geographic, economic, political entity, a category of thought or rather the space of `freedom, security and justice' for the movement of goods and citizens belonging to the European Union? In case of persons, is this movement indeed `free', `just' and `safe' for all the citizens that live in this space? Since its foundation the transnational experiment named European Union (EU), tried to provide political form to the far ancient idea of Europe. It made so through a set of rules opposing the entropy of the international system, setting up a common market and so continuing the process of political integration sanctioned by the Treaties. These rules generated a thick network, which grew up surprisingly, even out of size, by entangling `goods and persons' and sometimes slowing down the overall growth of the system. The geopolitical space of the European Union has expanded or decreased because of the historical circumstances and the political willingness of the ruling coalitions of its member States. This paper first appeared in Italian as "Da dieci a venticinque: il nuovo spazio europeo", in Fondazione ISMU, Decimo Rapporto sulle migrazioni 2004. Dieci anni di immigrazione in Italia, Milan: Franco Angeli, pp. 317-330. 11 In more than forty years of its recent history, Europe was a divided entity reproducing variables of political thought and socio-economic systems in contrast one with the other: East and West, planned economy and free market, totalitarianism and democracy. They are dichotomies, to a great extent, refuted from the historical overthrows of more recent years1. The collapse of the Soviet paradigm in 1991 and the following gradual reunification of the European continent have not only altered forever a vision of the world, but they have also sparked movements of populations for long appeased and thus put in discussion migration regimes and impermeability of European borders. At the beginning of this process, Western European migration scholars were wrong footed, sometimes lacking knowledge and explanatory instruments to comprehend the migration dynamics generated from until then a little studied or even ignored reality. The intellectual curiosity, instilled by the ongoing epochal upheavals, has however prevailed on stereotypes and widespread misknowledges. The exchanges of scientific experiences, proceeding simultaneously with the stages of European integration, have therefore intensified from one side and the other of the two, only little before, distant worlds. The idea that mooted this paper is to look at the transformations of the EU migration space in the time that, from the 1980s, covers the 1990s to reach the decisive appointment of 1st May 2004, the day that sanctioned the fifth and more imposing EU enlargement. The last date is actually a starting point for the continent that urges to look beyond and try to identify the empirical form and political features of the new migration scenario of the enlarged EU. 1 `Enlargements' and `restrictions' in the European Union The path of European integration is not linear at all. Within its history, the European Union has undergone accelerations followed by slowing downs in the process of formation of a common economic and political space. It is actually true that this path, though still far from being completed, has never been arrested and from a certain point has begun a selfreproduction by generating new political and institutional forms, which are subject of the deep interest of IR scholars, particularly those of the `neofunctionalist' school. Social phenomena and political processes, often complementary, supplied propulsion to the enlargement of the common European space: the processes of globalisation and economic interdependence on one side and the evident impossibility to adopt national immigration policies without externalising the control of the borders from the other. Europe, or better the European Union, has become therefore, unwillingly or aware, for some States a miraculous `panacea' and for 1 Exceptions are not missing if one thinks about Belarus of Alexander Lukashenko. 12 others an improvident solution by which to mitigate the malaises and the breathlessness suffered from the systems of national governance. Naturally, the characters of ineluctability and pragmatism at same time of the last statement, do not certainly aim to diminish the propulsive role of the ideas and the ideological afflatus lavished in time by the advocates of European integration. Scope of this writing is not to philologically reconstruct any development of European integration in the migration sphere, but instead to put forward some reflections and reading clues. However, to the ends of a correct analysis, some contextualization is necessary. The 1980s, starting point of our discussion, saw an acceleration of the political union with the introduction of the concept of `variable geometry' and the publication of the `White Book' of Delors Commission, which includes detailed proposals for realizing a common market. After the accession of Greece in 1981, which brought to 10 the EU member States, Spain and Portugal acceded as well in 1986. The same last year the European Single Act has been enacted. It modifies the Treaty of Rome by introducing the `qualified majority voting' for the harmonization of legislations. This Act, strongly wanted by Kohl and Mitterand, opened the road to the creation of a big common market without frontiers expected for the 1st January 1993 (Motta, 2003). The Delors Plan, adopted in 1989, prepared the setting up in three stages of the Economic and Monetary Union, while the Schengen Convention, which includes the total abolition of the border controls, has been signed on 19th June 1990. The last aim was reached only in 1993, after the signature of the Treaty of Maastricht (7th February 1992) that sanctioned the freedom of movement for persons, goods, services and capitals. Leaving for a moment this historical reconstruction, the developments of the European integration process have been distinguished by two enlargements to three southern European countries only five years one from the other and by the signature of the Schengen Convention that closes the 1980s and smoothes the way for the important institutional turning points of the 1990s. It is interesting to notice that the economic situation of Greece, Spain and Portugal at the time of their EU accession and its difference with the member States was not so dissimilar compared with that between the EU-15 and the new Central and Eastern European (CEE) members in 2004. Certainly, one should proceed with caution in making comparisons between socio-economic models characterized by such a different historical experience. In the case of CEE countries, these models have been shaped for long by planning mechanisms historically absent in the West. In any case, a calculation only `apparently' suggested by fears classifiable as irrational, urged then as now to raise distinctions and restrict the freedom of movement of workers from the new member States for subsequently re-negotiable transitional periods so as to protect from imbalances the labour markets of the old member States. How 13 this decision was groundless has witnessed by the scarce migratory flows once the freedom of movement for workers of the three Mediterranean Countries was sanctioned (van Selm and Tsolakis, 2004). On the contemporary level, the groundlessness of restrictions seems instead witnessed by all the projections, sector studies and econometric calculations carried out before the 2004 Eastward enlargement. However, past and recent estimations have not been enough to prevent a sort of `domino effect' in urging the member States to apply the restrictions on the eve of the May 2004 enlargement. The `invasion syndrome' and recurrent use of hyperbola like "big-bang" borrowed from astrophysics, inexorably unmask the hypocrisies of national immigration policies and the selfishness of member States when their own prerogatives of national sovereignty are at stake. In our opinion, it will be more interesting to look at the eventual reproduction of return migration scenarios, as in the case of Greece, Spain and Portugal when the internal economic conditions became competitive compared with those of the destination countries. They are hypotheses to be verified on the ground of the characteristics of the CEE migratory regimes and the logics of the pre- and post-enlargement scenario. One observation is to be added on the openly evident contrast between the EU set standards that advocate for the freedom of movement for all the workers who live and reside in the Union, and the distinctions exercised from the Member States by reproposing the transitional periods. They seem to deny and contradict the freedom of movement in selective terms, i.e. when the Union has been enlarged to countries whose economic development is inferior to the member States average and the related migratory potential `apparently' turned out only increased by virtue of projections based on their history of emigration countries. It is actually worth remembering that, when in 1995 Austria, Finland and Sweden acceded the Union, the need to adopt restrictive measures did not appear, as well as in 2004 as far Malta and Cyprus are concerned. There is moreover to be noticed a sort of myopia in writing analysis and forecast only on the basis of wage differentials. It is worth remembering that migration is in fact a more complex phenomenon. The migratory potential, i.e. the intention to carry out a migratory project, sometimes does not materialize because of the existence of a multiple series of factors as the characteristics of the job market2, the absence of well-established ethnic networks or the presence of cultural and linguistic barriers in the countries indicated as probable destination (Kaczmarczyk, 2004). In this regard, we fully share the statement of Claire Wallace (1999) according to: "Being poor is not enough to become a migrant". 2 One should not neglect that labour migration is first of all demand driven. 14 Saying this, the partial negation of the Treaties' postulate, which has sanctioned the freedom of movement, throws a gloomy light on the EU Charter of fundamental rights (i.e. the nucleus of the European Constitution) and raises questions on the compatibility of any unborn political union with criteria of democratic inclusion typical of a federal structure. 2 `Permeability' and `impermeability' of the enlarged EU borders The 1992 is an important year in the creation of a united Europe. With the signature of the Treaty of Maastricht, the member States allow the European project to take a qualitative leap towards the political unification. The European Union is actually born only at that time. The three communitarian pillars of the Treaty put again forward the supranational cooperation in the fields provided for by the Treaties of Rome and Paris and they sanction it in the Common foreign and security policy and Justice and home affairs. Therefore, in the 1990s and until the turning point of the end of the decade, the intergovernmental cooperation between member States crystallized in a definitive shape. The intergovernmental character of this cooperation has been sealed from the acknowledgment of immigration and asylum as matters of "common interest" and not of "common policies" (Geddes, 2003). The existence of the unanimity rule slowed down the adoption of decisions and limited the role of the EU institutions. In 1993, when the Treaty of Maastricht entered in force, the summit of the European Council in Copenhagen gave start to the EU enlargement by establishing the convergence criteria to accede the Union3. It is the beginning for the CEE countries of a slow process of adaptation of their migratory legislations, so as to respect the parameters included in the acquis communitaire. As a matter of fact, it is often question of inventing from scratch migratory policies until then only focused on the management of emigration and exit controls (Kpiska, Stola, 2004). From the beginning of the 1990s, the countries of this region, following the southern European experience, became countries of immigration and emigration at same time, sometimes reversing the net migration (Ruspini, 2003a). In the EU migration space a `Copernican revolution' took place in the middle of the `90s, which would have soon transformed the global migration regime of the continent. In 1995, for example, ten years after its signature the Schengen Convention entered in force, covering common external borders, common rules in visas and asylum, controls of the external borders and free movement of persons. The `Schengen Information System' (SIS) has been established to match freedom and security. It is directed to the collection and 3 The 1993 Copenhagen European Council created a framework for the EU enlargement by spelling out the principle of conditionality based on three crucial requirements for accession: the development of democracy (with emphasis on human and minority rights), the existence of a functioning and competitive market economy, and the capacity to implement the acquis communautaire. 15 exchange of personal identification data and the description of lost and stolen objects. Limited to the five 1985 founding States (France, Germany and Benelux), the Schengen space has progressively extended to nearly all the EU member States (with the exception of the United Kingdom and Ireland). Thus, also the southern European member States, part of that Mediterranean model born at the beginning of the 1980s by grouping common migratory characteristics and experiences, followed paths not dissimilar from those of the CEE countries to adapt their mechanisms of borders control. The reactive character of many of these legislative dispositions has been not always thought an optimum method for implementing suitable, and not imposed by historical contingencies, immigration policies (Kpiska, Stola, 2004). The need to satisfy parameters fixed from the above, at the EU level, and missing the advice of the directly interested countries, has pushed on several occasions to postulate policies that often do not adequately hold into account the historical characteristics of the region and the displacement of ethnic minorities outside the borders of origin as a consequence of population movements in the past century. The management of CEE ethnic minorities cannot therefore be conceived on the basis of the Western European experience, because the terms rarely coincide and the range of rights which the minorities of the region aspire and those that the governments of their countries of origin would be willing to grant are much wider compared to the Western European standards (Grny, Ruspini, 2004). Perhaps in the EU enlargement process, it would have been useful to set up ad hoc meetings and exchanges of experiences at the EU level between all the actors concerned with the policymaking process, immigrant communities and ethnic minorities from Eastern and Western Europe included. In this way, experts of the candidate countries would have been effectively involved in the immigration policy formation. This kind of active involvement would have certainly worked as a stimulus to facilitate the search for solutions and compromises in the diplomatic controversies happened during the enlargement process. The above observations do not aim at disclaiming the role of the `reactive' element in spurring the formation and harmonization of member and candidate countries immigration policies. This is certainly a first goal, though not definitive, however important, when so different starting premises are considered. The alleged facts testify also the influence that politics, and not only the market rules, carry out in shaping the migratory flows and space of that singular model of supranational political integration that is the European Union. Not always this (re)shaping has happened in the righter and wishful direction, so as to match the general with the specific interest of immigrant groups and ethnic minorities. At any rate, it is already an important success that this policy-making process has started. 16 On the basis of what is set out above, it is therefore self-evident the role that the Schengen acquis or the convergence criteria play in shaping the EU borders. At the beginning of the 1990s, CEE citizens have enjoyed an unexpected freedom of movement towards the West generated by the removal of the exit controls. Many, taking advantage of the concession of temporary permits, stayed in Western European countries, in particular where the geographic proximity, the historical and cultural ties and the economic attraction of the labour markets made the stay reasonable and wider the employment possibilities. The joint mix of absence of exit controls and adoption of liberal immigration policies by several western European countries made therefore possible and even sparked the migratory flows towards the West. Moreover, in the decade that goes until the beginning of the 1990s, the CEE migration space worked nearly exclusively by internal rules, in other words the population movements were mainly restricted to the region, as a direct consequence of the lack of exit controls and passport visas for acceding the West. These dynamics were functional to Western Europe. The region acted, in fact, as `buffer zone' between East and West and so it was until 1st May 2004. The Schengen barrier played for long the role of propeller for CEE migratory flows. These flows were circular, `incomplete', triggered by the exploitation of wage differentials at the time of the transition of the CEE economies and the contemporary backwardness and progressive decline of the bordering former-Soviet republics. An `epos' made of peddlers, small `entrepreneurs', asylum seekers, ethnic networks and not always legal trades between bordering regions of Eastern Europe was born, whose fascination of study and research has remained untouched although the time goes by. Therefore, what at first was temporary mobility slowly began a transformation in settlement implying stable stay. The index of mixed marriages between Poles and Ukrainians, for instance, increased as a result of the prolonged stay and the new Eastern flows, thus demonstrating the importance of this particular kind of flows in the overall migratory typology originating from the former Soviet Union (Grny, Kpiska, 2004). Soon the CEE countries will show characteristics and profiles similar to Western Europe in their way of experiencing the migratory phenomenon. Castles and Miller (1993) identified the constant factors associating countries that reached various stages of their immigration experience so as to include: A dynamic process of migration, which transformed the temporary entry of workers and refugees into permanent settlers who form distinct ethnic groups; The economic and social marginalization of the immigrants; Community formation among immigrants; Increasing interaction between immigrant groups and the local population; The imperative for the state to react to immigration and ethnic diversity (Castles, 1995: 293). 17 They are stages that the two authors have found, in different way, in all the Western European countries, and that the globalisation of migratory dynamics is gradually exporting to the CEE region. They are hypothesis to be verified on the ground of the enlarged migration space being synthetically analysed herein. In this space, delimited by new borders, different migratory experiences will tend more and more to converge until the similitudes as listed by Castles and Miller will prevail over the differences. In our opinion, it is not so much the next migratory convergence to debate, but the identity of the European migration space and its borders. The reshaping of this space and the Eastward shift of the EU border has actually generated dynamics of inclusion and exclusion to be observed with careful attention. In this regard, our opinion diverges from whom, by declaring the superiority of the market laws on politics, support the `uninterrupted' porosity of the EU border without making any distinction between the time before and after the EU enlargement (Favell, Hansen, 2002). There is nothing to object as far the porosity of the borders in the fifteen years before the enlargement. We are instead convinced that the migration dynamics and regional networks have suffered meaningful consequences because of the EU enlargement, and they require political interventions to face the process of borders reshaping and the ongoing mechanisms of enclosure. In other words, we argue that factors of inclusion and exclusion generated by the 2004 enlargement created `visible' borders, like the one between Poland and Ukraine, and equally `invisible' borders, as those generated by the simultaneous existence of wage differentials and the new boundaries of entry and mobility. The differences of socio-economic development, though inherent to the expansion processes, endanger the cohesion and social tissue of culturally and geographically similar communities and the well-established exchange and mobility practices between borders. As a matter of fact, it is not only question of East-West borders, but of North-South geopolitical spaces, as remarked few months before the Eastward enlargement, by some Maghreb colleagues complaining the insufficient attention reserved to the Southern side of the Mediterranean by the EU processes of `inclusion'. There are not doubts that the process of European integration is made of tight interdependent variables (Wallace H., 2001), but one should not forget that the meaningful, though not complete, solution of the East-West difference with the EU enlargement, leaves the North-South difference unsolved. Though mistrusting the porosity of the CEE borders, we cannot imagine Europe like a `Fortress'. More realistically, we hope that the Union will do its best to re-establish an absent or forever lost socio-economic equilibrium. For example, the EU aim would have be to prevent that the bridge demarcating the border between Narva in Estonia and Ivangorod in 18 Russia, two urban agglomerates making up a single city until 1st May 2004, increases again (Visetti, 2004) metaphorically becoming a deep moat between Catholicism and Orthodoxy, European Union and Russia. 3 The `pendulum' of Helen Wallace and the `pillar' of Justice and home affairs The pendulum fluctuates attracted by two opposite magnetic fields. In the same way, Helen Wallace (1996: 13) sharply noticed the fluctuations resulting from the shifts in interests and loyalties in the process of policy coordination of the EU field of Justice and home affairs. These fluctuations happen during the policy formation/harmonisation between the national and transnational/supranational dimension. The European institutions on one side and the national level governance on the other (with the minor `magnetic fields' of the regional and local dimension) are two opposite poles in competition for the overall field decisional spaces. The probabilities that one or the other dimension prevails and the policies are adopted depend on the strength of the two magnetic fields. If both sides are weak, no coherent policy will emerge either at supranational or national level. The `pendulum' of Helen Wallace is based on a series of premises, which we have indirectly pointed out, like the political inadequacy of the national States, the impact of globalisation and the specific features of the European region (Apap, 2003). The pendulum movements illustrate with precision the opposite tensions under way during the process of European integration: its progresses at times regular, other times irregular, the fluctuations and the immobility. This metaphor is also useful to illustrate the contrast, which became more and more intense from the second half of the 1990s, in the creation of the EU immigration and asylum policy between the intergovernmental and supranational dimension. A contrast that, in the light of the structural characteristics of the model, does not anticipate a definitive solution in favour of one or the other dimension, but rather a continuous fluctuation with sometimes the prevailing of one, sometimes of the other, depending on the historical circumstances and the political and economic interests at stake. In this context, some more precise information is necessary so as to contextualise the fluctuations in this field of policy. After the entry in force of the Treaty of Maastricht, the 1990s saw the 1996-97 European intergovernmental conference that prepared the Treaty of Amsterdam. On 2nd October 1997, the treaty was signed and on 1st May 1999 entered in force. The European Union became `a space of freedom, security and justice'. Justice and home affairs acquired a wider field of action and more specific objectives, the European institutions a more balanced role and a more effective and democratic method of work had been planned 19 (CE, 2002a). Moreover, the European Commission acquired wider prerogatives and a new Title (IV) included in the Treaty, gathered freedom of movement, immigration and asylum. The Schengen agreements were integrated in the legal frame of the acquis of the European Union. Aims to be achieved are "free movement of persons" (EU and third country residents) and "security through the fight of crime and terrorism" (art. 2 of the Single European Act). The introduction of a scoreboard, the so-called "Scoreboard to Review Progress on the Creation of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union" should guarantee the periodic control of the work in progress. It is the beginning of the `communitarisation' of the immigration policies. The praxis of intergovernmental consultation seems definitively to fade on the horizon. In fact, in five years from the entry in force of the Treaty of Amsterdam (2004), the decisions on immigration and asylum will have to be adopted only with qualified majority. Besides, the European Council will have to assure the effective freedom of movement, the control of the borders and the implementation of all the other measures in the field of immigration and asylum (Geddes, 2003). In October 1999, a special European Council gathered in Tampere with the aim to make the EU into `an area of freedom, security and justice'. One of the priorities of the Tampere Council is the EU invitation to elaborate a common policy on asylum and immigration. The aim of the common policy in these specific fields implies the creation of "a harmonized and common way for immigrants and asylum seekers to obtain entry to all EU States" (CE, 2002b). The main intervention areas to reach these goals have been carefully listed (for instance, Grny, Ruspini, 2004: 251). In short, with the signature of the Treaty of Amsterdam and the following meeting of the European Council in Tampere, a new institutional revolution seemed to overturn from the foundations the European institutions and to start an unprecedented acceleration in the EU process of decisional coordination in the field of asylum and immigration. Unfortunately, things are not exactly in this way. The subsequent European Councils, in the years from 2001 to 2003, showed slowing downs (Laeken) in asylum and immigration policy, followed by the determination to go on (Seville) or again by the acknowledgment of the progresses made with the approval of so long waited directives like the one on `family reunification' or `the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents' (Thessaloniki). In fact, what is clear from the analysis of the documentation produced in these and other venues is the member States' determination not to abdicate from their own prerogatives of national sovereignty by keeping the control of a sensitive field as immigration. The resounding declarations of principle included in these documents often clash with the daily practices of the national governments, so as to urge the European Commission more than once to invite the member States not to 20 adopt legislations in the migratory field that might, to a certain extent, contrast or hinder the ongoing supranational harmonization. The metaphor of the Wallace `pendulum' thus seems to find in these statements and in the contradictory results listed so far, a reason of being and a true confirmation. In spite of the harmonization efforts, it is therefore legitimate to argue that the progresses in this area are, at the end, the result of a combination of intergovernmental and supranational political decisions (Jordan, Strth and Triandafyllidou, 2003). On 1st May 2004, the conclusion of the first imposing phase of the process of the EU enlargement with the accession of 10 new member States took place at the same time with the entry in force of the Treaty of Amsterdam. The enlargement, with the revision of the borders and the external relations of the Union, had raised hopes in the setting aside of another piece of the member States sovereignty and the intensification of efforts for the common policy formation even in areas like immigration and asylum policy (Ruspini, 2002). In fact, the number of directives adopted in this field is, all in all, scarce in comparison with the legislative proposals put forward since Tampere, while the decisional mechanisms, at the moment, have not been changed as originally expected. The inability of the European Convention to impose the qualified majority voting on national States as condicio sine qua non in some sensitive decisional fields of the new European Constitution4, showed unavoidable repercussions on the expected deadline for the entry in force of the Treaty of Amsterdam. The agreement reached by the European leaders on the so-called `The Hague Programme' during the 4th and 5th November 2004 summit in Brussels, fixed the new 2010 deadline for the adoption of common policy solutions in the field of asylum and immigration. The approval of this new agenda has allowed the adoption of qualified majority decisions in the field of border controls, illegal immigration and asylum starting from 2005. The area of legal immigration remains instead subject to the unanimity rule and the right of veto until the European Constitution will not be approved. There is a predominant feeling that counterbalances, slowing downs and distinctions on principles will be able to influence future political choices and they will allow the `pendulum of Wallace' to fluctuate again. 4 Forms and features of the post-enlargement migration space Being the first phase of expansion of the EU migration space concluded, it will be interesting to notice how the new post-Tampere agenda will be put into practice and which impact will have in the construction of the common immigration policy. In this context, we limit our 4 Adopted from the 18th June 2004 Intergovernmental conference, the new European Constitution should enter in force on 1st November 2006. 21 suggestions to few remarks on the migratory phenomenology of the enlarged EU and to the identification of variables providing some interpretation for the future scenario. It is, in fact, not easy at all to make forecast in the migration field since those variables at stake are often of multiple nature. Moreover, our estimations are suffering from the influence of contingent factors, as the observation of the migratory dynamics of the just concluded enlargement, and they still lack of suitable elements for a wider vision. To make clarity, first of all, we will try to focus on a series of points. The EU migration space has been enlarged and it will be enlarged again to Southeast; The `buffer zone' between East and West moved further eastwards; The borders are not porous as before, at least in this EU border zone; Russia and the former-Soviet republics are still lacking suitable laws and infrastructures to carry out the role of `buffer zone' for long covered by the CEE countries before the EU enlargement; Migrants coming from the former-Soviet republics and the extremities of the Asian continent travel in the huge geographic spaces of Russia and the Soviet former-republics looking for a landing place in the West; Centrifugal migratory dynamics (towards the West) are added to centripetal dynamics (towards the `core' of Russia) making the overall Eurasian migration space extremely fluctuating. In this context, the demographic and economic differentials between border regions of the post-Soviet universe spark the migratory flows. The absence of controls in entry and the strict controls in exit towards the West, sometimes transform the transit in the post-Soviet space in stay of indefinite length. According to the most reliable estimations, 4/5 million immigrants are irregularly present in the territory of the Russian Federation (Ivakhniouk, 2003). It is an irregularity-settling tank that should raise greater interest from the EU side. At the southern borders of the European continent, the Mediterranean Sea separates opposite poles of economic development. The Maghreb presses to tighten closer cooperation ties with the countries of the north side of the Mediterranean, while migrants coming from sub-Saharan Africa try desperately to move towards the Schengen space (Barros, Lahlou, et al., 2002). The Maghreb countries are therefore assuming characteristics of transit typical of migratory phenomenology already known in other geographic areas of the European continent. Which is the EU answer to these described dynamics? The concession of `facilitated transit' permits for settling controversies like the one involving the Kaliningrad region, enclave between East and West of the enlarged Union, or to allow the Russians of Ivangorod 22 to visit their neighbours of Narva, are only extemporaneous solutions for controversies of small or medium size intensity. These solutions certainly represent best practices to face similar cases in other EU zones, but their complexity and limited operational sphere show undoubtedly several limits. In our opinion, the `neighbourhood policy' prepared for the EU enlargement still show too many vague characteristics. The Union has planned ad hoc budget lines for implementing these policies by taking advantage of the experience accomplished with other financial instruments like Phare, Tacis and MEDA (CEC, 2004). In any case, it is not only a problem, though important, to identify and display adequate financial instruments for policy implementation. As a matter of fact, our impression is that these overall policy proposals of the European Commission, which should smooth the way for the neighbourhood policy, still lack a real vision. They do not seem able to avoid the methodological superficiality and scientific vagueness of expressions like "ring of friends" to define the countries bordering the European Union. It is actually not always question of "friends", if one, for instance, think about the strongly authoritarian regime of Alexander Lukashenko in Byelorussia and his scornful and definitely little conciliating attitude towards the EU but also towards Russia. The existence of an unstable and uncertain world on its doorstep should press the EU to face in terms of actual politics, and not only of economics, the challenges and problems of the "neighbourhood". In the area closer to our interests, i.e. immigration policy, one should think from now about multilateral solutions that effectively involve all the parts interested in the policy-making process. A solution could be to use the "open method of coordination" (CEC, 2001) for the EU immigration policy not only in `horizontal' way, i.e. by involving all the actors at national level in the setting up of immigration policy, but also in `vertical' way by involving the non-governmental and international organizations, the migrant associations and the ethnic minorities operating at transnational level. This coordination should take place by stimulating at the same time the participation in the process of harmonization of actors of all the interested countries, either old, new EU members or neighbouring countries that probably will not become members in a near future. The challenge of new enlargements is waiting: the expected 2007 one to Rumania, Bulgaria and possibly Croatia and the one to Turkey whose accession date has still not been fixed. Turkey seems to raise more problems, because of its demographic potential and above all its identity characteristics of a Muslim country in between East and West. It is worth remembering that, only few years ago, the fear that some million Turkish citizens residents in Germany for long could acquire the double nationality and therefore make fully weigh their electoral power, forced the adoption of a compromise model in reforming the citizenship law. 23 The new law adopted for the first time some elements of jus soli, but the hypothesis of a double passport originally included in the reform supported by the red-green coalition, has been rejected. In the following years, advocated by the Christian-democratic and social Christian party a new debate started on the country identity and the concept of Leitkultur, as `dominant culture' whose roots date back, according to the exponents of the two parties, to the Christian tradition of Germany. The German case is only one example. Other western countries are living equally strong conflicts on issues of identity that the events following September 11th have particularly exacerbated. The conditions of immigrant communities and ethnic minorities living in the European Union became harsher. The multicultural practices are constantly put in discussion and face more and more difficulties in being really implemented (Rex, 2004). The Turkish issue is added to this composite picture, forcing the European Union to rethink itself, its identity and borders. Finally, only when the debate on the European identity will be entirely exhausted, the practical problems of the national and supranational political spheres could aspire to a suitable solution. References Apap J. (2004): Requirements for a More Effective and Enhanced JHA Cooperation in an Enlarged European Union: Towards Closer Partnerships (working paper), ELISE Consortium, Centre for European Policy (CEPS), Brussels, Barros L., Lahlou M., Escoffier C., Pumares P. and Ruspini, P. (2002): L'immigration irreguliere subsaharienne a travers et vers le Maroc, Cahiers de Migrations Internationales, 54 F, Genve: Bureau International du Travail Castles S. and Miller M. J. (1993): The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, London: Macmillan Castles S. (1995): How nation-states respond to immigration and ethnic diversity, New Community, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 293308. Commission of the European Communities (CEC) (2001): On an Open Method of Coordination for the Community Immigration Policy, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM 387, Final, Brussels, July 11 Commission of the European Communities (CEC) (2004): European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper, Communication from the Commission, COM 373 final, Brussels, 12 May Commissione Europea (CE) (2002a): Passo a passo. Spazio di libert, sicurezza e giustizia, Fact Sheet, 2.1, Direzione generale Giustizia e affari interni, Brussels, Settembre, Commissione Europea (CE) (2002b): Tampere. Punto di partenza della politica dell'Unione europea nel settore della giustizia e degli affari interni, Fact Sheet, 3.1, Direzione generale Giustizia e affari interni, Brussels, 24 Favell A., Hansen R. (2002): Markets Against Politics: Migration, EU Enlargement and the Idea of EUROPE, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 28, Number 4, pp. 581601 Geddes A. (2003): The Politics of Migration in an Integrating Europe, in Geddes A.: The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe, London: SAGE Publications, pp. 126148 Grny A. and Kpiska E. (2004): Mixed Marriages in Migration from the Ukraine to Poland, in Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 353-372 Grny A. and Ruspini P. (2004): Forging a Common Immigration Policy for the Enlarging European Union: for Diversity of Harmonization, in Grny A., Ruspini P. (eds.): Migration in the New Europe: East-West Revisited, Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, pp. 247-277 Ivakhniouk I. (2003): Eastern Europe: Current and Future Migration Trends, Key paper for the 4th Regional Conference of the Council of Europe "Migration Policies on the Eve of the EU Enlargement: What Challenges for Future Co-operation within the East European Region", Kiev, October 9-10 Jordan B., Strth B. and Triandafyllidou A. (2003): Contextualizing Immigration Policy Implementation in Europe, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 195224 Kaczmarczyk P. (2004): Future Westward Outflow from Accession Countries, in Grny A., Ruspini P. (eds.): Migration in the New Europe: East-West Revisited, Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, pp. 65-90 Kpiska E. and Stola D. (2004): Migration Policy and Politics in Poland, in Grny A., Ruspini P. (eds.): Migration in the New Europe: East-West Revisited, Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, pp. 159-176. Motta G. (2003): Dal mercato alla politica. Le istituzioni europee dalla CECA al Trattato di Nizza, in Faccioli Pintozzi L. (a cura di): Europa: il Nuovo Continente. Presente, Passato e Futuro dell'Unione Europea, Roma: RelazionInternazionali, pp. 37-48 Rex J. (2004): Multiculturalism and Political Integration in Modern Nation States, in Grny A., Ruspini P. (eds.): Migration in the New Europe: East-West Revisited, Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 93-108 Ruspini P. (2005): Da dieci a venticinque: il nuovo spazio europeo, in Fondazione ISMU: Decimo Rapporto sulle migrazioni 2004. Dieci anni di immigrazione in Italia, Milano: Franco Angeli, pp. 317-330 Ruspini P. (2004a): Between East and West: Migration in the Enlarging European Union, Siirtolaisuus-Migration, Vol. 30, No. 1, Turku, pp. 3-9 Ruspini P. (2004b): Lo spazio migratorio della Ue allargata: Russia e repubbliche exsovietiche. Nuovi confini migratori, in Fondazione ISMU: Nono rapporto sulle migrazioni, Milano: Franco Angeli, pp. 331-341 Ruspini P. (2003a): L'area dell'Unione europea, in Fondazione ISMU: Ottavo Rapporto sulle migrazioni 2002, Milano: Franco Angeli, pp. 269-277 Ruspini P. (2003b): Migratory Flows and Policies in the New European Space, in S. Giusti, L. Tajoli, (eds.): Convergence in the Enlarged European Union, Milan: Egea-ISPI, pp. 221-241 Ruspini P. (2002): L'area dell'Unione europea, in Fondazione ISMU: Settimo Rapporto sulle migrazioni 2001, Milano: Franco Angeli, pp. 263-270 Ruspini P. (2001): I paesi dell'Unione europea, in Fondazione Cariplo ISMU: Sesto Rapporto sulle Migrazioni 2000, Milano: Franco Angeli, pp. 225-233 Ruspini P. (2000): I paesi dell'Unione europea, in Fondazione Cariplo ISMU: Quinto Rapporto sulle Migrazioni 1999, Milano: Franco Angeli, pp. 213-219 25 van Selm J., Tsolakis E. (2004): The Enlargement of an `Area of Freedom, Security and Justice': Managing Migration in a European Union of 25 Members, mpi Policy Brief, No.4, Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute Visetti G. (2004): Ai confini della Nuova Europa una citt divisa tra Ue e Russia, La Repubblica, gioved 29 aprile 2004, p. 17 Wallace C. (1999): Economic Hardship, Migration, and Survival Strategies in East-Central Europe, Sociological Series, No. 35, Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies Wallace H. (1996): The Challenge of Governance, in Wallace H., Wallace W., (eds.) PolicyMaking in the European Union (3rd Edition), Oxford: Oxford University Press Wallace H. (2001): Introduction: Rethinking European Integration, in Wallace H. (ed.): Interlocking Dimensions of European Integration, Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, pp. 122 26 THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN EAST-WEST MIGRATION Liliana Hiri* This paper puts economic migration in a social perspective and constructs a framework that accommodates the various interests and externalities of international mobility at the level of a destination country. It thereby elaborates on the concept of positive effects of social networks, correlated with potential negative wage effects and agglomeration diseconomies in areas receiving immigrants. At the same time, the paper particularises the analysis to the case of one EU enlargement country, Romania. The findings in these case point to the crucial role of social networks in the choice of destinations in the EU. They also allow for the explanation of why migrants cluster in destinations with moderate relative income opportunities, based on better prospects of living in an accommodating social environment. Furthermore, this paper points out that various groups in the society of destination have different preferences over the optimum total number of migrants. However, a sustainable number of immigrants is ultimately to be found beyond what might seem optimal for individual groups. That could be also above what new immigrants themselves perceive as the best level of immigration. In the context of freedom of movement that means that social interaction would ultimately determine which the ideal number of new migrants should be. Thus, immigration seizes at the level where the social context finds this to be in the interest of the wider society in an integrated space. Keywords: labour migration, social networks, EU enlargement, Romania * The Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen, Garthdee Rd., AB10 7QE, UK; e-mail:, Tel: +441224-263418; Fax: +44-1224-263434 1 Introduction The enlargement of the European Union (EU) in 2004 has brought new dynamism into the integration process at European level, but also opened a series of questions regarding the sustainability of institutional structures and economic processes within the Community. One essential concern remains the way in which the accession of Central and East European Countries (CEECs) is shaping labour mobility at EU level. After decades of low internal migration in the EU, enlargement is expected to reverse the trend, and push labour mobility rates in Europe to new highs. Generally, studies of economic migration look at the effects of the process on either the society at origin, or at destination. However, there exists an `intermediary space', inhabited by migrant communities. This paper attempts to bridge the gap between home and 27 destination societies surrounding migrants, by introducing migrant networks. It also asserts that in the context of EU enlargement, where new member states gradually become part of a European free migration space, the effects of migration on old and new member states should be treated in the unified framework of the integrated EU space. This paper thus analyses the way in which workers from the East are received by West European nationals, at the same time as questioning the role of migrant communities to new migration from CEECs. Thereby, migrant networks become the link between sending and host societies. In this context, the continuation of migration to a particular destination will be treated here not simply as the result of migration intentions at origin, but also as a reflection of attitudes towards migration abroad, and more broadly, as a result of social networking. Expectations and reality about migration are not always evolving hand in hand. Perceptions about immigration can be false or exaggerated at the level of the public in destination countries. Migrants themselves often have an unrealistic image about conditions in the country of destination, before leaving their origin. On the other hand, individuals have a natural propensity to stay put. They prefer to live in a familiar environment, surrounded by friends, family, and people speaking their native language, as opposed to moving to an uncertain destination. The ensuing opinions and preferences of the public towards migration can be treated as an expression of the social context of migration. In this role, public attitudes act sometimes as a push factor, and on other occasions, as a deterrent to international mobility. Social factors ultimately complement, or rather substitute other incentives to economic migration - such as wage differential and further economic and political factors. The social context in the potential countries of destination can also influence the decision of an individual to choose one destination over another, as well as shaping the length of migrants' stay abroad. Moreover, even where the classical `push' and `pull' factors of economic migration give workers a strong reason to migrate, people decide either to stay home in the first instance, return home after a short spell of working abroad, or change their migration destination. Indeed, temporary or circular migration is one of the defining characteristics of East-West mobility in Europe. That is more often than not, socially conditioned. A main objective in this paper is to identify the role that the social environment plays in the continuation of East-West migration to particular EU destinations. It thereby proposes a new framework for the analysis of European labour mobility, which would accommodate both the interests of old EU Member States' nationals, and that of migrants from the East. Such an approach seems only natural in the context of EU enlargement, where the concerns of nationals in both East and West become a European Union matter. 28 Initially, an overview of existing studies questioning the role of social networks to migration will be presented. That is followed by the development of a theoretical framework on the utility of migration to different groups in the society of destination. There, the analysis draws on the existing economic literature reflecting possible externalities of migrant networks (see Bauer, Epstein and Gang, 2002; Epstein, 2002). It also shows how migrants could be perceived by various groups in society. Perceptions, translated into public attitudes, might finally influence the equilibrium size of migrant communities in various destinations. Public opinion at destination will be considered as a manifestation of the utility of migration to nationals. However, the social environment of migration is further extended, to contain migrant groups in the EU. Here, the particular case of Romanian migrant workers in the EU will be chosen for a more detailed analysis, together with the relevant social networks at home and abroad. In this sense, a set of sociological studies undertaken by a group of researchers at the University of Bucharest have already set the ground for the empirical investigation (for example, erban and Grigora, 2000; Radu, 2001; Sandu, 2000a, 2000b). Some relevant observations from existing studies will be thus reviewed, and further data published in relation to the role of social networks for East-West migrants is also analysed. Finally, the paper intends to give a new interpretation to previous empirical observations, discussing a theoretical optimum for migrant communities in the EU. 2 The relevance of migrant networks Migrant networks are accepted in the sociological literature as an essential link for what is known as the `dynamic migration system' (see Kritz, Lim and Zlotnik, 1992). The information that migrant communities abroad transmit to the country of origin about living and working conditions at destination is thereby essential. Additionally, the role that migrant networks play in the assistance of new immigrants can be significant. The relevance of networks has been extensively documented in the case of the Mexican migration to the USA. The empirical investigation of social networks thereby extends to the economic literature, by making use of the Mexican Migration Project data (see for example, Bauer, Epstein and Gang, 2000). The research in this context underlines the strong supporting role that networks play for new immigrants, with only some weakening in their importance where migrant communities become larger. Another research, referring this time to the East-West mobility in Europe, analysed the case of ethnic Germans moving as Aussiedler (or bersiedler) from Eastern Europe (or East Germany) into West Germany. Bauer and Zimmermann (1997) show that 73% of these immigrants in Germany live in proximity to friends and family, and 77% have friends at 29 destination, who come from the same origin. Moreover, despite the expectation that better skilled individuals rely less on migrant networks in order to integrate in the society and labour market of their destination, these appear to have the same tendency to locate close to existing migrant communities, as any other migrants. In the case of Albania, a European transition country experiencing large emigration rates, the existence of networks abroad was identified as a crucial reason for choosing one destination country over another. Kule et al. (2000) found that 28.7% of their survey respondents identify financial returns as the most important factor to migration, followed by the 24.8% who see easy access to a destination as a crucial factor and the 24.6% who consider the presence of family and friends abroad as most important to their choice of migration destination. Migration is often cumulative, meaning that initial mobility to a given location attracts more people to that very destination in the future. In the case of the CEECs, where migration is temporary, there is further evidence of a strong inclination of migrants with previous experience of work abroad to return repeatedly to the same locations in the EU. An ethnosurvey-based investigation of East-West Polish migrants (UN/ECE, 1998) clearly points to the repeated nature of migration between Poland and Western Europe. Thus, a majority of people having migrated to the EU in the past is ready to do so again. Thereby, information and social networking sustain migration patterns over time. It also becomes apparent that the availability of networks at destination does not necessarily influence the intention to migrate, but is very important in sustaining migration in a particular location. All this stresses the necessity to analyse migration and its sustainability in the wider context, including the role of individual experience, but also of social networks. The next section thus introduces a theoretical framework of migration, based on externalities in the wider social context of foreign work abroad. 3 The theoretical framework The definition of a common space in which the different attitudes to migration come together is first necessary. The assumption made is that while migration decisions are shaped at home, the sustainability of the process can only be decided in the country of destination. Migration is thus analysed from the point of view of social preferences expressed by various groups, interacting at the level of destination societies. This section also introduces costs and benefits of migration to three distinct groups: new migrants, established migrant communities abroad, and natives in receiving societies. The crucial link between individuals and communities is thereby given by social networking. 30 3.1 Social preferences for migration 3.1.1 General considerations on public opinion Society's preferences can be identified by the manifestation of public opinion, apparently pertaining to large sections of the population. A most inclusive public is the whole population of a determined territory. This section proposes to look at public attitudes as a reflection of the utility of a given process to the reference group whose opinion is of interest. Public opinion on migration is thus treated in the following as the expression of the benefits or losses induced by the process of cross-border mobility on a given population. Beyond private benefits or losses, public acceptance or discontent with migration also captures some by-products of the decision of migrants to move abroad. These externalities to migration are therefore discussed here at the level of the migrant receiving country. Externalities generally occur when individuals are affected by other people's actions, upon which they have no control. Meade (1973) suggested that: "An external economy (diseconomy) is an event which confers an appreciable benefit (inflicts an appreciable damage) on some person or persons who were not fully consenting parties in reaching the decision or decisions which led directly or indirectly to the event in question [stress added]'. In the case where migration is the `event in question', benefits (external economies) can be induced in society by increased networking in migrant communities. Such networking finds its manifestation in the support and the integration of new migrants, creation of new social ties, increased capacity to produce new goods and to trade a wider range of products, etc. Such positive network effects find further expression in a positive attitude to migration by those benefiting from the network. However, costs might be also incurred as in the case of nationals in the destination country, for which a large number of migrants induces redistribution or agglomeration effects. These diseconomies then translate in negative attitudes to migration on behalf of nationals in destination countries. As migration often proceeds independently of the benefits or losses of many people affected by it, the process clearly involves actors who are not fully consenting to it (i.e. various sections of the public in the country of destination). In this paper, the benefits and losses of migration are reconsidered in the general social framework of the host society. The utility of migration is consequently treated from the point of view of the society of destination (including migrants), as opposed to the private interests of individual migrants taking the decision to look for work abroad, and the nationals at destination competing with migrants for a limited number of existing jobs. 31 3.1.2 Perception of migration by nationals in destination countries Public opinion in countries of immigration usually materialises in restrictive immigration policies (Hanson et al, 2002). Nevertheless, it can evolve separately from policy, or even as a consequence of the policies in place. Moreover, public attitude at destination can also have a direct effect on migrants, by creating a friendly, or rather hostile environment to foreigners. As migrants arrive at their destination, they add to a labour pool made up by nationals of the host country, as well as by earlier migrants. Markets need to absorb an increasing amount of labour resulting from immigration, and the wage rate at destination could drop for those in competition with new immigrants5. That generally induces the attitudes towards immigrants to be negative in the host society. These negative attitudes in themselves act as an external diseconomy of immigration in the country of destination. On the other hand, public attitudes in host societies can also act as a signal for a welcoming or a hostile environment to potential migrants. Thus, a hostile public attitude towards immigrants in the country of destination ultimately diminishes the utility of migration for foreign workers. 3.1.3 Perception of migration by nationals in sending countries In order to have some `real effect' in a country of destination, intentions to emigrate from any country of origin have to translate in individual decisions to move abroad. A positive public opinion regarding migration in the county of origin derives from potential individual gains from work abroad and general benefits of migration to the home society (for example, remittances). However, attitudes to migration in countries of origin do not always materialise in the real pursuit of foreign residence or employment, given a series of constraints that come into play when an intention is to be put into practice. Furthermore, after migration has occurred, an individual is not always determined to maintain his migrant status. We thus have to be aware of differences between incentives to move abroad and incentives to stay abroad. It can be argued that migration to a specific destination is only sustainable if the social costs it generates do not exceed the benefits incurred by different groups from the process. 3.1.4 Perception of migration by migrant communities Networks of workers abroad are essential to the proliferation of information between host and home society, and they usually eliminate considerable transaction costs that individuals face on arrival abroad. Those considering the option of foreign employment, first decide whether 5 Evidence shows nevertheless that the real effects on wages are rather ambiguous. 32 emigration is desirable based on their private information about a given destination. Thereby, the higher the numbers of nationals from the same origin in a particular destination, the more potential migrants believe that a destination is desirable, readjusting their individual expectations about a foreign location. Nevertheless, if a hostile environment to migration prevails abroad, the existing migrant network can transmit the negative message back, to the country of origin. Gurak and Caces (1992) reviewed a large number of studies on migrant networks, defining these from various perspectives. They identify first approaches discussing destination country networks. These look at migrants' survival, adjustment, integration, or insulation strategies. Second, there are approaches looking at links between origin and destination countries. They consider the role that networks play in chain migration, their instrumental support to migration, their use in the creation of contact systems and accessibility of destination locations, as well as their relationship with social commitments. Finally, there are approaches considering networks at origin. These are portrayed in their insulation role, through remittances, as well as in their capacity to offer community support for those remaining in the home country. The analysis of migrant networks in this section focuses on migrant communities or enclaves in destination countries. Moreover, networks are considered to have their own preferences relative to further immigration from the same origin. For a migrant community, new immigration can both increase and decrease welfare, through the interplay of two processes. On one hand, the arrival of new immigrants increases social interaction. Larger networks have the capacity to generate an increased number of ethnic goods, along with new social ties and a familiar environment for newcomers in the alien country of destination. These social interactions first translate into a positive externality of further migration for an ethnic community established abroad. Moreover, as this community is a component structure of the wider society of the country of destination, the effect will ultimately translate into a positive outcome within the host society. The latter benefits directly through the increase in diversity (see for example Lazear, 1998), as well as indirectly, through the easier integration of migrants. On the other hand, wages in an expanding migrant community are threatened, as old migrants often come into direct competition with new immigrants. Thus, negative externalities set in where a migrant community is too large. Moreover, while existing networks in the country of destination are first expected to reduce transaction costs for migrants, a long-term or permanent link to an `ethnic ghetto' (Lazear, 1998) becomes disruptive. Too large migrant enclaves do not allow for benefits from diversity to expand, but 33 create isolated communities where migrants face disincentives to interact with the host society. A well-known example is that of poor language proficiency of migrants (Chiswick and Miller, 2002, Shields and Wheatley Price, 1999). The extensive use of ethnic enclaves limits potential social and economic ties in the country of destination. Subsequently, society fails to benefit from potential trade and increased diversity, as migrants remain isolated from the wider population, and are confined to an `ethnic ghetto'. A migrant community can also prefer to restrict or rather encourage migration depending on the skill level of new and established migrants. Skilled immigration is generally more acceptable than unskilled migration, given its positive effect on productivity. Unskilled migrants can damage the reputation of skilled migrants (Stark and Wang, 1999), as well as enter into direct competition with other unskilled individuals. However, unskilled migrants can also complement skilled migrants. On the other hand, skilled migrants can be better off helping new unskilled immigrants to settle abroad, rather than being in constant need to make transfers to such individuals in the home country (Stark and Wang, 2002). In conclusion, the preference of migrant communities over further immigration can vary from case to case. However, an initial positive attitude towards new migrants can be expected, followed by a decline in support, as negative externalities set in. 3.2 A migration model with externalities In this section positive and negative perceptions of migration, by different groups, are brought together. The objective is to use the coexisting positive and negative externalities, in order to characterise a theoretical optimum migration level. The model elaborates on the hypothesis that migration is sustainable by virtue of the social networking of migrants and despite negative perceptions by natives. The discussion of social costs and benefits of migration further hinges on the groups to be considered as part of the society of reference. In the following, migrants established abroad are considered as an integral part of the society of destination, along with natives. Moreover, where all EU citizens would receive equal treatment, the interests of all migrants from new members of an integrated area should be considered as equally relevant to the social welfare of the host Member State. On the other hand, as the decision to migrate is taken in the country of origin, the private benefits of moving abroad incurred by migrants are excluded from the social benefits calculations in destination countries. Nevertheless, any positive economies from migration that sustain the process in a given destination are to be considered as part of the set of social costs and benefits incurred at destination. Finally, immigration is considered to be sustainable as long as 34 its marginal social costs in a location are lower than marginal social benefits, but not beyond that point. In line with Bauer, Epstein, and Gang (2002) the theoretical model proposed here considers the utility of migration to a country abroad as a function of the number of migrants, and expects that the effect of further immigration on migrants' wages is negative. The utility of migration inside a migrant community is described by a function Umigr = f (N, w), where N is the number of migrants and w is the wage level of foreign workers. First, for migrants abroad, the increase of their community through immigration will bring about a utility increase, through network externalities. Thus, U mig ( N, w ) N >0 (1). Additionally, all migrants derive increasing utility from the capacity to earn a better wage abroad. Thus, U mig ( N, w ) w >0 (2). The capacity to achieve a given wage depends on the demand and supply of labour, and new migrants mean an increase of labour supply, whereby w = f(N). The increase in the supply of workers through immigration is prone to drive wages down in the community where these settle abroad. We thus have: w ( N ) <0 N (3). Further, the indifference curve for migrants established abroad is described by the equation: dU mig ( N, w ) = U mig ( N, w ) N dN + U mig ( N, w ) w dw = 0 (4), and we obtain an iso-utility locus of the form: U mig ( N, w ) dw N =- U mig ( N, w ) dN w (5). 35 According to inequality (1) and (2) this gives a negative value, describing a downwards sloping indifference curve. If now the stock of migrants is increasing, the utility in a migrant community will change as well, as described below: dU mig ( N, w ) dN = U mig ( N, w ) N + U mig ( N, w ) w w N (6). According to inequality (1), the first factor on the right-hand side in (6) is positive. The second factor is negative, as it multiplies a positive value derived from inequality (2), and a negative value, as shown in inequality (3). The optimum level of further immigration from the point of view of the migrant community is where the change in utility is maximised, or in other words, where expression (6) equals zero6. In line with equation (6), it can be argued that a change in the size of a migrant community will induce a positive effect as long as the network externality is greater than the negative effect of wage redistribution. We can thus expect an inverted U-shape preference for migration by the migrant community7, in accordance with increasing network effects that are later diminished through the negative impact on wage. In other words, the destination country benefits indirectly from migration, through networking effects in migrant communities, which nevertheless diminish as wages of foreign workers are pushed down. However, as we intend to consider how immigration affects the host society as a whole, next, the position of natives in the country of destination needs to be addressed. Natives are often vociferous about their preference for lower immigration, and we can describe for these a new utility function, including the number of migrants in the destination society. Natives' utility can be described in the form of: Unat = f (N, wnat), where N is the number of migrants and wnat are natives' wages. As observed by Gang, Rivera-Batiz and Yun (1996) natives' attitudes to migration deteriorate if the number of immigrants increases in a given destination. That shows a utility of lower migration, not of additional migration. However, negative attitudes towards migrants relate with their `visibility' (see Gang, RiveraBatiz and Yun, 2002), meaning that natives can be indifferent to migration as long as a migrant community is considerably small. That can be brought down to people's preference for uniformity, which in this analysis finds expression in an inequality of the form: 6 7 We shall call this a point Nmax comm. See Bauer, Epstein and Gang (2002) for the necessary conditions in this case. 36 U nat ( N, w nat ) 0 N (7). At the same time, the main economic interest of natives remains their income. Their satisfaction increases with a rise in wages. Therefore: U nat (N, w nat ) >0 w nat (8). It is not always certain how wages of natives evolve as a function of increased migration, but there is evidence of a slight deterioration, at least related to unskilled natives' earnings8. We thus have: w nat ( N) <0 N (9). Furthermore, as in the case of the migrant community, we describe an iso-utility for natives with migration of the form: d U nat ( N, w nat ) = U nat ( N, w nat ) U nat ( N, w nat ) dN + dw nat = 0 N w nat (10). Accordingly, the iso-utility locus for natives becomes: U nat ( N, w nat ) dw nat N =- U nat ( N, w nat ) dN w nat (11). If we take into account inequality (7) and (8) we obtain a positive value for (11). This indicates an upward sloping indifference curve. There is a direct relationship between lower immigration and higher wages for nationals. If we subsequently consider an increase in the number of migrants through further immigration, we obtain: dU nat ( N, w nat ) U nat ( N, w nat ) U nat ( N, w nat ) w nat = + dN N w nat N (12). 8 For the case of East-West migration, see Brcker (2000). 37 This is a sum of two negative components. The effect of an increase in migration thus induces a double cost to the society of destination, through natives' external diseconomies. However, if we are to consider the two groups, natives and migrants, as equal parts of the same destination country's society9, we can derive an optimum level of migration that takes into account all individuals, not only natives (to be called N*1destination). We can draw on the same graph a social benefits curve - derived from the positive effect of further immigration in migrant communities, and a curve showing the social costs of migration derived from the negative effects incurred by natives. The resulting figure 1 shows that the desirable immigration level in a given destination is neither zero as natives would argue, nor at the point where positive externalities net of negative wage effects to migrant communities are peaking10. We have instead a new, society-wide optimum, where the two `attitudes lines' cross. By equating equations (6) and (12) we could derive a theoretical optimum level of migration (N*1destination). On the vertical axis, we have the social costs and benefits of migration. (These can find their expression in positive, respectively negative attitudes to migration, as indicated by the two curve labels.) On the horizontal axis, we have the number of immigrants to a destination that already hosts a resident migrant population. The inverted U-curve represents the benefits of `new' migration to the established migrant community. It peaks at a level Nmaxcomm, where the increasingly positive effect of networking starts to be driven down by agglomeration effects reflected in lower wages. For natives, when immigrants reach a significant level as to be `visible' in society, fears of further immigration set in. After an initial pressure on wages in migrant communities11, the pressure on natives' wages sets in, too. That ultimately results in stronger public discontent among the native population, with respect to immigration. In this context, the sustainable level of migration for the society of destination should be searched at the point where the positive effects derived in migrant communities are below the negative effects on natives. According to Figure 1, optimum migration should be at the point N*1destination. 9 Which is the stated aspiration of developed countries, seeking to integrate migrants. See Bauer, Epstein, and Gang, 2002 for a description of optimum migration in migrant communities. 11 New migrants come first in competition with older migrants, in whose vicinity they settle, and later on, with natives. 10 38 Figure 1 Migration attitudes as an expression of social benefits/costs of migration Social costs/benefits of migration Negative attitude of nationals Positive attitude of `old' migrants Nmaxcomm. N*1destination N While `old' migrants derive benefits from the non-depletable positive externality of social interaction in a foreign destination, new migrants benefit additionally from the information that migrant networks convey about a foreign location. As mentioned earlier, the larger the community abroad, the stronger is the signal that a particular location is desirable for migration. Epstein (2002) modelled a so-called herd effect, as a by-product of migrant networks, which new migrants make use of in their choice of destination. Thus, positive preferences for migration by `new migrants' in the presence of increasing migrant communities captures both the positive effect of networking at destination, as well as the informational herd effect. Figure 1 can be redrawn to take into account the benefits derived from a particular location by `new migrants'. The curve showing the `attitudes to migration for new migrants' is depicted by the upper, bold grey line, in Figure 2. This captures both the positive effects reflected in `old migrants' attitudes, as well as the specific benefits experienced by new migrants in a country of destination - which determine herd behaviour. The benefits curve for `new migrants' abroad peaks later than that for `old migrants', at a point NnewM. It implies that new migrants find it optimal to choose a particular destination beyond the point that established migrants consider ideal for their community size. Moreover, in a society that confers immigrants equal 39 rights with nationals and residents12, the social optimum level of migration increases relative to the case depicted in Figure 1. The new optimum is at N*2integrated migrants and nationals in that location. Figure 2 Migration attitudes of natives, `new', and `old' migrants area, which takes into account the welfare of new immigrants in a destination, along with the welfare of established Social costs/benefits of migration Attitude of new migrants Social tension area Negative attitude of nationals Network buffer area Positive attitude of `old' migrants Nmaxcomm NnewM N1*destination N*2integrated area Some further elements have been portrayed in figure 2. First, given that up to the point N*1destination migrant communities derive benefits from immigration in excess of what they might need to internalise in terms of natives' negative attitudes, they should be willing to accommodate new migrants. However, where immigration increases beyond N*1destination, new migrants will have to fend for themselves as they are the only group who derive from migration higher benefits than the cost of negative attitudes towards them in the host society. Migration can be sustainable up to point N*2integrated area, which is optimal for an inclusive society in a free migration space. Beyond point N*2integrated area nevertheless, further migration is undesirable for any destination. Despite continuing positive benefits of migration to migrants themselves, the negative attitudes of natives cancel out all benefits from networking and herding, making further migration unsustainable in a given country. In sum, in a destination where migrant communities are already established we can expect that new immigration will occur in smooth conditions, up to a level N*1destination. Old migrants accommodate newcomers in the society of destination, by offering what could be 12 That would be the case in a free migration area across the EU. 40 called a `network buffer'. After that, while some favourable conditions to immigration still operate, the process passes through an area where `new migrants' have to accommodate abroad under circumstances of social tension - their networks do not seek to help further immigrants. The pursuit of migrants' integration by the authorities in the immigration country is nevertheless justified at this stage, given that further migration is still sustainable from the point of view of net benefits to the wider society that seeks the inclusion of immigrants. Nevertheless, when migrant numbers in a destination reach the level N*2integrated restrictions can be justified starting with this point. Finally, it has to be acknowledged that the curves used in figure 1 and 2 can vary according to the skill level of migrants. If migrants are highly skilled and earn above average wages abroad, nationals' attitudes (and migrant communities' for that matter) are generally positive to them. The curve `negative attitude of natives' flattens and `positive attitudes of old migrants' declines much slower. It might take a very high level of immigration to induce external diseconomies in the society of destination. Any reasonable number of skilled immigrant workers will be acceptable and that is, very probably, why countries often adopt more liberal policies towards the immigration of the highly skilled. Next, this paper will consider the case of the social environment of Romanian migrant workers in the EU. It should be reminded that Romania is presently in the process of EU accession, and freedom of movement for Romanian workers in the EU is still a question for the medium-term perspective. The aim is to observe whether sustainability of migration in particular locations depends indeed on the interaction of new, old migrants, and the society of destination at large. Thus, East-West migration is re-evaluated, in the framework of public attitudes in the EU, along with the role of migrant networks and their interaction with new migrants. area, new migrants in that particular location would bring net losses to the society at large. Migration 4 The social context of Romanian EU migration Many of studies undertaken so far with reference to East-West mobility of Romanian nationals (erban and Grigora, 2000; Radu, 2001; Sandu, 2000a, 2000b) used a sociological enquiry and analyse the migratory experience of small communities south of Bucharest. Complementary research was undertaken at the level of destination societies, by Potot (2000 and 2002), who investigated Romanian migrants in France and Spain. The findings with respect to the operation of social networks were particularly relevant for the present analysis. Additionally, IOM (1998) data will be considered in this section, for a better understanding of how migrant communities abroad influence new migration from CEECs. Finally, a few 41 observations regarding attitudes towards migration in EU countries of destination, and EU public preferences over enlargement to Romania will be also considered. Such attitudes were monitored so far by various Eurobarometer surveys. Sandu (2000a) uses a quantitative investigation of data originating with the 2001 Public Opinion Barometer of the Open Society Foundation in Romania. Thereby, the role of social networks becomes apparent, especially in the case of migration of the urban Romanian population. Additionally, Sandu's (2000a) in-depth interviews with migrant households indicated the highly relevant role of migrant communities abroad for the individual choice of a particular destination in the EU. Migrants also preferred locations where the native population was perceived as more understanding, allowing foreign workers to `live in normal conditions'. For example, after migrants confronted a hostile receiving society in France, they redirected their job search to Spain. There, they were integrated much easier into the local society, particularly in the South of the country, and in Madrid. In this sense, an earlier assumption of this paper is confirmed: the choice of a destination depends on the signalling capacity of established migrant communities abroad. There is an attractiveness of locations where earlier migrants reside, but there are disincentives to continue migration where a `social tension area' might have been entered. Thus, even abstracting from income differentials and migration policies, migrants settle in new destinations where integration in the wider society is perceived to be smooth. Radu (2001) observed that any information that migrants acknowledge to have about their destination (in Spain) is simply what they hear from earlier migrants to that country. Additionally, the occupational characteristics of those migrating to the EU are less relevant than individual connections abroad in shaping the pattern of foreign employment of Romanian nationals. This indicates that beyond the strong informative capacity that migrant communities usually have, they also allow for a herding behaviour, as modelled in section 3 of this paper. Another study, by erban and Grigora (2000), show that those who have been abroad once tend to go again, and take as well their partners with them at a later stage. The observed chain migration indicates in some instances the possibility of transforming temporary migrants into permanent migrants. That occurs especially if migrants add to their initial economic motivation to leave, a new attachment, to the social structures of the country of destination. However, erban and Grigora (2000) observe that migrants often work abroad in jobs that they would never consider doing in the home country. Beyond considerations of skills transferability, an explanation could be that migrants often lack any intention to see their position in relation to the society of destination. The connection to the society of origin 42 is thus essential, and migration is used to enhance social status in the home community, rather than in the country of employment abroad. A relevant point made by the studies undertaken in Romania is also the fact that the types of activities at destination practised by Romanian migrants change over time, often as a function of first or repeat migration. There is a clear tendency of upskilling of jobs undertaken in the EU in subsequent periods. Additionally, those who manage to acquire destination country language skills have better income opportunities, and an improved capacity to work directly with destination country contractors, rather than relying on badly paid employment, mediated by other people from their own ethnic community abroad (erban and Grigora, 2000). Thereby, the role of social capital is replaced by human capital in the longer term, as network diseconomies appear within migrant communities. On the other hand, initial social tension could diminish, where migrants are accepted as valuable partners in the wider community at destination. If analysed from a home country perspective, migration and attitudes to migration can be a simple expression of objectives to achieve, such as the enhancement of personal income. Any constraints on mobility at this stage are given by the resources at hand (such as money to support a migration decision), and the information about the society at destination (usually received from previous migrants). Nevertheless, information about the individuals' situation in host societies is often embellished by migrants, in order to defend their social status at home. That could attract further migrants to destinations that prove undesirable upon arrival abroad. However, if migrants are observed at destination, the motives behind their migration and stay abroad (migration continuation) become apparent, and we can determine what sustains migration in a particular location (Radu, 2001). Consequently, the role of migrant networks for the sustainability of migration is best analysed at destination, or from the perspective of returnees who have made use of networks abroad. In this sense, a useful complimentary analysis to the qualitative research on migrant households in Romania was the investigation undertaken by Potot (2000), of Romanian migrant communities in France and Spain. She first went out from the observation of an everincreasing migrant network of Romanian street vendors in Nice, France. Most of these vendors were originating in the same area of South Romania. Their employer was initially keen to hire new workers on a simple recommendation by individuals from the same origin. However, a dispute between the hiring company and some of its Romanian employees in Paris ceased the practice of employing Romanian vendors throughout France. Consequently, most migrants looked for new EU destinations. Thereby, many appear to have opted for employment in Britain, where, according to migrants' accounts, wages were higher, given the 43 lower number of Romanians already working there. In other words, `old migrants' do see themselves in competition with other migrants from the same origin, especially where their community becomes significantly large. Therefore, migrants stop to concentrate in a given location after an `optimum community size' has been reached. A second Romanian migrant enclave analysed by Potot (2003) settled in the El Ejido area of Spain. Here, informal work opportunities in the agricultural sector were widely available, and Romanian workers were easily accepted by the local population. An important feature of this migrant community was its capacity to better integrate in the wider society, and its reputation for contributing to the local economy with seriousness and hard work, while remaining `discrete'. This underlines the point that for migration to be sustainable in a particular location, it is not only important to receive support from previous migrants on arrival abroad, but also, to maintain `lower visibility'. Sandu (2000b) observed that people originating from the same broad areas of Romania tend to cluster in specific countries of destination in the EU. Amongst the latter, Italy and Spain are the destinations that present the strongest cumulative pattern, attracting an increasing number of Romanians in the recent past. On the other hand, Germany has a more stable inflow of Romanian migrants and similar rates of return migration to the home country. It is possible that South European destinations have not yet reached the limit of a sustainable immigration level. Germany on the other hand, attracted many ethnic Germans of Romanian origin in the beginning of the `90s. Thus, it could be beyond the level of an optimum immigrant community, where any new immigration is at the expense of some tension in the destination country. That ultimately encourages new migrants to return home after temporarily working in Germany. Table 1 The role of networks and information about destinations (% of all respondents) Reasons to migrate Good Networks Contacted experience abroad people abroad of others Slovakia Hungary Czech Republic Poland Slovenia Bulgaria Romania Source: IOM, 1998 Reasons to stay home Bad Workers badly Migration is experience of treated abroad risky others 65 45 55 71 33 38 85 24 28 36 50 37 15 18 2 6 3 16 2 7 4 23 34 16 46 43 18 25 52 55 37 64 58 47 68 70 71 71 73 79 61 71 44 Table 1 gives an overview of how many individuals in various CEECs are influenced in their attitudes to migration by the existence of migrant networks and by personal experience abroad. Thus, 85% of the IOM (1998) survey respondents in Romania would base their decision to move to another country on the fact that other members of their community had good experience abroad. Then, 18% of the surveyed Romanians would decide to move abroad if they had social networks established at destination, but only a few have already contacted such networks. On the other hand, while bad experience of others abroad does not seem to be often cited in Romania, a staggering 68% of the respondents would decide against migration if workers were inappropriately treated at destination. But we also need to acknowledge that the highest deterrent to international mobility appears to be the fact that migration remains a risky and uncertain business. About 70% of all surveyed individuals in the CEECs preferred to stay at home, given because of the risks of emigration. Ultimately, an overview of EU nationals' attitudes to accession countries and immigration is also needed in the social networking framework elaborated in this paper. Firstly, it can be seen that especially the countries receiving so far the largest number of Romanian migrants, Germany and Austria, are the least enthusiastic about the Romanian EU accession. On the other hand, new migrant destinations, such as Spain, have one of the most positive attitudes regarding enlargement to Romania. Table 2 Support for enlargement to Romania, by EU Member States 1999 % of population in favour of Romanian EU accession Belgium Denmark Germany Greece Spain France Ireland Italy Luxemburg Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden UK EU15 28 48 20 58 50 26 40 39 34 46 10 36 34 42 33 33 45 Source: Eurobarometer 51 In the same sense, Eurobarometer 55 enquired more specifically about Member States' public perceptions of labour market effects of enlargement and immigration, and the results are as expected. For example, the German population has the strongest expectation of increased migration, correlated with the fear of 77% of the population that such immigration will have negative effects at destination. That figure is even higher in the former EU border country of Austria, where 91% of the population relates a high increase in immigration from the East with negative impacts in the society of destination. On the other hand, Italy or Spain, which were shown in the overview of Romanian migration patterns to attract an increasing number of workers from this origin, expect ambiguous effects from immigration, or no negative effects at all. It can be argued that these latter countries might become increasingly attractive to CEEC workers, by virtue of social sustainability, and not necessarily because of particularly high potential wage gains for migrants. Table 3 Attitudes towards immigration/ labour market impacts of enlargement Enlargement will cause more immigration from CEECs 34% expect significant migration, while 50% believe migration will remain reasonable. 38% expect more daytime commuters. Increased immigration from CEECs will have negative effects Significant immigration increase is seen as negative by 91%. Anticipated commuting seen as negative by 81%. Negative attitudes come mostly from low skilled Austrians. 88% consider it a negative development. 77% believe this to be negative. Particular labour market effects of enlargement to the East 34% believe enlargement will slow down EU development. Fears connected to labour markets 52% fear job transfer to low production countries. Austria Belgium Denmark Public expects significant increase in immigration. 52% expect increase of immigration. - Germany Spain 40% believe that immigration will be limited. No negative effects expected. 33% believe unemployment will rise through immigration, 21% fear wage decreases and black economy development. - 67% fear job transfer to low production countries. Social problems, worse conditions on labour and housing markets. - - 46 Finland France Enlargement will cause more immigration from CEECs 3 in 5 Finns do not believe that immigration will increase (26% expect increase). 51% believe enlargement will increase immigration. Low interest in any enlargement issues. Controversial opinion. Increased immigration from CEECs will have negative effects - Particular labour market effects of enlargement to the East - Fears connected to labour markets - - - Greece Ireland Italy Uncertainty on extent of immigration. Increase in unemployment, worsening of economic conditions if immigration is large. - 75.2% fear job transfer to low production countries. 48.2% fear increased unemployment. 70% fear increased unemployment. Fear of job transfer to low production countries. Luxemburg - 80% fear increased immigration. 18% believe there are already enough immigrants. 88.5% consider CEEC immigration as negative. 2/3 believe significant immigration will be negative. 76% judge increased migration negatively. - Netherlands Portugal 43% believe that immigration will be significant; 43.1% believe in limited immigration. 42% expect significant immigration. - 22.3% are afraid of unemployment increase. Increase in unemployment expected. - 26% expect increased unemployment and worsened economic perspectives at home. - Sweden UK Fewer than one in eight informed on the issue; especially the young are uninformed. Source: Eurobarometer 55 Better economic prospects expected; pessimism on job creation. 78% fear of job transfer to low production countries. - The overall balance from this overview of EU nationals' perceptions of migration from the East remains in favour of the view that natives consider immigration from the East a threat to EU labour markets. That, in turn, makes our assumption of an increased disutility to nationals from further immigration a realistic assumption. This observation also justifies the EU's request to adopt a transitional period to labour mobility after the accession of CEECs, albeit 47 on the basis of the flexible `2-3-2 formula'13. Probably those Member States that fear migration from the East most, will be also the latest EU countries to liberalise labour mobility with the East, at the same time as being much more probable to have arrived to a `social tension area' surrounding immigration. With freedom of movement, these destination countries might deter further migration on the basis of externalities and lack of social sustainability alone, even without a direct policy intervention. 5 Conclusion It has thus been acknowledged that East-West migration is generally accompanied by sceptical attitudes among the host society's population. That in itself is however not enough to stop all immigration, neither to justify a zero-immigration policy. Moreover, it can be easily proven that where a migrant community is already established abroad, additional migration can contribute to the expansion of network benefits, and the thriving of earlier migrants. Networks also increase the capacity of foreigners to create ethnic goods and reduce uncertainty in the relationship between the host society at large and new immigrants. Consequently, the society as a whole can benefit from the expansion of social networks through continuing immigration from the same origins. However, where the size of migrant communities passes a given threshold, further migration becomes suboptimal for both settled migrants, and the wider host society. Immigration continues beyond this point based on a socalled `herd effect' attracting new migrants. Finally, herding itself becomes less relevant, as further migration occurs at the cost of increasing social tension within the host country and to the detriment of all social groups. The examples of EU attitudes towards migration from CEECs have shown that indeed, destination countries public opinion about migrants from the East is largely about fears of immigration. But the differences in attitudes towards foreign workers among EU Member States also means that there is scope for a redirection of migrant flows in the future, towards EU countries where negative perceptions are lower, and the sustainability of the process is easier. That would finally mean that even though migration is a cumulative process, the social optimum of migration at destination is quicker reached where the number of immigrants is already high. Therefore, migrants themselves might find it easier to redirect their search of jobs where there are relatively less migrants already residing. The outcome would be a more even distribution of foreign workers across the EU, which is reassuring to those who fear that a few countries will have to carry the burden of higher labour market competition in the Markets can be liberalised on the basis of bilateral agreements between new and old member states during a period of transition of up to 7 years. 13 48 enlarged EU. As has been observed in the case of Romanian migrants, new preferences of EU destinations have already developed, with traditional immigration countries such as Germany receiving and returning a similar number of CEEC nationals, while new immigration countries, such as Spain, record an increasing inflow of foreign workers. We could say that East-West migration in the EU is there to stay in the future. However, there are reasons to doubt that this would become a threatening phenomenon in the case of liberalisation of East-West mobility, or that it would affect only a few EU countries. On one hand, there are social benefits to gain from immigration in the EU as a whole, which are not yet fully exploited, and on the other hand, social and cultural barriers will continue to keep CEEC nationals at home. If the threshold of sustainability of East-West migration is already reached in traditional EU destinations, we can expect foreign workers to move towards countries where the social environment is more positive. In this context, the fears of strong negative effects of immigration in particular EU Member States might ultimately be unfounded. References Bauer, Th., G. Epstein and I. N. Gang (2000): What are Migration Networks?, IZA Discussion Paper no. 200, Bonn Bauer, Th., G. Epstein and I. N. Gang (2002): Herd Effects of Migration Networks? The Location Choice of Mexican Immigrants in the US, IZA Discussion Paper no. 551, Bonn Bauer, Th. and K. F. Zimmermann (1997): Network Migration of Ethnic Migrants, in International Migration Review, vol. 31, no. 1(7), pp. 143-49 Chiswisk, B. R. and P.W. Miller (2002): Do Enclaves Matter in Migrants Adjustment?, IZA Discussion Paper no. 449, Bonn Epstein G.S. (2002): Informational Cascades and Decision to Migrate, IZA Discussion paper no. 445, Bonn European Commission (1999c): Eurobarometer. Public Opinion in the European Union, Report Number 5, Brussels: European Commission European Commission (2001a): Eurobarometer 55, Brussels: European Commission, available from: Gang, I. N., F. L. Rivera-Batiz and M. Yun (1996): Economic Strain, Ethnic Concentration and Attitudes towards Foreigners in the European Union, IZA Working Paper no. 578, Bonn Gang, I. N., F. L. Rivera-Batiz and M. S. Yun (2002): Economic Strain, Ethnic Concentration and Attitudes towards Foreigners in the European Union, Working Paper, Department of Economics, Rutgers University Gurak, D. T and F. Caces (1992): Migration Networks and the Shaping of Migration Systems, in Kritz, M., LL. Lim and H. Zlotnik (1992) Hanson, G. H., et al (2002): Immigration and Immigration Policy in the United States, in Boeri T., et al (eds.): Immigration Policy and the Welfare System, New York: Oxford University Press IOM (1998): Migration Potential in Central and Eastern Europe, Geneva: IOM Technical Cooperation Center for Europe and Central Asia 49 Kritz, M., LL. Lim and H. Zlotnik (1992): International Migration Systems: A Global Approach, Oxford: Clarendon Press Kule D., et al (2000): The Causes and Consequences of Albanian Emigration during Transition: Evidence from Micro Data, EBRD Working Paper No.46, available from Lazear, E. (1998): Diversity and Immigration, NBER Working Paper 6535, available from Meade, J.E. (1973): The Theory of Economic Externalities. The Controls of Environmental Pollution and Similar Social Costs, Geneva: Sijthoff-Leiden Potot, S. (2000): Mobilits en Europe: tude de deux rseaux migratoires roumains, in Sociologie Romneasc, vol. 2, pp.101-20 Potot, S. (2003): Quand les migrants balkaniques rencontrent ceux venus du Sud, in Balkanologie, vol.VII, no. 1, June, pp.65-86 Radu, C. (2001): De la Crngeni-Teleorman spre Spania, in Sociologie Romneasc, vol. 14, pp. 215-31 Sandu, D. (2000a): Circular Migration as a Life Strategy, in Sociologie Romneasc, Vol 2, pp. 5-29 Sandu, D. (2000b): The Transnational Migration of Romanians, from a Community Census Perspective, in Sociologie Romneasc, Vol 3-4, pp. 5-52 [in Romanian] erban, M and V. Grigora (2000): Dogenii din Teleorman n ara i n strintate, in Sociologie Romneasc, vol. 2, pp. 30-54 Shields, M.A. and S. Wheatley Price (1999): The English Language Proficiency and Occupational Success of Ethnic Minority Immigrant Men Living in English Metropolitan Areas, University of Leicester Stark, O. and Y. Wang (1999): Altruism and Beyond. An Economic Analysis of Transfer and Exchanges within Families and Groups, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Stark, O. and Y. Wang (2002): Inducing Human Capital Formation: Migration as a Substitute for Subsidies, in Journal of Public Economics, vol. 86, pp. 29-46 UN/ECE (1998): In-depth Studies on Migration in Central and Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland, Economic Studies No. 11 50 MANAGING MIGRATION FOR AN ENLARGING EUROPE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE GOVERNANCE OF MIGRATION FLOWS Martin Geiger1) In the course of an intensifying cross-border and trans-societal inter-connectedness the sovereignty of nation-states and especially their capacity to effectively govern policy issues in a unilateral way have been eroded. In the mid-80s, trying to defend the concept of an imagined closed community of ethnically homogenous citizens European receiving states started to co-ordinate their approaches in order to find multi-lateral solutions as an exit-strategy out of declining national regulating capacities. Until today a complex, but somehow still embryonic, regional regime of inter-governmental collaboration has evolved. In addition to nation-states, trans-state expert panels and intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) have become the avant-garde in the promotion of new techniques to manage migration and asylum `in a more orderly way'. With regard to theories of international relations, the article will outline why and how intergovernmental organisations have become embedded as new `managers.' The role and contribution of these organisations then will be evaluated with regard to aspects of democratic transparency, accountability and policy effectiveness. In the European Union context, IGOs provide additional possibilities for negotiations but serve as well as a `fast-track exit strategy' for individual Member states to avoid complex and rather slow common decision making processes. Characterised by low levels of policy transparency but a high involvement in the implementation of restrictive policies, it is questionable if IGOs respect the interests of EU citizens and immigrants. Rather, the approaches currently applied by IGOs undermine the project of tolerant, more open-minded receiving societies. As will be argued, it is due to intraorganisational financial interests, the IGOs own political struggle for global/regional or issue-specific (asylum/migration) leadership as well as the power inequality between receiving and sending states that in the near future a new more just global or regional framework for the movement of people is unlikely to be established. Keywords: Migration Governance/Migration Management, Inter-governmental Organisations, European Union/Europe, EU Decision-Making, EU Harmonisation Process 1) Martin Geiger (, a political geographer, is currently working towards his PhD at the Department of Geography at the Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universitt Bonn, Germany. In 2005, Mr. Geiger was appointed visiting lecturer and guest fellow at Universitatea din Vest de Timioara (Romania). This article, as a working paper, has been presented at the 2005 International Colloquium Romania and the European Union in 2007, jointly organised by the Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence and the School of High Comparative European Studies (SISEC), both from Universitatea din Vest de Timioara (Romania), on May 5th 2005. The author thanks an anonymous peer reviewer who commented on an earlier version, published into The Romanian Journal of European Studies no.4/2005, Timioara (available from 51 Introduction The following article focuses on the involvement of inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) in the governance of migration flows, especially within the new approach to `manage' migration movements in a more orderly and more effective way. The author is concerned how the perspective on migratory movements within this new management paradigm seem to have become generalised and simplified, and this rather technocratic paradigm is mainly disrespecting the highly complex nature of (cross-border) population movements and the kaleidoscopic combination of their political, social and economic motivations, giving in reality every single migratory movement an unique individuality. It is intended to critically evaluate this new management paradigm, generally subsuming (more economically and socially motivated) migratory and (more politically caused) refugee movements under one single category of population movements `to be managed'. The author therefore prefers to use the rather neutral and theoretically better founded term of `governance.' The term governance, with regard to theories of international relations, refers to a process through which a single policy actor (or a multitude of policy actors) intends to change the behaviour of another actor (actor-oriented conceptualisation). Simultaneously governance can be conceptualised as an intervention of one or more actors in social systems with the aim to impose a change on the specific setting within a specific policy-area or part of the society concerned (setting-oriented conceptualisation)14. In the following it will be revealed that, in addition to nation states and their speed government departments, increasingly non-state/private as well as trans-state (including IGOs) actors take the place of these traditional actors in shaping the way migration movements are governed. In addition, the embryonic international regime to govern (or manage) migrations, having emerged within the last twenty years in Europe as well as in other world regions, is characterised by the struggle of these traditional state actors in keeping the capability to solve their nationally experienced migration `problem' by joining forces with other governments and thereby defend their regulatory capacity. The intentions of non-state, trans-state and traditional state actors to govern migration movements hereby include the intention to mitigate the root causes leading to emigration in other (mostly non-European) countries; governance is hereby directed towards (state) actors in sending and transit countries as well as the specific setting existing within the societies of these states. 14 For example: Grlitz, Axel and Burth, Hans-Peter (1998): Politische Steuerung, Opladen, pp. 9 and 115 52 1 Bridging the gaps in policy implementation: From unilateralism to multilateralism and supra-nationalism in migration governance The general discourse about globalisation encloses the paradigm of nation states that, in the course of intensifying cross-border and trans-societal internationalisation processes, have lost most of their former regulatory capacity, authoritative power and sovereignty (see Sandholtz 2000, 89; Brhl and Rittberger 2001: 2-5; Grlitz and Burth: 10-19). While non-state organisations (NGOs etc.) are increasingly acting trans-nationally, far-reaching liberalisations in the field of trade and financial transactions have led to the fact that private corporations are able to effectively circumvent national regulations (for example, see Lake 2000; Sandholtz, Prakash and Hart 2000; Sassen 2000). National governments with regard to the challenge to govern policy issues that hardly respect the territorial borders of their polities are confronted with the need to co-operate with other nation states and their actors in order to find crossborder and trans-polity solutions and to co-ordinate their individual actions in a given crossborder policy-area with those of these foreign forces. In the field of environmental protection, trade or the use of nuclear power, this has led to a new quality of cross-border negotiations and bargaining. By collaborating on the international level, national governments nowadays seek to find solutions for problems they either cannot solve due to their cross-border character or consist in issues that by unilateral action can only be tackled in a less effective way than by multilateral action. Not least of all, governments, by intending to bridge and close widening gaps in the implementation of policies by substituting or combining unilateral action by/with multilateral efforts, aim at securing their former authoritative position or at pretending to still possess full regulatory capacities (Jachtenfuchs 2003; Scharpf 1991). Despite these new intentions for international collaboration, state actors are struggling hard to keep up with new actors that have become involved in cross-border governance beyond the nation state: international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), private corporations and inter-governmental organisations (IGOs, being formed by nation states). In addition to the terms of international or global governance, referring broadly to new forms of multilateral negotiations and bargains in often over-lapping policy issues, the concept of international regimes is mostly used to describe a specific setting of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given (and specific) issue-area (Krasner 1983: 2). Regimes hereby can be conceptualised as institutional as well as normative arrangements to facilitate co-operation and co-ordination among rational, ego-centric and from each other independent policy actors with the aim to circumvent or mitigate negative side-effects of solely unilateral policy actions 53 (Schneider and Werle 1988: 11). In contrast to ad-hoc agreements, international regimes are arrangements with a certain capacity to resist to/to cope with short-term shifts regarding the power relations and interest constellations among the regime members (Krasner: 2-3; Zrn 2001: 63; Young 1983: 94). Within a regime, the intentions of actors to influence the governance of policy issues can either be directed towards the setting of the regime itself or towards other actors inside or outside this collaborative arrangement. Embedded in the globalisation paradigm is the assumption that migratory and refugee movements are directly resulting from fading national regulatory capacities of receiving, sending and transit countries. Already in the 1980s, several states started with the project of a new international regime to govern migration and refugee movements on the regional level (Europe as the main example), the UN Secretary General now again reinforced these intentions by calling out a Global Commission on Migration15 in order to discuss a new global, more just framework for the movement of people. Like will be outlined in the following chapters, Member states of the European Union (EU) have been successful in achieving a high level of institutionalised collaboration with other (non-) European states in certain fields of migration governance. Among EU Member states multilateral collaboration has now reached the level to become even supra-nationalised (the shift from inter-governmental collaboration towards the governance of migration and asylum issues exercised by supra-national institutions of the EU). Inter-governmental organisations and cross-border expert panels have been crucial to achieve this high level of intra-EU as well as EU-overlapping international collaboration the evolvement of a migration and asylum regime that has become extended to neighbouring regions (like Northern Africa). However, it has to be emphasised that this regime established within the last twenty years hardly can be regarded as an all-encompassing, complete arrangement as it focuses until today nearly exclusively on border controls, the restriction and avoidance of further immigration to EU core states. 2 New realisms, the project of a European migration and asylum regime and the European Dilemma of decision-making With the beginning of the 1980s and then later, with more emphasis, towards the end of the twentieth century, a trend in mid- and West-European receiving states gained momentum to severely restrict and avoid further in-coming migration and refugee movements. Following decades in that the former Federal Republic of Germany, the Benelux-states, Switzerland and France have been in need to recruit foreign guest-workers, and refugees were able to benefit 15 For more information see the homepage of the Global Commission on Migration: 54 from a certain, ideologically founded openness (`The free west'), the beginning of a global economic crisis and the implosion of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and Asia led to a turning point. Within the field of migration and asylum, as outlined by Joly, Lavenex and Blaschke, a new realism followed former more humanitarian or economically-rational approaches. Being based on the scenario of uncontrollable mass immigration from East Europe, European receiving societies developed the fear to become flooded with migrants and asylum seekers in a time when a profound crisis of their welfare systems started to evolve (Joly 1995: 496; Lavenex 2000: 1-3; Blaschke 2001). Especially against the background of the outbreak of violent inter-ethnic conflicts, warfare, mass displacement and the split up of the multi-ethnic republic of Yugoslavia, the threat of an implosion of the Soviet empire and its satellite states, potential Western European receiving countries acted, in a first step, unilaterally by imposing harsher immigration and asylum regulations and increased efforts to prevent mass movements (Brochmann 2004: 1112; Endres 1994: 63-71; Dehdashti 1996). Indeed, the more restrictive realist approach of receiving states had a certain success: the vast majority of refugees from the territory of Yugoslavia, only granted with a temporary refugee status, returned shortly afterwards; in addition, the common restrictive hard-line of EC Member states (European Community) opened the floor for new multilateral approaches with the goal to guarantee an effective further restriction of in-coming migration and refugee movements. Member states hereby coincided in their perception of migratory movements as being a (potential future) threat, endangering the construct of ethnically homogeneous nation states, their social cohesion and security. Firstly, the development of an embryonic Western European (EC) `control regime' was due to the common perception among the members of the EC that multilateral action was now needed in order to prevent migration and refugee movements from becoming out of control and to allay native fears of deepening social inequalities caused by immigration (Tomei 2000: 39; Miller 2000: 39). Until today consisting as an inter-governmental governance model, this regime provided the collaborative background for a far-reaching `harmonisation' (a close substantial convergence) of national legislations concerning the possibilities for so-called `Third Country Nationals'16 to get access, permissions to stay and work or asylum within the European Community/European Union. Secondly in addition to a shared need to collaborate on the inter-governmental (multilateral) level the harmonisation process in the field of migration and asylum resulted 16 Third Country Nationals = Persons not in possession of the citizenship of a Member state of the European Community/the European Union. 55 from a second, (more functional) need, stemming as a logical consequence from the progress in European integration: following the Schengen Treaty (1985) and the Single European Act (1987), the new freedom for EC citizens to circulate and migrate between different Member states had to be flanked by common regulations concerning the controls of the external borders, their fortification (Brochmann: 75-76; Tomei: 12-13 and 51-54; Collinson 1993: 3539). In this context, new Member states, like Spain due to the policy pressure exercised by core states like Germany or France had to implement foreigners' bills that acknowledged the interests of these core states to realise a restrictive governance of migration flows. This shows that the interests of some `partners' within this multilateral bargaining process were able to outweigh weaker parties (Arango 2000). In addition to the establishment of a collaborative arrangement (regime) in the field of migration control, following the Treaty of Dublin (1990), a regional regime to co-ordinate and harmonise the asylum policies evolved among the EC Member states. Intending to regulate which Member is responsible to decide about a possible asylum status, this regime encloses the concept of so-called `Safe Third Countries' as well as a list of states declared as being politically stable and free of politically motivated forms of persecution. To enforce the implementation of control measures, the restrictions on the access of unwanted migrants (including potential asylum-seeking migrants) in general, the regulations of Schengen and Dublin enclosed the formulation of carrier sanctions for airlines and other transport companies failing to ensure that their passengers possess valid documents and are allowed to enter the EC and/or that they do not overstay their visas. Although migration and asylum issues in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) now were officially transferred from the third (inter-governmental co-operation, Treaty of Maastricht, 1992) to the first pillar of EU decision-making (common EU decision-making), EU Member states remain reluctant to transfer substantial decision-making powers to the supra-national level. So far, migration and asylum issues as a policy area in the intersection between the national and the European level remain chiefly governed by national governments and the coordinating mechanism of the European Council. The European Parliament, in contrast, does not thus far possess any decision-making and politically binding power; actions of the Commission remain limited to initiatives and proposals directed to the Council. Migration and asylum issues can be regarded as one of the last, but heavily defended issues touching a decidedly sensitive part of the whole Europeanization process and posing a severe dilemma for the development of a (substantially advanced and effective) European Political Union. This sentiment continues to exist, despite the fact that with regards to cooperationtheory, the step towards further inter-governmental co-operation and then supra56 nationalization is likely to take place given the congruent interests among EU member States, transit and even sending states (Tomei: 42-51; Lake, p. 40, Keohane 1983). Given the fact that migration will be crucial for the future wealth and development of European societies that now begin to experience a drastic decrease of their native work force and a `greying of their population, a transformation of the current restrictive control regime seems advisable. In 2005, the EU Commission presented a first version of a Green Paper towards initiating a common European recruitment scheme that is offering immigrants new possibilities to work and live legally within the EU.17 Against the background of the current crisis of the EU (Ratification of the EU Constitution) and a new wave of `Realpolitiken' of individual EU Member states, however, it remains uncertain as to when such a common approach could be reached, let alone implemented. At the moment, the inter-governmental governance model to avoid and restrictively control a further influx of immigrants and asylum seekers, in contrast, seems likely to gain momentum, given the shared perception of immigration to be closely linked with the issue of terrorism (following the devastating attacks of Madrid and London). 3 Bringing new actors in: Expert panels and inter-governmental organisations Consultative Processes on migration and asylum: Budapest and Barcelona Despite the general discourse, arguing that European receiving states do only possess limited regulatory capacity to effectively govern migration and asylum issues in the national context (often this discourse confuses hereby the issues of integration with those of illegal migration, border controls and the fight against terrorism), Europe as a regional context can serve as an example that migration in deed can be effectively limited, although not completely avoided. The exodus from East Europe and Asia in most cases has been governed effectively, restrictively limited/avoided in large parts and the majority of migrants and refugees coming from the crisis area of the Balkans have returned. The main problem has more to be seen in failing national policies to actively promote the equal participation of Third Country Nationals in European societies and does in contrast to the general image of mass media and political discourse not consist in the fact that borders are too porous. However, migrants willing to cross borders can do so (even if these borders are heavily fortified/technologically secured) by risking their lives and investing high amounts of money. 17 See European Commission: COM 2004/811 (11.01.2005) 57 The effectiveness in restrictively limiting mass movements is, in addition to the close policy co-ordination among EC/EU Member states and the harmonisation of national approaches and legislations, mainly due to the extension of a collaborative institutional and normative arrangement towards main sending and transit states in neighbourhood to the territory of the EC (EU), especially the territory of the Schengen Treaty. Within the framework of various, partly overlapping, consultation and co-operation processes, Member states of the EC, starting at the end of the 1980s, developed a common approach towards these neighbouring states to convince them to closely co-operate with them in the restriction of further immigration. Simultaneously, EC states within these processes have been successful in transferring vast extents of the costs for limiting and controlling migratory and refugee movements to their neighbours (Georgi 2004: 19-27; Angenendt 2003). Within the so-called `Budapest Process' (established in 1993, following the consultative processes of Berlin and Vienna), representatives of Eastern and Central European post-communist transformation countries (later as well from the territory of the Community of Independent States (CIS) and other transit and sending countries) held informal meetings to discuss with officials of EC and EFTA (European Free Trade Area, including Switzerland) Member states measures to strengthen border surveillance and approaches how the `migration pressure' on EC states could be reduced. For their co-operation in taking back rejected asylum seekers and `illegal' (unwanted) migrants or (as safe countries) processing asylum seekers within their territory and repatriate rejected persons to other neighbouring countries, these Central and Eastern European states were granted with financial and technical assistance18. However, given the highly informal character of these consultative processes and the fact that (officially) no resolutions of politically binding character were formulated, the effect of these forums on the evolvement of a regional migration and asylum regime can only be roughly estimated19. The high significance of this process, however, becomes evident with regard of the development of this consultative forums: until today there has been a continuous growth by incorporating more and more receiving, transit and countries in these consultations, in addition, the consultative forum became represented by the establishment of its own intergovernmental organisation, the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) therefore it seems likely that the member states of this organisation and forum regard the Budapest Process as a politically utile platform for inter-governmental negotiations on issues of migration and asylum (Georgi 2004; Angenendt 2003: 191). 18 19 See Overbeek 2002; Overbeek 2000; Angenendt 2003: 190-191; Thouez and Channac 2005 It was only ten years after its establishment, in 2003, that a first official report of the activities of the Budapest Process became published. 58 In retrospective, it can be assumed that this inter-governmental political dialogue was of crucial importance not only for the East-ward extension of the EC-control regime (by avoiding a direct access and claim-making of migrants and asylum seekers on EC/EU territory, their processing on the territory of Eastern and Central European states and the repatriation and border control measures of these states), but also for the preparation of the EU-accession of some of these states. The new ten Member states of the EU, following the Budapest process and other bilateral and multilateral negotiations, adopted and implemented national regulations that went conform to the Schengen Acquis and the interests of their more powerful EC/EU or EFTA neighbours (Georgi 2004: 18-19). Their accession to the EU therefore could be somehow regarded as being a reward of their willingness for close cooperation in these matters. The eastward extension of the EC migration and asylum control regime was replenished to the South by the set-up of consultative forums with neighbouring transit and sending countries of Africa, especially the Maghreb states. In the framework of the so-called 'Barcelona-Process' (initiated in 1992) the European-Mediterranean Partnership issues of development aid, the promotion of human rights and the establishment of a free trade area (to become realised between the Member states of the EU and their African counterparts in 2012) were linked with the extension and intensification of border controls and cross-regional (mostly police) co-operation to impose strict limitations on migratory movements originating from Africa. Most African members of this process promised to take back rejected asylum seekers and `illegal' migrants after being expulsed from European territory, while approaches to grant more possibilities for their citizens to accede to EU states on a temporary basis have been discussed (mostly on a bilateral basis, for example between Morocco and Spain), but, however, in most cases not have been implemented so far. The new avant-garde in migration governance: Inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) and trans-state expert panels These mostly informal consultative processes on migration and asylum issues, mostly embedded in broader and multiple issue-policy frames (like the European-Mediterranean Partnership), with regard to international regime theory, do not necessarily have to lead to long-term institutional and normative arrangements (regimes). In some cases, their policy outcome and effect is limited to short-term/ad-hoc agreements without any politically binding character however, the initiation of such consultative processes is seen as a necessary step for the preparation and initiation of a regime in a specific issue area. 59 Consultative processes, based on negotiations between government officials, scientific experts and representatives of IGOs (as well as in some cases of actors of the civil society), can be described with the concept of `policy networks' Policy networks are providing the framework for first contacts between decision-makers from different (national, scientific or political) background, they serve in stabilising and relativising actor's expectations and are crucial in establishing of a formal equilibrium among actors that mostly differ greatly with regard to their capacities20. In the context of policy making processes that increasingly disrespect national borders, policy networks provide the platform for harmonising states'/ actor's unilateral approaches with those of other states/actors and the achievement of intergovernmental deals/bargains to achieve a multilateral/multi-party solution of a policy problem (Benz 1992: 154; Scharpf 1992). To initiate and promote learning processes (towards the achievement of a common standpoint) so-called `epistemic communities'21, consisting in a trans-state dialogue of scientific experts and certain renowned individuals (as structures parallel to these networks), are of crucial importance. In addition, inter-governmental organisations often serve in stabilising and/or intensifying the collaboration among states towards the establishment of a long-term regime. Sometimes these organisations are on their own a direct outcome of policynetworks and inter-governmental consultations (like in the example of the ICMPD). In other cases, regimes are containing inter-governmental organisations as members or important stakeholders (being nearly equal to states). The new quality and character of governance, increasingly taking place `beyond the nation state,' becomes evident with regard to the fact that policy networks/inter-governmental negotiations and international regimes have become set up by IGOs instead of individual state governments (Chayes and Handler: 271-273; Sandholtz: 82). The field of migration and asylum serves hereby serves as a remarkable example: the majority of today's existing regional consultative processes in deed have been set up and are (indirectly or directly) governed by inter-governmental organisations like the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the agency of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or the ICMPD (limited in its activities mostly to the regional context of Europe). Each of these organisations hereby is acting simultaneously as a `forum organisation' (in organising trans-state policy dialogues and acting as the administrative coordinator or secretariat within these consultative processes22) as well as a more technically 20 21 See Wolf 2003: 423-424; Zrn 2001: 63-64; Mayntz 2000: 12; Windhoff-Hritier 1985; Windhoff-Hritier 1987: 45-47 See Haas 1990: 55; Jachtenfuchs 2003; Chayes and Handler Chayes 1995: 278-281 22 See for example the role of IOM in the Mediterranean Migration Dialogue / The 5+5 Process. 60 oriented `service organisation'23 (by supplying their member states with expertise and technical knowledge24). While UNHCR is providing receiving, transit and sending countries with a broad repertoire of support measures in the field of refugees and asylum seekers (consisting in financial and technical support as well as policy advice), the IOM is active in the field of migrants' voluntary return, repatriation and resettlement. Both organisations as well as the ICMPD and other smaller organisations are aiming at a specific form of `capacity building' in their member states, they provide trainings for experts, decision-makers and practitioners (including border police officials) in the specific national context, and support governments technologically as well as financially in their efforts to better `manage' (or control) migration and refugee movements. Especially in the context of Europe and inter-governmental negotiations on migration and asylum issues between EU Member states and African, Asian or East European sending and transit countries (including authoritarian regimes like in the case of Libya), the advantage of inter-governmental policy networks and organisations can be seen in the fact that they are officially not bound to the EU-framework but allow, due to the membership of both receiving and sending countries, for informal and formal consultations without the need for `official' bilateral or multilateral talks. It seems likely that modes of governance in the field of migration and asylum in Europe will still be based on a multitude of European, bilateral and multilateral approaches implemented by individual states and/or additional intergovernmental actors25. Against the background of lengthy and complex EU decision-making processes and the current crisis of the European integration process, IGOs and policy networks can serve governments to circumvent some of these hurdles and find at least some short-term/ad-hoc solutions for their national `migration problem.' Contrary to the efforts of the EU-Commission to construct a `more open' regime (among others through the newly proposed `Hague Programme' calling for national quota and immigration liberalizations), the field of migration currently is simultaneously characterised by a new `re-nationalization:' EU member States (like Italy and Spain), seeking to find such a quicker solution to their national migration problem, enter in rather questionable agreements (in some parts facilitated by IGOs) for the repatriation of illegal immigrants (for example the agreement between Italy and Libya, or the repatriation of unwanted migrants from the 23 24 `Forum' and `service organisations:' see Tussie and Riggirozzi 2001: 164 See for example the efforts of IOM and ICMPD in the field of border management. The IOM, by having established the Mediterranean Migration Dialogue (MTM) as well as various other panels in this EU border region, can be regarded as a crucial actor also within the broader context of the EU-led Barcelona Process. This with regard to the fact that IOM is holding meetings between Northern African and EU member State (MTM and 5+5 Dialogue) officials - the EU-Commission, however, stays formally excluded but is being invited as an observer. 25 61 Canaries (Spain) to the Moroccan occupied West Sahara). Especially the inter-governmental organisation of IOM has developed into a regional (as well a global) key actor in the new `management' approach (see following sub-chapter), and has somehow become not only an `assistant' for its member states but rather as well a `managing director' in providing expertise and facilitating sometimes rather questionable formal and informal agreements. Despite the contradictions contained within its institutional framework, Member states of the EU (with the help of IGOs) nonetheless attempt to communicate a `common restrictive migration and asylum approach' towards neighbouring states and regions (among others via the newly established `European Neighbourhood Policy, and its migration-related initiatives). By incorporating transit and receiving states a variety of non-state actors (including private corporations like airline companies), and inter-governmental organizations and expert panels outside the official EU framework, the EU and its member States to some extent hereby `peripheralize' their regional or national `migration problems' to Third countries and delegate a vast extent of responsibilities (for example given by the Geneva Convention) to third states and the organisations such as IOM, UNHCR or for example the Red Cross. 4 Managing migration for the benefit of all: Towards a new philosophy in migration and refugee governance Although migration and refugee movements in most cases are politically unwanted, the realities of Europe as well as other regions show that migratory movements, in general, are hardly to be avoided. Despite accepting this reality, public and political discourse in most EU states is concentrated in a daily reconstruction of the image of a migration `crisis' (mostly represented as consisting in hordes of illegal migrants arriving in boats at the coasts of Southern Spain or Italy). The fear of `uncontrollable' migration movements hereby is directly linked to aspects of a fading national identity (see for example the discourse of the German Christian Democrats (CDU) in 2004) in an enlarging European Union, the postulation of a drastic decrease in public security, reflected by an increase in terrorist activities, being committed by not-enough-controlled illegal/non-enough-integrated immigrants. Because the European Union's efforts to curtail immigration thus far have not brought the desired results, it must be asked whether the perspective on immigration issues should be changed. According to Ghosh26, the adopting of a new `regulated openness' could lead to a de-criminalisation and de-illegalisation of immigrants by providing them with more opportunities to live and work legally within the territory of receiving states. 26 Together with Jonas Widgren (ICMPD) the IOM senior adviser Bimal Ghosh can be regarded as the "ideological mastermind" of the `management' approach in migration governance (see for example: Ghosh 1993; Ghosh 2004). 62 Since the mid-1990s a new concept as well a new trans-national discourse (or philosophy) has evolved that is based on the general assumption of migration as a problem that can be brought to a solution by `managing' migration flows in a new, more orderly and rational way. Migration movements are hereby regarded as an unavoidable fact and curtailing migration seems inappropriate due to economic and demographic reasons (for example the fact that in certain sectors labour shortages exist (or are foreseeable) or receiving societies suffer from a drastic ageing of their native population and work force). The long-term goal of states and inter-governmental actors is the establishment of a new international governance model, being based on a close co-ordination between sending, transit and receiving countries, and consisting as a politically binding global regime (framework), embracing regional- and sector-specific sub regimes.27 Problematically, the term `migration management' has now become the catch word of a broadly generalised discourse in policy-making and scientific debate. Although management has become a generally used term thanks also to the promotion of this term by representatives and advisors of IOM and IOM's own scientific journal (`International Migration') however, so far, no general turn in the perception of (and the political response towards) the migration phenomenon has occurred (given for example the case of the EU).28 It is especially this inter-governmental organisation, the IOM, that due to its growing importance in the regional (Europe) as well as in the global context became heavily criticised for the pragmatic and mostly technocratic implementation of its management approach. Under the slogan `Managing migration for the benefit of all'29 IOM sees its intra-organisational responsibility and challenge in assisting its members currently 105 governments "in meeting the growing operational challenges of migration management"30. Against the background of an estimated operational budget of 640 million $US31, IOM sees itself as the globally leading international organisation in migration issues and as one of the most important focal points for discussions on migration policy and management. In addition to the Mediterranean Transit Migration Dialogue (MTM), the organisation is acting as the coordinating agency within the Manila-Process, the South American Migration Dialogue, the Migration Dialogues in Southern as well as in Western Africa and various other panels. IOM within these dialogues facilitates expert networks among stakeholders in receiving, transit and 27 28 Migration management hereby is seen to embrace the management of refugee movements (the prevention of refugee crises, the channelling of refugee flows, the processing of asylum claims etc.). See for example Papademetriou 2003; Spencer 2003 29 See the homepage of IOM: 30 International Organisation for Migration (IOM), International Dialogue on Migration 2004, available at: (05.05.2004) 31 See International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Summary Update for the Programme and Budget 2004, available at: (05.05.2004). 63 sending countries and supports them to find "pragmatic and action oriented mechanisms" and to develop "institutions and infrastructure for a humane, safe and orderly migration management"32. In addition to IOM, also the UNHCR is earning criticism for its move from a former exclusively humanitarian ideal and mandate to a rather pragmatic/technocratic management approach: for most critics UNHCR, since the formulation of its `Convention Plus' (2003)33, moved in the direction to rather serve the interests of receiving states (in avoiding the influx of asylum seekers and refugees and to process asylum applications outside their territories) than those of refugees/asylum seekers. Similarly to IOM, UNHCR is increasingly regarded as a 'implementation' partner for receiving states that, under current real politics, are more interest in control and prevention than an humanitarian `management', centred on migrants/refugees and their interests. While out of intra-organisational interests (to promote their international standing and significance as well as to defend their issue-specific competence) IOM, UNHCR as well as other inter-governmental organisations (like for example the ICMPD) are competing with each other for scarce resources and are trying to take over the lead in consultative processes (especially with regard to IOM), these organisations at the same time are threatened to fall back to the status of independent and involuntary henchmen of states seeking to achieve short-term solutions for their individual `migration and asylum problems'. Increasingly, the most important financial contributors to these organisations (the G7countries) link their payments to the implementation of specific programs and measures, like the prevention of illegal movements and border enforcement. Instead of contributing to the set-up of a more adequate regime, based on the realisation of the benefits of migration, IGOs are more likely to support the further existence of traditional patterns of control. While some IGOs (like IOM) in the interests of potential receiving states have to deal with (or manage) unwanted (`illegal') migrants and organise their return as `pragmatic service providers,' other IGOs (like UNHCR) have to `manage' refugees/asylum seekers by processing them outside the territory of potential receiving countries (extra-territorial processing) and selecting the `really endangered refugees' from `only' economically motivated migrants. 32 33 IOM-Homepage: (05.05.2005). See Angenendt; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Convention Plus, to find at: (05.05.2005); Drke 1994 64 5 Critique and conclusion: Inter-governmental organisations as service providers and managers in the orderly movement of people Against the background of the European framework of migration management that currently consists of restrictive controls, one must ask if the efforts of international organisations result in a more orderly and more humane migration management. Migration management must tackle highly complex issues and challenges that result in a heightened need for intergovernmental and international cooperation. Although IGOs like the IOM and regional consultation processes intend to establish a global framework for the orderly movement of people, processes which de-link migration from the nation-state level, the `real problem behind migration management does not exists in a surge of population movements that are less predictable as before; rather states and their societies pose the main barrier to the development of such an international framework. This occurs within a general reluctance of states to transfer real binding power on questions of national sovereignty and security such as migration that touches the very fabric of nations to other entities. Co-operation in migration issues, so far, consists foremost in the transfer of control tasks to sending and transit states and the granting of rewards to these states whose co-operation in managing/control efforts are matched with development/financial aid or political and military support. Regional migration management in the European as well as other contexts suffers from immense differences regarding power and interests between receiving, transit, and sending countries. Mostly the individual interests, orientations and expectations of the people migrating are somehow forgotten and are not taken into account. The approach to manage migration and to reduce illegal migratory movements by a change in perspective, so far, lacks from the support of European receiving states to actually grant more migrants the opportunity to enter the EU and secure access to the labour market under circumstances of legality. While EU states continue to block immigration - except those belonging to a `very fine selection' of economically welcomed migrants - authoritarian states like Libya have now become included and accepted as partners to exercise control. Tolerated by other EU states, Italy continues with its approach and co-operates with a regime that is internationally accused of disrespecting human rights, internationally isolating itself for decades, lacking any legal, democratic framework as well as the capability to deal with migration in a humane manner. Italy's actions occur due to the general dilemma of the EU harmonisation process and the general unwillingness of European and national policy-makers to develop a `management approach based on a more realistic perception of the root causes of migratory movements: deepening economic imbalances between Europe and migrant sending regions and the pulleffect of European (informal) labour markets for foreign labourers. Quick fixes, resulting in 65 the transfer of the perverse side-effects of failing policies to the shoulders of migrants, so far are the only remaining answer. Any long-term perspective of migration management, has therefore to be said, is still missing. Inter-governmental organisations like the IOM could provide a solution to this situation by their engagement in the governance of migration and refugee governance. European Union member states and other nation states already benefit from their involvement and their contribution to standard setting, technical cooperation and (in)formal consultations. However, the role of organisations like IOM within this process is highly questionable. An institutional framework for the management of migration, based on IGOs as its dynamic actors, has its main constraint in that these organisations do not possess any formal mandate to deal with normative or regulatory aspects of international migration. Informal meetings and inter-governmental panels are mostly non-transparent, and the positions and strategies of the `managers' of migration (control) remain unclear to the public and the electorate of member states. In- and outside the framework of the UN unfortunately no organization or committee, so far, has a sufficiently broad mandate to claim to be the `co-ordinator of migration management on the global level. This applies also to the IOM, although this organisation does possess certain financial resources, is supported by a great number of states and, seems to be the most likely candidate able to fill the institutional vacuum on the global level. It must be criticised that most approaches of the IOM, while intending to tackle the root causes of migratory movements in emigration countries, have forgotten to pursue a change of perspective in receiving states who are the main financial contributors to the IOM. Migration management thereby is developing in another direction than to direct orderly and humane processes. The globally evolving institutional regime is likely to be based on a pure utilitarian ideology or political rationality where population movements will be allowed only when they seem economically warranted. Migration management in this sense remains limited to the world-wide extension of control policies that nation states are no longer able to exercise on their own. Although migration management was formulated to reduce the net-costs of migration, most residents of receiving societies still fear `waves of immigrants' and immigrants remain the scapegoats for deepening social inequalities and rising crime rates. The need to import foreign labourers, due to a rising demand in receiving societies caused by on-going economic and demographic transformations in the near future, has not resulted in a change of perspective. Nor do politicians see the necessity `to prepare residents to face this near-future challenge or to accept a co-existence with immigrants. Migration management that remains 66 limited to control as is thus far in the interest of all EU member states will further increase the costs and negative side-effects of increasing irregular movements. Instead of de-politicising and technocrising migration issues by adopting the neutral term `management,' IGOs should engage more actively in the protection of migrants rights. A just system of migration management should not only serve the purposes of wealthy receiving societies. `Managing migration, according to Papademetriou34, should not only intend to seek `perfection' as migratory movements result mostly from individually made decisions that due to their nature are highly uncertain and far from being predictable. Rather, it should lead to international agreements that are truly bi-directional and balanced and are based on moral and democratic values. Inter-governmental organisations, when pursuing this approach, would provide an escape out of antiquated national policies and failing or missing common approaches in the context of the European Union. References Angenendt, Steffen (2003): Regelung und Vermittlung, Die Rolle internationaler Migrationsorganisationen, in Thrnhardt, Dietrich and Hunger, Uwe (eds.): Migration im Spannungsfeld von Globalisierung und Nationalstaat, Leviathan Sonderheft 22, Wiesbaden, pp. 180-202 Arango, Joaqun (2000): Becoming a Country of Immigration at the End of the Twentieth Century. The Case of Spain, in King, Russell et al. (eds.): Eldorado or Fortress? Migration in Southern Europe, Hampshire and London, pp. 253-276 Benz, Arthur (1992): Mehrebenen-Verflechtung, Verhandlungsprozesse in verbundenen Entscheidungsarenen, in Benz, Arthur et al. (eds.): Horizontale Politikverflechtung, Zur Theorie von Verhandlungssystemen, Frankfurt and New York, pp. 147-205 Blaschke, Jochen (2001): Einwanderung aus dem Osten, in Blaschke, Jochen (eds.): OstWest-Migration, Perspektiven der Migrationspolitik in Europa, Berlin, pp. 5-35 Benedikt, Clemens (2004): Diskursive Konstruktion Europas, Frankfurt am Main, pp. 11-12 Brochmann, Grete (1996): European Integration and Immigration from Third Countries, Oslo, pp. 3-4 Brhl, Tanja and Rittberger, Volker (2001): From International to Global Governance, Actors, Collective Decision-Making, and the United Nations in the World of the TwentyFirst Century, in Rittberger, Volker (ed.): Global Governance and the United Nations System, Tokyo, pp. 1-47 Chayes, Abram and Handler Chayes, Antonia (1995): The New Sovereignty, Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements, Cambridge and London, pp. 278-281 Collinson, Sarah (1993): Beyond Borders, West European Migration Policy towards the 21st Century, London, pp. 35-39 Dehdashti, Rexane (1996): Prvention von Fluchtbewegungen, Die internationale Diskussion und die Entwicklung von Frhwarnsystemen, Berlin Drke, Luise (1994): Flchtlingspolitik auf supranationaler Ebene, Das UNFlchtlingskommisariat, die UN und die EG, in Heinelt, Hubert (ed.): Zuwanderungspolitik in Europa, Nationale Politiken, Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede, Opladen, pp. 176-194 34 See Papademetriou 2003: 53-55. 67 Endres, Daniel (1994): Schutz fr Flchtlinge und Vermeidung weiterer Flchtlingsbewegungen, Zur Arbeit des UNHCR in Osteuropa, in Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (ed.): Ost-West-Migration, Fluchtursachen und Handlungsperspektiven, Gesprchskreis Arbeit und Soziales Nr. 35, Bonn, pp. 63-71 Georgi, Fabian (2004): Migrationsmanagement in Europa, Eine empirischtheoretische Analyse am Beispiel des International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), unpublished Master thesis, Freie Universitt Berlin, pp. 19-27 Ghosh, Bimal (1993): Movements of People, the Search for a New International Regime, Paper prepared for the Commission on Global Governance, Geneva Ghosh, Bimal (2004): Managing Migration, Whither the Missing Regime?, Paper abstract, First Conference on International Management of Migration Flows, Maratea (Italy) 16-19 September Haas, Peter M. (1990): Saving the Mediterranean. The Politics of International Environmental Cooperation, New York, pp. 55 Jachtenfuchs, Markus (2003): Regieren jenseits der Staatlichkeit, in Hellmann, Gunther et al. (eds.): Die neuen internationalen Beziehungen, Forschungsstand und Perspektiven in Deutschland, Baden-Baden, pp. 495-518 Joly, Danile (1995): Whose protection? European Harmonization on Asylum Policy, in Cohen, Robin (ed.): The Cambridge Survey of World Migration, Cambridge, pp. 496-501 Keohane, Robert O. (1983): The Demand for International Regimes, in Krasner, Stephen (ed.): International Regimes, Ithaca and London, pp. 141-171 Krasner, Stephen D. (1983): Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in Krasner, Stephen (ed.): International Regimes, Ithaca and London, pp. 1-21 Lake, David (2000): Global Governance, A Relational Contracting Approach, in Prakash, Aseem and Hart, Jeffrey A. (eds.): Globalization and Governance, London/New York, pp. 31-53 Lavenex, Sandra (2000): Security Threat or Human Right? Conflicting Frames in the Eastern Enlargement of the EU Asylum and Immigration Policies, EUI Working Paper RSC No. 7, San Domenico, pp. 1-3 Mayntz, Renate (2000): Politikwissenschaft in einer entgrenzten Welt, Max-Planck-Institut fr Gesellschaftsforschung, MPIfG Discussion Paper 00/3, Kln, p. 12 Miller, Mark J. (2000): International Migration in Post-Cold War International Relations, in Ghosh, Bimal (ed.): Managing Migration, Time for a New International Regime?, Oxford and New York, pp. 27-47 Overbeek, Henk (2002): Globalisation and Governance. Contradictions of Neo-Liberal Migration Management, HWWA Discussion Paper 174, Hamburg Overbeek, Henk (2000): Globalization, Sovereignty and Transnational Regulation, Reshaping the Governance of International Migration, in Ghosh, Bimal (ed.): Managing Migration, Time for a New International Regime?, Oxford and New York, pp. 48-74 Papademetriou, Demetrios G. (2003): Managing Rapid and Deep Change in the Newest Age of Migration, in Spencer, Sarah (ed.): The Politics of Migration, Managing Opportunity, Conflict and Change, The Political Quarterly, Special Issue, pp. 39-58 Prakash, Aseem and Hart, Jeffrey A. (2000): Globalization and Governance. An Introduction, in Prakash, Aseem and Hart, Jeffrey A. (eds.): Globalization and Governance, London and New York, pp. 1-24 Sandholtz, Wayne (2000): Globalization and the Evolution of Rules, in Prakash, Aseem and Hart, Jeffrey A. (eds.): Globalization and Governance, London and New York, pp. 77-102 Sassen, Saskia (2000): A new Cross-border Field for Public and Private Actors, Denationalized State Agendas and Privatised Norm-making, in: Journal fr Entwicklungspolitik, 16/2000, 4, pp. 393-407. 68 Scharpf, Fritz W. (1991): Die Handlungsfhigkeit des Staates am Ende des Zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts, MPIfG Discussion Paper 91/10, Kln Scharpf, Fritz W. (1992): Einfhrung, Zur Theorie von Verhandlungssystemen, in Benz, Arthur et al. (eds.): Horizontale Politikverflechtung, Zur Theorie von Verhandlungssystemen, Frankfurt and New York, pp. 11-27 Schneider, Volker and Werle, Raymund (1988): Regime oder korporativer Akteur? Die EG in der Telekommunikationspolitik, MPIfG Discussion Paper 88/4, Kln Spencer, Sarah (2003): Introduction, in Spencer, Sarah (ed.): The Politics of Migration, Managing Opportunity, Conflict and Change, The Political Quarterly, Special Issue Thouez, Colleen and Channac, Frdrique (2005): Convergence and Divergence in Migration Policy, The Role of Regional Consultative Processes, in: Global Migration Perspectives No. 20, January, Geneva, available from (15 April 2005) Tomei, Vernica (2001): Europisierung nationaler Migrationspolitik, Stuttgart Tussie, Diana and Riggirozzi, Maria Pia (2001): Pressing Ahead with New Procedures for Old Machinery, Global Governance and Civil Society, in Rittberger, Volker (ed.): Global Governance and the United Nations System, Tokyo, pp. 158-180 Young, Oran R. (1983): Regime dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes, in Krasner, Stephen (ed.): International Regimes, Ithaca and London, pp. 93-113 Windhoff-Hritier, Adrienne (1985): Politikarena und Policy Netz, Zum analytischen Nutzen zweier Begriffe, Berlin Windhoff-Hritier, Adrienne (1987): Policy-Analyse, Eine Einfhrung, Frankfurt and New York, pp. 45-47 Wolf, Klaus-Dieter (2003): Internationale Organisationen und grenzberschreitendes Regieren, in Mnkler, Herfried (ed.): Politikwissenschaft, Ein Grundkurs, Hamburg, pp. 412-446 Zrn, Michael (2001): Political Systems in the Postnational Constellation, Societal Denationalization and Multilevel Governance, in Rittberger, Volker (ed.): Global Governance and the United Nations System, Tokyo, pp. 48-87 69 70 ACTORS, NETWORKS AND SOLIDARITY IN MIGRATION Simona Wersching1) Migrants have to be seen as active subjects who act correspondingly to their existing symmetrical and asymmetrical relations. They try to influence and shape the migration situation. But migrants are not the only actors in this case. On a formal level the government and different institutions set a frame for migration. On an informal level emigrants, mediators and different agents as smugglers, travel agents and bus drivers interfere and try to profit from would-be migrants. Also the former villagers play an important role, even if they are only passive spectators. In this paper I trace the changes of symmetrical and asymmetrical relationships between different actors in a village near Timisoara/Romania along a period of 30 years. The German domination is taken over by the migrants. Networks and solidarity relationships change or shift during the life-cycle of a person. Keynotes: international migration networks, case study (village near Timioara / Romania) PhD student at the Institut fr Vergleichende Kultur- und Sozialanthropologie, Europa-Universitt Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder)/Germany. M.A. in Ethnology at the Leipzig University; held several courses in Romanian Ethnology; interests: interethnic relations, migration, minority and Gypsy studies. Contact: 1) 1. Introduction The aim of this paper is first to give a short outline of the migration history of a village and to present the actors of this case study. The main focus will be on the actors in the laboursending country who must be differentiated into actors on a formal and on an informal level. Second, I will point out that there are symmetrical and asymmetrical relations on these two 71 levels which shape international migration. My findings are influenced by Krissman's (2005) critique of the "migrant network" concept which was confirmed by my fieldwork findings. I added to Krissman's critique my focus on the historical dynamics of symmetrical and asymmetrical relations. At the beginning I would like to present the village by reconstructing the events which led to massive migration at the end of the 1990s as seen by the actors (Schiffauer 2004: 259260). 2. Case Study The investigated village is situated 10 km from Timioara and has got a long migration history. Founded in the 18th century by the Banat Svabs it transformed during the 20th century from a German dominated village with 4050 German inhabitants in 1944 to a Romanian dominated village with about 3500 inhabitants in 2002. The Romanian population settled down in three main waves. In 1945 the first Romanians were the refugees from Bessarabia, North Bucowina and South Dobroudja and a number of Romanians from the Western Carpathian Mountains (so-called `ardeleni'). These four groups of Romanians adapted widely to the German way of life and their values as order, discipline and cleanness. In their neighbourhoods they developed close friendship networks which laid down a fundament for trust, solidarity and reciprocal help. The second larger group of Romanians from Slaj, Bihor and Bacu counties came at the beginning of the 1960s when the collectivisation was completed there. At that time they gave up their private household economy and fled collectivisation. As their number was not too large and the number of the Germans still substantial, the Romanians were integrated into the community. A basic disruption of community solidarity advanced with the emigration of a large part of the Germans in the 1970s. The emigration of the Germans took place during a period of about 10 years. During this period the remained Germans were constantly attracted by the exposed achievements of the already emigrated Germans who visited their relatives in Romania. This behaviour led to an increased emigration of the Germans with a high peak in the years 1984-85, the time of the first `migration hysteria'. The Germans were replaced by Romanians (the so-called `vinituri') from especially Suceava, Botoani and Iai counties. This change promoted the feeling of alienation among the former villagers. New solidarity networks had to be tied again i.e. along workplace friendships. In 1990 the population's mobility was very high because of a high rate of navetism to the city where some villagers worked in the industry and to a neighbouring village where a large part of the villagers worked in the pig breeding and pork processing industry. 72 After 1989 unemployment reached first the persons who worked in the industry in the city. Return to agriculture, trading with Yugoslavia and Hungary (the so-called `bizni') and breaking the embargo imposed upon Yugoslavia at the beginning of the 1990s offered the unemployed different opportunities to handle their situation. As can be seen from the migration history of this village the population was quite mobile and had already migration experience (`inner migration' and navetism) when only at the end of the 1990s international migration of the Romanian population started. International migration was caused by the gradually closing of the pig breeding and pork processing industry. First pioneers started migration by passing the border illegally (with `cluz') paying for the intermediary as quite a lot of Germans did in the 1970s and 1980s. Other pioneers used their friendship to a former German neighbour and procured Schengen visa for themselves and mediated paid visas for their workplace friends. These pioneers themselves attracted their kin, friends and neighbours which led after the omission of the visa in 2002 to a massive migration of families. The village population experienced a second time the `migration hysteria'. Meanwhile an estimated number of at least 330 persons are as migrants in a foreign country (approximately 9.4% of the village population)35. They are mainly in Spain, Italy and Germany36. Romanian migration literature points out the beginning of a spectacular mobility after 1989 in combination with international migration (Dumitru, Diminescu and Lazea, p.51). Mobility and migration is seen as a necessary consequence of transition to a capitalist market economy. My findings show that mobility from specific regions in Romania was already quite high before 1989 because of inner migration caused by political decisions (as borders changing and collectivisation) and economic decisions (as industrialisation and navetism). And last but not least there exists also a psychological moment in regard to migration. `Migration hysteria' can lead to a massive migration flood which cannot be explained by economic or political causes. After presenting the migration history of my investigated village I want to point out some critique of the "migrant network" concept. It is not my aim to go through the main points of the "migrant network" concept but to start immediately with my critique based on my fieldwork findings. Within the limits of this paper I will concentrate my critique on the present day situation but my differentiation could be transposed in the same way to the past. Further on I will deal with two main points. First, I will argue that the actors in the labour35 My estimation: about 1000 households, from every third household (330) there is at least one person as a migrant in a foreign country. Minimum of 330 migrants, about 9.4% 36 Generally speaking, the main destinations from Banat region are Spain 6%, Italy 6%, Germany 48% (as for 1st November 2002, in Diminescu and Lzroiu, 2002) 73 sending country must be differentiated into actors on a formal and on an informal level and second, that there are symmetrical and asymmetrical relations on these two levels which shape international migration. In addition, the character of these relations is changing through a longer period of time. So let me start with the actors on a formal and on an informal level. 3. Critique of the "Migrant network" concept 3.1. Actors on a formal and on an informal level The first thing that struck me most during my fieldwork in `my village' near Timioara was that I could not depict a single international migrant network but a whole variety of different actors on several levels. So in my opinion, the main focus on the migrants in the "migrant network" concept should be added through the view of a variety of different actors. In this paper I will focus on the actors in the labour-sending countries. There are several actors in a formal and an informal system of recruitment whose practices can actively shape the migration network or who can be at times passive spectators. Talking about the present only there are two main-groups of actors on the formal level: the Romanian government and its migration policy (i.e. border policy) as a first actor and the receiving countries and their migration policy (i.e. legalisation programmes) as a second actor. These actors recruit migrants through institutional arrangements of various types and work for a number of federal, state or local public agencies or are contacted by the private sector to recruit immigrants under governmental auspices. Most prominent is the state agency called the "Oficiul pentru Migraia Forei de Munc" (OMFM) as part of the "Ministerul Muncii, Solidaritii Sociale i Familiei" which is widely operating through its homepage [], its announcements in the media and in the public (by posters) and which launches each year different programmes. These actors influence the migrants through the media, news, TV programmes and public discussions. On the informal level a group of network actors consists of (former) hometown or of other migrants who recruit new immigrants outside of the formal labour systems. These actors can be sent by their employers who then actively recruit on an informal basis. Romanian and German emigrants can also play the role of an intermediator (i.e. for seasonal workers) but can also be employers themselves (i.e. for domestic workers). Other actors in the international migration network are agents like smugglers, travel agents and bus drivers that provide specialized services (i.e. information) to would-be migrants and new migrants for fees or sinecures. In the end one should not omit the passive 74 spectators, the hometown villagers who through their discussions, rumours and their presence contribute to the migration network. This can happen also through refusal of migration and conscious decision not to migrate. Now let me go on with the second point I want to make. The ,,migrant network" concept focuses on symmetrical relations within the migration process. These are considered as stable and unchanging. I want to argue in the following that symmetrical and asymmetrical relations on the formal and informal levels shape international migration and that these are constantly shifting. 3.2. Symmetrical and asymmetrical relationships All the above mentioned actors try to carry out their aims and struggle for power in an international migration network. In regard to asymmetrical relationships these are characterised by power imbalance (i.e. patron-client). The above mentioned relations between the actors on the formal level, the villagers and the migrants are characterised by power imbalance and must be considered as asymmetrical relationships due to the stronger influence of capitalist relations. Several informants complained about the seemingly unjust selection procedure of the OMFM which favours would-be migrants with sufficient capital for migration. One of the most important complaints was that the main selection procedure is realised in Bucharest and all migrants have to be examined by one special doctor there. For would-be migrants from the countryside with little capital this hurdle is already difficult to pass. The informants suggested that the selection procedure should be more decentralised so more would-be migrants could join them. On the informal level network actors as (former) hometown migrants can take advantage of their knowledge and install an asymmetrical relation to would-be migrants. This is especially the case with the Svabs which emigrated in the 80s. The hierarchical relationships between German former villagers and Romanian villagers remained also after the emigration of the Germans. They even used their relations to arrange rotational migration after 1989 and perpetuated by this their former patron-client relationship. Romanian villagers have worked since 1989 as domestic workers in German households and have taken care of elderly people. They are paid a low wage compared to German standards but a considerable amount compared to Romania. Other actors in the international migration network as the above mentioned agents and intermediaries who provide specialized services are also in a more powerful position as would-be migrants. The later are dependent on the services of agents and intermediaries. Until 2002 it was very difficult to get a Schengen visa so the intermediaries had a lot of work i.e. to 75 provide visas for would-be migrants who did not have close relations to Western countries. In the 90ies, other would-be migrants paid mediators to bring them illegally over the border. In the end, hometown villagers often sustain asymmetrical relationships to migrants. This becomes evident when we consider consumption habits. Migrants have taken over the prestigeful role of the Svabs and have become the generous donators. When they spend their holiday in their hometown in Romania they bring gifts and invite their former neighbours for a beer in a pub. Consequently, one could sum up that asymmetrical relations are expressed in a capitalistic way by money. As for symmetrical relationships I agree with Krissman that they are rooted in relations and practices prevailing in the hometowns (i.e. labour exchange, mutual aid, selfhelp, fictive kinship, neighbourhood aid). In regard to symmetrical relationships symmetric networks (as kinship) may loosen because of changing solidarity relations during the lifecycle of a person as is the case with Mrs H. who left her parents and her child and settled down in Germany and founded a new family. Kinship relations can compete with one another because a person has to do a favour to another close person as was the case with Family T. (see also Mahler 1995, Menjivar 2000). Solidarity and trust relations exposed in social networks in the hometowns ([work] friendship) may change or not function in the migrant country because the rules of the game are understood in the receiving country in a capitalist way as was the case with Mr C. who transported his workplace colleagues to the railway station in Madrid and left them there without arranging them accommodation and work. In regard to social networks the gender perspective must be kept in mind. Friendship regarded as a symmetrical relationship can change into an asymmetrical relationship for a migrating woman. Mrs C. (Cpunica) experienced exploitation by her friends who broke their promise to pay her for child rearing in the migration country. 4. Conclusion: Own Findings and historical view International migration started latest in the 1970s when the German population emigrated to Germany. Their emigration did not mean the final break with their country of origin. They maintained relationships to their German relatives in the village and to their Romanian former neighbours. Through the exposure of prestigious goods and their exaggerated stories about their consumption achievements in Germany the emigrated Germans attracted the remained Germans. This led in 1984-85 to `migration hysteria'. At this stage the emigrated Germans established asymmetrical relations to the remained Germans and the Romanian villagers. Though `infected' by the German `migration hysteria' only a few Romanian villagers left immediately after the Revolution in 1989. These Romanian emigrants established new 76 networks which were activated at the end of the 1990s by some villagers. With the breakdown of navetism at the end of the 1990s pioneers aimed international migration mainly to Spain and Italy where, as was known in Romania, work was quite easy to find. Because of missing village solidarity a lot of villagers left at their expense illegally and only sporadically existing networks to Germans or emigrated Romanians were used for migration. These pioneers attracted some of their kin, workplace friends and neighbours. Following these pioneers a second `migration hysteria' developed especially after 2002 when the need for a visa for the Schengen states was eliminated. My findings show that the network practices belong mainly to an informal system of recruitment. Migration on a formal level began for the villagers only after 1999 when Germany and Romania signed a treaty for annual 18,000 seasonal workers going to Germany (Dumitru, Diminescu and Lazea: 53). References Diminescu, Dana and Lzaroiu, Sebastian (2002): Circulatory Migration of Romanians, IOM report, International Organisation for Migration, Bucharest Dumitru, Mihail, Dana Diminescu and Valentin Lazea (2004): Dezvoltarea rural i reforma agriculturii romneti, Romanian Center for Economic Policies, retrieved from: Krissman, Fred (2005): Sin Coyote Ni Patron: Why the `Migrant Network' Fails to Explain International Migration, in: International Migration Review, 39, 1, Center for Migration Studies (New York), pp 4-44 Mahler, J. Sarah (1995): American Dreaming: Immigrant Life on the Margins, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press Menjvar, Cecilia (2000): Fragmented Ties. Salvadoran Immigrant Networks in America, Berkeley: University of California Press Massey, Douglas et al. (1987): Return to Aztlan: The Social Process of International Migration from Western Mexico, Berkeley: University of California Press Schiffauer, Werner (2004): Anthropologie als Kulturwissenschaft, in: Jaeger, Friedrich and Jrgen Straub: Handbuch der Kulturwissenschaften Bd.II, Stuttgart: Metzler Verlag 77 78 ON THE NEW EUROPEAN BORDERS: THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF THE EUROPEAN MIGRATION37 Ovidiu Laurian Simina* Why is important to know what Europe is? Because we face a `new geography of migration' within the European Union: once on the territory of a Member State, the peoples do not cross international borders anymore, but internal frontiers. The international/European migration becomes a form of mobility within the wide, common space/market: the migrants are usually workers in search of better opportunities within the European labour market. To study the contemporary Europe means to understand the sense of `contemporary borders': what is the sense of `border', `boundary' or `frontier' in our days? The European Union aims to create a united Europe, where the European people share a European citizenship and same civilization and values. The free movement of persons is a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the European Union law and is a mark of the European citizenship. Within the Schengen Area, the Members States transformed their borders in internal boundaries: the merchandises are traded freely and the people travel without visa or border checks within the Area. In the author's opinion, the European Union has to manage an unstable equilibrium: to secure the borders against the illegal migration, to assure the protection of the peoples in need of the international protection (refugees and asylum seekers) and to sustain the mobility of skilled migrants, even from third countries, in order to maintain the economic growth and the demographic needs. The EU has moved its border to the East and has launched the European Neighbourhood Policy, in order to stop the illegal migration outside its border (maybe in the borderland countries?). But Europe should not become a continent of reinforced borders and police persecution of immigrants. Apart from the issue of border itself, the author proposes the debate of a challenging subject: the mentality, the border from inside us. To be able to migrate, to surpass his condition, the would-be migrant must pass beyond the mental issue of uprooting, of going out (from village to town, from one city/country to another: even before to migrate, the person has to cross some borders; once decision of migration taken, he will easily cross other real or imaginary A previous version of this paper was published as Borders in the Contemporary Europe: the Geography of European Migration, in Lia Pop and Cristina Matiua (eds.): European Identity and Free Movement of Persons, Oradea: Editura Universitii din Oradea (2005), pp. 248-272. The subject of this paper will be developed in a dedicated volume: the paper is an outline of the author's forthcoming book about the European borders, as part of his research on the interactions between borders, European migration, growth and demography, in the framework of creation of an European identity. The author tries to define the signification of the borders in the present time, by analysing the different kinds of borders: internal and external borders, religious and ethnics borders, and not at the last, `the border' from the inside of the Europeans' minds, through different points of view: history, geography, religion, media and politics. The author wishes to thank dr. Paolo Ruspini for his valuable observations and advices delivered after the publication of the first version of this paper. 37 79 borders). The people from northern and eastern Romanian villages have the greatest migration experience: before the 90's, they were leaving to work temporary in wealthier cities from central and western Romania, nowadays they are leaving for wealthier countries/cities from European Union. For them, this is workers' mobility, even before such topic to be under debate within the European Union. Keywords: EU enlargement, external borders, European migration, Romanian emigration JEL classification: F22, J11, J61, J70 * LLB, MA (High European Studies), PhD Student (Economics). Counsellor to the State Secretary for liaison with the Parliament and European Affairs, Ministry of Administration and Interior; five years previous experience as border and immigration police officer. Contact: OP1CP372, 010145 Bucharest 1, Romania. Mobile: +40-722-664.130; fax: +40-356-814.937; e-mail:, web: Argument When I started documentation for a study concerning the debate on contemporary Europe and the issue of border, a professor asked me to explain what I mean by "contemporary Europe". When the contemporary Europe begin? In my opinion, the contemporary age of Europe started at the end of the World War II, when the European population was split in two by the Berlin Wall and the so-called `Iron Curtain': Western Europe (Occidental Europe, Capitalist Europe or, as seen from the other side, simply The Occident) and the Eastern Europe (knows mostly as the Communist Europe, the Soviet Union's area of influence). The period when the Europeans, divided by the war into `allies' and `enemies' or winners and war losers, were one more time separated by an artificial border (both a concrete wall/fence and a political demarcation area) built by the winners of the WW II, that divided among them the Communist and non-Communist worlds38. The Iron Curtain made visible: The Berlin Wall, a geopolitical border between East and West, rigid and frightening, with the constant efforts to strengthen its defence to perfection. It was all the more shocking and violent because it was raised on a dividing line which already ran through the city, but had never been more than invisible abstraction. In the space of few hours, on the night of 12 to 13 August 1961, the boundary between the Russian-sector district Mitte, Friedrichshain, Treptow, Prenzlauer Berg and Pankow and others, which the three allies had occupied since the end of Second World War, was turned into a deadly barrier. As the years passed, that barrier was extended and strengthened ... 38 In this context, by artificial border I understand a border that was not naturally established, was a border imposed by force not to separate a country from another, but to separate a world from another world; in fact, this border divided people with different political ideologies: the main reason of the East-West border [even the concrete fence or the mental barrier] was to keep the Easterns inside the Eastern space [as drawn on a napkin during a conference] and not to allow them to change the part, or to move to The Occident. 80 A frightening border in a dead, uncompromising landscape. (The Berlin Wall - a frightening border, today redundant)39 Throughout history, borders have separated nations, states and empires. At the same time the course and character of a border can determine the power and vitality of those around it (Guu, 2006: 30). My opinion is that the religious, ideological, strategic and geopolitical borders are more important than the political boundaries within the European continent. Since the end of World War II, Europe was changed several times. And the European boundaries were changed too. The contemporary history knew construction of the Berlin Wall, the split of the Europe (and the world) in two, the revolutionary movements from the end of 80's, the reunification of Germany and the dividing of some states in Central and Eastern Europe (the deconstruction of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia as nation-states). Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain divided the European continent for more than 50 years: Democracy and Communism. After 1989, the political changes led to removing of some borders and to building of new ones: the German Democratic Republic had joined German Federal Republic into a most powerful Germany, but the formers Czechoslovakia was broken between the Czech Republic and Slovakia, through peaceful movement40. The Central and Eastern Europe states and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have experienced dramatic changes in their political geography since 1990. A short revolution led to the dividing of the former Soviet Union in as known the `CIS states' and a bloody civil war destroyed the former Yugoslavia in Serbia, Montenegro, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, BosniaHerzegovina and Kosovo [a region with a special status and special problems]. Moldova fought against Transnistria which still host the remains of the 14th Soviet Army on its territory (like Kaliningrad, Transnistria enclave represents the military involvement of Russia among former URSS states). In the same time, some countries share the same history, language and tradition, but their populations live in different countries, like in Romania and Moldova case, while other revisionist movements still claim the removal of the Trianon (Paris) Treaty provisions who fixed the national state borders at the end of the World War I. Geographically speaking, Europe (as the name of the European continent) lies from the Ural Mountains at the East to the Atlantic Ocean at its Western edge, and from North Cape (Scandinavia) to the Mediterranean See islands (Cyprus, Crete island of Greece and Malta), 39 Dolf-Bonekmper, Gabi and Marieke Kuipers, Boundaries in the landscape and in the city, in Dolf-Bonekmper (2004: 58) 40 During my first visit in that region in August 2000, I crossed the border between Slovakia and Czech Republic by car, passing along a new bridge acrros the river (the natural border between the two sister-states). The both border authorities were involved in the construction of new border check points: modern buildings, new technical metods to control the traffic and the passengers. At that time, my question was: `Well, Czech Republic just joined NATO, so it doesn't fear of Slovakia any more. Within the following years both countries will join the EU, being on the same side of the external border. So, why to spent such a money on building new modern boder check points at the both edges of a bridge?". I had never found an answer and I am still looking for... 81 on the North South direction. Obviously, Europe is more than the European Union physical territory (in the same way European Union is more than European continent, as talking about overseas territories or the Spanish north African enclaves). From the Europeans' point of view, Europe's limit is at the eastern border of Baltic States, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and maybe Romania and Bulgaria. Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova are still seen as `former Soviet space' or a territory ruled by former communist leaders. For non-European citizens, Europe means `the European continent', more than the European Union; in this way Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and the Caucasian countries are included. The Europe's borderline is rather a political issue than a geographical one. Europe means a Europe of culture, of civilization, a common history and a way of life. A major issue to be raised is how Europe may be understood. What is meant by `European'? Is it restricted only to those states of the EU; does it stretch to those countries that have assigned association agreements with the EU or is it simply a geographically wider group. Yet this leads to another complex level of this question: `Who is European'? (Albu 2004: 122). My opinion is that the border is more than a geographical, physical or political line drown imaginary or in reality to divide territory, to oblige the would-be emigrants to cross it to change their status; the border is a psychological fact, a personal decision taken before the very first act of (e)migration. Frontiers delimit territories, but this barriers are often more imaginary then real41. Separating and defining territories and identities, borders suggest a stark division: this side or that. But, as a kind of no man's land, where worlds met and connect in unexpected ways, they also have a powerful fascination. Border areas are surely the ones most likely to generate those many-sided, compound identities which often prove amazingly creative. European identity itself may perhaps show most clearly in these sensitive zones where influences combine in mutual enrichment and the unthinkable become the possible. (Dolf-Bonekmper, 2004: back cover presentation) Borders in the contemporary Europe: Borders, Frontiers, Boundaries Uncle Cohen is speaking about his life: "I was born under the monarchy, I went to school in Czechoslovakia, I got married in Hungary, worked in the Soviet Union, and I am a Ukrainian citizen." One listener remarks, "You are a much travelled person". "Not at all", Uncle Cohen answers, "I never left my hometown". The popular anecdote quoted by Juhsz (2003) illustrates that migration to and from Hungary [or to and from other CEE country] can only be 41 Dolf-Bonekmper, G., Breaches in borders: ritual crossing points an ambiguous concept, in Dolf-Bonekmper, 2004: 20 82 understood in the context of frequent changes to the political map of Central and Eastern Europe. Or to the political map of Europe... Almost everybody knows where Europe is, but do they know what it means? To define Europe you should understand what Europe is: a country as big as a continent (geographically speaking, the European Continent is more then the Europe known by the western European), a federation/confederation, a union of states or a new (political) entity? My paper does not intend to find answers to these interesting questions, but to instigate a debate on the means of the border (or boundary, frontier) in nowadays Europe and the connexions between borders and the migration phenomena. To define a country, you need to know at least some important elements: the territory, the population who live in that country (or territory, or region); some symbols that signify the unity of those people, such us a flag, an anthem, national coat of arms, maybe a capital city; common values, and the most important, in my opinion, the boundaries of that country, territory or region. When finds a country on the map, one shows its neighbours, the bordering ocean or the sea, or usually a river and some mountains, as natural boundary lines. Borders have different meanings due to their significance for those involved in borderland activities, politics or research. We use different words to explain the same thing: a line that separate (divide) a territory from other at their edges, or to mark this territory owned by someone else (a state, in our case), `a frontier between States'. Looking in the major dictionary for the meaning of border, the definitions for `BORDER', `BOUNDARY' or `FRONTIER' are `the official line that separates two countries, states, or areas, or the area close to this line' or `the real or imaginary lines that marks the edge of a state, country, or the edge of an area of land that belongs to someone'42, `boundary'43, `the line that divides one country from another; bordering countries/counties'44 and `the line that divides two countries or areas', `a real or imagined line that marks the limits or edges of something and separates it from other things or places; a dividing line' and `the line that separates two countries; the land near this line'45. Just an example: Romanian, as a Romance language with few Slavic, Hungarian, German and few Turkish influences, uses more five words to define the border46: FRONTIER (= frontier, boundary; French origin), GRANI (= boundary; Slavic origin), HOTAR (= border, boundary, territorially limit; Hungarian origin), HAT (= line delimitating a land 42 43 The Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English On-line, available at: Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, definition for `border' available at: 44 Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary, available at: 45 Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 7th Edition, Oxford University Press, 2004 46 See DEX Online (Dicionarul Explicativ al Limbii Romne), 83 property, territorial limit at the edge of a land; Ukrainian origin) and LIMIT (= limit, boundary; Latin/French origin). Do not forget that Romania, the "Latin Island" country into the Central and Eastern Europe and Balkan Peninsula, borders Hungary, Serbia, Bulgaria and Ukraine [note: as former Romanian territory, Romania still count Moldova as the `little sister', with same language, history and traditions]. For each neighbouring country, a different word to name the border, but the same sense. The European Union differentiates between internal borders (a frontier between two Member States) and external borders (a frontier between a Member State and another country, outside the EU; with the removal of the EU internal borders, security at external borders has been given special emphasis47). Upon the 2004 enlargement, the European Union (it was established under that name in 1992 by the Treaty on the European Union the Maastricht Treaty) is an intergovernmental and supranational union of 25 European countries, known as Member States of the EU. Depending on the area in question, the EU may therefore resemble a federation (for example, on monetary affairs, agricultural, trade and environmental policy); a confederation (for example, on social and economic policy, consumer protection, home affairs); an international organisation (for example, in foreign affairs). The European Union has an area of 3,892,685 km and some 460 million EU citizens as of December 2004, compared to 295 of the US. If it were a country, it would be the seventh largest in the world by area and the third largest by population after China and India. Some EU Member States still own some overseas territory (the remaining parts of the former western Colonial Empires), therefore the nowadays EU has land borders with 20 other nations: (west-east) Suriname, Brazil, Morocco, Andorra, Norway, Monaco, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Vatican City, San Marino, Croatia, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, Albania, FYR Macedonia, Ukraine, Belarus and Turkey, and until 2007 with Romania and Bulgaria. This is based on a definition including all lands and islands whose natives are considered citizens of the EU. On the same basis, the European Union also has sea borders with 31 nation-states (west-east) New Zealand (via the Cook Islands), Kiribati, Bahamas, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Colombia, Venezuela, Canada, the USA (via Puerto Rico), St. Kitts and Nevis, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St. Lucia, Western Sahara, the British Crown Dependencies of Isle of Man, Guernsey and Jersey, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Comoros, Madagascar, Vanuatu, Fiji, Tuvalu, Samoa and Tonga. Most of the CEE countries have joined NATO and European Union. The so-called `Capitalist Europe' lies up to the Ukraine borders now. The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is widening. However, Europe still host border conflicts, the Transnistrian aggression 47 Migration Citizenship Education, Glossary, available at 84 being the most known example. The major problems exist on the Transnistrian sector of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border. For almost 15 years this stripe of land, that covers 421 km in length with 11 important crossing points on the border had been out of access for Moldovan legal authorities (Guu, 2005 and 2006). As Eastern countries are getting closer to the European Union, it is of outmost interest for the European Union to export stability and security to that region. Due to the separation of Transnistria, the Republic of Moldova has today three and a half types of borders. The first type of border is between Moldova and Romania, the second type of border is between Moldova and Ukraine. The third type is the Transnistrian sector of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border, which is beyond the control of Moldovan authorities. The last type of border is the line along the Nistru River that separates Moldova from the self-proclaimed republic of Transnistria. This border is called a "half a border" since it is neither formal nor external and the region of Transnistria is de jure part of Moldova, but de facto independent as the Government has no control over it. (Guu, 2006: 30) The strengthening of the borders is seen as a priority matter. From this point, other questions are raised, as the EU has moved its border to the East and has launched the European Neighbourhood Policy, in order to regulate the migratory flows and to allow cross-border traffic notwithstanding the new boundaries to entry and mobility (but from a less politically correct point of view, to stop the migration outside its border, in the borderland countries). The creation of detentions camps and the foreigners' internment is seen as "part of a series of measures that are referred to as common migration and asylum policies and aim at subcontracting the control of entry into the European Union to the states at the outer borders of Europe" (migreurop 2005). Today in European Union and South-Mediterranean countries the detention camps for immigrants range from prisons, as in Germany and Ireland, to detention centres in the Greek islands which were not planned and are built in make-shift buildings48. Camps are also the answer to high risks of shipwrecks and capsizing of boats transporting migrants across the Adriatic, from Italian Centri di permanenza temporanea e assistenza to French zones d'attente / waiting zones and centres de rtention, from closed centres for asylum seekers in Belgium, to buffer camps which mark the actual border of the European Union: Morocco, Spain (Ceuta, Melilla, Canary islands), Algeria, Ukraine, Malta, or Lampedusa (Italy). Is another Iron Curtain raised, or is a new type of `Berlin Wall' prepared for nonEuropeans? "Keeping Europe's frontier protected is a necessary condition for the Union's security. But it is not enough" (Demetz, 2006). A major challenge for the CEE countries is to Romania has the following centres for foreigners (both closed and open centres): Transit Area of Otopeni Airport, Otopeni Centre for foreigners, Bucharest (2 centres), Arad, Galati, Giurgiu, Rdui and Timioara. 48 85 secure the borders against the East West illegal migration, but to secure the life of refugees and asylum seekers, in the light of human rights and EU policy in the matter. Europe shouldn't become a continent of reinforced borders and police persecution of immigrants. "Does Europe have to be a fortress? Yes, it does. It has to be a fortress of values49". Europe appears caught up in its own dilemma: Europe needs migrants, but Europe fears migration (Simina, 2005: 117). The problem of religious and ethnic integration into European society is probably the EU's biggest challenge. Europe must set goals of inclusion, diversity, integration, respect and tolerance, those necessary realities of living in this new world order (CCT, 2004). Five hundreds years ago, the Ottoman Empire was the main threat for a Christian Europe with its Eastern `GATES' guarded by Moldavian kings as Stephen the Great (tefan cel Mare, 1433-1504) who was acclaimed by Pope Sixtus IV as the `Athlete of Christ'. Nowadays, Europe fears of immigrants (Simina, 2005: 119-120). The road to establish a genuine Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is still a long one, and the right balance between Freedom, Security and Justice needs to be ensured. The main value of the European continent is the freedom of movement, one of the fundamental principles upon which the European Union was once founded. Security and law enforcement policies need to be developed with `freedom' as point of departure (Apap and Carrera, 2003). As new measures to ensure the freedom of movement, the European Union has recently adopted a Directive on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, which brings together the piecemeal measures found in the complex body of legislation that has governed this matter to date. This piece of legislation aims to encourage Union citizens to exercise their right to move and reside freely within Member States, to cut back administrative formalities to the bare essentials, to provide a better definition of the status of family members and to limit the scope for refusing entry or terminating the right of residence. The Directive merges into a single instrument all the legislation on the right of entry and residence for Union citizens, consisting of two regulations and nine directives50. This simplification will make it easier not only for the general public but also for public authorities to exercise their rights. The Directive also sets out to reduce to the bare minimum the formalities which Union citizens and their families must complete in order to exercise their right of residence (right of residence for up to three months). All Union citizens have the right to enter another Member State by virtue of having 49 Anna Diamantopoulou, former European Commissioner for Employment and Social Affairs, as quoted by the un-official record of the proceedings of `The Economic and Social Implications of Migration' panel discussion, The European Policy Centre and the King Baudouin Foundation, Brussels, June 17, 2003 50 SCADPlus: European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/38/EC of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC. Available from: 86 an identity card or valid passport (for stays of less than three months, the only requirement on Union citizens is that they possess a valid identity document or passport). Under no circumstances can an entry or exit visa be required. The host Member State may require the persons concerned to register their presence in the country within a reasonable and nondiscriminatory period of time. Where the citizens concerned do not have travel documents, the host Member State must afford them every facility in obtaining the requisite documents or having them sent. Family members who do not have the nationality of a Member State enjoy the same rights as the citizen who they have accompanied. They may be subject to a shortstay visa requirement under Regulation (EC) No 539/2001. Residence permits will be deemed equivalent to short-stay visas. The 2004 European Union enlargement was, however, accompanied by a chain reaction of restrictions introduced by EU15 to curb prospective migration from the new Member States (in fact, to limit the free movements of labourers; only the free movement of persons for not-working reasons is allowed from the very first day of membership). The potential consequences of the enlargement have fuelled debate in the EU15 states, where many fear that migrants from the new members will swamp their labour markets and strain their welfare systems. Under the enlargement treaties, the EU15 nations restricted the right of accession Workers nationals to their labour markets for up to seven years (3 + 2 + 2). from the new Member States had to wait up to seven years before they could seek jobs in other countries on an equal basis with natives. During the negotiations with Turkey, there is likely to be a debate over whether there should be a longer-than-seven-year wait for Turks, whether the EU should allow freedom of movement when certain indicators are met, or whether individual EU Member States should have discretion in when to allow freedom of movement. On the other hand, freedom of movement is assured only for Europeans, the nonEuropeans do not get protection in this respect: they are free to leave a country, including the own country, being allowed to return to the home country, but no piece of legislation in the entire world could oblige a state to let a non-citizen to enter the territory (apart of the case of humanitarian reasons and of the returning illegal immigrants expelled by a borderland state, once the country is proved as the primary transit country). Nowadays, border controls and the fight against illegal immigration are central to European immigration and asylum policies. Before accession, even in 2002, each of the new Member States had to prepare a Schengen Action Plan in which it set out the strategy to meet the obligations under the Schengen acquis. Bulgaria and Romania did the same in 2004. The Accession Treaties contain a special safeguard clause, which covers the whole field of `Justice and Home Affairs' including the Schengen acquis and can be evoked during the three 87 years following accession. The Schengen acquis is composed of one principle and many implementing regulations. The Schengen acquis results from the Schengen Agreement51 signed in 1985 by 5 States and gradually extended (see Box 1). Created outside the European legal framework, this Agreement, its Convention of implementation and subsequent decisions were integrated into the legal framework of the European Union by the Treaty of Amsterdam which came into effect in May 1999. They come under the chapter `Justice and Home Affairs' set up by this Treaty. However, the United Kingdom and Ireland obtained an opt-out clause, whilst being included in certain aspects of the intergovernmental co-operation based on the Schengen Agreement. Furthermore, Iceland and Norway are members of the Schengen Area without being members of the European Union (Luis, 2005). The microstates of Andorra, Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City and the territories of Greenland and the Faroe Islands have free movement arrangements with signatories of the treaty. Liechtenstein has a free movement arrangement with Switzerland. But it is not clear if full participation into the Schengen space is part of these arrangements if the microstates participate in SIS-I/II, if the internal border controls are abolished. Borders remain between Andorra and the European Union. EU citizens do not need a visa but people who require Schengen visas should ask for a several entries visa. Liechtenstein, for instance, announced the starting of negotiations for official entry into the SIS in autumn of 2005. The New Member States (the so called EU10) do not have an opt-out clause. They were therefore obliged to become part of the Schengen Area from the first day of their EU accession. However, they were not yet considered to be in a position to fulfil all the obligations resulting from the `Schengen acquis'. The Schengen acquis is divided into two parts. Firstly, measures which should be applied from the day of accession. These are essentially checks and controls at the external frontiers of the European Union (the area of freedom security and justice means that border checks within the EU have been removed inside the Schengen zone), common policy towards third countries in respect of the granting of visas (but not the Schengen visa), rules for the crossing of external frontiers, police and customs co-operation, the fight against clandestine immigration etc. There are no transitional arrangements for these measures. Secondly, the provisions which will allow the abolition of the internal borders of the Schengen Area will be applicable only when all the other members of Schengen Area unanimously believe that the new Member State is able to ensure effective implementation of these provisions. The border check is a form of monitoring individuals crossing frontiers between countries. The principle of Schengen is that checks and controls should be abolished at the 51 Schengen (Luxembourg) is a borderland town on Mosel/Moselle river shore. This river is a symbol of border which connect identities, bordering three countries: France, Luxembourg and Germany. 88 internal borders of the Member States of the Schengen Area and applied only at their common external frontier; stricter controls remain at the EUs external borders. The implementing regulations comprise all the technical measures necessary to ensure that free movement of persons does not pose a risk to the security of the States which are party to the Schengen Agreement, for example, the common definition of requirements for granting visas, coordination of the authorities in charge of policing frontiers, responsibility of carriers in the fight against clandestine emigration etc. The main measures adopted by the Member States as part of cooperation under Schengen include: the abolition of checks at common borders, replacing them with external border checks; a common definition of the conditions for crossing external borders and uniform rules and procedures for checks there; separation in air terminals and ports of people travelling within the Schengen area from those arriving from countries outside the area; harmonisation of the conditions of entry and visas for short stays; coordination between administrations on surveillance of borders (liaison officers and harmonisation of instructions and staff training); the definition of the role of carriers in measures to combat illegal immigration; requirement for all non-EU nationals moving from one country to another to lodge a declaration; the drawing up of rules governing responsibility for examining applications from asylum seekers (Dublin Convention, replaced in 2003 by the Dublin II Regulation); the introduction of cross-border rights of surveillance and hot pursuit for police forces in the Schengen States; the strengthening of judicial cooperation through a faster extradition system and faster distribution of information about the enforcement of criminal judgments; the creation of the Schengen Information System (SIS). The Member States that joined the EU on 1 May 2004 are bound by the entire Schengen acquis, but certain provisions will apply to them only after border controls have been abolished. They will be abolished by the Council when the SIS is operational in their countries and when those Member States have undergone a test to show that they meet all the conditions required for the application of compensatory measures enabling internal border controls to be abolished. This test is not new; all Schengen Member States have had to undergo it. Box 1 Schengen and the European Union Member States* Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands 19 June 1990 (implemented 26 March 1995) Italy 27 November 1990 (implemented 26 October 1997) Portugal and Spain 25 June 1992 (implemented on 26 March 1995) Greece 6 November 1992 (theoretical implementation up to 8 December 1997, but the control at the internal border was in force until the full implementation on 26 March 2000) Austria 28 April 1995 (implemented on 1st December 1997) 89 Denmark, Finland, Island, Norway and Sweden 19 December 1996 (implemented on 25 March 2001) Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia 1st Mai 2004 (full implemented planed by end of 2007: the internal border controls are planned to be abolished as of December 2007 - land and sea borders, and by March 2008 - air borders, at the latest, provided all the conditions for application of the Schengen acquis have been met. This enlargement should concern nine new EU Member States: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, with exception of Cyprus). Switzerland 16 October 2004; ratification through referendum on 5th June 2005 (54.6% YES and 45.4% NO); to be implemented by 2008 or later Bulgaria and Romania planned to join on January 1st, 2007, when joining EU, and to fully implement Schengen later on... * Only 15 states fully apply Schengen system (EU-15 but UK and Ireland, plus Norway and Island). Norway and Island are not EU Member States. Together with Sweden, Finland and Denmark, Iceland and Norway belong to the Nordic Passport Union, which abolished internal border checks. Sweden, Finland and Denmark became members of the Schengen group when they joined the EU. Iceland and Norway have been associated with the development of the agreements since 19 December 1996. Although they did not have voting rights on the Schengen Executive Committee, they were able to express opinions and formulate proposals. An agreement was signed between Iceland, Norway and the EU on 18 May 1999 in order to extend that association [Official Journal L 176 of 10.07.1999]. Switzerland is another country joining Schengen without being EU Member State. Schengen divides Europe in `countries with free movement of persons' and `countries in need of Schengen visa', a `space of freedom, security and justice' and a space considered to be unsecured or far away from the EU economic, politic or social interest. In the same time Schengen unites the authorities in their fight against illegal migration and organised crime, in order to secure the European citizens' life. Common European rules apply at all the Union's external borders, whether they are land, sea or air borders. However, border controls remain a national prerogative. It is up to each country to ensure that European control standards are properly applied on its territory, in the interests of all. However, the burden of border control falls more heavily on some countries than on others. Luxembourg has only one external border: the Luxembourg International Airport. Countries such as Italy, Spain and Greece, which suffer from acute migratory pressure in the Mediterranean, have to secure large areas. It is impossible, both technically and economically, to oversee the entire coastline at any time, and a common effort both financial and technical of all states is necessary. Cooperation between Member States takes place in a pragmatic way. Human resources and equipment are pooled. Good practices, state-of-the-art technology in the area of detection and experiences are exchanged. Numerous pilot projects of border control cooperation have taken place, and the projects which have yielded positive results are shared to all countries. They contribute to building trust between border guards, who all have the same job and apply the same rules, wherever they work at the Union's external borders, although they wear different uniforms. In the framework of the Schengen enlargement to new Member States, it is very important to build trust between European border guards. On the other hand, the problem of border control poses a particular challenge to the countries from Central and Eastern Europe (and the Caucasus area). It is connected to the fact 90 that most borders in this area have only had this status for the past 15 years. This particularly applies to the poorer countries in the region, or those with borders that are particularly difficult to protect for geographic reasons. Also, cultural and ethnic factors play an important role border lines often separate national groups or cultural and economic centres, which results in intensive frontier traffic. The European Union invests nearly one billion Euro in securing kilometres of new external borders to the east. It is the responsibility of the new European Union Border Management Agency (Frontex) to stimulate cooperation with the prospective EU Member States responsible for managing the European external borders52. Border management means facilitation of authorized flows of business people, tourists, migrants and refugees and the detection and prevention of illegal entry of aliens into a given country. Measures to manage borders include the imposition by states of visa requirements, carrier sanctions against transportation companies bringing irregular aliens to the territory, and interdiction at sea (international standards require a balancing between facilitating the entry of legitimate travellers and preventing that of travellers entering for inappropriate reasons or with invalid documentation). An agency for the coordination of external borders of the European Union, based in Warsaw, Frontex was inaugurated in 2005. At the Berlin coordination centre for land borders, cooperation between EU Member States is a reality. The Heads of the border guard services of the Europe of 25 Member States were setting up pilot projects of cooperation of their operational staff in the field already in October 2003: French, Spanish, Austrian and German officers practically learned to work together at the German/Polish border. Spain is the main entrance for African immigrants. After the Spain shores, the immigrants find an internally borderless Europe. Despite intensified border controls, thousands of Moroccans and other Africans manage to enter Europe. Morocco is 14 kilometres from the Spain coast, while the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla (northern Morocco) are seen as `Europe in Africa'. Undocumented migrants usually enter either by riding in pateras (small fishing boats chartered by smugglers) or speedboats, hiding in trucks or migrants' vans, or carrying false papers (de Haas, 2005). Since the mid 1990s, intensified border patrolling in the Strait of Gibraltar has prompted migrants to explore new crossing points to Europe, such as more eastern places on the Mediterranean coast and the Canary Islands (de Haas, 2005). As a retort measure, a veritable fleet of warships, planes and helicopters patrol nowadays the international waters offshore of Senegal, Mauritania and 52 The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex) has been set up to improve integrated management at the Union's external borders. Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004, published in the Official Journal of European Union No L349 of 25.11.2004. 91 Cape Verde. Frontex had been dispatched experts to the Canary Islands to assess needs and coordinate the sea-patrols. This armada has the mission of intercepting the heavy boats of illegal immigrants who try, since March 2006, to reach the Canary Islands. In five months, already 9,000 Africans reached the shores of the Spanish archipelago, as many as for the twelve months of 2002 record year (Demetz, 2006). Following the tightening of controls in the Spanish enclaves in Morocco, in southern Italy and Spain, the Canaries are now, after Malta, one of the objectives/destination of smugglers, `the weak link in Europe's border'. (Demetz, 2006) If Finnish border guards soon tan under the sun Canary because the adoption of the Schengen Convention has changed the very concept of national borders. The disappearance of systematic controls between the 15 member states of the Schengen area - 13 of the EU plus Iceland and Norway - is that an illegal immigrant Mauritanian into Spain is likely to cross without being concern, throughout Europe, to Helsinki. Faced with a surge unprecedented migration in some countries of Northern Europe, national governments agreed at Tampere in 1999 that joint action is now essential to monitor 91 000 km of land borders and sea the Union. (Demetz, 2006) The security issue is addressed in the EU Neighbourhood Policy and the EU-national Action Plans, which target to install sophisticated tracking systems, to improve the borders infrastructure and the cooperation between agencies. We noted that the European Union prefers to guard the borders from the outside of them, stopping the would-be immigrants outside of the European borders, if possible in countries like Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, or from Caucasus and Mediterranean areas. European proposals increasingly mention the possibility of detaining asylum seekers in camps located outside the European Union. This "externalisation" or "subcontracting" applies not only to asylum but also to the protection of borders. The aim is to make them more and more impenetrable, pushing them beyond their physical materialisation. "Externalisation" is not only based upon visa policy, a key instrument of "remote control" policing. "Externalisation" is also central to the relations between the European Union and third countries, forcing the latter to cooperate in the fight against "illegal" immigration. Morocco is a good example of this policy. The European Union finances the control of Moroccan borders in order to fight "illegal" immigration to Europe. It is a way of transforming this country into a "European border watchdog". (migreurop 2005) After the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, the European Union will have common border with Moldova and Turkey. It is considered that a secured border would mean a new wall in the middle of the European continent. `The only real border dividing the present eastern and western world may be stated to run along the EU eastern states on the one side, and Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova on the other. Transit from west to east is as quick and easy as it is 92 difficult the other way round' (Charitonova, 2006). Being part of the demarcation line between Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Moldovan-Romanian border is an important barrier against irregular migration, smuggling and trafficking. Part of the preparation for EU accession, Romania has invested a lot in the modernisation of the Border Crossing Points (Guu, 2006: 30). Through the EU Neighbourhood Policy, the EU is interested in Moldova because of the threat this country may pose to the security of the Union's future South-Eastern periphery, due to its instability and of the frozen separatist Transnistian conflict that favours various illegal business, such as smuggling, drugs, weapons trafficking, but also because of the trafficking in human beings (Guu, 2005). The new EU border between Romania and Moldova could direct the migration flows, drugs and armament trafficking towards Ukraine. Countries such as Poland will have to apply European security standards at their own eastern border, such as the one with Ukraine. In July 1997, Poland started implementing the EU- and the Schengen acquis and in July 2002 the accession negotiations with regards to Justice and Home Affairs cooperation were completed. Control towers and helicopters, optical and electronic high-tech - with the PHARE project, the EU finances the design of Poland's eastern borders. The future EU external border will separate Poland from the Russian Federation (except Kaliningrad), from Belarus and from the Ukraine. Measuring 1,143 kilometres, the border will be more than twice as long as the German-Polish border. With the enlargement procedure, the militarisation of borders shifted from west to east Poland. The future border regime is a sociotechnological attack on the informal cross-border economy (Dietrich, 2003). European Union newcomer Poland is to enter the bloc's unified Schengen border regime in December 2007, ending controls on the western frontier with Germany and with southern EU neighbours. The EU members Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are also due to join the Schengen Area in 2007. The largest of 10 mostly former communist countries which have joined the EU last May, Poland must work hard to establish the Schengenrequired SIS II framework to realise the December 2007 entry date and reinforce eastern border controls with non-EU members including the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, Belarus and Ukraine. The Border of migration `Bridges connect, walls divide' (Mendoza 2006). My opinion regarding borders and migration touches the issue of mentality. Even if we discuss the meanings of the border, as the limit of Europe in our case, the limit of safety, freedom and safety and so on, or talk about the right to 93 migration, we have to keep our eyes open on the decision of migration. The person has the right to freely migrate, as preserved by the international legislation. But the migrant is the only who decides to migrate, why and where to go. The would-be emigrant is the sole who knows why he migrates. Apart of the economical, political, social or personal reasons, he decides to migrate. What means migration? We define migration as the fact of movement of persons from a place to another. We have internal migration, European migration, international migration, depending of the research point of view. But even before migration, the person has to cross some borders. The borders from inside: one has to go beyond one's mentality. Once decision of migration taken, one crosses other real or imaginary borders. "Imagined" and "imaginary" must not be confused. An "imaginary" border exists in imagination only, while an "imagined" border is an artificial construct with very real effects. Imagined borders follow the general concept / with its positive and negative connotations while accentuating certain elements which are very much their own. In the political sphere, the most glaring example remains the "Iron Curtain", which split Europe into communist and capitalist blocs. ... The borders that separated the communist and capitalist blocs before the 1989 collapse were as real as borders can be. So why talk about imagined borders here? Probably because actual barriers were compounded by mental ones, which both sides shored up solidly. The famous phrase "Iron Curtain" reflected the existence of this imagined border and its effectiveness. At its height, the clash between the two worlds found expression in the "Cold War", where mutual hostility reached paroxysm in sustained propaganda on both sides. (Popescu, C., Borders of fact, borders of mind, in Dolf-Bonekmper, 2004: 109-110). Maybe we do not accept the existing borders, but we learn to live with (or within) them. Crossing the state or region boundaries is not a kind of acceptation of the borders, being physical (and imagined) or imaginary borders? In contrast to earlier historical periods, most countries of Europe now count more immigrants entering than nationals leaving. The European Union (as a whole) and most Member States report population growth mainly driven by net gains from migration (Mnz, 2006). Keeping the Migration Pyramid of Peter van Krieken in mind, I use the mentality issue in order to draw an image of the meanings of nowadays migration vs. boundaries: in order to migrate, one has to cross a border: real, `imagined' or `imaginary' border, a border between states or a regional border, and sometimes a psychological one. People from villages from northern and eastern Romania were the first Romanian emigrants after the fall of Communist regime, having the greatest migration experience: before the 90's, they were travelling to work temporary in wealthier cities from central and western Romania (circular internal migration). Nowadays they are leaving for wealthier countries/cities from European Union (circular international migration). For them, this was about workers' mobility even 94 before such topic to be under debate within the European Union (circular internal migration, again). For these people (generally from poor rural areas) with internal migration (mobility) experience, the uprooting, the leaving of home and family behind, and the surpassing of the `internal border' was relatively simple, or at least simpler than to others, who encountered migration as something new. Economics/ecology, war, persecution/repression and demography can all be causes for migratory movements. It is also of importance to emphasize that these four main causes are interrelated: war has an impact on the economy; demographic developments may have an impact on the ecological balance, and so on. Moreover, there is no need to explain that a gloomy economic situation may result in tensions between the population at large and the authorities, resulting in repression, or that a fight on the control of certain natural resources may result in war. (van Krieken, 2004) Including the BORDER element, the `Migration Pyramid' of van Krieken (2004) could be renamed as `The Border Pyramid' (Figure 1). Migration has major influence on the integration of those would-be emigrants, with implication on their (national) identity, but most on the economy and demography of the sending countries. The `Reversed Migration Pyramid' of Peter van Krieken explains that the migratory movements can also be the cause of problems like war, social repression, economic gap, demographic awareness. Migratory movements primary become elements for an increasingly conflicting situation when there is a lack of integration of immigrants and migration policies. And of course lack of education regarding acceptance of immigrants (the mentality issue the Reversed Border Pyramid). Figure 1 The Border Pyramid 95 The Border Pyramid The Reversed Border Pyramid M ECONOMY / ECOLOGY DEMOGRAPHY BO RD ER WAR PERSECUTION / REPRESION WAR DEMOGRAPHY PERSECUTION / REPRESION ECONOMY / ECOLOGY M Source: The theory of the "Migration Pyramid", in Peter J. van KRIEKEN, A need to reinvent the wheel?, International Conference on Population and Development, UNECE + UNFPA, Session on Migration, Management and Integration, Geneva, 2004 Romania, as external border of the European Union Even if is considered a Eastern European country, Romania lies in the centre of Europe, as the parallel of 45 latitude North, halfway between the Equator and the North Pole, intersects this country territory close to Bucharest, the capital city. Passing near Bucharest is also the meridian of 25 longitude East that marks the middle of distance between the Atlantic and the Ural Mountains, Europe's Western and Eastern limits. All the states are defined by their borders. Romania is located in SE Central Europe, north of Balkan Peninsula, on the Lower Danube, bordering on the Black Sea and five other states: Republic of Moldova in the northeast and east (681.3 km, the historical region of Bessarabia once part of former Moldavia principality, occupied by the Tsarist Russian Empire in 1812, united with Romania in 1918 and illegally annexed by the URSS in 1940), Ukraine in the north and east (649.4 km), Bulgaria in the south (631.3 km), Serbia in the southwest (546.4 km) and Hungary in the west (444.0 km). Romania adopted this name in 1862, after the foundation of the nation-state through the union of the Romanian principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia in 1859. The 1859 double election of Alexandru Ioan Cuza as ruling prince of both Moldavia and Wallachia had the first result the removal of the frontier between the two principalities. The present territory of Romania is a result of the union between the historical Transylvania with Romania Kingdom, the symbol of the union of all Romanians in 96 BO RD ER S ER D R BO R E D R O B a single state (December 1st, the anniversary of the Great Assembly held in Alba Iulia in 1918, which decided on the union, is the National Day of Romania). In the European framework, Romania has to manage an unstable equilibrium: to secure the borders against the illegal migration, and to assure the protection of the peoples in need of the international protection (refugees and asylum seekers). More of that, as Baldwin-Edwards stressed, Romania is navigating between Scylla and Charybdis53: being under great pressure to conform to the acquis requirements in order to join the EU on 1st January 2007, Romania would to do well to keep in sight her national interests in the spheres of economy, polity and society, as well as geopolitics54. As external EU border, Romania has to build a strong border. Stronger enough, even against its own citizens: during the hot political summer of the year 2005 [before the decision of Romania's accession to the EU to be taken], the public debate in Romania raised the problem of the legislative efforts of the Government which imposed strict measures at the borders. Many Romanians were returned from the border for not fulfilling the conditions of travelling to the European Union. Even the political party of the Hungarian minority (part of the Government coalition) has claimed against the rules `which could stop the free travel of minorities abroad'. At the present, Romania guards the European Union safety and wellness by securing the Romanian-Hungarian border (the present external EU border). From the first day of the EU membership, Romania `moves' the European Union external border far eastern, securing the second longest external border on the land (with Serbia, Ukraine and Moldova). Romania and Bulgaria will secure the difficult border with the Ukraine, Moldova, Serbia, Black Sea and Turkey, the main routes for illegal migration to the European Union. The strategic position of these states on the European map is probably a good reason for the EU-15 for accepting Bulgaria and Romania as members of the European select club, rather than the economic development rate of the countries at a certain moment. The eastern border with Moldova is very important one: formerly part of the Soviet Union's western border, this is the only border of the Republic of Moldova, which used to be an international border before 1991. (Guu, 2006: 30) Note from the Editors: see Martin Baldwin-Edwards in Migration Policies for a Romania within the European Union: Navigating between Scylla and Charibdis, keynote speech at the international colloquium `Romania and the European Union in 2007', held on May 6, 2005 at the West University of Timioara, Romania. His paper is included further on in this volume (as the leading article of the 3rd part). 54 Les Questions Rgionales et Multilaterales en Roumanie, MINEFI-DGTPE, Ambasade de France en Roumanie, Mission conomique, Fiche de Synthse, 23 September 2005, available at (02/12/2005): 53 97 Bibliography: Albu, Ioana (2004): A Fragile Union of States, in Silai, Grigore (ed.): Lucrrile susinute cu ocazia colocviului internaional "Europa ntre cei 15 i cei 25" dedicat Zilei Europei, Timioara 9 mai 2004, Timioara: Editura Universitii de Vest, pp. 121-128 Apap, Joanna and Carrera, Sergio (2003): Progress and Obstacles in the Area of Justice and Home affairs in an Enlarging Europe, in Romanian Journal of European Affairs, Vol.3, No.2, September, Bucharest: European Institute of Romania, pp. 65-85 Charitonova, Olga (2006): Mixed Migration Movements and Human Rights at the Eastern EU Border, retrieved from CCT (2004): A Borderless Europe, Contra Costa Times, May 11, 2004, available at (15.04.2005): de Haas, Hein (2005): Morocco: From Emigration Country to Africa's Migration Passage to Europe, Migration Information Source, October; available at: Demetz, Jean-Michel (2006): Frontires sous pression, L'Express, Friday June 9, retrieved from Dolf-Bonekmper, Gabi (coord.) (2004): Dividing Lines, Connecting Lines Europe's Cross Border Heritage, Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, December EU (2005a): The Hague Programme: Ten Priorities for the Next Five Years. The Partnership for European Renewal in the Field of Freedom, Security and Justice. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, European Commission, COM(2005) 184 final, Brussels, May 10 EU (2005b): The Hague Programme: Ten Priorities for the Next Five Years. A Partnership for European Renewal; Chapter no.3 Regulating Migration in an Area of Free Movement; Chapter no.4 Schengen Reaches Adulthood EU (2004a): First Annual Report of Migration and Integration. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2004) 508 final, Brussels: European Commission, July 16 EU (2004b): The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union, Annex I to the Presidency Conclusion Brussels, 4/5 November 2004, 14292/05 Annex I, Brussels: European Commission, November EUROSTAT (2005): EU Population up by 0.5% in 2004, EUROSTAT News Release, 136/2005, October 25 Gelatt, Julia (2005): Schengen and the Free Movement of People across Europe, Migration Information Source, Washington D.C.: Migration Policy Institute, October; retrieved from (15.10.2005): Grieco, Elizabeth (2002): Defining `Foreign Born' and `Foreigner' in International Migration Statistics, Migration Information Source, Washington D.C.: Migration Policy Institute, July 1 Guu, Daniela (2006): Migration, Visas and Borders in the Context of EU Enlargement: the Case of the Republic of Moldova, in Szczepanikov, A., Cank, M. & J. Grill (Eds.): Migration Processes in Central and Eastern Europe: Unpacking the Diversity, pp. 30-32, published by the Multicultural Centre Prague at Guu, Daniela (2005): Another Berlin Wall on the Prut River Or the Consequences of the New EU Eastern Border on the Republic of Moldova, presentation at the `Workshop on Developments and Patterns of Migration Processes in Central and Eastern Europe', 25 27 August 2005, Prague; retrieved from (02.12.2005): IPP (2002): Noua frontier Schengen i impactul asupra relaiilor dintre Romnia i Republica Moldova. Implicaii ale securizrii frontierei la nivel politic, social, economic 98 i operaional (IPP New Schengen Border and Its Impact on Romanian Moldovan Relation. Actual Implications of the Secured Border at the Political, Social, Economic and Operational Levels), Bucharest: Institute for Public Policies, October Juhsz, Judit (2003): Hungary: Transit Country between East and West, Migration Information Source, November; Luis, Olivier (2005): The Schengen "Acquis" and the New Member States, Revue Elargissement, MINEFI DGTP, France, No.73 English Edition, February 7, Editorial Meehan, Elizabeth (2006): Borders and Employment: Opportunities and Barriers, Mapping Frontiers, Plotting Pathways Working Papers No.15, Queen's University, Belfast; retrieved from Mendoza, Louis (2006): The Borders between Us: On Building and Bridging the Divide, in Contemporary Perspectives on Immigration, Immigration History Research Center (IRCH), College of Liberal Arts, University of Minnesota, retrieved (22.02.2006) from ml#more migreurop (2005): Migreurop Definition of Camps. From European Migration and Asylum Policies to Camps for Foreigners, migreurop - Camps d'trangers et politiques d'externalisation, available from: Mnz, Rainer (2006): Europe: Population and Migration in 2005, Migration Information Source, June 1st; available from: Salt, John (2005): Current Trends in International Migration in Europe, Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, September Simina, Ovidiu Laurian (2005): Next in Line Romanians at the Gates of the EU (Emigrants, Border Control, Legislation), in Koluk, Tadeusz (ed.): The 4th International Immigration Conference (2004), Independent University of Business and Administration, Warsaw: PWSBiA, pp 115-167 van Krieken, Peter J. (2004): A Need to Reinvent the Wheel?, European Population Forum 2004, Geneva, February 12 - 14, A SURVEY OF IMMIGRATION PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND A COMPARISON WITH THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES Samuel Jay Levine1) 1) Adjunct Professor Emeritus, Syracuse University, College of Law, USA; member of the District of Columbia Bar, the American Immigration Lawyers Association, and the World Jurist Association; senior partner of Levine 99 & Associates, The Randolph Towers, 4001 Ninth Street North, Suite 224, Arlington, Virginia 22203, USA Phone: (703) 524-8500, Fax: (703) 527-4473, E-mail:, 1 Introduction Russian President Vladimir Putin in his recent55 annual address to Russian law makers said, that "the demise of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century". He continued that "for the Russian people it became a genuine tragedy"56. Due to the situation of Russian speaking minorities in former Soviet States, he may be right from his perspective but the salient point is, the paramount importance of human self determination which in a democratically focused society, converts to State self-determination such as in the formation and the enlargement of the European Union. In fact, President Putin has been somewhat pre-refuted in his lament by such international documents as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 at the United Nations which dealt with human rights on an international basis giving, in this case, the seminal ability of foreign States to impose a human rights agenda on State infractors as had been woefully absent during World War II, along with a long series of supplemental documents advancing the essence of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The European Union continues to stride in that spirit attempting to make its current and future members to be substantially internally EU wide internationally borderless with a common structure of justice, democracy, currency and additional commonalities when mutually deemed to be advantageous. Having emerged from the ashes of World War II, and the Cold War, the EU could never achieve its greatness with continued subjugation from the East of the present European Union. In the middle part of the 19th century the United States fought a Civil War in which more of our soldiers were killed than in all American wars combined from the formation of the U.S. until 1965. That American Civil War had two themes about which to battle: 1) the rights of individuals not to be enslaved; and 2) the right, if any, of an internal State to secede from a national union. The American Civil War permanently settled both the issues for the U.S. resulting in the end of slavery and that once voluntarily unified, at least from the American perspective, states remain united forever. Having said this, it is evident that the European Union alone with its present and future enlargements has permanently changed for the better the future history, politics, economics, and the destiny of its current and future 55 The paper was prepared for and presented as keynote speech at the SISEC International Colloquium Romania and the European Union in 2007", held in Timisoara on May 5th, 2005. The author refers at the 2005's address of President Putin. 56 The Washington Post, Express Edition, p. 6 (26 April 2005) 100 members and, for that matter, such changes positively greatly affect all non-member States in Europe and throughout the rest of this planet. This paper will focus on the similarities and differences between both unions and their respective problems with foreign immigration. 2 The European Union, an American Perspective The European Union and the United States are the two largest economies in the world which together account for about half of the entire world economy. The EU and the U.S. have the biggest bilateral trading and investment relationships in the world. Transatlantic flows of trade and international investment amount to around one billion Euros a day, and combined global trade accounts for more than forty percent of all world trade. In fact, our combined economies are so intertwined that some economists have recently suggested that we may have to look at the EU and the U.S. with its North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as one economic region in the foreseeable future becoming increasingly partnering and forming a greater cohesive economic relationship with each other (Bloomstrom, Kokko and Globerman, pp. 1-10). Additionally, the U.S. and the EU share the same deep and unfailing commitment to transparent parliamentary style democracy, to human rights, and to personal freedoms, and we share the same concept of the individual and his or her personal fulfilment in an open and just society. And by working together, the United States and the European Union can promote their common goals and interests in the rest of the world effectively. A major difference with America is that the EU is a political, economic and monetary union, but a union which is still composed of independent sovereign States. The EU presents as a semi-constitutional State, with legislative, executive, and judicial powers, but has yet to have a proper constitution. The EU has common political organs, which have voluntarily suborned internal member State sovereignty in part. Indeed, the European Union is not a finished product, it is an economic geo-political process which will, in all likelihood, be significantly larger, and stronger and perhaps more cohesive before the end of this century. Progressive enlargement of the European Union combined with and supplemented by an inevitable progress towards greater clarity, transparency, cohesion, and efficiency is a goal to which all member States of the EU do adhere and do mutually advance. Besides being a political community, an economic community, a monetary community, the EU it is also, and above all, a community of laws, which can only function effectively when the same body of laws are shared and maintained by all of its members. Therefore, the fundamental principle of negotiations regarding membership is the adoption of 101 the so-called acquis communautaire containing the body of laws of the EU which currently comprises approximately 85,000 pages of legal texts which must be adopted and credibly implemented by all membership enlargement candidates. Yet the original core members are having some constitutional and monetary issues to settle at. The perspective of the European Union regarding immigration with all its possible benefits is that the EU faces a serious problem: demographic changes, an aging population with less and less people actually in the productive work force and a precipitous decline in birth rates which are clearly under the human replacement threshold. This has drastic consequences not only for the labour market, but also for the maintenance and the sustainability of what is commonly defined as the "European Social Model: social security, health care, and pension systems. This development which will become entirely tangible from 2010 onwards, affects the European Union as a whole, and it is interesting to note that the EU enlargement to the East has not brought about increased immigration to the "old" EU member States and a necessary rejuvenation of the EU work force, but it has actually increased the elderly population of the European Union as a whole. What will be needed is a clever and well-balanced policy mixture of targeted immigration, extension of the retirement age, better child care and parental leave policies. This may be politically and even economically costly, as various political forces may also in the future seek to utilize the spectre of increased immigration for populist political purposes. In addition, the search for highly skilled migrants to meet the projected labour needs will open up new scenarios of competition between the U.S. and the EU, as well as potentially between the European member States themselves. European migration throughout history has been caused by economics, war and its fleeing refugees, political forces, ethnic problems, and religious persecution including the ubiquitous immigrant search for a better life. Now in the territory which is the EU and which we in America were taught to consider as the "old world" the EU has consequently made the "old world" into the "new old world". As to problems, the European Union has been trying through various types of legislation to end member State divisions over the subject of immigration57. The EU has also enhanced the legal status of its citizens, and a main aim of the EU is to extend limited rights to legal immigrants. The current history of European migration has moved away from economics and other migration issues to now becoming unfortunately politicized. The European Union has been making its combined territory more appealing to foreigners by 57 European Immigration History, pp. 1, available at (28 April 2005): 102 introducing anti-discrimination laws, but this is the first step and the second step involves getting member States to accept a common European immigration policy.58 In August of 2004, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees through the High Commissioner Ruud Lubbers59 called upon the European Union to define a clear immigration policy and to distinguish between economic migrants and refugees.60 The now former High Commissioner Ruud Lubbers resigned just several months ago over the EU inability to have a generally accepted immigration law. "The European Union has no clear migration policies, it is not managed migration" , the then Commissioner, former Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers61, told a news conference in Geneva after the annual session of the executive committee of the U.N. High Commission for Refugees. "In the future the governments will see that you need managed migration for labour because the absence of that policy is one of the reasons that so many people try to reach Europe with human traffickers because they know there is a need for the skills of certain illegal migrants".62 The EU policy is to try to develop a common system for immigration and asylum and a single external border control strategy even using EU border guards who do not represent their individual countries. The Luxembourg EU Presidency (January to June, 2005) was committed to furthering a common asylum policy, working towards the long-term resident status for refugees and developing a workable return and readmissions policy.63 The EU immigration problem is further complicated by the fact that the member States of the European Union have different economic structures consequently having very varied needs for legal immigrants. Destination countries must weigh the social and economic implications of a common immigration policy and consider whether their giving up of national sovereignty over immigration matters will benefit member States in the long run. A common European Union immigration policy would play a crucial role in the pattern of migration flows in the years to come; and, its macroeconomic effects are of utmost importance to the citizens of the EU Regarding legal immigration, Western Europe is earning an EU wide reputation for being known as "Fortress Europe" while the remainder of the European Union has struggled for decades to provide coordination on immigration policy. In 1988, the Commission of the European Community attempted to address five key issues: the rights of asylum (there are Ibid. Over 17 Million Refugees Worldwide, pp. 1-2, available at (May 2005): UN Refugee Chief Calls for Clear EU Immigration Policy, pp. 1, available at (10 August 2004): 61 See Lubbers, Ruud: Wikipedia, pp. 1-3, available at (2 May 2005): See also UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, The Long Journey Home, pp. 1-5, available at (2 May 2005): 62, Supra, pp. 1 (2005) 63 Illegal Immigration, Asylum & Border Control, p. 1, available at (30 April 2005): 59 60 58 103 now more than 4,242,000 asylum seekers in the EU64), the status of refugees, the status of non-EU nationals, visas, and deportation, yet many of their recommendations were not implemented. EU leaders met at a summit in Seville on June 21-22, 2002 and declared that regulation of illegal immigrants would be their first priority with no apparently productive results to date. There are many examples of the immigration problems of the EU. The stunning decision by the Dutch government to expel an estimated 26,000 rejected asylum applicants was only the latest in a series of actions by European Union countries to tighten border controls and to limit immigration to some of the most generous social-welfare states of the world. But as in the recent Dutch Parliament's vote, old high ideals are crashing into hard political realities. Politicians such as the late Pim Fortuyn65 in the Netherlands and Joerg Haider66 in Austria made significant electoral gains against mainstream parties in recent years by placing anti-immigration policies at the heart of their platforms. The failure of many traditional centre-left and centre-right parties to even acknowledge the problem posed by immigration only enhanced the popularity of figures like the late Mr. Fortuyn and Mr. Haider, pollsters say (Sands 2005b, pp.1-3). An example is people now applying to live in the Netherlands will have to take an examination to prove that they understand the Dutch language and culture, the government has proposed. The test will require 350 hours of study and cost approximately 500 Euros. It is the latest sign of the growing hard line regarding immigration after decades in which Holland has been one of Europe's most relaxed nations regarding most of the immigration process. A murder in the Netherlands by a Muslim man and death threats from Muslim extremists have been matched by rising assaults on immigrants and arson attacks on Mosques in the Netherlands. There are now nearly a million Muslims in the Netherlands, or approximately six percent of the total Dutch population, which is a drastic change from a mere two decades ago. Announcing her proposals in the Dutch Parliament, Rita Verdonk, the Immigration Minister67, said that a video film designed to capture the essence of Dutch life would be sent to applicants in their home countries. It offers images of windmills, tulips, a description of the flag and a brief biography of William of Orange. As an early warning of the liberal mores, it also shows topless women sunbathing and a homosexual wedding. It would be viewed obligatorily for all foreign adult people hoping to live in the Netherlands, commonly qualifying by marrying a Dutch citizen or by joining family members already 64 65 UNHCR (2005): Basic Facts, available at See World: Europe, in Pictures: Death of Pim Fortuyn, pp. 1-3, available at (7 May 2002): 66 See UK Edition, Haider Party Launched in Austria, pp. 1-2, available at (May 2005): 67 See Minister Verdonk Meets Rumanian Delegation, pp. 1, available at (23 March 2005): 104 there. The introductory film says Holland is "a small country with sixteen million inhabitants, making it one of the most densely populated countries in the world". Immigrants play an important role but protests against their numbers are mounting, it adds. The language test part of the immigration process to the Netherlands would be computerized and taken by telephone. Applicants would be asked to repeat recorded phrases then answer simple questions in Dutch, such as: "How many wheels does a car have?" Knowledge of Dutch culture would be tested in separate sessions organized by local Dutch embassies (Rennie 2005b, pp. 1-2). Even centre-left and leftist leaders such as British Prime Minister Tony Blair68 and Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson69 have within the past year responded to popular pressure to check uncontrolled immigration of relatively cheap labour. Mr. Blair has been under heavy pressure from the opposition Conservatives and from leading tabloid newspapers to halt what the prime minister himself has called "benefits tourism" a wave of illegal worker migration to take advantage of Britain's healthcare and welfare systems. British Home Secretary David Blunkett70, Mr. Blair's point man on the immigration issue, noted in an opinion piece in December that "governments of the left which fail to address the public's concerns about immigration, security, and law and order have been swept from power by the right, amazingly even sometimes from the far right". Until recently, Britain and Ireland had been not expected to impose "transitional" curbs, on immigration which can last up to seven years. But Mr. Blair's government has rolled out tough new rules regarding workers from member states to register with the British government and banning them from collecting social and employment benefits for at least two years. If EU workers from those new EU countries "can't support themselves, they will be put out of the country", Mr. Blair said in a British Broadcasting Corporation interview recently. Sweden's Lennurt Persson71 earlier this month predicted "enormous problems" for his country unless immigration from the Baltic's and Eastern Europe were curtailed. Sweden is expected to impose immigration controls for up to five years and the Social Democratic Government recently passed a measure that would punish air and shipping lines if they even unwittingly allowed illegal immigrants to cross into Sweden. Finland, Denmark and Belgium have all announced waiting periods of at least two years before fully opening their borders to workers from the new EU entrants, and France, Spain and Italy are expected to do same. Germany and Austria have already said they plan to impose the maximum seven year EU transition period, bringing complaints from leaders in See Tony Blair's Speech on Immigration in Full, pp. 1-9, available at (22 April 2005): See Statement of J January 2005 by Prime Minister Goran Persson Following the Natural Disaster in Asia, Government Offices of Sweden, pp. 1-3, available at (5 January 2005): 70 See Blunkett Urges Vote Fraud Action, available at (6 April 2005): 71 See Attendance of ICNDT Meetings at Nice Acropolis on 10/24-27/1994,, pp.1-2 (1994) 69 68 105 Poland and other EU enlargement States. U.N. Secretary-General Koffe Annan, in a speech to the European Parliament a year and a half ago said the anti-immigrant political tide in Europe, fed by "images of floods of unwelcome entrants and threats to societies and identities", had "vilified, even dehumanized" those seeking asylum or a better life. "The vast majority of immigrants are industrious, courageous and determined" Mr. Annan added, "They don't want a free ride." The European Union faces new pressure to crack down on immigration because Islamic terrorists from North Africa carried out the train bombings in Spain. Even before the Madrid attacks, which killed 201 persons and seriously injured more than 1,500, the European Union member governments had been tightening immigration controls in preparation for the current admission process of ten new countries to the EU bloc this month. The unproven thought that huge, largely unassimilated Muslim communities in Europe might harbour terrorists only will accelerate the negative trend of xenophobia. In Germany, Wolfgang Bosbach72, serving as lead spokesman on domestic-security issues for the opposition Christian Democrats, said confronting the new terror threat in Europe "is inseparable from discussion on the immigration law". "We want to facilitate the expulsion of extremist foreigners... and make it possible to expel extremist foreigners even if they have not been prosecuted under criminal law", he said in an interview with the German broadcaster ARD. Past EU coordination efforts have faltered even as populist antiimmigration parties have racked up electoral successes in countries such as France, Austria and the Netherlands. Mark Krikorian, executive director of the Washington-based Center for Immigration Studies, said the possible role of Moroccan sympathizers of al Qaeda in the Spanish bombings "is likely to highlight a trend on immigration that was clearly already there" (Krikorian, pp. 1-2). Sizable Muslim minority communities in Europe tend to be poorer, more geographically concentrated and less ethnically diverse than in the United States, Mr. Krikorian said (Sands 2005a, pp. 1-2). Denmark recently enacted a law to prevent radical Islamic clerics from entering the country. In France, Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy73 has boasted of plans to double the number of would-be illegal immigrants deported or turned away at the borders of France. The government of former Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar74 introduced a new immigration law in 2000 and amended it three times in the following three years: each time to make it tougher on illegal immigrants. Spanish authorities in recent years have arrested about two dozen (24) suspects considered to be part of al Qaeda, and Spanish 72 73 See Guest Blogger: Living in the EU, p. 4, available at (16 April 2005): See France's Nicholas Sarkozy, American Future, pp. 1-8, available at (February 1st, 2005): 74 See Visiting Irvine, Former Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar Remembers Pope,, pp.1-2 (2 May 2005) 106 officials believe that other Islamic terrorist cells operate in that country. In an ironic twist, the current government of Sot Party leader Jose Luis Rodriquez Zapatero75 Prime Minister of Spain since 2004 has talked of easing some immigration controls, even though the Madrid bombings widely are credited with ushering his party to victory. "A qualitative change is required in Immigration policy", Francisca Sauquillo76, a Sot deputy in the EU parliament and an adviser to Mr. Zapatero, said at a Madrid news conference. "What is needed is regulated immigration, without condemning immigrants beforehand", she said. Curbing immigration in the EU will have both positive and negative effects on the economic stability of EU member States. Tighter border controls will likely improve economic opportunities for native workers and strengthen member State security within the EU, but it has been shown, that the aging population of Europe will be in need of immigrant labour in the upcoming years. Some estimate that the EU will be in need of 75m immigrant workers over the next fifty years. A common immigration policy will need to reconcile these issues in order to ensure a brighter economic future for Europe as a whole. This challenge will no doubt be one of the more important challenges to solve by the EU in the 21st Century and beyond. 3 The Current Status of European Union Immigration The issue of immigration in the EU has never been as interesting or as controversial as it is today. While huge numbers of illegal immigrants cross the borders of the EU each year, government authorities continue to have dissenting opinions on the way the EU should handle such matters. EU member States, on average, have been tightening national immigration policies since the early 1990's. Massive inflows of immigrants coupled with economic recessions and unemployment have exacerbated the xenophobic nature of Western Europe in recent years. Countries with previously liberal immigration policies are now closing their borders, which brings out the most negative effects of xenophobia. To help support an ageing population and counteract plummeting birth rates, Europe needs more, not less, immigration, a European official has said. Vladimir Spidla, labour and social affairs Commissioner at the European Commission in Brussels, said Europe would have to accept large numbers of economic migrants, despite rising unemployment in countries such as Germany77. Before unveiling a new five year Social agenda for the EU, Mr. Spidla, a former Czech prime minister, said: "Over the next twenty years, there will be twenty million International Disputes, pp. 3-5, available at (2 May 2005): Calendario Agrupacion, Coloquio, Charla, Francisca Sauquillo Perez del Arco, pp. 1 (7 February 2005) Europe Needs A lot More Immigrants, Says EU Chief, pp.1-2, available at (2 May 2005):, the UK Independence Party, and 76 77 75 107 fewer workers in Europe, even including migrants". Playing down public fears that the EU is already "full-up", Mr. Spidla suggested voters should take a longer-term view instead. "Naturally, if you only look at the next two weeks; things look different. But in the EU we have to work on the long term and we definitely need immigration", he said. Launching his social Agenda, Mr. Spidla gave a warning that "our society is ageing". Within two decades, almost half of the population of the EU would be over 55. European practices on welcoming legal migrants which vary dramatically are: one end of the spectrum are States such as Denmark, where a centre-right government recently won re-election, in large part thanks to some of the toughest limits and quotas on economic migrants in the EU. At the other end of the spectrum Spain has launched an amnesty scheme for nearly one million illegal workers, who will have the right to migrate to other EU nations (Rennie 2005a, pp.1-2). 4 Conclusion In surveying the problems the EU has with illegal immigration, this author notes that those problems centre around human trafficking of illegal migrants some of whom are prostitutes or who carry contagious diseases, abuse of illegals, drug cartel members and other criminals illegally migrating, border control problems, entry of possible terrorists or spies, economic migration, false papers, marriages of convenience, and a possible uniform law and standardized enforcement policy. As this paper began with the important and complex, economic, trade and leadership roles of the EU and of the U.S., American immigration problems are so very similar that without certain specific indicators one would not be able to differentiate between the EU and the U.S. It appears that the long road of bolstering the economics of other States, serving as a model for the rest of the world, eliminating terrorism, giving generously to foreign aid for education, quality medical availability, pest eradication, development of foreign infrastructure and to stimulate targeted foreign economics is a very possible means of mitigating the problem of illegal immigration. Immigration laws on both sides of the Atlantic resonate like the Tower of Babel, only in modern times we have commonly accepted translation of words, but unfortunately not a common perspective on solutions78. And, in a final response to Russian President Vladimir Putin, who knows, but Russia could be a future member State of the European Union in an enlargement years from now. In that way, the Russian people would receive a proper benefit from the EU with a foundation based on mutuality. 78 Dolphin, Lambert, The Tower of Babel and the Confusion of Languages,, pp. 1-29 (April 2005) 108 References BIS Review (2002): AHEM Wellink: EU Expansion and EMU, p. 19 Bloomstrom, Magnus, Kokko, Ari and Globerman, Steven (1998): Regional Economic Integration and Foreign Direct Investment: The North American Experience, Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance No. 269, pp. 1-10, October Dolphin, Lambert (2005): The Tower of Babel and the Confusion of Languages, pp. 1-29 European Union Center of California (2005): A Common European Union Immigration Policy & Its Effect on Domestic Economies, pp. 1-26, available from Krikorian, Mark (2005): Harvesting Illegals, FrontPage Magazine, available at (8 April 2005): Coloquio, Charla (2005): Calendario Agrupacion, Francisca Sauquillo Perez del Arco, February 7, p.1 Guerot, Ulrike (2004): The European Paradox: Widening and Deepening in the European Union, German Marshall Fund of the US, May 15, pp. 1-4 (2005): European Immigration History, pp. 1-2 Infoplease (2005): Prime Minister: Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, Daily Almanac for May 2, 2005, pp. 1-5, available on, Visiting Irvine, Former Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar Remembers Pope, pp. 1-2, (2005). Ministry of Finance (2005): History, The Dutch Ministry of Finance, pp. 1-5, available at (April 2005): Questia (2005): Elusive Borders For An Unidentified Object: the European Paradox,, pp. 1-5, April Rennie, David (2005a): Europe Needs A Lot More Immigrants, Says EU Chief, Daily Telegraph, pp. 1-2, available at (29 April 2005):, Questia Media America Inc. Rennie, David (2005b): Dutch Plan Culture and Language Test for Immigrants, Questia Media America Inc., available at (April 29, 2005): Sands, David R. (2005a): Islamic Terrorism Prompts Immigration Worries. European Nations Likely To Crack Down, Questia Media America Inc., pp. 1-2, available at (29 April 2005): Sands, David R. (2005b): Western Europeans Create Limits on Huddled Masses, The Washington Times, available on, pp. 1-3 Timesonline (2005): Tony Blair's Speech on Immigration in Full, pp. 1-9 Bello, Walden (2001): Genoa and the Multiple Crises of Globalisation,, pp. 1-6, July UNHCR (2005): Over 17 Million Refugees Worldwide, UNHCR, pp. 1-2 EURUNION (2005): European Union in the US: Facts & Figures on the European Union States, pp. 1-5, and Transatlantic Agenda, pp. 1-7, available at (May 2005): Henning, Randall C. (2005): American Interests and Europe's Monetary Union, pp. 1-26, available at (May 2005): The Washington Post (2005): Express Edition, The Washington Post, p. 6 109 110 RETURNING TO THE LAW OF THE JUNGLE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES Wolfgang P. Schulz It is in the nature of things that I have more questions than answers, but I must say what I have to say. Rechtsanwalt (lawyer): Schultz & Kollegen Rechtsanwlte, Berlin, Germany. Mr. Schultz is President for Europe of the World Jurist Association of the Peace Trough Law Center (WJA). He is member of the Berlin Law Society and Bar Association. Contact: Schultz & Kollegen Rechtsanwlte, Wilhelmstrasse 94, D 10117 Berlin; Tel: +49-30-229.48.18, Fax: +49-30-226.79.173; Web:; E-mail: 111 After the destruction of the Nazi regime and the liberation of Europe from German Nazism by the allies, hopeful developments of international relations and international law began. On the basis of the victory of the international anti-Hitler coalition the United Nations were established. Mankind had learned from the terrible experience of the darkest chapter in the modern history of human race. Never again should such inhumanity and such barbarism triumph, was the unanimous decision. The charter of the United Nations was passed. The legal world order, the international law, particularly the ban on the threat or use of force in international relations was the most important historic achievement of civilisation. A consensus was reached that after the unspeakable misdeeds in the Third Reich and during the Second World War never again should political arbitrariness determine the acts of the states. International law became an obliging content and frame for political acts. This applied to the peaceful coexistence of states and human rights protection as well. The basic principle of the international law is to guarantee peace and safety to the world. A UN declaration of October 1970 also forbids every kind of war propaganda. International law knows also the relevant responsibility for its violation. Peace violations and war crimes may not remain with impunity. In the Nuremberg tribunal the main Nazi war criminals were indicted. The statute of Nuremberg is still valid. A main part of the international law is the respect for the sovereignty of states Experience such as the ,,dictation of Munich"(1938) when German troops occupied Czechoslovakia under the pretext to "prevent alleged Czech atrocities against Germans", should never happen again. One of the achievements following the victory of the anti-Hitler-coalition and the establishment of the United Nations was also the establishment of a fundamental respect and protection of everybody's human dignity. It was agreed, that never again should such peopledespising ideology predominate as that of ,,master race" and "inferior race". Equality of every human being, independently of colour, nationality, religion etc., should be ensured for the future. According to Hegel "From the descent (of a human being) there can't be drawn any reason for the authorization or non-authorization of that human being. A human being is reasonable in itself; there lies the possibility of the equality of the rights of all persons. " I will deal with political developments in today's world because disturbances, wars and the threat and use of force have much more influence on migration and cause greater refugee flows than poor economic conditions. I oppose brutal regimes in Iraq and elsewhere, but I also oppose the new doctrine of "pre-emptive war," which causes permanent and dangerous conflicts and is the reason why the US is now regarded as the major threat to peace in large parts of the world. 112 After the destruction of the Nazi regime and the liberation of Europe from German Nazism by the allies, hopeful developments of international relations and international law began. The United Nations, legal world order, international law, particularly the ban on the threat or use of force in international relations are the most important historic achievements of civilization. The whole world seems to be turning upside down before our eyes. We see and experience these days that the basic principles of this international legal system are shaken. Under the pretext of the "fight against terrorism" the rule of law is restrained, weakened, and undermined. We experience a return to the law of the jungle; the law of force, the law of the strongest replaces the rule of law in international relations. The only super power and some other states, too, single out parts of the UN charter and declare them as non-binding for themselves, while at the same time they justify everything else of what they do with other parts of the Charter. Today it seems that the US tries to do everything it can to make the UN an antiquated organization with no value. International law becomes only wastepaper, if the UN isn't willing to obediently follow the US policy. Truth dies long before a war begins. Lies and propaganda also determine the media's war coverage (are they "embedded" war correspondents or are they in bed with the troops?), and even after the end of a war, truth is still absent. Reasons for war are fabricated. Wars themselves are celebrated events like a piece for orchestra or a movie [One could even speak of the "military-entertainment complex" or so to speak: "militain-ment"]. The claim that Iraq is a threat to the security of the United States and Britain is an insult to healthy human intellect, particularly (as Scott Ritter confirmed) Iraq's weapons of mass destruction were nearly completely destroyed by 1998. Only people who are constantly under media impact and its disinformation, hate and stultification are prepared to believe this claim. Perhaps the Bush administration believes its own propaganda lies. Among other things Congressman Dennis Kucinich said in his statement at the beginning of April: ,,This war has been advanced on lie upon lie. Iraq was not responsible for any role Al-Quaeda my have had in 9/11. Iraq was not responsible for the anthrax attacks on this country. Iraq did not try to ac-quire nuclear weapons technology from Niger. This war is built on falsehood... Stop this war now. It is wrong. It is illegal. It is unjust and it will come to no good for this country". The war on Iraq has continued unabated since August 6, 1990 because sanctions killed 5,000 Iraqi children per month. This is about 1 every 10 minutes! Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, when asked to comment on the deaths of 500,000 Iraqi children as a 113 result of the sanctions, answered: "We think the price is worth it". Denis Halliday of Ireland, former UN representative to Iraq, said: "If these sanctions are maintained in spite of these consequences, this is intention, and intention is part of the definition of genocide." In 1998 he re-signed. His successor to the Oil for Food program, the German Hans Graf von Sponeck, stepped down after a year and a half for the same reasons. This war destroys not only Iraq; it also undermines world peace order. The main dangers of a new war are the systematic violation of the mandate of UN Security Council and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states. The United States has committed a capital crime in modern international law: an attack against another state in violation of the UN Charter. The new poque has brutally returned us to the heathen world of force, and armies and empires. The war is in open violation of the United Nations Charter and the Geneva Conventions. In this war the allies violated the protection guaranteed to the civilian population under international law - especially the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977 (article 51). The wilful causing of widespread death and serious long-term physical and psychological injuries, the extensive destruction of property, hospitals can not be justified by military necessity. The wanton use of toxic depleted uranium ammunition, with its long-term environmental destructiveness, and cluster bombs and other weapons meant to cause unnecessary suffering are also prohibited under international law, but also another matter of importance is the systematic and deliberate destruction of the social and cultural infrastructure that is necessary for the continued existence of Iraqi society. It is awful what happens in the name of "Western civilization". The US and British propaganda call this war the liberation of the Iraqi people. The price for such liberation is simply too high!!! Why do the liberated Iraqis not cheer their liberators then? Perhaps because the supposed smart and surgical precision weapons cannot distinguish between military and civilian targets (think about so-called "friendly fire"). The Bush administration's military campaign to "shock and awe" Iraq was senseless mass slaughter of defenceless women, children and men justified by the claim that the military was merely disarming a dangerous enemy. Don't forget that Saddam used to be an ally of the United States and that Rumsfeld shook his hand and supplied arms into Iraq. The true reason is not what the United States tells the American people and the world. Oil is but one of the real reasons. The production and use of arms is another big deal e.g. for the US Carlyle group, where most of the leading managers 114 are former politicians, Frank Carlucci, George Bush Sr., Sen. James Baker among others79. Reconstruction and modernization will be done by the Halliburton group (where Dick Cheney was chairperson before he became Vice-president) and Bechtel and so on and so forth p.p. The historian Emmanuel Todd found out an additional motivation for US wars. The US economy has taken a real beating and fears to losing its position as the single superpower. There-fore the Americans would have to make war against weaker opponents to demonstrate their superior strength first of all to themselves. The US is dependent on foreign money even from the readiness of `Old Europe' to invest and to acquire enterprise, because of a net foreign debt of three trillion dollars and an annual new indebtedness of 5 per cent of the gross domes-tic product. Political Unilateralism stands in the way of economic Multilateralism. A policy that prefers going to war is to be abhorred. It is, one and at the same time, a defeat of human reason and humanity. When a politician believes so firmly in his own sense of mission, garnishes his own obsession with power (power mania) with pseudo-religious arguments, even considers his acts as God's will, he becomes a danger. Speaking in such a situation of a war of civilizations or a crusade is not only wrong but can be fateful. Terror but also war in the name of God is blasphemy. The answer could be similar to what we know from the Islamic warriors of God. During the first few days of the war on Iraq I saw some pictures of US soldiers. One shows a missile with an inscription "Almighty" and another one with "The Good Lord"!!! Another picture shows a tank with the inscription "Killer angels". Who was coached to kill here and lose respect for life? How can they speak about respect for unborn life? Other pictures appear to be even more frank: a US officer bears a sign: "Welcome to New Texas (former Iraq) - HQ MCAGCC-I - Headquarters Marine Corps Air - Ground Combat Center Iraq 1st Lt. D. M. Fischer Commanding" I appreciate the German government's refusal to follow Bush like a faithful yet blind vassal. Together with a large majority of states and, what is more important, together with the vast majority of the world's population the German government is no longer80 willing to follow the US administration obediently into a dangerous war adventures violating international law. Unfortunately, it does not go far enough. AWACS in Turkey, warships near Yemen, NBC 79 80 See also publications by the anti-corruption organizations `Judicial Watch' and `Center of Public Integrity'. NATO interventions in Yugoslavia and Afghanistan have already earlier undermined the peacekeeping role of the United Nations. 115 detection tanks in Kuwait and overflight rights for German airspace represent at least complicity in murder. The German government must not put its alliance loyalties higher than international and national law. It's much better to take alone the responsibility for right than to take joint action for wrong. I can't think of anything better in this connection than what the great American Martin Luther King has said in 1967 during the war on Vietnam: ,,The Americans are forcing even their friends into becoming their enemies. It is curious that the Americans, who calculate so carefully on the possibilities of military victory, do not realize that in the process they are incurring deep psychological and political defeat. The image of America will never again be the image of revolution, freedom and democracy, but the image of violence and militarism"81. Human rights and democracy have a civilian, not a military logic. The problems and challenges of our time cannot be solved with war, however essential and urgent their solutions might be, in terms of globalization, migration, demographic or ethnic problems, of the endangered natural resources, terrorism or organized crime. The recent developments in the international relations and the militarization of societies by vastly expanding police powers severely restrict basic democratic rights and threaten fundamental civil and human rights. Since September 11th, 2001, we have been confronted with an increasingly restrictive policy against immigration, with an increasing number of racist attacks against immigrants, foreigners and minorities. While the European Union becomes more diverse by admitting 10 new member states, it also becomes less tolerant to migrants and minorities. The war on terrorism is also war against own citizen The U.S. army (L.L. Lemnitzer, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff) drafted plans in the early sixties to terrorize U.S. cities (bomb Washington D.C., attack marines etc.), to provoke war with Cuba82. That shows "... that the Pentagon was capable of launching a secret and bloody war of terrorism against their own country in order to trick the American public into supporting a ... (war) ..."83. The anti-terrorist legislation in many countries threatens the freedom in favour of public security. The choice is democracy or security, which is claimed to be the alternative. 81 82 83 Vietnam: A Time to Break Silence By Rev. Martin Luther King 4 April 1967 Northwoods document ,,Body of Secrets" by James Bamford 116 "They, who would give up an essential liberty for temporary security, deserve neither liberty nor security" said Benjamin Franklin. Media, Patriot Act and Homeland Security Bill cause intolerance and hysteria and work up feelings of animosity, crusting domestic dissent and criminalizing legitimate protest. "Enemy Combatants" can be held indefinitely, with no charges against them, no right to see an attorney, no right to go before a judge. "Enemy Combatants is indefinites, so ... anyone who is suspect can be denied all due process rights guaranteed under the constitution"84. We lull ourselves into a false sense of security and we are asked to give up our civil rights. Civil rights organizations warn about an "adaptation and habit-forming effect". It is awful and bitter irony that refugees fleeing from persecution and conflicts around the world become subject to further persecution due to the so-called war on terrorism. We will lose our own dignity if we suffer that other person's human dignity is violated. Whoever wants to preserve her or his own human dignity, must overcome her or his own indifference and fight against indifference in his or her community, against every violation of civil and human rights, as well as against the invasion of his or her privacy by state-run abuse of power. In a global world no power can act in the long term unilaterally, but must cooperate multilaterally, otherwise we will soon experience a global disaster. In the age of globalisation and threats to the very existence of humanity, peace and worldwide cooperation can only be secured if we find concepts of how to cope with conflicts multilaterally, set up democratic structures, install decision-making processes and coordinate activities. A permanent and peaceful solution to the Middle East issue requires us to return to search for multilateral consensus in the framework of the UN bodies existing for this very purpose. If you seriously want peace, you need the patience to negotiate with the other side. Military strikes without a mandate of the UN Security Council threaten to become a precedent for arbitrary violent action by anybody who chooses whatever kind of purpose (see Chechnya). This would put an end to the long and laborious process of the renunciation of violence as laid down in the UN Charter, and war would again become the customary means resorted to in solving conflicts of interest. There is yet another danger looming, namely the release of an enormous armaments spiral, including nuclear armament. Do we want the rule of law in international relations to be replaced by "might is right" and the law of the jungle? No, never! Law must rule the world, not force. This has been the basis of our present world order. This must be valid also in the future! 84 Riva Enteen, Exec. Director of the US National Lawyer's Guild 117 And my last point: after other reasons stated for the war, we hear now that the US will bring democracy to Iraq. This is a sad irony, because in "God's own country", on the contrary we witness a decline of democracy and an increase of intolerance. Nearly every criticism of the Bush administration or even of the war has unpleasant consequences. I hope all of us can approach this war with a clear conscience. 118 119 PART II: EUROPEAN MIGRATION EXPERIENCES 120 EMPLOYMENT OF IMMIGRANTS IN THE FINNISH LABOUR MARKETS Elii Heikkil and Maria Pikkarainen1) This article discusses employment of immigrants in the Finnish labour markets and the differences in labour market performance according to immigrants' demographic characteristics. The data consists of the gross-stream data of the whole working-age population from the periods 19931994 and 2002 2003. These periods represent different economical cycles in the Finnish labour markets. Theoretical approach to international migration is giving the perspective to the analysis. Finland's high unemployment level during the depression in the beginning of the 1990s affected also very high 121 unemployment figures for the immigrants. During the recent decade, the employability of immigrants has improved due to recovery of economic life in Finland. Key words: labour market performance, employment, immigration, Finland 1) Both from Institute of Migration, Linnankatu 61, 20100 Turku, Finland; Tel: +358-2-2840-450; Fax: +358-2-2333-460; Emails: and Introduction Approximately 175 million people live outside their country of birth, and of these, 100 million have migrated to find work. Most migration occurs between developing countries, but migration to Europe has increased rapidly, and of the EU-population of 380 million, 20 million are immigrants (Immigrant Council of Ireland 2003: 17; Evans 2004: 3). In the context of globalisation, the central role of migration has become increasingly apparent during the 1990s and at the turn of the millennium. Permanent and especially temporary migration for work have increased. The competition among the OECD nations for a skilled workforce has increased. These countries also want to keep their own human resources within their borders. For instance, France has taken a so-called scientific visa into use, which allows scientists from outside the European Economic Area (EEA) to work in France. Also, Germany issues a green card for IT-professionals from outside the EEA, and the United Nations have proposed a visa specifically for entrepreneurs. While new technology spets have especially benefited from the visa procedures, so have other professionals, such as medical doctors and nurses (Mahroum 2001; Sopemi 2002; Martin et al. 2002: 12 13). The increase in work-related migration applies not only to skilled labour; also, some OECD-countries extensively employ unskilled workers in farming, building and domestic services. In many countries, this work force is largely undocumented (Sopemi 2002). This article focuses on employment of immigrants in the Finnish labour markets. We will concentrate on the employment of immigrants with respect to different background variables, such as their country of birth, gender, education and employment sector. The aim of the analysis is to create new knowledge of the immigrants' situation in the Finnish labour markets during the economic recession at the beginning of the 1990s and during the economic upswing of the turn of the millennium. This article is a part of the "International Migration, Need of Labour and Effects of Immigration on Education Supply" anticipation project, 122 which is funded by the European Social Fund (ESF), the Finnish Ministry of Education, and the Institute of Migration. From Statistics Finland, the following research data has been obtained: regional grossstream data on the immigrant (persons who moved to Finland from abroad) working-age population (1574 years) for the periods 19931994 and 20022003. The years 1993 and 2002 are periods of immigration, and for these years we use immigrants' background data and data on main activity. The gross-stream data include all information on immigrants who moved to Finland from abroad for the years 1993 and 2002, and this data is compared to the following years' (1994, 2003) situations with regard to main activity. Thus, the immigrants' labour market situation can be studied with respect to region and time-span. The gross-stream data on education are incomplete, for two possible reasons: first, this information is lacking for many immigrants, and second, education and examination may not be recognized by the Finnish education system. For example, without a verified record of his/her achievements, a well-educated person might be considered to have only basic education. Broadly speaking, only a third of the immigrants have background information of education and thus the rest fall under the category of "unknown". The theory of international migration of labour force The necessary conditions for international labour migration are: (1) that migration between countries must be institutionally possible; (2) that the destination country must have a labour demand, which cannot be met by domestic labour force; (3) that the country of origin must have an emigration-oriented labour supply, either due to labour oversupply or to a wage or welfare gap between the countries that is big enough to encourage emigration (see Wiman 1975: 42). Neoclassical economic theories emphasize wage and employment differences between countries. Individuals are seen as rational decision-makers who choose whether to migrate on the basis of economic costs and benefits of moving between countries. One of the individual's goals is to maximise income (Todaro 1969). During recent years, economic theory on migration has highlighted that rather than single actors, groups such as families and households make migration decisions. The members of groups act collectively not only to maximise their anticipated income, but also to minimise risks (Massey et al. 1993: 436). Network Theory analyzes the migration process in terms of personal, cultural and other social bonds. In emigration countries, the information on foreign jobs and living standard is transmitted mainly through personal networks, such as friends and neighbours who 123 have already emigrated. In immigration countries, immigrant communities often help their compatriots find work and assimilate into the new environment. Such networks decrease newcomers' costs and risks, which in turn attracts new migrants (Massey et al. 1993: 448 450; Oishi 2002: 7). World System Theory sees migration as a natural consequence of economic globalisation and markets transcending national borders (Massey et al. 1993: 444448). According to Wanner (2002: 11) there are four explaining factors for migration in Europe: (1) historical bonds, examples of which having formed during the colonial era or, in the case of Eastern Europe, as political alliances; (2) geographic proximity, which is especially important for the Mediterranean countries and for Scandinavia; (3) a common language; and (4) immigration policy, which defines a country's openness towards immigration. This last factor is especially important during the coming decades considering demographic development. According to Structural Theory, international migration is a type of exploitation of peripheral countries practised by the international system's core nations. Workers from developing countries are drawn to the industrial countries' secondary labour markets, which are characterised by low wages, poor working conditions, and job uncertainty (see Oishi 2002: 5). Dual Labour Market Theory links immigration to modern industrial economies' structural requirements. According to Piore (1979), immigration is not caused by push factors from sending countries (for example, low wages or high unemployment), but by pull factors from receiving countries (such as the need for foreign workers). Dual Labour Market Theory splits labour markets into two non-competing blocks: primary and secondary. The capitalintensive primary sector's employees get steady, education requiring employment, while jobs in the labour-oriented secondary sector are uncertain and require little training. These jobs are easily suspended, especially during economic recession when the withdrawal of wages causes unemployment. Minorities, including immigrants, are more concentrated in the secondary than in the primary labour markets (Massey et al. 1993: 442443). Human Capital Theory presents the labour force as heterogeneous, in that employment and individual wages are determined by individual capital. Countries are able to guarantee immigrants suitable work by retraining them on the basis of labour market needs. International mobility can, on the individual level, be conceptualised as a type of investment of human capital. Individuals migrate to where they can be most productive according to their skills. Before they get a higher income, which is tied to greater workforce productivity, they must commit to certain investments. Such are the material costs for migration, the learning of 124 a new language and culture, difficulties in adapting to new labour markets, and psychological cost of cutting old ties and creating new ones (Chiswick 1978; Massey et al. 1993: 434). Human Capital Theory considers a part of human capital, including language skills, customs knowledge and contact nets, to be tied to a particular country. For this reason, immigrants can, in the beginning, be presumed less employed and to earn less than the native population in similar situations, or than those who have lived long in the country. When their skills, mastery of the language and familiarity with the labour markets improve, immigrants' social status will likely improve, allowing them to take higher-productivity jobs (Chiswick 1978; Hmlinen et al. 2005: 34). The employment of immigrants Main activities of immigrants according to country of birth There are considerable differences in immigrants' main activities of among the ten largest country-of-birth-groups and also between economic periods. During the recession, immigrants born in the U.S., China and Sweden had the highest employment rate (Table 1). Also the return migrants, i.e. native Finns, have had a better employment situation compared to other groups. Only few of the Iraqi and Somali refugees have found work in Finland. The highest unemployment rates are found among Estonians, those born in the former Yugoslavia, and those born in the former Soviet Union. A third of Iraqi immigrants have been students and the proportion of pensioners has been high for the return migrants. The "other" -category for main activity shows the highest numbers for Somalis and Chinese. Housewives, for instance, belong to this category. Table 1 Main activities of immigrants according to the largest origin groups in 1994, one year after immigration (%) (Data: Statistics Finland) Country of birth Finnish origin return migrants Former USSR Former Yugoslavia Estonia Somalia Iraq Sweden China Total(abs.) Employed Unemployed Student Retired Other 3.059 2.039 1.198 980 412 224 211 210 29,1 12,0 6,5 14,3 0,7 0,4 30,3 31,9 26,7 44,4 53,3 47,1 23,8 42,9 26,5 9,0 9,6 12,2 13,4 14,0 19,2 33,9 16,1 18,1 17,0 9,5 1,2 1,0 0,7 1,8 2,9 0,0 17,6 21,9 25,6 23,6 55,6 21,0 24,2 41,0 125 Vietnam USA Other countries Total 162 106 1.775 10.376 13,6 34,0 21,1 18,5 40,7 13,2 27,7 35,3 18,5 8,5 17,3 13,6 3,7 4,7 1,5 7,6 23,5 39,6 32,4 25,0 This decade's positive economic development also manifests itself in a better employment situation for immigrants (Table 2): the immigrants had an average employment rate of 44 % in 2003, though it was only 18.5 % in 1994. The Estonians have had the highest employment rate followed by return migrants, Swedes and British, i.e. immigrants from Western countries. Estonians have displayed success in Finnish labour markets because many master the Finnish language (Heikkil 2005). Iraqi refugees still have difficulty finding work; they have the highest unemployment rate. Many of the Chinese are students and of the return migrants one tenth are retired a year after moving to Finland. In terms of main activity, many of the immigrants born in Thailand and former Soviet Union belong to the "other" -category. Table 2 Main activities of immigrants according to the largest origin groups in 2003, one year after immigration (%) (Data: Statistics Finland) Country of birth Finnish origin return migrants Former USSR Estonia Sweden China Britain Germany Iraq Turkey Thailand Other countries Total Total(abs.) Employed Unemployed Student Retired Other 4.858 1 .812 768 438 268 224 213 236 219 228 3.223 12.487 56,9 26,4 58,7 52,3 47,8 52,2 47,9 9,3 42,0 32,0 32,7 44,1 8,8 17,0 5,2 10,0 3,7 7,6 7,0 29,7 17,4 12,7 14,4 11,7 10,0 17,0 8,9 13,7 28,7 9,8 10,8 27,5 9,1 14,1 16,4 13,5 9,7 0,2 0,0 0,5 0,0 0,5 1,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,4 4,0 14,6 39,4 27,2 23,5 19,8 29,9 32,9 33,5 31,5 41,2 36,1 26,7 Taken as a whole, there are considerable differences in the employment rates of immigrants during different observation periods also when employment is observed by the concept of labour force (=employed and unemployed). During the recession of 1994, the employment rate for immigrant men was only 36 % of the labour force, and for women it was even lower, 32 %. The unemployment rate was thus for both groups over 60 % and for women, 68 %. The situation has improved during this decade, in that the employment rate for men has risen to 83 % and for women to 74 % in 2003. 126 Employment of immigrants in different branches of activity Immigrants tend to be concentrated in certain branches of activity (Figure 1). The trade sector is the most important employer during all economic cycles. The education and research sector is emphasized after the category of "occupation unknown" in 1994. Instead in 2003 the finance, insurance, real estate and business activities sector has been the second most important employer of immigrants followed by education and research. The importance of transport and communication has increased during this decade, like health work, manufacture of electrical machinery and construction. The immigrant employment sectors show some gender differences (Figures 23). At the beginning of the 1990s, trade was the most important employment sector regardless of gender, but other sectors, for example education and research, have been an important employment sector for immigrant women. In the health and social work sectors employment of women is also accentuated. Immigrant women also have found work in the agricultural sector, in that many unmarried farmers in East Finland have wed Russian women. This socalled cross-border marriage phenomenon is also common in the border area between Finland and Sweden. The sector of cleaning, sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation, and similar activities also employ slightly more women than men, because the cleaning sector, for example, provides jobs for many immigrants. More immigrant men than women have found work in the industrial sector, which includes the forest industry, the manufacture of machinery and equipment, and the manufacture of metal products. Construction has been a typically male-dominated sector and this also holds among immigrants. Many, regardless of gender, belong to the "occupation unknown" -category. In 2003, trade is accentuated for both immigrant men and women, in other words, the situation has not changed since 1994. Instead, finance, insurance, real estate and business activities have increased in importance and this sector has especially employed men. For women, in 2003 education and research are important, as in 1994, and employment in health work has doubled in the period between 1994 and the turn of the millennium. The importance of social work for women has not changed during the study period and social work is one of the main employers. Figure 1 Employment of immigrants in different branches of activity in 1994 and in 2003 (Data: Statistics Finland) 127 0 Agriculture 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 percentage of employed Forestry Forest industry Manufacture of metal products Manufacture of machinery and equipment Manufacture of electrical machinery Manufacture of transport equipment Manufacture of instruments etc. Other metal industry Other industry Construction Trade Transport and communication Finance, insurance, real estate and business activities Public administration, defence and security Cleaning, sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities Education and research Health work Social work Organisational activities Cultural activities Service activities used by private households Occupation unknown 1994 2003 Figure 2 Employment of immigrants in different branches of activity, according to gender, in 1994 (Data: Statistics Finland) 128 0 Agriculture Forestry Forest industry Manufacture of metal products Manufacture of machinery and equipment Manufacture of electrical machinery Manufacture of transport equipment Manufacture of instruments etc. Other metal industry Other industry Construction Trade Transport and communication Finance, insurance, real estate and business activities Public administration, defence and security Cleaning, sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities Education and research Health work Social work Organisational activities Cultural activities Service activities used by private households Occupation unknown 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 % 20 Women Men Figure 3 Employment of immigrants in different branches of activity, according to gender, in 2003 (Data: Statistics Finland) 129 0 Agriculture Forestry 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 Women Men % Forest industry Manufacture of metal products Manufacture of machinery and equipment Manufacture of electrical machinery Manufacture of transport equipment Manufacture of instruments etc. Other metal industry Other industry Construction Trade Transport and communication Finance, insurance, real estate and business activities Public administration, defence and security Cleaning, sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities Education and research Health work Social work Organisational activities Cultural activities Service activities used by private households Occupation unknown The transport and communication and the construction sectors have become more important for immigrant men. This decade has been a time of intensive construction, which requires new labour. A new feature in the transport sector has been immigrant men working as bus drivers, especially in the centres of Southern Finland. Industry has employed many men, and the manufacture of electrical machinery has been especially important. Immigrants' employment situations also differ among the five biggest origin groups. Of the return migrants to Finland in 1994, 29 % (899 persons) were employed a year after 130 arrival. Of these, 17 % were employed within trade and 10 % within finance, insurance, real estate and business activities, as well as 10 % within the education and research sector. Of those born in the Soviet Union, who in 1993 immigrated to Finland 12 % or 244 persons were employed in 1994. For almost one quarter of them, the occupation was unknown. 13 % were employed in trade and 10 % in cleaning, sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities. Of the Estonians, 140 persons (14 %) were employed and the most important sector was cleaning, sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities (14 %). The second most important sector was trade (11 %). For one fifth of them, the occupation was unknown. Of those born in the former Yugoslavia, 78 persons were employed, only 6.5 %, and 42 % of these had an unknown occupation in 1994. 10 % were employed in trade and in education and research. Of the Chinese who had immigrated in 1993, a third, or 67 persons were employed in 1994. A third of them worked in cleaning, sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities, and a fourth in the trade sector. A tenth of the employed were active in education and research. More than half (2 763 persons) of the return migrants to Finland in 2002 were employed in 2003. The most important sectors were finance, insurance, real estate and business activities as well as trade and health work. A fourth (478 persons) of the immigrants born in the former Soviet Union were employed a year after the arrival. Trade, as well as transport and communications, were their main employment sectors, both employing 12 %. For 20 %, the occupation was unknown. 451 of the Estonian immigrants (59 %) were employed a year after their arrival, in 2003. A fifth of them worked in transport and communication and another fifth in construction. The next important employment sector for Estonians was trade. Half of the native Swedes, 229 persons, were employed in 2003: around 15 % in trade and in finance, insurance, real estate and business activities. Half of the Chinese were employed (128 persons), mostly in trade (26 %), in education and research (23 %), and in the manufacture of electrical machinery (18 %). The educational background of immigrants according to main activity Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the main activity of working-age immigrant men and women, according to education. The data have been gathered for the end of 1994 and 2003, a year after immigration. The diagrams of 1994 show that the proportion of the employed grows 131 with better education. Employment rates vary considerably according to level of education; namely, unemployment decreases as education improves. Of the men with only primary education 42 % were unemployed, but of those with doctoral education, only 4 % were unemployed. The unemployment rate for women with primary education has been lower than for men (33 %) because many belong to the "other" -category not included in the labour force. When analysing unemployment level according to the concept of a labour force, immigrant women with primary education have higher unemployment (75 %) than men (70 %). In all classes of education, except for "the lower higher education", the relative employment rate for men is higher than it is for women. The difference between men and women is greatest in the category of "lowest higher education": the employment rate for men is 66 % and, for women, only 52 %. Again, it is important to note that more women than men belong to the "other" -category, which is by definition outside the labour force. Membership in that category has decreased for both genders when employment has improved with education. Also, the share of students decreases when education improves. Immigrant men still had a better employment situation than women in 2003 (Figure 5). The employment rates were, however, higher than in 1994 and for those with primary education, the rate has doubled regardless of gender. The employment rate increases as education improves, but the growth is not as strong and the differences between education levels are not as great as in 1994. For women there is a small variation in the relative employment rate, and the relation of employment to educational level is not as accentuated as for men. Women with at least "higher lower education" have a lower employment rate in 2003 than in 1994. Thus, women with "upper higher education" had an employment rate of 75 % in 1994 and only 57 % in 2003. The phenomenon is explained by those who, during this decade, have become unemployed, students or entered the "other" -category. If this group of women is seen as part of the labour force, the differences between the decades are not so great: women with "upper higher education" had an employment rate of almost 90 % in 1994 and 83 % in 2003. In 2003, unemployment observed evenly in all education levels for both men and women, while in 1994, those with less education were more often unemployed. Membership in the "other" -category decreases as education increases, especially for men. The share of students generally diminishes as the educational level rises. Now there are more students than in 1994, and students can also be found in those categories where a better basic education exists. Figure 4 Main activity of working age immigrant men and women according to education in 1994, one year after immigration to Finland (Data: Statistics Finland) 132 Men 1994 100 % Other 80 % Pensioners Students 60 % Unemployed Employed 40 % 20 % 0% Primary education Secondary education Lowest higher education Lower higher education Upper higher education Doctoral education Women 1994 100 % Other Pensioners Students 60 % Unemployed Employed 40 % 80 % 20 % 0% Primary education Secondary education Lowest higher education Lower higher education Upper higher education Doctoral education Figure 5 Main activity of working age immigrant men and women according to education in 2003, one year after immigration to Finland (Data: Statistics Finland) 133 Men 2003 100 % Other 80 % Pensioners Students 60 % Unemployed Employed 40 % 20 % 0% Primary education Secondary education Lowest higher education Lower higher education Upper higher education Doctoral education Women 2003 100 % Other 80 % Pensioners Students 60 % Unemployed 40 % Employed 20 % 0% Primary education Secondary education Lowest higher education Lower higher education Upper higher education Doctoral education Summary Neoclassical economic theories emphasize differences between countries in terms of wages, employment and standard of living, as the initiating migration forces. This kind of economic gap exists between Finland and the southern and northern countries around the Baltic. The difference in standard of living is greatest between Finland and Russia. The difference in GNP between Finland and Russia is one of the biggest if not the greatest in Europe; and it had increased during the 1990s. Compared to Estonia, Finland's wages are three times higher with respect to purchasing power (Heikkil & Jrvinen 2004: 1415). 134 If individuals choose to emigrate in order to maximise their income and welfare - i.e. for calculated reasons, as economic theories propose - the goals of migration are not always achieved in the individual's life. One indicator of such is the high unemployment of immigrants. In a variety of countries, including Finland, there has been a demand for certain types of labour, such as in the ICT-sector and in other professions. Refugee immigrants have faced employment difficulties, and when they have found work, it has not always corresponded to their education. The situation in the labour market is a central indicator of the social status of immigrants and ethnic groups. Both in Finland and in other industrialized countries, it is more difficult for immigrants to find work than for the native population and thus the former often have many times higher unemployment rates than the latter (Heikkil & Peltonen 2002: 56; Sopemi 2005: 62). The employment rate of immigrants has improved with the economic upturn in our country. Refugees, such as those from Iraq, have faced difficulties in finding employment: their situation has essentially not improved during the different economic cycles, and is worse than for immigrants in general. According to Network Theory the individual would profit from his/her own social networks by finding an active role on the labour markets. According to Pikkarainen's (2005) survey, the networks are useful, because they allow people to find open jobs that are not advertised in the papers or on the Internet in other words, so-called hidden labour markets (see Ahmad 2005). Also Joronen (2005: 76) has observed that information on open jobs is nowadays often spread through informal communication. At the turn of the millennium, the situation was different, at least for friends of foreigners, as Jaakkola showed in his research (2000: 43): only 10 % of the immigrants found jobs through them, and even fewer found suitable jobs. Discriminating attitudes are revealed especially in the seeking of work. In some cases, Finnish nationality has been groundlessly required, and in some cases, the employer has falsely told immigrant applicants that the position has been filled. Also, employers have made exaggerated demands for language skills. The number of immigrants in Finland is still so small that most employers have no experience of immigrants. Therefore, ethical practices must be developed well in advance (Etnisten suhteiden neuvottelukunta 2005: 2930). Multiculturalism should be seen as part of business and as competition advantage (Tyministeri 2003: 51). According to World System Theory, migrants are drawn more easily to neighbouring countries; also a common language and cultural proximity are important. A good example of this is the Finnish emigration to Sweden of recent history. Also the differences in standard of 135 living as factors initiating migration have been seen in the migration between Finland and Sweden. Finland has, during the period of study, received immigrants from neighbouring countries: return migrants, immigrants from the former Soviet Union and from Estonia. At the beginning of the last decade, many immigrants came as refugees from the former Yugoslavia and from Somalia. In this decade, the number of Swedish immigrants has doubled in comparison to the era of economic recession. Also, Chinese and Iraqis have immigrated to Finland, and in 2002, immigrants also arrived from Thailand and from Turkey. After Finland joined the European Union, we received many migrants from Great Britain and Germany. In Finland in 1993, there were no immigrant groups from Western Europe among the ten largest immigration groups according to the country of birth. The common labour markets have therefore eased mobility within the EU. The Finnish labour markets face changes because a large part of the population will soon retire. Especially the health sector and other labour-intensive sectors will demand more labour. At the same time, educational level in Finland will rise. The vacated jobs will not be attractive to the native population, because many of those are in the low-paid and low-status sectors. It is a common belief that the number of immigrants in these sectors will increase. Many post-industrial countries have both a labour deficit and labour reserves. The rapidly expanding industrial production and service sector have especially faced labour deficit. It is difficult to find people for low paid, low-status, heavy and monotonous jobs (see Wiman 1975: 46). Such sectors are e.g. agriculture, construction and service sectors such as cleaning. Immigrants are over represented in the construction sector, in hotel and restaurant jobs and in domestic service. Their employment rates within these sectors are higher than their general employment rate (Sopemi 2005: 66). So-called entry-level jobs, which introduce immigrants to the labour markets, are often within these sectors (e.g. Forsander 2002: 43). Primary and secondary labour markets, in accordance with the dual labour market theory, exist in Finland. In the former, human capital is fully utilized, and in the latter, this might not be the case, i.e. work and education do not correspond. Educations, thus human capital, are essential for employment. In Finland, it can clearly be observed that good education guarantees employment during economic up- and downturns. Jaakkola (2000: 91) refers in his research to winners and hard-workers. Well-educated westerners invited from abroad are the winners, while the hard-workers are those with little education and work experience; they are often refugees coming from the third world countries. Finally, there is much active potential among the immigrants who expect to take part in society. The immigrants who already live in Finland do not suffice to remedy the 136 threatening labour deficit. Thus it is important that Finland increases its appeal as a country of work opportunities and attracts more educated, working-aged immigrants to a variety of economic sectors. References Ahmad, A. (2005): Getting a Job in Finland. The Socail Networks of Immigrants from the Indian Subcontinent in the Helsinki Metropolitan Labour Market, University of Helsinki, Department of Sociology, Research Reports 247 Chiswick, B. R. (1978): The Effect of Americanization on the Earnings of Foreign-born Men, Journal of Political Economy 86: 51, pp. 897921 Etnisten suhteiden neuvottelukunta (2005): Kala kuivalla maalla. Kotoutuminen maahanmuuttajan nkkulmasta, Tyministerin Tyhallinnon julkaisu 344 Evans, J. (2004): Protecting Migrant Workers' Human Rights. A Trade Union View, Siirtolaisuus-Migration 2004: 4, pp. 38 Forsander, A. (2002): Luottamuksen ehdot. Maahanmuuttajat 1990-luvun suomalaisilla tymarkkinoilla, Vestliitto, Vestntutkimuslaitos D 39. Heikkil, E. (2005): Finland in the Globalizing International System a Special Viewpoint of International Migration, The 4th International Immigration Conference `Contemporary Migration Issues: Migration and Society. Legal Frameworks of Migration versus Human Rights', PWSBiA, Warsaw, Poland, 2123 November, 2004. Conferences and seminars 16, Warsaw: PWSBiA, pp. 309325 Heikkil, E. & S. Peltonen (2002): Immigrants and Integration in Finland. Survey: About the Situation of Immigrants and Refugees in Six Baltic Sea States. Developed within the framework of the European Community Action, SOCRATES Heikkil, E. & T. Jrvinen (2004): Muuttoliike Suomen ja Itmeren maiden vlill, Talous ja Yhteiskunta 2004: 1, pp. 1317 Hmlinen, K., A. Kangasharju, S. Pekkala, M. Sarvimki (2005): Maahanmuuttajien taloudellinen asema Suomessa, Talous & Yhteiskunta 2005: 1, pp. 3339 Immigrant Council of Ireland (2003): Labour Migration into Ireland. A Study of Recommendations, on Employment Permits, Working Conditions, Family Reunification and the Integration of Migrant Workers in Ireland, Dublin Jaakkola, T. (2000): Maahanmuuttajat ja etniset vhemmistt tyhnotossa ja tyelmss, Tyministerin Typoliittinen tutkimus 218 Joronen, T. (2005): Ty on kahden kauppa maahanmuuttajien tymarkkina-aseman ongelmia, in Paananen, S. (ed.): Maahanmuuttajien elm Suomessa, Tilastokeskus, Helsinki, pp. 5982 Mahroum, S. (2001): Europe and the Immigration of Highly Skilled Labour, International Migration 39: 5, pp. 2743 Martin, P., H. D. von Loeffelholz & T. Straubhaar (2002): Managing Migration for Economic Growth: Germany and the United States in Comparative Perspective, The John Hopkins University, The American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, AICGS Policy Report 1 Massey, D. S., J. Arango, G. Hugo, A. Kouaouci, A. Pellegrino, E. J. Taylor (1993): Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal, Population and Development Review 19: 3, pp. 431466 Oishi, N. (2002): Gender and Migration: An Integrative Approach, University of California, The Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, Working Paper 49 137 Pikkarainen, M. (2005): Maahanmuuttajien tyllistyminen ja heidn odotuksensa tyelmst Suomessa, Siirtolaisuusinstituutti, Web Reports 8 Piore, M. J. (1979): Birds of Passage: Migrant Labour in Industrial Societies, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press Sopemi (2002): Trends in International Migration. Continuous Reporting System on Migration, OECD Annual Report, 2002 Edition, Paris: OECD Sopemi (2005): Trends in International Migration, OECD Annual Report, 2004 Edition, Paris: OECD Todaro, M. P. (1969): A Model of Labour Migration and Urban Unemployment in Less Developed Countries, The American Economic Review 59, pages 138148 Tyministeri (2003): Tyvoiman rekrytointimahdollisuudet EU- ja ETA-alueen ulkopuolelta. Maahanmuuttopolitiikan tulevat haasteet projekti, Tyministerin Tyhallinnon julkaisu 325 Wanner, P. (2002): Migration Trends in Europe. Council of Europe, European Population Papers Series 7 Wiman, R. (1975): Tyvoiman kansainvlisen muuttoliikkeen mekanismi, ETLA, Elinkeinoelmn tutkimuslaitos B9 138 LABOUR MIGRATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF DENMARK Mete Feridun1) 139 This article aims at investigating the nature of the causal relationship between immigration and economic development measured by GDP per capita in Denmark using Granger causality test. The results on the unit root test indicate that all the series are non-stationary and are in I(1) process. The Johansen cointegration test reveals that there is no cointegration among the data sets. The Granger causality test shows that when the level of immigration increases, GDP per capita also increases. It has also been found that immigration has no impact on unemployment, and vice versa. Key words: Economic development, population growth, unemployment, cointegration 1) PhD Student, Department of Economics, Loughborough University, Loughborough, Leicestershire; LE11 3TU United Kingdom; Web:; E-mail:; previously Lecturer in Economics and Finance, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Cyprus International University, Nicosia, Cyprus 1 Introduction As is the case for many developed nations, Denmark faces the challenges of an ageing population. The combination of the demographic effects of the baby booms that marked the immediate post war period, the fall in fertility rates that began from the late 1960s, and longer life expectancy have led to a very marked acceleration of the population ageing process in Denmark. This have serious implications for the sustainability of the pension and benefit systems and for labour market equilibrium. With more elderly persons and fewer young persons, Denmark is expected to experience a fall in the labour supply within the next few decades. This will have to be accompanied by an increasing number of persons of foreign origin entering the labour market. Inflow of aliens into the country in the last decade has made immigration and immigration policy a major public issue in Denmark. Danish people are concerned that immigration reduces employment opportunities for the existing workforce, depresses wage rates in already low-wage labour markets, and financially strains taxpayers via their receipt of transfer payments and use of social service programs. In this respect, it is essential to assess the impact of foreign workers on GDP per capita and unemployment to assist policy-makers in designing policies regarding immigration. International migration and the role that it plays in the economies of the originating and receiving countries has frequently been a topic of interest. To our knowledge, such study does not exist in the literature particularly for Denmark. The present study aims at filling this gap in the literature through investigating the nature of the causal relationship between immigration and two macroeconomic indicators, GDP per capita and unemployment using Granger causality tests based on Danish data during the period between 1983 and 2003. This paper is structured as follows. Next section reviews some of the existing studies on the impacts of foreign workers on the economy and unemployment. Section III provides a theoretical framework through which immigration may have an impact on the economy of the host countries. Section V 140 reviews the data and presents the results obtained. Last section provides conclusions and policy implications that emerge from the study. 2 Literature Review Literature on the economic impact of immigration focuses primarily on the effects of immigration on the unemployment of domestic workers. Marr and Siklos (1994) studied the relationship between immigration and unemployment in Canada using quarterly data for the period 1962-1990. They used Granger causality and found that before 1978, changes in immigration levels did not affect the Canadian unemployment rate, but after 1978 immigration rates contributed to changes in the unemployment rate. Marr and Siklos (1995) investigated the relationship between immigration and unemployment in Canada using annual data from 1926 to 1992. They used both Granger causality tests between unemployment and immigration and the unrestricted VAR approach involving time series regression of unemployment, immigration, wage (per capita total labour income), and real GDP. The Granger causality tests revealed that immigration was not caused by past unemployment; however, past immigration did cause unemployment. Evidence also suggested that immigration and unemployment rates were inversely related and the past unemployment rate had a quantitatively smaller impact on immigration than past immigration had on current level of unemployment. Konya (2000) tested the Granger causality between immigration and long-term unemployment in Australia in the period between 1983 and 1998. Using quarterly, both seasonally adjusted and unadjusted data, she found that there was a negative unidirectional Granger causality, both between the seasonally unadjusted and adjusted series, running from immigration to long-term unemployment. Akbari and DeVoretz (1992) analyzed Canadian data to assess the impact of immigrant workers on the employment of Canadian-born workers for 125 Canadian industries using 1980 data. They used translog specification of the production function. The estimated cross elasticities suggested no economy-wide displacement of Canadian-born workers by immigrants. Withers and Pope (1993) studied Australian data spanning the period between 1861 and 1991 using both structural disequilibrium modelling and causality testing. They found that unemployment caused immigration no evidence in the opposite direction. They also found structural breaks in the relationship that originated from government policy changes. Withers and Pope (1985) studied quarterly Australian unemployment and immigration data from 1948 to 1982. They used both statistical causality techniques and conventional structural models to investigate the relationship between immigration and unemployment. They run Granger causality tests on quarterly data with twelve lags and reached the conclusions that 141 there was no evidence of causality from immigration to unemployment, unemployment did influence subsequent immigration, immigration did not significantly affect structural unemployment; and migrants created as least as many jobs as they filled. Winegarden and Khor (1991) investigated whether undocumented immigration caused any substantial increases in joblessness among the vulnerable groups in U.S workforce. They used 1980 U.S. census data on the state distribution of the alien population to analyze the relationship between this population and unemployment among youth and minority workers. They also estimated a simultaneous equation model involving unemployment and immigration as endogenous variables. Evidence show that undocumented immigration has not caused any substantial increases in joblessness among the presumably most vulnerable groups in U.S workforce, although small amounts of displacement were detected. Gross (1997) used Canadian data and analyzed the ability of a regional market, British Columbia, to absorb the growing flows of immigrant workers with declining levels of skills in times of relatively high unemployment. He found that immigration is positively related to unemployment in the shortrun and negatively related to unemployment rate in the long run. He also found that higher average skill level among immigrants makes them more competitive in the short-run. Marr (1973) examined the relationship between immigration and unemployment rate for Canada for the period 1950 to 1967. He found a significant negative relationship between immigration flows and the Canadian unemployment rate and argued that a high unemployment rate led to a lower flow of immigrants. But when total flows were disaggregated by sending area, he found that higher unemployment rate led to lower immigration except for immigration flows from Asia, Central America and South America. Altonji and Card (1991) studied the effects of immigrants on less-skilled natives in 1970 and 1980 data on U.S. cities. They found little evidence that inflows of immigrants are associated with large or systematic effects on the employment or unemployment rates of less skilled natives. There exists a vast empirical literature on the effects of immigration on the income of the host country citizens. Laryea (1998a) analyzed the impact of foreign-born labour on wages in Canada using data from Labour Market Activity Survey for the period 1988-1990. They used a random effects model to analyze the wage impacts by broad industry groups and also by gender. Results from the regressions show that for the total sample, foreign-born and native born were complements in production. The relationship also held for the male and female sub-samples. However, when the data was disaggregated by industry, wage suppression by immigrants was detected in the primary, transport and storage, wholesale and retail trade industries. 142 Laryea (1998b) employed a generalized Leontief production function to analyze substitutability or complementarity relationships between Canadian, old foreign-born and new foreign-born workers, using data from the 1991 census. He also extended the analysis to broad occupational groups. The results showed that Canadian and new foreign-born workers were substitutes in production with adverse impacts on Canadian-born wage. The earlier immigrants, on the other hand, were found to be complements to Canadian-born workers. In case of occupational group, professionally trained immigrants and unskilled Canadian-born workers were found to be substitutes. However, the relationship between unskilled immigrants and Canadian professionals and skilled Canadian workers were found to be complementary. Gruen (1986) studied the per capita growth rates in the OECD countries using crosscountry regressions and found that high rates of population growth are negatively associated with per capita GDP growth where 1% growth in the immigration rate as a proportion of the population leads to a 0.7% fall in per capita growth in GDP. On the other hand, Jolley (1971) examined the impact of migration on Australia's economic growth using a neoclassical production function, adjusted for cyclical demand-driven fluctuations. The results suggested that immigration had raised GDP but had slightly lowered GDP per capita. Easton (1990) attempted to appraise the growth performance of the New Zealand economy using descriptive statistics. He concluded that one of the reasons behind the relatively poor post-war economic growth performance was a high rate of population growth. On the other hand, Grossman (1982), using cross sectional U.S. data, found that a 10% rise in migration causes a 0.8% fall in native employment and the long run wage elasticity suggests that the same rise in immigration will reduce natives' wages by 1%. 3 Theoretical Framework This section presents the theoretical framework through which immigration may affect the labour market in the host country. Effects of immigration on the income of the host country citizens can be studied in two ways, namely supply side effects and demand side effects. In the Supply side effects, inputs, i.e. foreign labour force and domestic labour force, can be either substitutes or complements. When two inputs are substitutes in production, an increase in the supply of an input will decrease the demand for its substitute. An increase in the labour supply through increased immigration in a given labour market will lead to an increased competition for jobs among immigrants. This would reduce the market wage for immigrants. Depending upon their skill requirements, employers are likely to substitute immigrant labour for the native worker since the former is cheaper. This 143 competition for jobs in the local labour market between natives and immigrants would reduce the earnings of natives. If variation in the number of immigrants relative to the native born workers across selected labour market demonstrates that a higher ratio of foreign-born to native-born worker is associated with a lower wage rate of native born, then immigrants and native born are substitutable labour inputs in production. In this case, foreign-born workers would affect the earnings and job opportunities of native workers adversely. When immigrants and native workers are perfect substitutes, they compete for jobs in the same labour market and the effects are shown in Figure 1. We assume that the labour supply curve for natives is upward sloping, shown by the line S1, and (L2 L3) immigrants enter the labour market shifting the labour supply curve to the right to S2. We further assume that the demand for labour is fixed with or without entry of immigrants. The market wage rate falls from W1 to W2 and that L1 L3 amount of native workers will be displaced by immigrants. Figure 1 Impact of immigration on the income of the host country citizens (When immigrants and native workers are perfect substitutes) Source: Feridun (2005) Wage S1 S2 E1 E2 D1 W1 W2 L3 L2 L1 Employment In the case of complementary inputs, immigration flows could lead to increased wages for native workers. If there are skill shortage in the host country and immigrant relieve these bottlenecks, it would expand job opportunities in general, resulting in an increased demand for labour and eventually leading to higher wages of native-born workers. In this case immigrants and native workers are employed in two distinct labour markets and they are complementary inputs in production. When they are complements in production, then an increase in the demand for labour can increase the wage rate of indigenous workers. When foreign-born and the native born are complements in production, an inflow of foreign-born worker would augment the productivity of native workers. Therefore, the demand for nativeborn workers goes up, as shown by the shift in the demand curve from D1 to D2 in Figure 2. These will cause an increase in the wage rate from W1 to W2. 144 Figure 2 Impact of immigration on the income of the host country citizens (When foreign-born and the native born are complements in production) Source: Feridun (2005) Wage S1 E2 E1 D1 D2 Employment W2 W1 0 L3 L1 L2 When we study demand side effects, we assume that the product demand is fixed. However, immigration has both demand and supply side effects in goods market. Immigrants demand goods and services, make expenditure and therefore the expenditure generated by the inflow of immigration causes the demand curve for goods and services to shift rightward. This will, in turn, cause an increase in the demand for labour. When both demand and supply effects are present, the net effect on the native would depend on the immigrants' marginal propensity to spend and the chance of getting job relative to natives. If, for example, immigrants' relative expenditure is less than their relative employment, then the demand for labour will shift to a less extent than the supply of labour and therefore some natives will lose their jobs. Impact of immigration on the level of unemployment in the host country can be studied through two perspectives. Some people contend that the employment of immigrants decreases the employment of domestic workers on a one-for-one basis. They argue that a given number of jobs exist in the economy and that if one of these positions is taken by an immigrant, then that job is no longer available for a legal resident. At the other extreme is the claim that immigrants only accept work that resident workers are unwilling to perform and thus take no jobs from native workers. According to McConnell et al (2003), immigration does cause some substitution of illegal aliens for domestic workers but the amount of displacement is most likely less than the total employment of immigrants. Figure 3 Impact of immigration on the level of unemployment in the host country Source: Feridun (2005) Sd Wage Wd St D Wt 145 0 Qd Qt Employment D is the typical labour curve, Sd portrays the labour supply of domestic workers, St reflects the total supply of domestic and immigrant workers. Given the presence of the illegal workers, the market wage and level of employment are Wt and Qt. The presence of the immigrants increases the total number of jobs in the market. With the illegal migration, the number of jobs is Qt. Without the inflow it is Qd. Therefore, it can be said that native employment would increase by the amount Qd upon the deportation of Qt immigrants. In light of this theoretical background, this study aims at testing two null hypotheses. The first hypothesis assumes that the immigrants and the native workers are perfect substitutes, and states that immigration will lead to decreased per capita income in the host country. The second hypothesis states that immigration leads to unemployment in the host country. 4 Data and Methodology This study uses data that consists of annual observations spanning the period between 1983 and 2003. All data are obtained from the World Bank World Development Indicators database and were transformed into logarithmic returns in order to achieve mean-reverting relationships, and to make econometric testing procedures valid. Immigration, denoted by IMMG, is measured by the size of foreign or foreign-born residents as a percentage of total population. GDP per capita, denoted by GDP, is calculated as gross domestic product divided by midyear population. Unemployment, denoted by UNEM, refers to the percentage of the total labour force that is without work but available for and seeking employment. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the logarithmic transformations of time series data. The measures of skewness and kurtosis as well as the probabilities of the JarqueBerra test statistic provide evidence in favour of the null hypothesis of a normal distribution for all data sets. In addition, simple correlations are estimated for the first differences of the series for each country and no evidence of correlation was found as can be seen in Table 2. Table 1 Descriptive Statistics (Source: Author's calculations based on data from World Bank World Development Indicators database) Immigrati Unemploym GDP 146 on Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Probability Sum Sq. Dev. 23.54 9.13 16.07 2.36 2.54 0.02 2.97 0.54 13.54 ent 31.77 3.64 31.32 1.74 1.36 0.42 2.84 2.63 0.44 0.25 3.67 5.55 7.83 2.32 0.27 0.05 2.27 1.65 0.43 15.37 Jarque-Bera 1.56 Table 2 Correlation Matrix (Source: Author's calculations based on data from World Bank World Development Indicators database) 4.1 ADF Unit Root Tests The first necessary condition to perform Granger-causality tests is to study the stationary of GDP UNEP IMMG GDP 1 UNEM IMMG 0.13 0.55 1 0.03 1 the time series under consideration and to establish the order of integration present. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) (1979) unit root test is used in examining the stationarity of the data series. It consists of running a regression of the first difference of the series against the series lagged once, lagged difference terms, and optionally, a constant and a time trend. This can be expressed as: yt = 1yt-1 + 2yt-1 + 3yt-2 + 4 + 5t (1) 147 The test for a unit root is conducted on the coefficient of yt-1 in the regression. If the coefficient is significantly different from zero then the hypothesis that y contains a unit root is rejected. Rejection of the null hypothesis implies stationarity. If the calculated ADF statistic is higher than McKinnon's critical value then the null hypothesis is not rejected and it is concluded that the considered variable is non-stationary, i.e. has at least one unit root. Then, the procedures are re-applied after transforming the series into first differenced form. If the null hypothesis of non-stationarity can be rejected, it can be concluded that the time series is integrated of order one, I(1). Table 3 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test Results Test with an intercept Levels Immigration GDP Unemployment CV* (1%) CV (5%) 1.76 2.06 1.77 -3.49 -3.37 1st differences -11.57 -6.94 -5.63 -4.03 -3.5 Test with an intercept and trend Levels 3.76 2.85 3.55 -5.55 -3.68 1st differences -12.52 -7.34 -6.33 -5.65 -3.76 Test with no intercept or trend Levels 0.37 2.58 1.32 -2.74 -1.92 1st differences -7.46 -11.24 -10.32 -2.64 -1.87 * McKinnon Critical Value The lag length was determined using Schwartz Information Criteria (SIC) Table 3 summarizes the results of the ADF unit root tests on levels and in first differences of the data. Strong evidence emerges that all the time series are I(1). 4.2 Cointegration Tests Next, we perform cointegration analysis. Cointegration analysis helps to identify long-run economic relationships between two or several variables and to avoid the risk of spurious regression. Cointegration analysis is important because if two non-stationary variables are cointegrated, a VAR model in the first difference is misspecified due to the effect of a common tend. If cointegration relationship is identified, the model should include residuals from the vectors (lagged one period) in the dynamic Vector Error Correcting Mechanism (VECM) system. In this stage, Johansen cointegration test is used to identify cointegrating 148 relationship among the variables. Within the Johansen multivariate cointegrating framework, the following system is estimated: zt = 1 zt-1 + ...+ k- 1 zt-k-1 + zt-1 + + t: t =1, ...,T (2) Where is the first difference operator, z denotes vector of variables, t ~ niid (0,), is a drift parameter, and is a (p x p) matrix of the form = ', where and are both (p x r) matrices of full rank, with containing the r cointegrating relationships and carrying the corresponding adjustment coefficients in each of the r vectors. The Johansen approach can be used to carry out Granger causality tests as well. In the Johansen framework the first step is the estimation of an unrestricted, closed pth order VAR in k variables. Johansen (1995) suggests two tests statistics to determine the cointegration rank. The first of these is known as the trace statistic (3) where are the estimated eigenvalues 1 > 2 > 3 > ... > k and r0 ranges from 0 to k-1 depending upon the stage in the sequence. This is the relevant test statistic for the null hypothesis r r0 against the alternative r r0 . The second test statistic is the maximum eigenvalue test known as max; we denote it as max (r0). This is closely related to the trace statistic but arises from changing the alternative hypothesis from r r0 + 1 to r = r0 + 1. The idea is to try and improve the power of the test by limiting the alternative to a cointegration rank which is just one more than under the null hypothesis. The max test statistic is max (r0) = -T in(1 i) for i = r0 + 1 (4) The null hypothesis is there are r cointegrating vectors, against the alternative of r + 1 cointegrating vectors. Johansen and Juselius (1990) indicated that the trace test might lack the power relative to the maximum eigenvalue test. Based on the power of the test, the maximum 149 eigenvalue test statistic is often preferred. Table 4 presents results from the Johansen cointegration test among the data sets. Neither maximum eigenvalue nor trace tests rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 5% level. Table 4 Johansen Cointegration Test Results Null Hypothesis Trace Statistic 5% Critical Value Maximum eigenvalue Statistic 5% Critical Value r=0 r<=1 r<=2 33.66 13.72 4.16 39.74 24.22 10.45 19.27 10.57 6.33 23.29 21.45 11.44 r is the number of cointegrating vectors under the null hypothesis. A linear deterministic trend is assumed. 4.3 Granger-causality Tests According to Granger (1969), Y is said to "Granger-cause" X if and only if X is better predicted by using the past values of Y than by not doing so with the past values of X being used in either case. In short, if a scalar Y can help to forecast another scalar X, then we say that Y Granger-causes X. If Y causes X and X does not cause Y, it is said that unidirectional causality exists from Y to X. If Y does not cause X and X does not cause Y, then X and Y are statistically independent. If Y causes X and X causes Y, it is said that feedback exists between X and Y. Essentially, Granger's definition of causality is framed in terms of predictability. Granger (1969) originally suggested the Granger test, which was improved by Sargent (1976). To implement the Granger test, we assume a particular autoregressive lag length k (or p) and estimate equation (5) and (6) by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. X t = 1 + a1i X t -i + b1 j Yt - j + 1t i =1 j =1 k k (5) Yt = 2 + a 2i X t -i + b2 j Yt - j + 2t i =1 j =1 p p (6) 150 F test is carried out for the null hypothesis of no Granger causality H 0 : bi1 = bi 2 = = bik = 0, i = 1,2. where F statistic is the Wald statistic for the null hypothesis. If the F statistic is greater than a certain critical value for an F distribution, then we reject the null hypothesis that Y does not Granger-cause X (equation (5)), which means Y Granger-causes X. A time series with stable mean value and standard deviation is called a stationary series. If d differences have to be made to produce a stationary process, then it can be defined as integrated of order d. Granger (1983, 1983) proposed the concept of cointegration, and Engle and Granger (1987) made further analysis. If several variables are all I(d) series, their linear combination may be cointegrated, that is, their linear combination may be stationary. Although the variables may drift away from equilibrium for a while, economic forces may be expected to act so as to restore equilibrium, thus, they tend to move together in the long run irrespective of short run dynamics. The definition of the Granger causality is based on the hypothesis that X and Y are stationary or I(0) time series. Therefore, we can not apply the fundamental Granger method for variables of I(1). The classical approach to deal with integrated variables is to difference them to make them stationary. Hassapis et al. (1999) show that in the absence of cointegration, the direction of causality can be decided upon via standard F-tests in the first differenced VAR. The VAR in the first difference can be written as: X t = 1 + a1i X t -i + b1 j Yt - j + 1t i =1 j =1 k k (7) Yt = 2 + a 2i X t -i + b2 j Yt - j + 2t i =1 j =1 p p (8) Since, maximum eigenvalue and trace tests do not reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 5% level, aforementioned VAR method can be used. Table 5 shows the results of these regressions. Table 5 Granger Causality Test Results Null Hypothesis Lag 1 F - Statistics Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 151 Immigration does not granger cause GDP per capita GDP per capita does not granger cause immigration Immigration does not granger cause unemployment Unemployment does not granger cause immigration * Reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level. 53.52* 1.75 1.46 1.24 5.03 1.94 1.33 0.35 0.64 0.55 1.33 1.56 0.63 0.47 0.54 3.36 Results of Granger-causality test show that the null hypotheses of immigration does not Granger cause GDP per capita is rejected in 1 year lag, at the 5% level. Results show no evidence of reverse causality. On the other hand, the null hypotheses of immigration does not Granger cause unemployment is not rejected in any lag at the 5% level. Again, results show no evidence of reverse causation either. 5 Conclusions and Policy Implications The aim of this paper is to assess the impact immigration has on economic development and unemployment in the Denmark. The results on the unit root test indicate that all the series are non-stationary and in I(1) process. The Johansen cointegration test reveals that there is no cointegration among the data sets. The Granger causality test shows that when level of immigration increases, GDP per capita also increases. It has also been found that immigration has no impact on unemployment, and vice versa. A number of policy implications emerge from the study. As the analysis has shown, the future development of the Danish society will depend among other things on whether the country is capable of securing a successful integration of foreigners. This includes not only the residing foreigners in the country but also those that are expected to immigrate in the future. A number of actions should be taken in order to cope with the expected decline of the labour force. For instance, Denmark may choose to mobilize the latent labour supply among various target groups such as the ageing population, inactive and unemployed youth, inactive adults and inactive and unemployed foreign born residents. As evident from their positive impact on GDP per capita growth, immigrants and their children will be a great asset to Denmark in the future. Therefore, taking care of immigrants' basic requirements and making Denmark attractive to foreign employees must be a priority for the policy makers. Policies should be developed to educate domestic societies to tolerate the temporary and permanent presence of an increasing number of people with foreign background. However, authorities should determine how many and what type of immigrants are needed. Denmark has to define 152 clear goals and guidelines for their immigration and integration policies. In this respect, restricting the immigration of people with low qualifications to prevent integration difficulties and the negative impact on the economy can be considered as a policy option. References Akbari, A. and D. J. DeVoretz (1992): The Substitutability of Foreign-born Labour in Canadian Production: Circa 1980, Canadian Journal of Economics, August, Vol.25, No.3, pp. 604-14 Altonji, J. G. and D. Card (1990): The Effects of Immigration on the Labour Market Outcomes of Less-Skilled Natives, in J. M, Abword and R. B. Freeman (eds.): Immigration Trade, and the Labour Market, Chicago: University of Chicago Press Borjas, G. J. (1983): The Substitutability of Black, Hispanic and White Labour, Economic Inquiry, January, Vol.21, pp. 93-106 Borjas, G. J. (1999): The Economic Analysis of Immigration, in Orley Ashenfelter and David Card (eds.): Handbook of Labour Economics, Volume 3A, North-Holland Borjas, G. J. (2002): Does Immigration Grease the Wheels of the Labour Market?, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1., pp. 45-56 Borjas, G. J. (2005): Labour Economics, Chicago: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 3rd edition Borjas, G. J., Richard B. Freeman, Lawrence F. Katz (1996): Searching for the Effect of Immigration on the Labour Market, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 84 Chiswick, B., C. U. Chiswick, P.W. Miller (1985): Are Immigrants and Natives Perfect Substitutes in Production?, International Migration Review, winter, 674-85 Dickey, D. A., W. A. Fuller (1979): Distribution of the Estimators for Autoregressive Time Series with a Unit Root, Journal of American Statistical Association, 74 Easton, B. (1990): Structural Change and Economic Growth in Postwar New Zealand, Paper to the NZAE Conference, Victoria University Feridun, Mete (2005), Economic Impact of Immigration on the Host Country: The Case of Norway, Prague Economic Papers, No. 4 (2005) pp: 350-362 Fischer, P., Straubhaar, T. (1996): Migration and Economic Integration in the Nordic Labour Market, 2. Nordic Councils of Ministers, Copenhagen Friedberg, R. M. (2002): The Impact of Mass Migration on the Israeli Labour Market, Quarterly Journal of Economics Friedburg, R. M., J. Hunt (1995): The Impact of Immigration on Host Country Wages, Employment and Growth, Journal of Economic Perspectives 9 Granger, C. W. J. (1969): Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Models and Crossspectral Methods, Econometrica, 37 Gross, D (1997): Immigration Flows and Regional Labour Market Dynamics, Vancouver Centre of Excellence: Research on Immigration and Integration on the Metropolis (RIIM), Working paper No.97-09, October Grossman, J. (1982): The Substitutability of Natives and Immigrants, Review of Economic Studies, 64 Gruen, F H (1986): How Bad is Australia's Economic Performance and Why?, Economic Record, 62(179) Jolley, A (1971): Immigration and Australia's post-war economic growth, Economic Record 47, March Johansen, S., Juselius K.(1990): Maximum Likelihood Estimation and Inference on Cointegration with Applications to the Demand for Money, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics. 153 Koivukangas, O. (2003): Foreigners in Denmark, Virtual Denmark, Institute of Migration, Turku, April Konya, L. (2000): Bivariate Causality between Immigration and Long-Term Unemployment in Australia, 1983-1998, Victoria University of Technology Working Paper No 18/00 Laryea, S.A (1998a): The Impact of Foreign-Born Labour on Canadian Wages: A panel Analysis, Vancouver Centre of Excellence: Research on Immigration and Integration on the Metropolis (RIIM), February Working paper No.98-06 Laryea, S.A (1998b): The Substitutability and Complementarity of Canadian and Foreighborn Labour: Circa 1990, Vancouver Centre of Excellence: Research on Immigration and Integration on the Metropolis (RIIM), Working paper No.98-09, April Mankiw, G.N. (2003). Macroeconomics, New York: Worth Publishers Marr, W.L., P.L. Siklos (1995): Immigration and Unemployment: A Canadian Macroeconomic Perspective, in D.J. DeVoretz (ed.): Diminishing Returns: The Economics of Canada's Recent Immigration Policy, The C.D. Howe Institute Toronto and the Laurier Institution, Vancouver, pp. 293-330 Marr, W.L., P.L. Siklos (1994): The Link between Immigration and Unemployment in Canada, Journal of Policy Modeling, Vol.16, No.1, pp.1-26 Marr, W.L (1973): The economic Impact of Canadian Inward and Outward Migration and Their Determinants, 1950-1967, unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Western Ontario Mosisa, A. T. (2002): The Role of Foreign-Born Workers in the U.S. Economy, Monthly Labour Review 125 Pischke J., J. Velling (1997): Employment Effects of Immigration to Germany: An Analysis Based on Local Labour Markets, Review of Economics and Statistics 79 Roy, A.S. (1997): Job Displacement Effects of Canadian Immigrants by Country of Origin and Occupation, International Migration review, Vol.31, No.1, spring, pp.150-61 Sderling, I. (2003): Integration of Migrants in Europe: The Case of Denmark 2003, paper presented at the conference `The Challenges of Immigration and Integration in the European Union and Australia', University of Sydney, February 18-20 SOPEMI (2003): Trends in International Migration. OECD Continuous Reporting System on Migration, Paris: OECD Publications Service Wallin, G., B. Kwam (2000): A Nordic Strategy for Maintaining Supply of Labour?, Nordic Labour Journal, 5 Withers, G, D Pope (1985): Immigration and Unemployment, Economic Record, 61 154 ASSESSING THE DETERMINANTS OF EMIGRATION INTENTIONS IN LATVIA AFTER THE EU ENLARGEMENT 155 Artjoms Ivevs 1) This paper analyses the structure of emigration from Latvia after the EU enlargement. We use the data from the 2005 survey on emigration intentions from Latvia to find out which factors determine emigration intentions of individuals belonging to different ethno-linguistic groups, males and females, as well as people living in the capital area and outside it. We conclude that younger individuals are more likely to emigrate and foreign work experience is an important emigration driver for the majority of the respondents. However, important intergroup differences exist with respect to other determinants of emigration. Living in the capital diminishes the probability of emigration for Latvian-speakers and males. Income is negatively linked with the willingness to move for Latvian-speakers, females and those living outside the capital, while Russian-speakers are more likely to emigrate when their income is higher. The networks are relatively unimportant emigration drivers for females, Russian speakers and those living in Riga. Finally, on average, ethnic minority respondents are more likely to go working abroad. Keywords: Emigration, EU enlargement, Latvia, ethnic minorities, networks 1) Tom (Artjoms) Ivevs, BA (University of Latvia), DEA, PhD (University of Aix-Marseilles II), is Research Fellow at Leverhulme Centre for Research on Globalisation and Economic Policy (GEP), Nottingham University. Contact address: School of Economics, Room C39, The Sir Clive Granger Building; University of Nottingham; University Park; Nottingham NG7 2RD UK; Tel: +44(0)115.846.8417; Fax: +44(0)115.951.4159; E-mail:; 1 Introduction The recent enlargement of the European Union (EU) has shown how delicate international labour flows are, even within a relatively homogeneous space such as the enlarged EU. While immigration continues to be an important issue for receiving states85, the governments of some new EU member state are becoming increasingly concerned by the massive outflows of domestic labour. For instance, it is estimated that up to 10% of the total workforce of Latvia one of the poorest EU state have left, temporarily or permanently, in search for higher earnings, principally to the UK and Ireland, and the trend is not decreasing. Besides the new states which joined the EU in 2004, emigration pressure is particularly high in Romania and Bulgaria which will to join the Union in 2007. The instantaneous effect of emigration on the growth of new EU members is certainly negative, and emigrants' return incentives are still not strong enough. This paper analyses the determinants of emigration intentions from Latvia. We use the data from a 2005 survey86 where the respondents where asked to evaluate their probability of going working abroad. The sample contains 1060 observations (in-depth face-to-face interviews) and is highly representative. Besides analysing the whole sample, we are also 85 86 E.g., immigration plays an important role in the negotiations over Turkey's accession to the EU. The survey was realised by the Marketing and Public Opinion Research Centre (located in Riga, Latvia: at the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia in order to assess the ongoing process of mass work emigration. 156 interested in determining the profile of a potential migrant in different respondents' groups: males and females, ethnic minority and majority, as well as individuals living in the capital and outside it. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the main theories explaining individual's emigration probability. We present the data and regression results in section 3. Conclusions summarise the work. 2 Insights from emigration theories and their implications for Latvia Ever since the age of mass migration over a century ago, economists, social scientists and politicians have tried to explain why people move from one place to another. The numerous migration theories developed so far rarely include all aspects of workers' movement across borders and regions, certainly due to complex and multifaceted nature of migration phenomena. It can be argued that the general theory of migration flows has not appeared yet. However, all existing theoretical approaches provide useful and interesting, though incomplete, insights into migration explaining87. The neo-classical migration theory is the oldest and, probably, the most influential one. Based on the pillars of neo-classical economics rational choice and individual utility maximization, its main idea is that flows of workers are contingent primarily on wage differential between source and destination region or country88. Migration is the result of individual decision made by rational actors who seek to increase their well being by moving to places where the reward of their labour is higher, taking into account the tangible and intangible costs associated with the move (Todaro, 1976). Sjaasted (1962) views migration as a form of investment in human capital, since it implies incurring certain costs in order to receive higher benefits from one's labour. In such a framework, inter alia, younger individuals should have higher probability of migrating. The wage differential between source and destination countries is by no means the most important driver of migration, but certainly not the only one. For example, the neoclassical theory cannot explain why two immigration receiving countries with similar welfare and wage levels have different immigration rates, or emigration intensity is not the same in two economically similar source countries. This approach, which concentrates almost only on 87 Arango (2000) notes that "the usefulness of theories that try to explain why people move is in our days dimmed by their inability to explain why so few people move. Theories of migration should not only look to mobility, but also to immobility. The classic pair `push' and `pull' should at least be complemented with `retain' and `repel'". See Arango (2000) for a critical review of theories explaining migration. 88 The importance of economic arguments as primary migration drivers was already recognized at the end of 19th century by Ravenstein (1885): "bad or oppressive laws, heavy taxation, an unattractive climate, uncongenial social surroundings, all have produced and are still producing currents of migration, but none of these currents can compare in volume with that which arises from the desire inherent in most men to "better" themselves in material respects". 157 income differentials at macro level, and practically excludes the human dimension of migration, was complemented by a set of new theories, such the new economics of labour migration and network theory, in the last quarter of the 20th century. The new migrationexplaining approaches highlight the not only economic, but also human nature of peoples' movement across borders. The new economics of labour migration also assumes rational behaviour of migrant, but views him more as the family or the household than the individual migrant. The migration is now a family strategy that is aimed not only to maximize income, but also to diversify sources of income, and minimize risks. Moreover, the migrants do not necessarily maximize their income absolute terms, but rather relative to other members in their reference group. Stark and Bloom (1985) and Stark and Taylor (1989) call this "relative deprivation", and argue that migration will be more pronounced in societies with higher income inequality where relative deprivation is felt more intensively. Obviously, the probability of emigrating will be higher for individuals at the bottom of income distribution, even when the wage level of the rich in the sending country is considerably lower than that in the potential destination country. Thus, wage differential between countries is not the only sufficient condition for migration to occur, as predicts the neo-classical approach. The third theory explaining migration flows recognizes the existence and importance of migration networks. Massey et al (1998) define them as sets of interpersonal relations that that link migrants with relatives, friends or fellow countrymen at home. They convey information, provide financial assistance, facilitate employment and accommodation, and give support in various forms. In so doing, they reduce the costs and uncertainty of migration and therefore facilitate it. Furthermore, as migration networks are cumulative, they induce "chain migration". Importantly, migration network approach provides a missing link between the macro focus of the neoclassical theory and micro focus of the new economics of migration. Next, a demand-driven migration approach is provided by the dual labour market theory. Its main idea is that advanced economies with segmented labour markets demand foreign labour for unattractive, unstable and low-productivity jobs in labour-intensive sector. This theory states that potential migrants must fill the pre-existing jobs upon arrival, which may not be always the case. Finally, a political dimension of international migration should necessarily be taken into account. Negative attitudes towards immigration which lead to restricted admission policies of immigrants dissuade the majority of would-be migrants who would move if only economic factors mattered. Political factors are nowadays much more influential than differential wages in determining international mobility or immobility (Arango 2001). 158 What emigration patterns would predict the above-mentioned theories for the Latvian case? With the EU enlargement in May 2004, bilateral free labour agreements have been established Latvia (as well as other new European states) on the one hand and the UK, Ireland and Sweden on the other. Finland and Spain are expected to lift restrictions of free work entry in 2006. While the outflow of Latvian workforce was non-negligible prior to the EU accession, it has been particularly intensive since 2004, mostly to the UK and Ireland. Therefore, the political reduction of entry barriers was crucial in intensifying emigration. But, the outflow would not be that pronounced if income differential were not that high. Indeed, Latvia remains the poorest EU economy, with income amounting to 40% of the EU-25 and 30 % of the EU-15. Apart from income differential as migration driver, another important prediction from the neoclassical and human capital theory is that younger and non-married individuals are more likely to move. As to income and education levels, are relatively poorer, and hence, less educated individuals will be more likely to move, since they feel relatively more deprived with respect to other members of their reference group. I also expect that migration networks would have a significant and positive effect on emigration from Latvia, particularly given that significant communities of Latvians have established in the UK and Ireland. 3 Data and regression results We use the data from the survey on emigration intentions of Latvian workforce realized by the Marketing and Public Opinion Research Centre in December 2005. The database consists of 1,060 observations (face-to-face in-depth interviews), corresponding to 0.1% of Latvian workforce. The sample is highly representative, insofar as it closely replicates Latvia's age, gender, ethnic and territorial distributions. The survey contains information on different respondents' socio-economic characteristics: age, sex, income, education, place of residence, marital status, household size, labour market status (student, unemployed, retired), first language spoken, foreign work experience, and information about family and friends networks abroad. The means of all variables are summarized in table 1 below. We focus only on the respondents aged 55 or younger, since older respondents have relatively low probabilities of going working abroad. Table 1: Socio-economic characteristics of the respondents Native language Gender Whole sample Latvian Russian Male Female Age (continuous 34.88 34.64 35.26 34.63 35.11 Place of residence Riga Other city agglomeration or urban area 33.80 35.75 159 variable) Sex (male) Married Child Household size Income (continuous variable) Student Unemployed Empl. in public sector Empl. in private sector Primary education Secondary education Secondary Vocational education Higher non-finished education Higher education Riga (capital) Other city Rural area Worked abroad Network info First language (Latvian) 48.5% 56.9% 53.6% 3.16 112.92 14.2% 7.1% 25.1% 47.0% 15.8% 21.0% 31.3% 11.3% 20.6% 29.6% 39.4% 31.0% 4.7% 68.3% 61.7% 46.7% 54.6% 53.8% 3.20 114.77 14.8% 7.6% 29.9% 43.2% 17.7% 20.3% 28.2% 11.8% 22.1% 21.6% 37.6% 40.8% 4.1% 67.7% 51.4% 60.6% 53.4% 3.10 13.0% 6.3% 17.3% 53.2% 12.7% 22.2% 36.3% 10.6% 18.3% 42.6% 42.3% 15.1% 5.6% 69.4% 60.8% 53.9% 3.20 14.4% 6.7% 18.3% 58.3% 19.4% 19.7% 34.2% 10.8% 15.8% 31.7% 36.4% 31.9% 6.4% 68.1% 59.4% 53.1% 53.4% 3.12 13.9% 7.6% 31.4% 36.4% 12.3% 22.3% 28.5% 11.8% 25.1% 27.7% 42.1% 30.1% 3.1% 68.6% 63.9% 50.8% 52.9% 49.8% 3.19 151.39 15.7% 4.5% 19.9% 54.7% 13.3% 21.8% 26.9% 13.9% 24.2% 66.5% 16.6% 16.9% 6.0% 65.3% 53.5% 46.7% 60.1% 56.7% 3.13 84.41 12.9% 9.2% 18.3% 58.3% 17.8% 20.4% 34.8% 9.2% 17.8% 57.7% 42.3% 3.6% 70.8% 68.4% 109.98 125.33 102.91 Before turning to estimation of the determinants of emigration intentions, it is worth mentioning several differences in socio-economic characteristics of the respondents belonging to distinct groups. First, about 38% of the respondents belong to the ethno-linguistic Russian speaking minority group. Compared to the Latvian-speaking majority, they share similar distributions of educational attainment and mean income, but are under-represented in the public sector, over-represented in the private sector and are more urbanized. Second, females are likely to have lower income, are more educated and are less two times less likely to have foreign work experience than males. Finally, the mean income of the respondents living outside Riga agglomeration is two times lower than that in the capital area, they have less foreign work experience and are more likely to be unemployed. The survey question which is of central interest for this study is "How high is the probability that you will go working abroad during the next two years?" Given that the respondents were asked to describe their willingness to move as "very high", "rather high", "rather low" or "very low" (a categorical and ordered variable), and the fact that the differences between the ranks are not necessarily equivalent, the model may be appropriately addressed by an ordered probit approach. 160 Along with variables which explain the willingness to emigrate and are available from the survey (see Table 1), we introduce several interacting variables: age*male, age*married, age*child, age*unemployed (to find out whether emigration propensity of men, married, respondents with child(ren) and unemployed increases or decreases with age), child*unemployed (whether having a child speeds up emigration of an unemployed person), child*unemployment rate and married*unemployment rate (whether bad future prospects reflected by high unemployment rate increase emigration propensity of married and those with child(ren)). To test Stark's relative deprivation theory, we introduce a variable relative income deprivation which is calculated by dividing respondent's income by the mean income of the community she lives in (corresponding to 25 administrative districts). Note also the variable household size, which, apart from the respondent herself, may include her children, spouse and parents. Unfortunately, the survey does not contain information on the number and age of respondents' children. Tables 2-5 report the determinants of emigration intentions of respondents in the mixed sample (Table 2), Latvian and Russian-speakers (Table 3), males and females (Table 4) and respondents living in Riga agglomeration (Riga and Riga district) and other cities and urban areas (Table 5). 161 Table 2: Determinants of emigration intentions, whole sample Ordered probit regressions, whole sample , age < 55 Dependent variable probability of emigration (1- very low.... 4 very high) Age Household size Household size Male Married Child Unemployed Age*male Age*married Age*child Age*unemployed Child*unemployed Child*unemployment rate Married*unemployment rate Public sector Student Riga Rural area Unemployment rate Primary education Secondary education Higher non-finished education Higher education Income Relative income deprivation Worked abroad Network information Latvian language # of obs Prob>chi Pseudo R 1 -0.027*** -0.167 0.016 0.151 -0.088 0.075 0.217 2 -0..027*** -0.155 0.015 0.144 -0.091 0.079 0.227 3 -0.037*** -0.268 0.026 4 -0.037*** -0.254 0.024 5 -0.026*** 6 -0.026*** 0.143 -0.151 -0.003 0.209 0.004 0.011** 0.000 0.009 -0.475 -0.044*** 0.021 -0.038 0.099 -0.354** -0.147 -0.006 -0.050 0.207 0.090 0.115 -0.0006 1.295*** 0.411*** -0.211* 494 0.000 0.091 0.003 0.010 0.000 0.009 -0.479 0.020 -0.043*** -0.036 0.111 -0.371*** -0.151 -0.005 -0.044 0.209 0.083 0.097 -0.037 1.267*** 0.410*** -0.214* 494 0.000 0.090 0.137 -0.151 0.007 0.220 -0.046 0.195 -0.345** -0.158 -0.017 -0.031 0.188 0.047 0.115 -0.0004 1.274*** 0.394*** -0.234** 494 0.000 0.085 -0.045 0.201 -0.357*** -0.160 -0.015 -0.028 0.190 0.042 0.100 -0.022 1.250*** 0.393*** -0.237** 494 0.000 0.085 -0.042 0.130 -0.358*** -0.176 -0.017 0.001 0.201 0.048 0.111 -0.0002 1.235*** 0.390*** -0.231** 494 0.000 0.084 -0.044 0.138 -0.362*** -0.173 -0.016 0.001 0.203 0.042 0.097 0.003 1.217*** 0.389*** -0.234** 494 0.000 0.084 Note: Robust standard errors used to calculate coefficients' level of significance: * - if a coefficient is significant at 10%, ** - at 5%, *** - at 1%. Pairwise correlation between variables male and age*male, child and age*child, married and age*married, unemployed and age*unemployed varies between 0.88 and 0.94, therefore they are not included in the same specifications. Reference for education: secondary vocational. Reference for Riga and rural area: other city. Household size is equal to the number of family members including the respondent. Unemployment rate is the unemployment rate in 2005 for the administrative district (region) in which the respondent lives (source: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia). Relative income deprivation is equal to the ratio of individual income over the average income (based on this survey data) in the administrative district (region) in which the respondent lives (altogether 25 districts). Network information dummy is equal to 1 if a respondent has family members or close friends who are currently working or have (recently) worked abroad. Latvian language dummy equals to 1, if a respondent is a native Latvian speaker, 0 if Russian speaker. 162 Table 3: Determinants of emigration intentions, by gender Ordered probit regressions, males, age < 55 Ordered probit regressions, females, age < 55 Dependent variable probability of emigration Dependent variable probability of emigration (1- very low.... 4 very high) (1- very low.... 4 very high) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 -0.026*** -0.324 0.036 -0.252 0.253 0.506 -0.033*** -0.433* 0.048 -0.032*** -0.400 0.045 -0.025*** -0.039 -0.003 -0.039 -0.074 -0.064 -0.025*** -0.037*** -0.049 -0.130 -0.002 0.003 -0.009 -0.076 -0.050 0.020*** -0.005 -0.004 0.183 0.021 -0.085*** -0.120 -0.041 -0.241 0.009 0.002 -0.106 0.466** 0.139 0.222 -0.002** -0.037*** -0.133 0.004 Specification Age -0.026*** Household size -0.352 Household size 0.039 Married -0.243 Child 0.252 Unemployed 0.480 Age*married Age*child Age*unemployed Child*unemployed Child*unemployment rate Married*unemployment rate Public sector -0.036 Student 0.154 Riga -0.513*** Rural area -0.392 Unemployment rate -0.011 Primary education -0.070 Secondary education -0.138 Higher non-finished -0.025 education Higher education 0.076 Income 0.000 Relative income deprivation Worked abroad 1.197*** Network information 0.684*** Latvian language -0.338** # of obs 223 Prob>chi 0.000 Pseudo R 0.128 0.002 0.007 0.021* -1.196 0.009 -0.018 -0.003 0.193 -0.483** -0.336 -0.005 -0.025 -0.162 -0.031 0.058 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.022* -1.198 0.009 -0.017 -0.024 0.187 -0.469** -0.326 -0.005 -0.018 -0.160 -0.046 0.023 0.020*** -0.004 -0.003 0.173 0.016 -0.081*** -0.104 -0.001 -0.329* -0.034 0.011 -0.093 0.473** 0.151 0.211 -0.056 0.145 -0.496** -0.380 -0.010 -0.061 -0.135 -0.039 0.040 -0.103 0.101 -0.177 -0.016 -0.019 0.052 0.432** 0.072 0.203 -0.002* -0.086 0.133 -0.264 -0.054 -0.012 0.050 0.433** 0.085 0.198 0.088 1.159*** 0.676*** -0.341** 223 0.000 0.129 1.186*** 0.679*** -0.320** 223 0.000 0.133 0.077 1.149*** 0.671*** -0.325** 223 0.000 0.133 1.506* 0.216 -0.061 271 0.000 0.070 -0.236* 1.473* 0.211 -0.064 271 0.000 0.069 1.576** 0.164 -0.049 271 0.000 0.087 -0.246** 1.527** 0.162 -0.053 271 0.000 0.086 Note: Robust standard errors used to calculate coefficients' level of significance: * - if a coefficient is significant at 10%, ** - at 5%, *** - at 1%. Pairwise correlation between variables male and age*male, child and age*child, married and age*married, unemployed and age*unemployed varies between 0.88 and 0.94, therefore they are not included in the same specifications. Reference for education: secondary vocational. Reference for Riga and rural area: other city. Household size is equal to the number of family members including the respondent. Unemployment rate is the unemployment rate in 2005 for the administrative district (region) in which the respondent lives (source: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia). Relative income deprivation is equal to the ratio of individual income over the average income (based on this survey data) in the administrative district (region) in which the respondent lives (altogether 25 districts). Network information dummy is equal to 1 if a respondent has family members or close friends who are currently working or have (recently) worked abroad. Latvian language dummy equals to 1, if a respondent is a native Latvian speaker, 0 if Russian speaker. 163 Table 4: Determinants of emigration intentions, by native language Ordered probit regressions, Latvian speakers, age < 55 Dependent variable probability of emigration (1- very low.... 4 very high) 1 2 Age -0.031*** -0.030*** Household size -0.148 -0.145 Household size 0.016 0.016 Male 0.061 0.045 Married -0.017 -0.009 Child -0.030 -0.036 Unemployed -0.093 -0.086 Age*male Age*married Age*child Age*unemployed Child*unemployed Child*unemployment rate Married*unemployment rate Public sector -0.026 -0.014 Student 0.090 0.122 Riga -0.421** -0.486** Rural area -0.251 -0.264* Unemployment rate -0.023* -0.018 Primary education 0.117 0.120 Secondary education 0.096 0.096 Higher non-finished 0.146 0.154 education Higher education 0.202 0.162 -0.0016 Income *** Relative income -0.164* deprivation Worked abroad 1.738*** 1.700*** Network information 0.586*** 0.580*** # of obs 303 303 Prob>chi 0.000 0.000 Pseudo R 0.105 0.104 3 -0.035*** -0.290 0.031 4 -0.035*** -0.286 0.031 Ordered probit regressions, Russian speakers, age < 55 Dependent variable probability of emigration (1- very low.... 4 very high) 5 -0.023** -0.206 0.017 0.266 -0.177 0.192 0.624 6 -0.022** -0.138 0.010 0.249 -0.196 0.187 0.661* 7 -0.037*** -0.216 0.014 8 -0.035*** -0.147 0.007 0.001 0.008 -0.006 0.005 -0.657 0.032* -0.014 -0.020 0.084 -0.449** -0.233 -0.034* 0.070 0.092 0.177 0.180 0.0016*** 0.001 0.007 -0.005 0.005 -0.674 0.029 -0.012 -0.009 0.123 -0.513*** -0.246 -0.028 0.079 0.094 0.185 0.138 -0.118 0.339 -0.292 -0.160 -0.009 -0.314 0.277 -0.339 0.047 0.0018 -0.168* 0.324** 0.701* 0.224 191.000 0.000 0.085 0.695* 0.230 191.000 0.000 0.088 -0.143 0.345 -0.213 -0.067 -0.017 -0.275 0.282 -0.316 -0.004 0.008* 0.014* 0.001 0.010 0.684 0.031 -0.090*** -0.051 0.040 -0.319 -0.250 0.023 -0.245 0.370 -0.247 0.067 0.0017 0.007 0.013* 0.001 0.012 0.680 0.035 -0.091*** -0.079 0.045 -0.249 -0.163 0.014 -0.226 0.373 -0.229 0.023 0.295* 0.669* 0.267 191.000 0.000 0.098 0.664* 0.272 191.000 0.000 0.101 1.765*** 0.594*** 303 0.000 0.111 1.725*** 0.588*** 303 0.000 0.109 Note: Robust standard errors used to calculate coefficients' level of significance: * - if a coefficient is significant at 10%, ** - at 5%, *** - at 1%. Pairwise correlation between variables male and age*male, child and age*child, married and age*married, unemployed and age*unemployed varies between 0.88 and 0.94, therefore they are not included in the same specifications. Reference for education: secondary vocational. Reference for Riga and rural area: other city. Household size is equal to the number of family members including the respondent. Unemployment rate is the unemployment rate in 2005 for the administrative district (region) in which the respondent lives (source: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia). Relative income deprivation is equal to the ratio of individual income over the average income (based on this survey data) in the administrative district (region) in which the respondent lives (altogether 25 districts). Network information dummy is equal to 1 if a respondent has family members or close friends who are currently working or have (recently) worked abroad. Latvian language dummy equals to 1, if a respondent is a native Latvian speaker, 0 if Russian speaker. 164 Table 5: Determinants of emigration intentions, by the place of residence Ordered probit regressions, Riga and agglomeration, age < 55 Dependent variable probability of emigration (1- very low.... 4 very high) 1 2 3 4 Age Household size Household size Male Married Child Unemployed Age*male Age*married Age*child Age*unemployed Child*unemployed Child*unemployment rate Married*unemployment rate Public sector Student Rural area Unemployment rate Primary education Secondary education Higher non-finished education Higher education Income Relative income deprivation Worked abroad Network information Latvian language # of obs Prob>chi Pseudo R -0.018* -0.288 0.029 0.214 -0.036 -0.058 -0.122 Ordered probit regressions, other cites and rural areas, age < 55 Dependent variable probability of emigration (1- very low.... 4 very high) 5 6 -0.037*** -0.239 0.029 0.083 -0.075 0.103 0.631** 7 -0.052*** -0.369 0.043 8 -0.052*** -0.374 0.043 -0.017* -0.038*** -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.265 -0.448** -0.410* -0.238 0.027 0.046* 0.043* 0.030 0.194 0.092 -0.056 -0.095 -0.055 0.111 -0.126 0.630** 0.006 0.006 0.022 0.022 0.016 0.015 -0.008 -0.006 0.059 0.068 -0.115 -0.106 -0.168 -0.155 -0.092 -0.175 -0.156 -0.087 0.001 0.015* 0.002 0.021** -0.523 0.015 -0.047** 0.064 0.199 -0.096 -0.016 -0.236 0.227 0.087 0.295 -0.002** 2.148 *** 0.556*** -0.207 282.000 0.000 0.135 0.001 0.015** 0.002 0.021** -0.538 0.012 -0.045** 0.081 0.223 -0.114 -0.011 -0.236 0.220 0.090 0.273 -0.194 * 2.087 *** 0.566*** -0.211 282.000 0.000 0.134 0.028 -0.088 0.032 -0.094 0.340 0.080 0.036 -0.149 0.000 0.987 ** 0.289 -0.360 ** 212.000 0.009 0.072 0.325 0.084 0.032 -0.177 0.108 0.964 ** 0.284 -0.375 ** 0.008 0.074 0.369 0.087 -0.015 -0.159 0.000 1.024 ** 0.318 -0.287 * 212.000 0.021 0.080 0.355 0.091 -0.017 -0.192 0.077 0.992 ** 0.310 -0.305 * 212.000 0.023 0.081 0.039 0.393 -0.100 -0.033*** -0.261 0.221 0.047 0.303 -0.002** 2.070 *** 0.527*** -0.256 * 282.000 0.000 0.128 0.054 0.412 -0.115 -0.029** -0.267 0.215 0.047 0.285 -0.167 * 2.014 ** 0.535** -0.258 * 282.000 0.000 0.127 Note: Robust standard errors used to calculate coefficients' level of significance: * - if a coefficient is significant at 10%, ** - at 5%, *** - at 1%. Pairwise correlation between variables male and age*male, child and age*child, married and age*married, unemployed and age*unemployed varies between 0.88 and 0.94, therefore they are not included in the same specifications. Reference for education: secondary vocational. Reference for Riga and rural area: other city. Household size is equal to the number of family members including the respondent. Unemployment rate is the unemployment rate in 2005 for the administrative district (region) in which the respondent lives (source: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia). Relative income deprivation is equal to the ratio of individual income over the average income (based on this survey data) in the administrative district (region) in which the respondent lives (altogether 25 districts). Network information dummy is equal to 1 if a respondent has family members or close friends who are currently working or have (recently) worked abroad. Latvian language dummy equals to 1, if a respondent is a native Latvian speaker, 0 if Russian speaker. 165 Our main results are summarized by the following points: Age. The negative and significant coefficient of age is consistent with the neoclassical theory of migration. However, the potential emigrants living outside Riga agglomeration (compared to those living in other cities and rural areas), as well as Latvian speaking emigrants are likely to be younger (the absolute value of the age coefficient is higher). Gender, marital status and children. On the whole, we do not find that being male or female, being married or single or having children affect the probability of emigration. Nevertheless, higher unemployment rate diminishes the propensity to emigrate of the respondents who are married and have children (spec. 3 and 4 in Table 2). Interestingly, the probability of going working abroad of married women, married ethnic minorities and married individuals living outside the capital increases with age (spec. 7 and 8 in Tables 3-5). These three categories of respondents are also particularly unlikely to go abroad from if the area where they live if hit by high unemployment. These findings suggest, first, that not only young and single individuals are the only potential migrants, since more aged married people whose children are probably already independent may have also non-negligible willingness to emigrate. Second, high unemployment rate (which is a reflection of disadvantageous economic conditions) may represent an obstacle to emigration for several groups of married individuals. Living in Riga. Because of the higher standard of living in the capital, we expect that those living in Riga will be less likely to emigrate. The negative and highly significant Riga dummy (spec. 1-6 in table 2) confirms this. However, contrarily to the Latvian speakers, living in the capital does not prevent Russian-speaking minority respondents from going abroad. This may be explained by the fact that a half of all ethnic minority population live in Riga, whereas the respective share for the ethnic Latvians is only 20%. Similarly, Riga coefficient is negative and highly significant for men, but not women. This could be related to the fact that in the capital there is a high demand for male labour (e.g. in construction). Therefore, staying in Riga may represent an alternative for emigration. Unemployed status. We do not find that unemployment status affects emigration decision for the whole sample. At the same time, the unemployed are more likely to emigrate if they live outside Riga agglomeration or belong to the Russian-speaking minority group. Another interesting result is that the probability of emigration of the unemployed increases with age for males and for those who live outside Riga. 166 Education. Education dummies are insignificant in all specifications, except for the females group where we find that women with secondary education are more likely to emigrate (we have used secondary vocational education as a reference value). Note the insignificance of the education dummies does not come from the possible multicollinearity with other explanatory variables (e.g. income). In specifications not presented in this paper, we excluded the variables that are likely to be correlated with educational attainment, but still did not find any significant effect of education. Income. While for the whole sample income does not appear to be an emigration driver, it is significant in several sub-samples. For respondents living outside the capital area, as well as for women, the probability of emigration diminishes with income (spec. 5 and 7 in Tables 3 and 5). For Latvian speakers, higher income is associated with lower probability of emigration (spec. 1 and 3 in Table 4), and for Russian speakers income coefficient is non-negative89 (whereas the coefficient is not significant in spec. 5 and 7 in Table 4, this is most likely due to multicollinearity). Among other things, these results confirm the absence of the financial constrain to migration (Faini and Venturini, 1994, Lopez and Schiff, 1998), since in several respondents' groups the lowest income is associated with the highest probability of emigration. Relative income deprivation. We find that ethnic Latvians, women and respondents living in cities other than Riga and urban areas are more likely to emigrate if their income is lower than the average income of their district (region) if residence. This result is consistent with the theory of relative income deprivation la Stark. However, for the ethnic minority individuals the theory "works" in the opposite direction Russian-speakers are more likely to emigrate in their income is higher that the average in the community they live in. This is an interesting result suggesting that for the ethnic minority there are additional incentives for emigration which will be discussed in a while. Foreign work experience. We find in all specifications that the respondents who have already worked abroad are more likely to repeat their migration experience. This result implies the circular or temporary nature of migratory flows from Latvia. Nevertheless, foreign work experience is a two times more important emigration driver for Latvian speakers, compared to 89 Whereas the coefficient is not significant at 10% in spec. 5 and 7 in Table 4, this is most likely due to multicollinearity. If we exclude variables related to income (e.g. Riga dummy or unemployment rate), the coefficient becomes significant at 10%. 167 Russian speakers. Similarly, respondents living outside Riga are two times more likely to go working abroad if they already have worked abroad, compared with similar Riga residents. Network information. Our results confirm an extremely important role of network connections in emigration. Networks are particularly significant for Latvian-speakers, males and those living outside Riga. On the contrary, the networks coefficient is insignificant for Russian speakers, females and the respondents from Riga. Among other things, this result implies that in Riga more information is available on job opportunities abroad, and therefore the respondents rely less on family and friends networks for emigration. Latvian language. Probably, the most intriguing result of this study is that individuals belonging to the ethno-linguistic minority group are more likely to emigrate. The language coefficient is significant in all specification for the whole sample, as well as for males and those living in the capital area. As argued earlier, this result means that Russian speakers face additional incentives to emigration. We provide several explanations why ethnic minorities could have higher emigration probability in Latvia today. First, the non-recognition of the main minority language (Russian) at the state level results in a particular type of labour market segmentation where minorities are under-represented in sectors where the knowledge of the state language (Latvian) is essential. For example, ethnic Latvians are over-represented in most public jobs, especially in the government, education and health (Zepa et al., 2005). In such a situation, Russian speakers could consider that their human capital is not appropriately rewarded in Latvia and would therefore be willing to emigrate. Second, Russian speakers could be concerned by the implementation of the education reform which stipulates a more intensive use of Latvian in Russian speaking schools and may be perceived as an attempt of assimilation. Note that our previous results also suggest these are ethnic minority individuals with higher income - and therefore more skilled who are more likely to emigrate. This means that Latvia is experiencing a minority brain drain with all the negative consequences on the countries economic, demographic and social prospects and development. 4 Concluding remarks This paper is the initial analysis of the 2005 Survey on emigration intentions from Latvia. The sample consists of 1,060 observations and is highly representative. Our objective is to determine the main emigration drivers for the whole population, as well as among different respondents' groups: males and females, ethnic majority and minority and individuals living in the capital area and outside it. 168 We find that age, network information and previous foreign work experience are important factors determining emigration probability of the majority of respondents. However, considerable differences exist in emigration "behaviour" of different groups of the respondents. The results suggest that ethnic Latvians and males are less likely to emigrate if they live in the capital area. The probability of emigration increases with age for married females and Russian speakers, and well as unemployed respondents living outside Riga. The willingness to emigrate is particularly low for respondents living in areas with high unemployment rates. The negative relationship between income and emigration probability is obtained for ethnic Latvians, females and respondents from rural areas and cities other than Riga. On the contrary, respondents belonging to the Russian speaking minority group are more likely to emigrate when their relative income (with respect to the district's mean) is higher. Finally, Russian-speaking respondents are on average more likely to emigrate. A more profound analysis of the different emigration "behaviour" of ethnic minority and majority groups is an important direction of our future research. In particular, we intend to explore the thesis that different kinds of anti-minority discrimination constitute an additional incentive to emigrate. The issue is all the more important in the context of increased migration opportunities in the enlarged European Union where the populations of the "new" member states comprise people with different linguistic, ethnic and religious origins. References Arango, J. (2000): Explaining Migration: A Critical View, International Social Science Journal, 165, pp. 285-296 Faini, R. and Venturini, A., (1994): Migration and Growth: The Experience of Southern Europe, CEPR Discussion paper 964 Lpez, R. and Schiff, M. (1998): Migration and the Skill Composition of the Labour Force: The Impact of Trade Liberalization in LDCs, Canadian Journal of Economics, 31(2): 318336 Massey, D., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A. and Taylor J.E. (1998): Worlds in Motion: International Migration at the End of the Millennium. Oxford: Oxford University Press Ravenstein, E. (1885): The Laws of Migration, Journal of the Statistical Society, 46: 167-235 Sjaastad, L. (1962): The Costs and Returns of Human Migration, Journal of Political Economy, 70: 80-93 Stark, O. and Bloom, D. (1985): The New Economics of Labour Migration, American Economic Review, 75 Stark, O., and Taylor, E. (1989): Relative Deprivation and International Migration, Demography 26: 114 169 Todaro, M., (1976): A Model of Labour Migration in Developing Countries, in Internal Migration in Developing Countries: A Review of Theory, Evidence, Methodology and Research, Geneva: BIT Zepa, B., Spule, I., Kave, E., Krastia, L., Krisne, J. and Tomsone, I. (2005): Ethnopolitical Tension in Latvia: Looking for the Conflict Solution, Baltic Institute of Social Sciences, available at 170 171 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND MOBILITY OF THE EU CITIZENS IN THE VISEGRAD GROUP COUNTRIES: COMPARISON AND BILATERAL FLOWS Radka Bicanov 1) Zuzana Fglov 2) Eva Kacerov 3) The aim of this paper is to evaluate the international migration and mobility of the EU citizens - from the old Member States as well as from the new Member States in four selected Visegrad countries. Most of the international migration in Visegrad countries is related to their historical and geographical ties. Thus the role of migrants from the EU15 in the total immigration flows is relatively small. Today, the EU citizens in Visegrad countries come mainly from other new Member States. Despite their geographical proximity and former economic integration within CEFTA, the four Visegrad countries are not significantly linked with international migration flows except for the Czech and Slovak relation. With regard to evaluation of regional economic integration, we have found out that the Czech and Slovak Republics are also significantly interconnected with labor migration. The migration relations between the Czech and Slovak republics are stronger than the trade flows although both countries are relatively more integrated in the regional trade than Hungary and Poland. For the latter countries it is typical that if they are integrated in regional economy they are more likely trade than migration flows. Keywords: international migration, Central Europe, EU enlargement and migration University of Economics, Prague, Department of World Economy University of Economics, Prague, Department of Econometrics 3) University of Economics, Prague, Department of Demography Contact person: Ing. RAdka (Bicanov) Papouskov, PhD, University of Economics, Faculty of International Relations, Department of World Economy; 4, Winston Churchill Sq., 130 67 Prague 3, Czech Republic; E-mail:; 2) 1) 1 Introduction Migration and mobility of workers among the EU Member States is very often mentioned as an important adaptation tool in economic and structural disruptions on the Single European Market and in asymmetric economic shocks for single European currency. However, the labour mobility has still the most barriers compared to trade or capital international flows, partly just because they are people who have to be moved. With regard to Eastern enlargement of the EU in 2004 most of the research studies in human migration were focused on the current and potential migration from the new Members to the old EU Member States (EU15)90. Nonetheless, the new Members have experienced a changing migration history 90 E.g.: Alvarez-Plata, Bruecker and Siliverstovs, 2003; Krieger, 2004; European Commission, 2001; Krichel and Levine, 2001; Straubhaar, 2001; Fassmann and Mnz, 2002; Bruder, 2003; etc. 172 which we found very interesting. Our aim was to find out whether there is also a reverse flow in migration of EU15 citizens towards Visegrad Group countries. As a second step our aim was to evaluate how important the bilateral migration flows between selected Visegrad Group countries are, because after the enlargement they have become the intra EU mobility. The final question was related to the impact of enlargement and relaxed mobility barriers for the EU citizens on the immigration flows in Visegrad Group Countries. We have selected the Visegrad Group Countries: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland because they are neighbour countries in Central Europe, they all have had a similar historical development in the last century and since early 90s they have undergone the economic transformation. They promoted regional trade with Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA) agreement since 1993 and their association with the European Union ended as a full membership in 2004. Although these countries are often compared with each other we keep in mind that they differ in size (area, population) as well as in economic development. However, our hypothesis was that these four countries might also have tight relations in form of human migration. The paper is divided into three sections: in the first one we briefly comment on the role of international migration in these selected countries. The second section is focused on the EU citizens among the international migrants in four selected countries. Finally, the third part analyzes the bilateral flows among the selected countries and compares migration to trade flows. 2 Migration experience in Visegrad Countries Central and Eastern European countries were traditionally rather emigration then immigration countries. Although the migration flows were restricted after the Second World War up to the beginning of the 1990s, all selected countries recorded a slight negative net migration. According to R. Mnz and H. Fassmann (1995: 2), more than 14 million people left Central and Eastern European countries during 1950-1992, out of which most were from East Germany (37%), Yugoslavia (17%), Poland (14%) and Soviet Union (12%)91. Emigrants targeted mainly Western Europe (2/3 moved to Germany) but also overseas destinations such as the USA, Canada, and Australia. Turbulent early 1990s were typical with relaxed migration controls and large movements of people partly ethnic motivated, partly "freedom" oriented. Approximately 400 thousand people left four Visegrad countries in the early 90s. K. Iglicka from Warsaw estimates that 6 million people emigrated from Poland alone in the post-war period (Iglicka, 2005). 91 173 Table 1 Average yearly net international migration in Visegrd Countries 1960-1999 (in thousands) 1960-64 Czech Rep. Slovakia Hungary Poland -16.6 22.0 0.9 -6.3 1965-69 -0.4 -5.3 0.9 -20.1 1970-74 -21.6 -9.8 -1.6 -71.7 1975-79 2.2 -3.0 -1.0 -40.3 1980-84 -6.6 -5.6 -11.8 -23.1 1985-89 2.4 -3.5 -26.7 -41 1990-94 -5.8 -7.5 0.1 -14.9 1995-99 10.1 1.9 0.0 -14 Source: European Social Statistics: Migration, European Communities (2002: 47) Later on situation has changed: from emigration countries they became transit countries for migrants from Balkan, Eastern Europe and Middle East, and so called "buffer zone" between east and west. They started to host migrants on their territory while the emigration has become more temporary. The countries with more or less successful economic transition have become also target countries for international migrants. From the Graph 1 it is evident that this holds in particular for the Czech Republic and Hungary, while Slovakia and Poland still show significant emigration rates. We have to keep in mind that these data include quite undervalued numbers of emigrants and due to differences in migrant categories and changes in legislation; the international comparisons are quite difficult. The more advanced Czech Republic and Hungary show in most of the years rather positive net international migration resulting in growth of number of foreigners within their population. Although Slovakia shows positive net migration according to official figures, it is estimated that 10-15 thousand people leave the country annually resulting in net emigration rates (Divinsky, 2005). The Slovaks are the third biggest group of foreigners from new Member States who have applied for work in Great Britain in the first year of EU membership (following Poles and Lithuanians) (Home Office, 2005). However, according to OECD data, the Czech and Slovak Republics belong to countries with the highest increase of foreign population. In Visegrad countries lived altogether 450 thousands of foreigners in 2003 (OECD, 2005). The highest share of foreigners in total population can be found in the Czech Republic and Hungary - over 1%, in Poland and Slovakia the share of foreigners in total population is very low. When comparing to western European countries still the role of international migration is smaller. Countries like Austria, Germany, Belgium or Switzerland reach the share of foreigners of 8% in total population (Salt, 2005). We would find higher numbers and shares of foreigners if we count foreign population as foreign born and not according to citizenship: in the Czech Republic 4.5% population is foreign born, while in Slovakia 2.5%, in Hungary 2.9% and in Poland 2.1% (OECD, 2005: 142). 174 Graph 1 Net migration in Visegrad countries 1995 2003 (in thousands) 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 -5 -10 -15 -20 -25 thousands 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia Source: Data: Council of Europe (Salt, 2005) Table 2 Number of foreigners and their share in total population in Visegrad Countries (in thousand, %) 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Czech Rep. 77.7 103.7 158.6 198.6 209.8 219.8 228,9 201.0 210.8 231.6 240.4 As % of total 0.8 1.0 1.5 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.4 population Slovakia 11 16.9 21.9 24.1 24.8 27.4 29.5 28.3 29.4 29.5 29.3 As % of total 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 population Hungary .. 137.9 139.9 142.5 148.3 150.2 153.1 110.0 116.4 115.9 130.1 As % of total .. 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.3 population Poland .. .. .. 29.9 32.5 .. 42.8 .. .. 49.2 .. As % of total .. .. .. 0.1 0.1 .. 0.1 .. .. 0.1 .. population Source: OECD (2005): Trends in International Migration 2004, p. 334; Council of Europe (Salt, 2005) Note: data for the Czech Republic include only permanent residents up to 2000, since 2001 include persons with asylum status and foreigners with long term residence (over 90 days) who are staying longer then 1 year. Data for Hungary include long term residence staying longer than 1 year. Data for Poland include foreigners with permanent residence and with restricted residence permit. Foreigners in Visegrad countries are mainly citizens of neighbour and close by countries. One can observe that the geographical proximity as well as existence of ethnic groups, language and historical ties is very important. The most important groups of foreigners are: in the Czech Republic citizens of Slovakia, Ukraine, Vietnam and Poland; in Hungary citizens of Romania, Ukraine, Serbia, Montenegro (foreign born in Romania, Czechoslovakia, Soviet Union); in Poland citizens of Ukraine, Russia, Germany and Belarus; 175 in Slovakia citizens of the Czech Republic, Ukraine and Poland (foreign born in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Ukraine) (OECD, 2005: 327). Most of the migration is economic motivated although it is difficult to compare situation in selected countries because of different regimes of residence permits. The labour migration is the most important part of total migration flows. Migrants from certain countries create often recognizable and important segments on the labour markets, such as Ukrainians in the Czech Republic or Romanians and Ukrainians in Hungary working in construction industry or in seasonal work, while citizens of Vietnam or China work as traders or entrepreneurs in restaurants and retailing. Some of the migrants work without a valid work permit, usually in construction industry, agriculture, forestry or cleaning services. These data are difficult to collect. Many of the migrants headed towards the Western Europe but remained in the Central European transit countries. Lately, the networks of countrymen, experiences of the first comers and growing economies in Central European countries have attracted migrant workers to the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia as to final destinations. The foreign workers are unequally distributed within the host countries with majority concentrated in the capital cities (Prague, Bratislava, Budapest, and Warsaw) and prosperous regions. This is evident in particular in Slovakia (Salt, 2005). Besides of the labour migration, the family reunification is very important and recently we observe high dynamics in education motivated migration (OECD, 2004: 293). Although Visegrd countries are not recognized as traditional educational centres (such as UK, USA, Australia, Germany) the number of students - foreigners raises dynamically every year as well as the share of foreigners in total student population (see Table 3). This is true in particular for the Czech Republic (Bicanova, 2004). Table 3 Number of foreigner students in Visegrd countries in 1999 and 2002 Number of foreigner students (in thousands) 1999 2002 Czech Rep. Slovakia Hungary Poland 4,583 8,869 5,693 9,783 1,643 11,783 7,401 Share of foreigners in total university students (in %) 1999 2002 1.9 3.2 0.4 3.4 1.1 3.3 0.5 Fivemost important countries of origin of students foreigners (2000/01) Slovakia, Greece, UK, Russia, Ukraine Czech Rep., Greece, former Yugoslavia, Ukraine, Israel Romania, Slovakia, former Yugoslavia, Ukraine, Israel Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Norway Source: Eurostat Statistics in focus 1/2005; OECD (2004): Education at Glance 2004 176 Most of the migration statistics do not include asylum seekers. Since early 1990s Visegrd Countries have received many asylum seekers who have been refused in western European countries and returned to transit countries where they came from. In some selected countries in Central Europe (Czech Republic in 2003 11,400, Slovakia in 2003 10,300) the number of asylum seekers overtook numbers in some western European countries (OECD, 2005: 315). 3 Role of EU citizens in international migration The EU membership has meant some important changes for Visegrad countries in the field of migration. As Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland became members (together with other countries) of the EU, their citizens became EU citizens with all their rights and freedoms with exception to free movement of workers which remains restricted for a transitional period (2+3+2 years). The movement of new Member States citizens in the old EU15 states has been discussed and feared most. However, the EU enlargement has brought also free movement of the EU15 nationals on their territory as well as free movement of other new Member States citizens, which is probably the most important change for migration reality in the new Member States. The countries also had to adopt all the rules of acquis in their legislation, including free movement of EU citizens and visa policy with regard to the third country nationals. Along with the EU membership, the Visegrad countries also became more attractive for asylum seekers and labour migration from the non EU countries. Released obstacles for entry and work in new Member States have not changed trends in bilateral migration flows dramatically but they meant just easier access and possible higher underestimation of migration data. Although it is usually compulsory (or at least essential) for the foreign workers and residents to register according to national rules, many foreigners (EU citizens) do not obey these rules. As we will see in individual countries, when analyzing the mobility of EU citizens in the Visegrad countries, majority of these EU citizens come from new Member countries. The EU15 citizens usually come as entrepreneurs, spets or professionals, often accompanying the investment of foreign companies (OECD, 2005). The mobility of the new Member States citizens towards old EU15 countries can be only evaluated in UK, Ireland and Sweden, in countries which opened up their labour markets immediately after enlargement. According to British Home Office some 232 thousand citizens of new Member States registered for work within the first year (1.5.2004 30.6.2005). Most of the workers are young people who do not have dependants with them. The three biggest groups are citizens of Poland (131.3 thousands, 57% of all), Lithuania (33.8 thousands 15%) 177 and Slovakia (24.4 thousands, 11%). From the Czech Republic and Hungary only 14.6 thousand, respectively 6.9 thousand, workers registered in UK (Home Office, 2005). Since 1st May 2006 four other countries (Finland, Portugal, Greece and Spain) released barriers to entry on the labour market for new Member Countries. In the rest of the old EU countries citizens of new Member States need a work permit and have to respect national rules, although for some professions the access to work can be very easy. 3.1 Czech Republic and the EU citizens' migration Out of the selected countries, the Czech Republic hosts the highest number of foreigners on its territory. As of the 31st December 2006, there lived 278,312 foreign nationals in the Czech Republic, out of these 110,598 had a permanent residence permit and 145,909 had temporary residence permit (EU citizens and their family members). The rest of the foreigners (21,805) had long term visa for the period over 90 days. Recognized asylum holders (1,799) are not included ( According to data of the Czech Statistical Office, the number of EU25 citizens reached 87,142 at the end of 2005, out of which 18,784 were citizens of EU15 and 68,358 were citizens of the new Member States. The enlargement in 2004 increased the number of EU citizens residing in the Czech Republic 6 times: mainly because of entry of other new countries (Slovaks and Poles are important migrant groups), but also because of increased numbers of EU15 citizens. The share of the EU25 citizens in total foreigner population increased to 31.3% ( The graph shows the number of foreigners according to their country of origin: EU citizens are divided into two groups to old and new Member States. The share of acceding countries Romania and Bulgaria is 2.5% of all foreigners. The number of the EU15 citizens in the Czech Republic has been steadily increasing from the beginning of the 1990s to almost 16 thousand in 1999. In 2000 we could observe a drop to 13 thousand because of changes in the legislation. Since then their number increased again (by 30% between 2005/2003) and reached 18.8 thousand EU15 citizens in 2005 ( Still the share of the EU15 citizens has been relatively low since 1997 between 6-7% of total number of foreigners. The most important groups of EU15 citizens are Germans (almost 40%), Austrians (12%), Britons (11%), Italians (9%), Frenchmen (8%), Dutchmen and Greeks. According to data of Czech Statistical office, the highest increase in total numbers of residing EU citizens between 2003 and 2005 was observed in case of Ireland, The Netherlands, Germany, Italy and UK (Bicanova et al, 2005). 178 Graph 2 Foreigners in the Czech Republic as of 31.12. 200 000 180 000 160 000 140 000 120 000 100 000 80 000 60 000 40 000 20 000 0 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 EU 15 EU 9 Ro+Bu Other Source: Czech Statistical Office ( Cizinci v CR) It is quite important to differentiate between the two groups of EU citizens, although they have the same treatment with regard to laws and rights. The migration of EU15 citizens is mainly economic motivated, two thirds of working foreigners work as employees (have working permit) and one third holds valid trade licence. Also looking at the age structure, more then 70% of foreigners are between 25-54 years. According to available data, the EU15 citizens work in highly skilled positions since 60% of work permits issued in 2003 to EU15 citizens required university education ( We have also found out that the place of residence of EU15 citizens in regions of the Czech Republic is highly correlated with location of foreign direct investment (Bicanova, 2005). The Graph 3 shows required education for the work permits issued in the Czech Republic in 2003. Unfortunately these data do not include Slovakian citizens who did not need work permits according to bilateral agreement between the Czech and Slovak Republic and the Slovaks make up 50% of the foreign workers. We can estimate that the share of university educated foreigners from new Member States including Slovakia is lower than in case of the EU15 citizens. 179 Graph 3 Work permits in the Czech Republic according to required level of education in 2003 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 15 un +L ith +S lo R o+ Bu rm EU ot he r its University Secondary with GCSE Secondary without GCSE Basic w or k pe To ta lv al id Po l+ H Source: Czech Statistical Office The Graph 4 presents employment of EU25 citizens in NACE structure which differs with employment of other migrants who are dominantly active in trade activities (G) and construction (F). Graph 4 Employment of EU25 citizens 31.12.2004 A Agricuture and forestry 2% 14% 12% 4% C Mining and quarrying D Manufacturing 35% F Construction G Wholesale and retail trade; repairs K Real estate, renting and business activities other services 14% 19% Source: Czech Statistical office To sum up, the share of EU citizens in total foreign population in the Czech Republic increased due to the EU enlargement from 7% to more than 30% in 2005 and the share of EU citizens among working foreigners raised to 49% (4% EU15, 45% EU9). 180 3.2 Slovakia and the EU citizens' migration Slovakia has been traditionally an emigration country, but since 1990s we consider it a transit country with positive net migration. According to Slovakian Statistical office, the positive net migration was largest in 2004 as a result of the EU entry as well as higher migration from South East Europe. However, according to unofficial estimates the net migration is negative with 15-20 thousand people leaving the country to the Czech Republic (42%) or Western Europe (Divinsky, 2005). Citizens of Central and Eastern European countries are the most important group of migrants with 57% of all foreigners immigrating in 2004. These flows were mainly from the Czech Republic, Ukraine, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Poland, Macedonia and Hungary. The citizens of the EU15 represent 20% of all immigrants in 2004, in particular from Germany, Austria, UK, France, and Italy. According to Divinsky (2005: 47), their numbers are slightly increasing because of the relaxed entry conditions due to the EU membership and because of the raising role of foreign direct investment in the country. The role of EU citizens is slightly higher in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic. According to official data, 8,343 EU25 citizens had a residence permit in April 2005 in Slovakia which represents slightly over 40% of all (permanent as well as temporary) residence permits in the country (total 22,802). The most important groups of EU citizens were at the end of 2004 citizens of the Czech Republic (3,583), Poland (2,468) and Hungary (1,519) making together 80% of the EU citizens in Slovakia, followed by Germany (988) and Austria (576) (Divinsky, 2005: 68 -77). After the enlargement, the EU25 citizens are the most important group of foreign workers, representing 77% of all work permits in 2004 (1,838 out of 2,379). However, Divinsky estimates that their number must have been at lest twice as much (Divinsky, 2005: 77). It means that many of the EU citizens do not register for residence and work since there is no penalty and they use their right to move and settle freely within the EU. We can sum up that as in the case of the Czech Republic, the increase in the share of the EU citizens occurred mainly because of the entry of other Central European countries in the EU. The citizens of the EU, in particular from Western Europe, work in highly qualified positions as managers, experts, company representatives. The number of the EU citizens will remain underestimated since many foreigners do not register with the relevant authorities. 181 3.3 Hungary and the EU citizens' migration Hungary is a country with second highest international migration among the selected countries. While for much of the 20th century, Hungary was a nation of emigrants, since 1989, the trend seems to have turned and Hungary has become a desirable destination. In January 2005 there lived 140 thousands of foreigners with residence permit in Hungary (Hungary, 2004: 10). Most of the foreigners come from neighbouring Central and East European countries with large ethnic groups of Hungarians. The most important groups of foreigners come from Romania, Ukraine, Serbia and Montenegro, Germany, Slovakia and China. This is reflected also on the labour market as out of 48 thousands work permits issued in 2004, 60% were granted to Romanians, 14% to Ukrainians, 3% to Serbians, and 3% to Slovaks (Statistics 2002-2005). The number of Czech and Polish nationals was even smaller than the number of work permits guaranteed to Japanese (0.8%) who accompany the foreign direct investment in Hungary. In 2002 approximately 12.2 thousand EU15 citizens lived in Hungary, representing 10.5% foreign residents (Juhasz, 2003). The enlargement of the EU has brought 3times more Slovaks registering for work and over 9,350 new residence registrations for EU citizens in 2004 (Dunai, 2005). This does not necessarily mean an increase in total number of foreign workers but rather increase in legally employed Slovaks. Furthermore, the number of the EU citizens' applications increased between 2004 and 2005 by 38%. In 2005, the residence permit was granted to 12,898 EU25 citizens who account for approximately 19% of residence and settlement permit applications lodged in 2005. Most important groups of applicants in 2005 were Germans (4,569) and Slovaks (2,368), followed by Austrians, French and British nationals (each between 800 and 1,000) (Statistics 2002-2005). To sum up, the migration of EU citizens is relatively less important in Hungary than in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland, but this can significantly change with future enlargement which includes Romania and it is the most important migrants group in Hungary. 3.4 Poland and the EU citizens' migration In contrast to formerly mentioned Visegrad countries, Poland is larger and more populous country which has been considered as an important source of migration and a reserve of labour in Europe. Poland is a country with negative net migration and the Polish Diaspora creates conditions for current migration outflows. However, the role of Poland in international migration trends has been modified by its geographical location between East and West and by its EU membership to a country with complete migration experience (emigration as well immigration, different kinds of migration,...) (Iglicka, 2005). 182 In 2002, 49 200 foreigners lived in Poland and they were mainly citizens of former Soviet Union countries (Ukraine 20%, Russia 9%, Belarus 6%, Armenia 3% of foreigners) (OECD, 2005: 251). These migrants represent temporary work migration, quite often illegal. Second most important group of migrants are Vietnamese and Chinese merchants and businessmen. The third group is comprised of highly skilled workers, often managers and professionals from western countries. Some of them are descendants of former emigrants, in particular to Germany). The re-emigrants and descendants of emigrants often come for doing business and support companies, as managers, experts, consultants, or teachers (UK). In 2003, the EU15 citizens received 18 % of all residence permits, which were mainly granted to German citizens (permanent as well as temporary stays), French and UK citizens (temporary stays). The share of EU25 would be approximately 20% (Iglicka, 2005). Unlike in Czech and Slovak Republic, in Poland most of the EU citizens are from Western European Countries. The central European new Member States comprise a small share. 4 Bilateral migration flows in Visegrad countries Although there are problems with data availability and international comparability in the field of international migration due to different kinds of permits, underestimation of undocumented migration, and different kinds of systems of data collection, we tried to identify the most important bilateral migration flows between Visegrad countries. Selected countries are neighbours and are economically related; possibly they can be connected also by migration flows. The table 4 shows the most important migrations from other Visegrad countries ranked by the number of foreigners in host country in 2003. This corresponds with the number of working foreigners in Visegrad countries. We can observe that the bilateral migration relations are not most important (compared to other groups of foreigners in the Visegrad countries) with exception to the CR SR relation. In absolute numbers, the Slovaks in the Czech Republic followed by Poles in the Czech Republic are the most important migration relations. When we use data of foreign born population in particular countries (third column in Table 4) we can identify two other important migrant groups: people born in the Czech Republic living in Slovakia and people born in Czechoslovakia living in Hungary. 183 Table 4 Most important bilateral migrations in Visegrd countries (last available year, in thousands) Number of Number of working Number of foreigners in foreigners foreign born host country persons 66.3 56.8 285.3 1. Slovaks in CR (2003) 16.3 6.8 24.7 2. Poles in CR (2003 4.9 2 75.6 3. Czechs in Slovakia (2003, 2002) 2.8 (only SR) 39.9 4. Czechs and Slovaks in Hungary (2002) 3.9 2.4 0.1 3.4 5. Poles in Slovakia (2003) 1.9 0.3 2.7 6. Poles in Hungary Source: OECD (2005): Trends in International Migration 2004 Note: The data in the third column shows that e.g. 285.3 thousand people living in the Czech Republic were born in Slovakia. Migration Using these data we also calculated the relative importance of migrants from other Visegrad countries in total number of foreigners. The high relative importance (migration relation) can be found in case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, in which the share of foreigners from other three Visegrad countries reached 35%, and 29% respectively. In Hungary and Poland, foreigners from other countries are more important. When using data on foreign born population, relative relations are more important. The share of other three Visegrad countries in total foreign born population reached in 2003 70.5% in the Czech Republic, almost 81% in Slovakia, 14.5% in Hungary and 1.2% in Poland (use data OECD, 2005: 146-147). We believe that these numbers reflect common or relative history paths, national border changes or migration behaviour of previous generations. Tab. 5 Relative importance of selected countries' citizens in total number of foreigners (%) Host country Home country CR SR Hungary Poland Total Visegrd countries 1 CR (2003) x 27.9 0.2 1 6.9 35.0 SR (2003) 16.7 X < 53 8.2 < 29.9 Hungary (2002) 3.42 x 1.6 5.0 Poland (2002) 1.6 < 0.13 < 0.13 x < 1.8 Source: own calculation based on OECD data (Trends in International Migration 2004: Tab. B.1.5), and: Czech statistical office (Cizinci v CR 2004) 2 this figure is a sum of shares of people with Czechoslovakian citizenship (2400) and Slovakian citizenship (1500). We assume that most of the Czechoslovakian citizens were Slovaks. 3 these data correspond to the last quoted groups of foreigners in the statistics, the selected countries were not quoted thus their number must have been smaller. Note: The figure 27.9 in first column and second row states that Slovakian citizens make up 27.9% out of all foreigners in the Czech Republic We also analyzed the economic relations of Visegrad countries which created CEFTA in 1993, using the bilateral shares of migrant workers and trade flows. We found out that interconnection is higher when using numbers of employed foreigners than total foreign population (measured by citizenship) (see last row in tab. 6). It is also clear that the 184 interconnection is much higher in the Czech - Slovak relation than with other countries because of the common history as a one country until 1993. The bilateral flows of Czech and Slovaks make a very important part of international workers mobility in these two countries. Tab. 6 Relative importance of workers from Visegrd countries in total employment of foreigners (%) Host country CR (2003) SR (2002) Hungary (2002) Poland (2003) Home country x 42.5 < 0.7 < 1.2 CR 55.7 x 6.6 < 1.2 SR < 0.3 <2 x < 1.2 Hungary 6.7 2.1 0.7 x Poland Total Visegrd countries < 62.7 < 46.6 < 8.0 < 3.6 Source: OECD (2005): Trends in International Migration 2004 (Ttab B.2.4); own calculations Migration linkages with other Visegrad countries are much smaller in Hungary and Poland, but we can see that in case of Hungary there is some evidence of workers migration from Slovakia. The Slovaks work in north-western Hungary where many of the foreign investment companies are located and demand labour force. Maybe even more people are commuting to Hungary (Dunai, 2005). For Poland the data are so insignificant, that they were not available. When we compared the migration data with bilateral trade linkages we could observe that it was Slovakia which has the highest share of trade in the regional Visegrd relations (24% of exports, 20% of imports), followed by the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (see Table 7). Also this higher performance in trade is again the result of deep bilateral relations of CR and SR. If we compare migration and trade linkages in the Visegrd countries, we can sum up: 1) economic engagement of CR and SR in the region is higher when using migration numbers than trade numbers; 2) both CR and SR are more engaged in the regional relations than Hungary and Poland, but this is the result of former Czechoslovakia and cultural proximity; 3) Hungary and Poland are less active in the regional relations but if they are engaged it is more by trade (7-9%) then by migration, this is true particularly for Poland; 4) Poland is an exporter of workers, partly to Visegrad countries (CR, SR) but mainly to western European countries; 5) in case of CR we were able to compare the migration flows with trade as well with FDI. The share of Visegrad countries in total FDI stocks to CR was 9% and in total stock of DI abroad 22.6 %. The Czech Republic is a provider of investments in Visegrad countries (data of Czech National Bank, 185 Tab. 7 Share of exports to Visegrd countries in total export of CR, SR, Hungary and Poland (2004, %) Host country Home country CR SR Hungary Poland CR x 13,32 2,37 4,32 SR 8,36 x 2,17 1,79 Hungary 2,74 5,2 x 2,57 Poland 5,10 5,49 2,86 x Export to selected countries 16,20 24,01 7,40 8,68 Source: own calculations, national statistical offices and CNB Note: 8.36 in first row and second column means that 8.36% of total Czech exports in 2004 went to Slovakia. Share of imports from Visegrd countries in total imports of CR, SR, Hungary and Poland (2004, %) Host country Home country CR SR Hungary Poland Import from selected countries CR x 5,29 2,03 4,58 11,90 SR 13,22 X 3,3 3,89 20,4 Hungary 2,85 1,77 x 3,21 7,83 Poland 3,62 1,65 1,89 x 7,16 Source: own calculations, national statistical offices and CNB Note: 13.22 in first row and second column means that 13.22% of total imports to Slovakia in 2004 came from the Czech Republic. 5 Conclusion In average the EU15 citizens comprised one third of all foreigners living in EU15 countries in 2002 (the social situation 2003). This is now also true for new Member States where in CR the share of EU25 citizens in total foreigners reaches 30% and in Slovakia is over 40%. There are differences in Visegrad countries; the role of EU citizens in total migration is higher in the CR and SR because of strong bilateral relations and common past. In Hungary and Poland we observe higher relations with neighbour countries in South and East than with the EU25 countries. After the enlargement the share of EU citizens in Visegrad countries increased mainly by the fact that other important migration sources became Members too, partly by an increase in EU15 citizens (Poland). The role of migrants from the EU15 in the total immigration flows in Visegrad countries is relatively small. Anyway, the number of EU15 citizens has been gradually rising with the deeper economic relations of Visegrad Group countries with the European Union during the 90s and with investments (FDI). Migration from the old EU15 countries is mainly economic motivated: EU15 citizens usually work in highly skilled positions and they are located in regions with economic opportunities. Although the Visegrad countries share borders, historical and economic path, the bilateral migration relations are not dominant except of CR-SR relation, and to some extent in case of Poles in the Czech Republic. The migrants in Visegrad countries are mainly citizens of other neighbour or geographically close or ethnically, historically or linguistic related countries. Other factors play more important role in migration relations rather then regional economic integration (CEFTA). 186 For the comparison of the form and depth of regional integration we used the relative share of number of foreigners from the rest three Visegrad countries in the total number of foreigners (measured as foreign workers) for every single Visegrad country and we also counted the share of imports and exports with the three Visegrad countries in total imports and exports for every single Visegrad country. We have found out that the Czech and Slovak Republics are also significantly linked with labour migration. There is also relation between Slovakia and Hungary with regard to labour force. The migration relations between the Czech and Slovak republics are stronger than the trade flows although both countries are relatively more integrated in the regional trade than Hungary and Poland. For the latter countries it is typical that if they are integrated in regional economy they are more likely trade than migration flows. Poland is an important labour exporter but these workers are mainly active in the old EU Member States. The strong Czech and Slovak regional participation can be explained mainly by their strong bilateral economic ties. References Alvarez-Plata, P., Bruecker, H. and Siliverstovs, B. (2003): Potential Migration from Central and Eastern Europe into the EU-15. An update report for the European Commission DG Employment and Social Affairs, Brussels: European Commission ISBN 92-894-6373-2 Bicanov, R. (2004): Mezinrodn migrace a jej vliv na konkurenceschopnost ceskho hospodstv, Working paper 26/2004, Prague: Institute of Integration of the Czech Republic into the European and world economy; pp.31 Bicanov, R., Kacerov, E. and Fglov, Z. (2005): Mezinrodn migrace mezi vybranmi novmi clenskmi zemmi Evropsk unie. Vzkumn grantov kol GRACES. Prague: University of Economics, 72 p. Bicanova, R. (2005): Zapojen CR do tok pmch investic po roce 2000 a vztah stavu PZI v zemi s mezinrodn migrac. In Beranova, P., Bicanova, R., Bic, J., Luks, Z., Mal, J., Tauser, J., Wawrozs, P. and Zambesk, P.: Globalizace a integrace: implikace pro hospodskou politiku a zmny prvnho du, Working paper 12/2005. Prague: Institute of Integration of the Czech Republic into the European and world economy; 270 p. Bruder, J. (2003): East-West-Migration in Europe, 2004-2015, Thnen-Reihe Angewandter Volkswirtschaftstheorie, Diskussionspapier Nr. 40, 2003 CS (2005): Cizinci v Cesk republice 2004, Czech Statistical Office, section Foreigners in the CR ( Pragu: CS ISBN 80-250-0858-4 Divinsk, B (2005): Zahranicn migrcia v Slovenskej republike, Bratislava: F.Ebert Stiftung Dunai, M. (2005): The New EU: Work in Progress; Commutes Trump Relocation in East, Easing Fear of Migrant Flood, in Wall Street Journal (Eastern edition), Apr 5, 2005, New York, N.Y., pg. A.15. European Commission (2001): The Impact of Eastern Enlargement on Employment and Labour Markets in the EU and the Member States, Brussels European Communities (2002): European Social Statistics: Migration. Luxembourg: European Communities ISBN 92-894-4327-8 European Communities (2005): Population in Europe 2004, First Results. Statistics in focus 15/2005 187 Fassmann, H. and Muenz, R. (2002): EU Enlargement and Future EastWest Migration, in IOM (ed.) New Challenges for Migration Policy in Central and Eastern Europe, Geneva: International Organisation for Migration GUS (2004): Sytuacja demograficzna Polski 2003, Warszawa: Glwny Urzad Statystyczny available from Home Office (2005): The Accession Monitoring Report, May 2004 - March 2005, retrieved from Hungarian CSO (2005): Hungary 2004. Budapest: Hungarian Central Statistical Office Iglicka K. (2005): EU Membership Highlights Poland's Migration Challenges. Migration Policy Institute Juhsz J. (2003): Hungary: Transit Country Between East and West. Migration Information Source: Country profile, Migration Policy Institute Kepinska E. (2004): Recent Trends in International Migration, SOPEMI Report for Poland; Institut Studw Spolecznych UW; retrieved from: Krichel, R. and Levine, J. (2001): The Economic Impact of Labour Mobility in an Enlarged European Union in Ghatak S. and Sassoon, S. (2001): Migration and Mobility the European Context. Houndmills (New York): Palgrave. ISBN 0333920368 (vz.). Krieger, H. (2004): Migration Trends in an Enlarged Europe, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. Luxemburg: European Communities Nyiri P. (1999): New Asian Migration to Eastern Europe: The Case of the Chinese in Hungary. Transit 17/1999. Vienna; available at (20/11/05) from OECD (2004): Education at Glance 2004, Paris: OECD OECD (2005): Trends in International Migration 2004: SOPEMI. Paris: OECD Salt J. (2005): Types of Migration in Europe: Implications and Policy Concerns. European Population Conference 2005: Demographic Challenges for Social Cohesion. Strasbourg, April Statistics 2002-2005. Available at Straubhaar, T. (2001): EastWest Migration: Will It Be a Problem?, in Intereconomics, July/August 2001a. UHCP P-PZ (2004): Rocenka radu hranicnej a cudzineckej policie, Bratislava 188 189 GERMAN TRADE UNIONS AND MIGRATION AFFAIRS: STRENGTHENING CROSS BORDER COOPERATION AND CAMPAIGNING FOR THE RATIFICATION OF THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF ALL MIGRANT WORKERS AND THEIR FAMILIES Rdiger Ltzer *) ,,We should not put our head in the sand or see only the risks of the enlargement. We are watching a start into a new era in Europe. Europe never ended at the river Oder" *) Trade Union Secretary, IG Metall Trade Union, Alte Jakobstrae 149, 10969 Berlin, Germany; E-mail:, Web:, Tel: 030/25387-0/-147/-103; Fax: 030/25387-2720 German trade unions have always supported the enlargement of the European Union. They see it as an important step to overcome old divisions, especially the east-west-division of Europe of the cold-war-area. A greater European Union means more democracy and social justice for the whole continent. Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus, the Baltic States and Hungary have become members in the EU on May 2004. Romania and Bulgaria will follow soon. German trade unions very much hope, that this will lead to better living standards in all those countries and thus close the gap in real income, wages, employment and other social standards between the old and the new member-states, and we will help trade unions in all those countries to succeed. But a greater European Union does not only bring advantages. Trade unions and their members and especially employees, who are not protected and organized in a trade union, also face the danger of social and wage dumping. A greater labour market means greater differences in wages and labour conditions. Employers, especially big companies, tend to look for places where they find cheaper labour, lower safety standards, longer working hours, and where they have to pay fewer taxes. A greater European market offers them a lot of such opportunities. 190 German trade unions therefore supported the EU-enlargement, but at the same time demanded regulations to prevent social dumping, especially wage dumping. One result of that demands was the introduction of a 7-year-transitional period, during which the movement of work-seekers from new member states to old member states of the EU was restricted. Only Malta and Cyprus were excepted from that restriction. This regulation was enforced as a means to prevent the misuse of cheap labour by companies and employers. The CecchiniReport says: "The common market would not make sense, if it would lead to social progress with a minus sign and start a competition between Europeans that endangers the basic rights of employees." This 7-year-provision means that the labour market situation and the danger of cheaplabour-migration have to be reviewed two times, the first of which will happen two years after the EU-enlargement, that is until May 1st 2006. If it is found necessary to continue those restrictions, it has to be reviewed again 3 years later that is May 1st 2009. All restrictions end on Mai 1st 2011. In addition to that there are further restrictions, at least in Germany. We have restrictions also for companies from new EU-member-countries, operating in the building sector, the cleaning sector and in the decorating business. On the other hand, a number of bilateral treaties have been signed between Germany and its neighbours allowing workers to take up to 300,000 seasonal jobs for a three month period each year in the agricultural sector, in the tourism sector and in hotels and restaurants. Another 5,000 jobs are allowed for qualified workers from Hungary, Slovakia, Poland and 10 further countries to continue their qualification in German companies. Another 9,375 jobs are allowed for so called "crossborder-jobs", 90% of them for people living in the Czech Republic and working in German companies on the other side of the border. Let me quote from a brochure published by the German trade union federation DGB, i.e. the umbrella organisation of German trade unions. Under the headline "consequences for the labour market" it says: "They (i.e. many German trade union members) are afraid about lower wages and higher unemployment as a result of the new membership of middle- and eastEuropean countries. These fears result on one hand from real experiences with companies that look only for short-time profits, on the other hand they result from the actual debate about off-shoring, from a lack of information about regulations regarding the enlargement of the European Union and finally from a lack of information about the economic development of many middle-east-European countries." 191 In the same brochure the DGB criticises studies and propaganda brochures from conservative circles warning about the dangers of a so called "massive inflow" of cheap labour from the East. The IFO-Institute in Munich for example has published a study in 2001 in which it warned that more than 1.5 million labourers from Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary would enter the German labour market in the 15 years beginning with 2002. This study ignored all restrictions against a free access to the German labour market that were already discussed at that time. The DGB as well as all other German trade unions always combined their demand for restrictions against the free movement of workers in the first seven years with a strong pledge and support for a policy that tries to speed up, to accelerate economic growth in those countries. Our aim is to lower the differences in wages, social benefits and living standards as quickly as possible and by doing this to have less competition between workers in the old and in the new EU-countries. The DGB also initiated and organised conferences with trade unions from the new member states, especially from Poland and the Czech Republic, to strengthen cooperation between trade unions on both sides of the border. Let me quote again from a speech, held by Dieter Scholz, regional chairman for Berlin and Brandenburg in the DGB, on a conference held on September 18th, 2003 in Berlin: "Let us exchange experiences. We want to know each other better. Let us view the enlargement of the EU as a chance, not as a threat. I very well know that a building worker in Frankfurt/Oder has as many fears about loosing his job as a metal worker in Poznan or a female textile worker in Liberec. We should not put our head in the sand or see only the risks of the enlargement. We are watching a start into a new era in Europe. Europe never ended at the river Oder ... The DGB has always supported the singular historic challenge of the EUenlargement. Since many years we have a close cooperation between the DGB, Polish trade unions and trade unions from the Czech Republic. We want to benefit from our common experiences we have made during many workshops, conferences and seminars. ... Borders have to be overcome in the hearts and minds of the people, too. ... Not a competitive mentality has to stand in the forefront, but the development of the potentials of our common living area. ... Border regions always are important, because these are the areas where people come together first. Here we have to reduce clichs and resentments; here we have to start building trust. ... The income gap must not be allowed to grow further. Our priority must be to reduce the differences in living and working conditions in Europe. More jobs, more employment has to be our first priority." In a statement issued on July 9th 2001 under the headline "Making the EU-enlargement more social: Freedom of movement for employees and free market in the service sector", the federal board of the DGB demanded: 192 "The transitional regulations regarding the introduction of freedom of movement in the labour market must be checked within the set timetable. These checks have to be made not only by watching the economic criterions and the situation on the labour market, but also in order to use them as a means to promote and honour social progress in the new member countries. In the first place this means to establish operating structures for a social dialogue, in the second place it means to introduce laws and other legal regulations that allow unions and management, especially the trade union side, to act and protect the interests of their members. So far this aspect was only a marginal note during the negotiations with the new member states. Therefore these regulations covering the transitional period have to be used with the aim to promote legal and structural conditions for a social dialogue and a lively practice in the new member states. This must be supported by a strategy of information about working and social conditions in Europe that helps employees both in the old and the new member states." In the meantime one can hear new tones in German trade union statements regarding the EUenlargement. You can hear more discussions about an offensive strategy than about building new barriers. Not because the danger of social dumping has become smaller. It even has increased, when we look at the outsourcing-strategy of big companies in the metal industry, car industry, electric and electronic. But at the same time trade unions discuss more about how to act offensive against these developments than only to react. The federal board of the German metal trade union "IG Metall" for example, which is the second largest union in Germany with more than 2.5 million members, issued a brochure in January 2004 that stated: the greater market is already a fact. Investments of German metal companies in east and middle European countries have increased on an enormous scale during the last ten years. The total amount of German foreign investments in that countries increased from 0.9 billion Euro in 1990 to 40.5 billion Euro in 2001. Real wages are still very much low, in Poland for example wages are paid at a level of about 40 percent of the EU-level, in Hungary 55 percent, in Slovenia 73 percent. Companies will do all they can do to profit from that differences by continuing their strategy of outsourcing and increasing foreign investments. Trade unions must counter that strategy by strengthening their cross-bordercooperation in order to increase real wages and real incomes in the new member states as quickly as possible, to improve social security, public services etc. At the same time the federal board of the IG Metall issued a second brochure with information about trade union structures in the new member states, contacts, addresses and telephone numbers in order to improve cross-border-cooperation between the IG Metall and trade unions in the new member countries. Second thoughts can also be heard from "ver.di", the trade union for the public service, the banking and finance sector, for transport and the private service sector including retail trade, which is the largest single union in Germany with nearly 2.7 Million members. 193 "ver.di" demanded in the past years restrictions against a free access of workers from new member states into the German service sector. They now realize that these restrictions lead to a situation where for example Polish female workers in the cleaning sector work pretend to be self-employed, i.e. one-person-companies. If a person pretends to be a oneperson-company, you can't organize him in a union. But that person still undermines social standards and wages, because his or her real position in the labour market is very weak, so that he or she cannot demand the necessary income or price for the service. Many of these people perhaps would like to become a union member to improve their wages and social security. In order to change this and to be able to organize these workers in the service sector, "ver.di" has started giving the problem of restricted access to the German labour market a second thought. So far no official statement that changed the old positions has been published. But there is a lot of discussion going on in the background. Such discussions are part of the general discussions in German trade unions about their future strategy towards globalisation and larger markets. It could mean that they are moving away from a more defensive strategy towards a more offensive strategy. Volker Rossocha for example, who is in charge for migration affairs in the DGB, made that very clear during a conference in Berlin in the end of October 2004. The conference discussed Polish-German cross-border economic cooperation, and Rossocha stated very clearly, that he wants restrictions against labour migration to be reviewed in 2006. Those restrictions lead to a greater dependency of workers to their employers, make it more difficult for them to change their job and take up another, better paid job etc. On the other hand, Rossocha made it very clear, that many discussions in Germany about migration are overshadowed by political and ideological propaganda issues, especially by parties like the German Christian democratic and Christian social party, CSU and CDU. Migration and migration policy is an old trade union issue. In August 1907 the international sot congress in Stuttgart, i.e. the meeting of all social democratic parties and trade unions of that time, passed a resolution on migration affairs, which say as follows: "This congress acknowledges the difficulties arising for the proletariat of a country with a high developed capitalism from a massive inflow of workers who are not organised, who are accustomed to a lower living-standard and come from mainly agrarian countries as well as the dangers that arise from a specific form of migration (i.e. unregistered or "illegal" migration, R.L.). But we do not find it suitable and even condemn under the point of view of proletarian solidarity positions that try to fight those dangers by excluding certain nations or races from immigration." 194 This resolution was passed with a large majority. Only the US- and the British delegation opposed that motion, the first arguing with cheap black labour and the danger of cheap labour inflow from China, the second hinting at the danger of cheap labour from Ireland and the British colonies. The period starting with World War 1st is today seen as a period of Nationalism and Racism, of closing borders against so called foreigners, as the beginning of a dark century with two terrible wars in Europe. Nowadays we move forward to an area of international cooperation and globalisation. A human right group in Germany called the "Komitee fr Grundrechte" (committee for basic human rights) in Cologne has started a petition to the German parliament early in 2004. This petition demands from the German government to sign and accept the UNconvention for migrant workers. This convention has come into force on the 1st of July, 2003, but has not been signed so far by any European Union member country. The German government as well as other EU-countries so far refuses to sign that UN-convention, arguing that it offers migrant workers and their families too many rights and therefore might lead to illegal migration. The refusal of the German government - as well as other industrial countries - is not acceptable to trade unions from a fundamental human rights point of view. Trade unions in a lot of other countries, too, have actively campaigned for the ratification and effective implementation of the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of the Families, as well as the two relevant ILO Conventions, no.97 and 143. Indeed, the UN Convention reinforces basic human rights included in the ILO Conventions, including the right to organize into trade unions and to bargain collectively. For trade unions the UN Convention breaks new ground on several fronts. It represents a significant advance for the defence of the fundamental rights of workers documented and undocumented as well as their families. Moreover, it covers all aspects and dimensions of the migration process, from country of origin to country of destination. Migration is an integral part of growth and development processes more significant in some times and in some countries than others. Nevertheless like many aspects of development there are both positive and negative impacts for the migrants themselves and for the countries of origin and destination. There is increasing recognition of positive contributions of migration through remittance flows, transfer of investments, technology and critical skills. The challenge is how to deal with migration in such a way that the positive effects are maximized, making it a positive phenomenon for migrants, their families, countries of origin and of destination. 195 Although a lot of migrants and their families have by and large benefited from migration, the numbers of those who toil under abusive and exploitative employment conditions without effective access to legal protection is still large. A ratification of the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families by member states of the European Union as well as by coming member states like Romania and Bulgaria would definitively be an important positive step to improve the situation of these migrant workers not only in the signing countries, but worldwide. 196 197 HUMAN TRAFFICKING: COMPONENT OF THE ILLEGAL MIGRATION. WESTERN BALKANS PERSPECTIVE Teofil Parasca *) "Trafficking in human beings is a disgrace for all civilised countries" Grard Stoudmann, Director of the OSCE / ODIHR Pacifying and Stabilization of the countries in the space of former Yugoslavia is a medium time process, if analyzed from a historical perspective. It is also a phenomenon followed with maximum attention by the neighbouring countries, including Romania, NATO and EU countries. There is to be very easy observed the contrast between the lack of resources of the local population in some areas and the waste of it, in other areas, in the effort of reconstruction of the area, waste which generated image of enrichments opportunities and grounds for human trafficking. In this article, by "Western Balkans" we will refer to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Srpska, Serbia and Montenegro, Kosovo and Metohia, Macedonia and Albania. The Human Trafficking was a problem in this region mainly between 1996 and 2004. The main component was the trafficking of women for prostitution. Because the legal aspects of counterfeiting this phenomenon are technical and very much known, this paper will refer mainly to the political and experts actions in combating and prevention, as well cooperation between countries at institutional level Keywords: trafficking in human beings, Western Balkans, OSCE, illegal migration *) At the time of submitting the paper: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje; Law graduate from the Law Faculty of the Bucharest Police Academy; experience as international police officer and police adviser/trainer in Kosovo (UN and OSCE Missions) and Macedonia (OSCE); holder of the "Pentru Merit" National Order granted by the President of Romania (2002); Contact address: 10, Cozia St., 310101 Arad, Romania. E-mail: Trafficking is still perceived and treated as an isolated social and criminal phenomenon to be addressed separately from other social and economic problems. We know that the root causes of trafficking poverty, unemployment, discrimination, violence in the family, demand in the countries of destination fuel human trafficking, but this knowledge has not yet been translated into policies and strategies. There are no initiatives to integrate anti-trafficking activities into development policies or poverty reduction strategies. Trafficking in human beings is one of the most pressing and complex issues in the OSCE region. Women, children and men are trafficked to or from OSCE states into conditions amounting to slavery. The result is always the exploitation of the migrant's labour or person. Trafficking in human beings touches on issues of human rights, inequality, 198 discrimination, rule of law, crime control, law enforcement, corruption, economic deprivation and migration. Trafficking is distinguished from illegal migration, or from smuggling of persons, in that it includes an element of force, deception or coercion for the purpose of placing a person into involuntary servitude or an otherwise abusive situation (See terminology definitions in Box.1). Due to the clandestine nature of both trafficking and smuggling of human beings, it is likely that trafficking networks make use of already established smuggling routes. Little risk and high profits are factors that make trafficking in human beings a serious business for organized crime across Europe. Coercion, threats and violation of fundamental rights await trafficked persons once they arrive in the country of destination. The need to reimburse a multiple of the actual fees for travelling costs and documents, accommodation, and other "services" drive trafficked persons into an additional dependency of their perpetrators. These persons have little possibilities to escape, as they often fear local authorities and deportation, and are exploited by their traffickers. Almost always, they are forced to surrender their travel documents to their traffickers. This viscous cycle represents a new form of modern-day slavery. Terminology Box.1 Forced labour: All work or service which is exacted from a person under the menace of penalty and which is undertaken involuntarily; Organised criminal group: A structured group of three or more persons existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, in order to obtain, directly, or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit; Smuggling of migrants: The procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a country of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident; Traffickers: All those who are involved in the criminal activity of trafficking of persons. The term does not apply solely to persons convicted of human trafficking offences, but also refers to suspects, arrested and prosecuted persons who, through various means, have come to the attention of criminal justice system actors; Trafficking in persons: The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation includes, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. Source: Trafficking in Persons: Global Patterns, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), April 2006, p.6-7 199 Trafficking in human beings is expanding rapidly in the OSCE region, affecting all participating states of the OSCE either as countries of origin, transit or destination. "Trafficking in human beings is a disgrace for all modern and civilised countries", said Ambassador Grard Stoudmann, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), during the OSCE Ministerial Council held on 27-28 November, 200092. There are no research programs looking into the relationship between poverty, discrimination (especially gender discrimination and discrimination against ethnic minorities), child abuse and neglect and trafficking. Anti-trafficking programs that support potential and actual victims do not address the issues of violence against women, social exclusion, discrimination, poverty and unemployment in a structural way. Very little research has been done on the `demand' side of trafficking in human beings in the region or on the relationship between EU migration policies, unregulated migration in the South Eastern Europe, demand for cheap unprotected labour and trafficking; there are no clear standards or procedures governing the work of agencies involved in anti-trafficking responses. Awareness raising campaigns are the main tool used by NGOs, international organizations and governments to inform the general public and high-risk groups about trafficking. These campaigns, together with information and help-lines on trafficking operating in all the countries of the region, make up the core of anti-trafficking measures. Similar awareness raising activities are conducted in every country in the sub-region, regardless of the character of the country (origin, transit or destination) and prevalence of trafficking. More attention should be paid to campaigns tailored to the needs of the country. Expensive mass media campaigns are thought less effective by those working on the ground than small-scale campaigns especially in countries where general awareness of trafficking is already high and groups with access to mass media have been reached. Some local NGOs have innovative programs to raise awareness among high-risk groups at community level. These campaigns are more effective, much cheaper and involve local community's more than large-scale media events. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) is the main OSCE institution dealing with the fight against trafficking. The OSCE has been dealing with the issue of trafficking in human beings since a commitment to combat trafficking was included in the Moscow Document (1991). In 1999, an Adviser on Trafficking Issues joined the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODHIR). Since then, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights has supported a number of projects in various countries dealing with the issue of trafficking in human beings. Poland: training workshops for policemen, border guards, social workers, prosecutors, government representatives, journalists and others were held to raise awareness about trafficking in women. Russia and Romania: round tables on trafficking in human beings between non-governmental and governmental representatives. Ukraine: ODIHR supports counselling hot line services. Moreover, projects have also been implemented in Albania, Moldova and Central Asia. (Source of information: OSCE's web-site, public data available at 92 200 Information on trafficking should be mainstreamed into other information and awareness raising campaigns. Anti-trafficking information should be included in, for example, anti-discrimination programs, programs aimed at minorities, HIV/AIDS prevention programs and social and economic development programs. Re-integration is the most difficult area of anti-trafficking. Social inclusion should prevent further victimization of the trafficked people, and prevent re-trafficking. However, re-integration programs are costly and, where implemented, not always effective. Return and re-integration are seen as the main, if not the only, options for trafficking victims. The capacity of their countries to help them re-integrate is rarely questioned. But in a situation of widespread poverty, unemployment and weak social support structures, it is unrealistic to expect these countries to develop programs to give returning victims the chance of a completely new life. The factors that pushed women to take their chances with the traffickers do not disappear following their return but are, in fact, compounded by stigmatization and new problems. Prevention initiatives that empower develop life skills and offer employment opportunities for high-risk groups should be the priority for governments and international organizations. At this point, such prevention programs are beyond the financial and technical capacity of the implementing agencies. Many countries now see trafficking victims as a vulnerable group in need of special attention and assistance, but practitioners do not clearly understand what "re-integration" should mean. Re-integration programs that can prevent retrafficking are scarce, small-scale and reach very few returned victims, re-integration needs go beyond the financial and technical capacity of implementing agencies. There is no exchange of information or networking among organizations implementing re-integration programs, re-integration is seldom integrated into broader development or anti-discrimination programs. Some NGOs have developed very good, although small, re-integration programs which could be seen as models for re-integration. There is a growing understanding of the need for reintegration programs, but they are still small-scale, short-term and supported by foreign donors. There has been no discussion about how long-term, locally owned re-integration programs could be implemented in situations of general poverty and unemployment. There has been no discussion on how prevention or re-integration programs should function when there are no social services in the countries of origin or how they should be integrated into planned reforms for social welfare systems. The latest developments highlight the changing nature of trafficking, with girls and women increasingly trafficked within countries and men increasingly trafficked for labour. It 201 is fund that an increasing number of repatriated victims in South Eastern Europe are returning from EU countries, rather than from other parts of South Eastern Europe. What is more, those judged to be trafficking victims often refuse the assistance that is available, as they do not want to return to their countries of origin. Trafficking in the region is decreasing, as there has been a significant reduction in the number of victims assisted. Other sources consider trafficking is not declining at all, but has simply become less visible, with victims unwilling to seek assistance for fear of repatriation, deportation and stigma. Is simply not clear whether anti-trafficking efforts are succeeding or not. Few foreign victims in shelters are from the "transit" countries. Yet governments, international agencies and donors continue to set up new shelters. In 2002, women seeking assistance had no safe place to go. Today, either the victims are not being identified or those who are identified refuse to go to the shelters. There is a "victim hunt", with service providers trying to find women to put in shelters with high running costs and few users. More interest in "borderline cases". The debate on trafficking in the region is broader than two years ago, with cases of domestic prostitution, under-age prostitution, street children, exploitation and abuse of women, children in Roma communities and children in institutions described and treated as cases of trafficking. Service providers accept women and children into their programs even if their situation meets only the broadest definition of trafficking. The Stabilization and Association process is not simply a bilateral process with each country. The Zagreb Summit93 placed considerable emphasis on the central need for regional co-operation as part of the EU's "contract" with the Stabilization and Association process countries. Similarly, the Stabilization and Association Agreements include a clear commitment to regional co-operation. The main directions of actions should be94: to encourage the countries of the region to behave towards each other and work with each other in a manner comparable to the relationships that now exist between EU Member States. An important means to this end will be the establishment of a network of close contractual relationships (conventions on regional co-operation) between the signatories of Stabilization and Association Agreements, mirroring the bilateral relationship with the EU as represented by the Stabilization and Association Agreements; 93 Information about the Zagreb Summit, held on 25 November 2000 in Zagreb, Croatia, and The Final Declaration of the Zagreb Summit, could be found at: 94 For more information related to South Western Balkans and the EU enlargement, see European Commission's enlargement web page: (From Regional Approach to the Stabilization and Association Process) 202 the creation of a network of compatible bilateral free trade agreements (as part of the conventions mentioned above) which means that there are no barriers to goods moving between the countries of the regions themselves nor with the EU and, in effect, neighbouring candidate countries; to persuade the authorities in the countries of the region to work together to respond effectively to the common threats to the region's and the EU's security which come from organized crime, illegal immigration and other forms of trafficking. In many cases, e.g. on visa policy, a common approach by all the countries will be needed to deal with the threat effectively. Program of Assistance for the Protection, Return and Reintegration of Trafficked Women and Children in the Western Balkans and Main Countries of Origin (PRTB) Phase II will continue to facilitate the orderly, safe and dignified return and reintegration of trafficked persons, in particular women and children stranded in the Balkan countries. IOM will do this in the context of IOM's global concern to prevent, assist and protect migrants who fall victim of trafficking. It will also continue to facilitate the collection of more detailed data on the phenomenon of trafficking in the region using the recently established Counter Trafficking Module Data Base. In cooperation with local government partners and NGOs, as well as international agencies, IOM will assist trafficked victims in need of return and reintegration assistance with pre-departure counseling, and return transportation to their home countries. Upon arrival of the victims, the IOM offices will, in coordination with local partners and according to individual's needs, temporarily lodge the victims in safe shelter if available. In cooperation with NGOs, medical and social assistance services will be made available in order to possibly smooth the victims' reintegration process into their families of origin, as well as to facilitate access to vocational training and/or employment orientation courses. References EU (2005): EU Plan on Best Practices, Standards and Procedures for Combating and Preventing Trafficking in Human Beings, Official Journal of the European Union, C 311/1 09.12.2005 OSCE (2006a): "Alliance against Trafficking in Persons" High Level Conference on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, Especially Women and Children: Prevention Protection Prosecution. Executive Summary, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Special Representative on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, Viena, March 17 OSCE (2006b): Speech of Helga Konrad at the High Level Conference on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, Especially Women and Children: Prevention Protection 203 Prosecution, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Special Representative on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, Viena, March 17 OSCE/ODIHR (2004): National Referral Mechanism. Joining Efforts to Protect the Rights of Trafficked Persons. A Practical Handbook, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Warsaw Stability Pact (2004): South Eastern Europe's Struggle against Trafficking in Persons. Developments 2000-2004, Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Task Force on Trafficking in Human Beings, Vienna, May UNDP (2005): Trafficking in Human Beings in South Eastern Europe, UNICEF Sarajevo, UNOHCHR Sarajevo and OSCE/ODIHR Warsaw, March UNDP (2003): Best Practice-Law Enforcement Manual for Fighting against Trafficking of Human Beings, United Nations Development Programme Romania, Bucharest UNICEF (2003): Guidelines for the Protection of the Rights of Children Victims Trafficking in Southeastern Europe, United Nations Children's Fund, May (updated December 2003) UNODC (2006): Trafficking in Persons: Global Patterns, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, April Velkoska, Violeta (2005): Combating Trafficking in Human Beings through the Practice of the Domestic Courts, Coalition "All for Fair Trials", Skopje, November The Zagreb Summit (2000): The Final Declaration of the Zagreb Summit, Zagreb Summit, Zagreb, Croatia, November 24 Source of data OSCE: Questions and Answers: Trafficking in Human Beings in South Eastern Europe OSCE Handbook IOM: Program of Assistance for the Protection, Return and Reintegration of Trafficked Women and Children in the Western Balkans and Main Countries of Origin (PRTB) Phase II 204 205 NAVIGATING MIGRANTS INTO THE GREEK LABOUR MARKET: THE ROLE OF MIGRANT ASSOCIATIONS THE CASE OF EASTERN EUROPEAN MIGRANTS ASSOCIATIONS Dimitria Groutsis *) This paper examines the nature, role and significance of migrant associations in Greece with a specific focus on Eastern European women and their representation in these associations. Geographically this region comprises the largest source of migrants into Greece. The paper examines how the Greek labour market landscape has in recent years been transformed, a shift enforced by changes from within: with new areas of the labour market opening up; and by nature of in-migration. In spite of the rapid changes the formal state regulatory infrastructure has remained underdeveloped and ad hoc, resulting in weak links between the state apparatus and the demands of migrants. As a consequence, migrant associations have emerged to formalize what have been in the main informal community links between migrants from the same ethnic groups and across ethnic groups. The paper shows that while these horizontal links within and between community groups are significant it is the vertical links between the migrant associations and authority groups within the Greek political economy that must be established to navigate migrants out of their fixed labour market location. Keywords: migration, labour market spaces, migrant associations, social capital *) Lecturer, Work and Organisational Studies, School of Business H69, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia; Email:; Tel: +61 2 9351 2485, Fax: +61 2 9351 4292 1 Introduction In the last two decades Greece has become a country of significant in-migration and now hosts between 900,000 and 1.2 million immigrants (Anthias and Lazaridis, 2000; Lianos, 2001; Pantazi, 2003; Petronoti and Triandafyllidou; 2003; Baldwin-Edwards with Kyriakou, 2004; Kasimis and Kassimi, 2004). While residence permits are required for all foreign nationals over the age of 18 residing in Greece (covered by Law 2910/2001), approximately 400,000 migrants remain `irregular' in status, a consequence of the sudden impact of migration into Greece and the inability of the Greek state to administer legislation successfully (Tzilivakis, 2005). Source countries contributing to the large-scale immigration include: Albania, Central and Eastern Europe and a variety of areas from the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, South East Asia and more recently East Asia. In terms of the gender breakdown we have seen a distinctive shift in migratory movements in recent years with an increasing feminization of 206 migration. According to a recent UN Report (2005), 49% of the world's international migrants are women. This gender shift also defines migration into Greece of Central and Eastern European groups. While Albanian and Romanian women come with spouses; Bulgarian, Georgian and Ukranian women are the sole principal migrants (Greek Population Census, 2001; Pantazi, 2003; Cavounidis, 2004). Little research has engaged in this problematic, and even less so with a focus on migrant women's voices in the form of migrant women's collectives (Anthias and Lazaridis, 2000; Markova and Sarris, 2002; Cavounidis, 2003). Although the migrant landscape is coloured by individuals from all parts of the globe Central and Eastern Europeans predominate as source country migrants. While other countries in Southern Europe have also experienced significant transformations in their resident constitution as driven by migration, what distinguish the Greek case are the shared borders with their migrant cohorts. Thus the close geographical proximity to Greece has made it a desirable destination for migrants95. In addition to spatial proximity, a central determinant fuelling and forging the migration of individuals from these countries have been the kinship and community ties with the host country. These ties provide the initial point of contact regarding migration to Greece and thus encourage the move to Greece96 (Boyd, 1989; Portes, 1995; Sassen, 1995; Petronoti, 1996, Anthias and Lazaridis, 2000; Cavounidis, 2004). Although these informal ties are central as the initial points of contact and to providing vital information exchange, a byproduct of the demand for access to and knowledge of services and information regarding settlement issues: including legal and labour market requirements, has been the emergence of migrant associations. Labour geographers (Massey, 1984; Peck, 1996; Herod and Wright 2002; Herod, 2003) suggest that social actors shape the spaces and are participants in negotiating and renegotiating the entry into particular spaces. Simultaneously, the space they are entering shapes their actions and reactions to circumstances. The emergence of migrant associations in response to a lack of formal state apparatus shows how migrants in Greece draw on their social capital to navigate their way through the Greek labour market creating and shaping new labour market divisions. To understand and assess the spaces created by migrant associations, the paper draws on the work of Granovetter (1973), Putnam (1998), Narayan (1999) and Woolcock (2000) who distinguish network characteristics in social capital theory. Thus, the According the population census of 2001, Albanians comprise 55.6% of the total foreign population; Bulgarians 4.7% of the total population; Georgians 2.9% of the total population; and Romanians 2.9% of the total population (Greek Population Census, 2001). 96 Cavounidis (2004) reveals that 75% of Albanians had some links with Greece prior to migration 60% had a relative, 15% had a friend; 28% Bulgarians had a relative, 3% had a friend; 46% Romanians had a relative, 35% Romanians had a friend. 95 207 paper is informed by two bodies of work: the work of labour geographers and the work of social capital theorists97. Before turning to an exploration of the nature, structure and role of migrant associations the paper maps the space migrants are navigating their way through with an examination of the Greek political economy and the manner in which it has managed migrant labour mobility into the Greek labour market. 2 Greek Politico-Economic and Labour Market Landscape The Greek economy is comprised of distinct but interrelated hubs of economic activity: the formal and the informal economies (Baldwin-Edwards, 2002). It is this distinction that makes for the ad hoc and unstructured policy implementation process. The formal sector is dominated by state regulation and transparency while the informal is defined by a lack of state regulation and thus no formal monitoring. Although existing in a space beyond the reach of state regulation the informal sector has a significant and legitimate presence in the Greek political economy, contributing to 30% of economic activity (Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption, 2001; Baldwin-Edwards, 2004; Leventis, 2004)98. Demand for migrant labour exists predominantly in the informal sector where conditions are most precarious and the monitoring of worker's rights exists beyond the reach of policy and state regulation. A ready labour market in the informal structure reinforces the existence of illegal status, as it is not a demanded requirement to have legal status to gain employment in this area. Consequently, a large group of migrants remain embedded in clandestine spaces of existence. While the polarity of the Greek labour market forges the legal/illegal migrant status, the lack of any meaningful state regulatory mechanisms to manage the flow of people into Greece has also frustrated efforts to gain resident status and work permits. The result is that migrants enjoy almost no institutional protection in their quest to find gainful employment. Entry into the labour market is based on access to network connections. In a study conducted by the Employment Observatory (2004) investigating methods of labour market access for the local (Greek) labour market, it was shown that 37.2% of private companies recruit through social networks. This method of labour market entry is even more significant for migrant workers. According to figures released by the National Employment Observatory 97 Detailed discussion of each of these bodies of work (as analytical devices) is not permissible in this paper. For detailed discussion on how labour geography is useful in understanding migrant labour mobility see Groutsis, D. (forthcoming): Globalisation and labour mobility migrants making spaces, migrants changing spaces: The case of overseas qualified professionals entering the Australian labour market, in Hearn, M. and Michelson, G. (eds): Rethinking Work, Cambridge University Press, Australia. 98 This activity rates higher than in any member state of the EU. 208 (2004) 61% of migrants found their job through a relative or friend living in Greece. This pattern is also confirmed in a study by Cavounidis (2004) who highlights the informal channels which allow migrants to gain access to the labour market. Of these networks Cavounidis (2004) notes: "... they can be expected to be particularly crucial in the case of migrants because as newcomers, migrants are less familiar with, or less able to access, the formal methods of job search characteristic of host societies ... Such information problems are compounded in the case of unauthorized migrants, who attempt to minimize contacts with formal institutions or agencies and hesitate to approach employers or other individuals whose intentions are unknown." While providing a ready and effective route for certain labour force participants into the labour market, these network links close the door to individuals who are not appropriately connected whereby particular groups are ushered into certain areas while these areas remain impenetrable to others. The result is that this method of labour market entry reinforces the labour market divisions that define the Greek labour market. This divided labour market features a large sector of self-employment (Gavroglou for Employment Observatory Research-Informatics, 2003); a bloated public sector (Gladstone, 2002); a predominance of small organizations (Gavroglou for Employment Observatory Research-Informatics, 2003); a predominance of full-time labour force participants (with only few entering part time employment sectors) (Gavroglou for Employment Observatory Research-Informatics, 2003); and an informal labour market soaking up particular groups, notably in the domestic and personal care services and building and construction (National Employment Observatory, 2004). While the Greek labour market remains structurally fragmented the definitive characteristics of workers entering certain areas reinforce the labour market schisms. The Greek labour market is segmented according to gender (Chletsos for Employment Observatory Research Informatics SA, 2003), ethnicity (National Employment Observatory, 2004) and migrant resident status (legal/illegal) (National Employment Observatory, 2004; Levinson, 2005). Where are migrants located? What is the migrant labour market profile? Migrants are overwhelmingly located in the secondary labour market in both the formal and informal sectors, a labour market location which emerges regardless of the skills, training and vocational experience of the individual (Markova and Sarris, 2002; OECD, 2002; Pantazi, 2003; Cavounidis, 2004; Leventis, 2004; National Employment Observatory, 2004). The National Employment Observatory (2004) notes that the majority of male migrants are located in the building and construction area and blue and white collar works in heavy and 209 light industry; women, in domestic and personal care services; and a very small proportion which is undifferentiated by gender - work as salespeople, scientists and artists. Labour market location is based on gender and ethnicity a condition which is reinforced not only because of the pre-existing spatial arrangements which foster the entry of particular groups into certain areas but also because of the way in which migrants gain entry into the labour market: invariably from people within their community who are working in similar areas. The result is the continued reinforcement of labour market divisions (Cavounidis, 2004). In sum, the significant in-migration in recent years has resulted in a reconfiguration of the labour market driven by those coming into the country and the areas of the labour market which have opened up to absorb this new stock of labour. New divisions have emerged in the Greek labour market opening up a market for immigrant women in domestic and personal care services and for immigrant men in the building and construction industries. Entry into these areas is overwhelmingly influenced by network connections. What role do migrant associations play in assisting migrants to negotiate the labour market spaces available to them? The role, nature and significance of these associations/networks is critically evaluated by drawing on social capital literature. 3 Migrant Associations Creating Spaces of Engagement for Migrants in Greece Migrant associations representing Eastern Europeans in Greece emerged in the 1980s99, as loosely formed groups bringing together people as a means of sharing in ethno-specific cultural celebrations. A Romanian spokesperson noted: "When Romanians first came to Greece in the 1980s there were not many migrants ... well, we were not an obvious presence. We would find out about members of our community and come together to celebrate particular cultural events; to provide support through what was really a social event ..." (Romanian representative, Interview February, 2004) This is reiterated by an Albanian spokesperson: "When we first came to Greece with my family there were not many Albanians here ... there were not so many migrants. In this new country we found support by 99 The 1980s saw to the first wave of migration from Eastern Europe. 210 coming together with other Albanians ... in a social and festive setting..." (Albanian representative, Interview April, 2005) While information exchanges regarding settlement and labour market issues were discussed in this informal setting, the process was ad hoc. As noted by a Romanian spokesperson: "... We would also discuss how to get a job ... where jobs were available. Things were very different in the 80s. There were not many of us (migrants) here. We came with skills and many of us were accepted in areas where we could use our skills. There was none of this legalization process, as there is now ... There were not as many obstacles to working. Many of us had Greek friends who had studied in Romania and we could get information on the labour market through them and in this way we passed it on to other people from our community living here ... .....It was just in conversation; at our gatherings....It wasn't structured information....But it didn't need to be. Not like now." (Romanian representative, Interview February, 2004) Overall, this initial phase of the community network brings to bear the overlap between cultural and social capital, which incidentally continues in present day migrant associations. Gould (2001) considers cultural capital and social capital as interdependent forces, suggesting that when shared occasions emerge for cultural reasons, relationships are being enhanced and social capital networks are extended. The emergence and development of migrant associations suggests this is the case. Into the 1990s, migrant associations have developed structurally as lobby groups. A stock-take of registered associations shows that of the seventy-eight, twenty-three represent Central and Eastern European migrants. While continuing to engage as a hub for cultural collectivism, these associations act as centres of information regarding labour market issues and related settlement issues: including information on gaining residence and work permits. This form of social capital exchange within community networks is considered the bonding phase of community development and while seeking to support and inform community group members this information exchange remains closed to those outside the specific community (Granovetter, 1973; Putnam; 1995; Putnam, 1998; Narayan, 1999; Woolcock, 2000). In addition to the independent force of migrant associations representing the interests of their specific communities is the united coalition known as the Greek Forum of Migrants which is comprised of migrant representatives from twenty-eight communities including Central and Eastern European community representatives100. This coalition pools the varied community resources to lobby for collective interests while filtering information to community representatives to pass onto their specific communities. Issues tabled include: 100 Notably the website lists only 22 communities, with an absence of Eastern European representatives who are active members. 211 legalization responsibilities and the impending reforms to the legalization process; labour market issues; migrant children's education; access to health care services; available training opportunities; general rights and community gatherings. The forum then acts as an information hub and the representatives as nodes, reaching out to the rest of the community in the independent community groups. This structure is an instance of bridging defined by cross-community overlap featuring a sharing and exchange of resources. The bridging phase sees to an extension of the initial stage of network development defined in the closed community network exchange (Putnam, 1998; Narayan, 1999; Woolcock, 2000). Regarding the operation of the Greek Forum of Migrants a Bulgarian spokesperson noted: "I come here to get information for people in my community. We exchange information here and we also work together. For instance we learn about labour market rights and we report this information to our community members. In the Forum we also provide information on what is happening within our community." (Bulgarian representative, Interview March 2005) This is reiterated by an Albanian representative who noted that participation in the Forum was useful because: "We keep up to date with issues that concern all our members. We keep up-to-date with changes in the legislation (regularization process) ... just through discussions with other representatives in the Forum we also find out about jobs that may be of interest to our community members. So, here we get information and we transfer it back to our community members. It is useful because sometimes in your own community you miss out on information ... so, we are all better informed like this ..." (Albanian representative, Interview March 2005) The point of the two-way information flow between the community groups in the Forum is noted by a Ukrainian representative: "Coming together at the Forum means that we can tell everyone what we know and we can take back to our community information from other communities in discussions that we have here as a Forum ... it is very useful" (Ukrainian representative, Interview March 2005) The bonding and bridging stages illustrate the horizontal links within and between communities enhancing the exploitation of social capital for the purpose of assisting migrants in Greece. The horizontal process of information and resource exchange firmly situates the migrants group within the migrant community. That is, the third stage known as 212 "linking" remains unfulfilled. This phase is defined by the establishment of links between the migrant communities and authority structures, in this case the state apparatus. Social capital exploitation between the migrant communities and authority relations does not occur. The lack of vertical relations thus raises questions regarding the possibility for transforming the fixed location of migrants in the Greek political economy in general, and more specifically in the Greek labour market (Portes, 1998). Of note within the community network structure is the lack of a formal structured female voice. While women represent their communities in the Greek Forum of Migrants, including: Albanian, Bulgarian, Ukrainian, Polish and Georgian representatives, all women noted the need for a migrant women's network representing their specific needs, rights and interests. "We have different needs .... we are in different areas of the labour market to men and we need to support other women migrants. We are trying to create a better understanding of how to get a job in Greece...we try to provide information to women in our community and beyond - of jobs available. It is better to get a job through contacts in the community rather than to go to an employment agency. We have heard of many big problems with these agencies. So we try to help with information about jobs that we hear about ... and this is the way we help other migrant women." (Albanian representative, Interview April 2005) "I got my friend a job and we find out about jobs for other friends...other women ... and now that we have more to do with other communities, we tell other community members about jobs ..." (Bulgarian representative, Interview March 2005) When asked about the labour market location that these connections lead to the response was immediate. "... it is in domestic area, as cleaners, as carers. We know that this is all that is available for us. I am a lawyer. I may be able to assist better with legal issues with community members who need my help, but I cannot work as a lawyer ... It doesn't matter what you are teacher, doctor, lawyer, university lecturer you work in the domestic area ... These are the jobs available in Greece and these are the jobs we find out about. It is too hard to get a job in your field ... I think it is impossible ... We must be realistic. We come here to work and this is what we can work in. The best we can hope for is a good employer and good conditions but not work in our area." (Bulgarian representative, Interview March 2005) While women meet informally within their respective communities they are in the process of extending reach across communities. 213 "... so we can discuss all our issues between our communities....We will follow the structure of women's organisations formed by Filipino women and Nigerian women. We will then elect representatives who will come together to discuss issues and then they will report these discussions to their community groups ... We thought of bringing all the women together to discuss our issues, but there are too many of us ... Well, this is the plan but we do not have resources." (Albanian representative, Interview March 2005) While the organisation of a group representing women's voices is significant for migrant women in Greece, representing a more structured forum of information exchange within and between community groups, the collective does not provide the opportunity to establish broader links within the Greek political-economy and within the Greek labour market. 4 Conclusion The changing pattern in the movement of people into Greece in recent years has transformed the composition of the labour market with foreign workers accounting for as much as 15% of the workforce (Lianou, 2003). This stock of labour has created new labour market divisions and has fed into pre-existing labour market segments. Over time, patterns and processes of labour market behaviour have become locally embedded and to a degree self-perpetuating: a process which is reinforced by the pre-existing labour market space in Greece, the way in which migrants gain access to the Greek labour market, underscored by the horizontal relations between and within community networks (Massey, 1984). While community kinship networks are fundamental to migrant's choice of destination, settlement and labour market entry, the way in which these networks are drawn on is significant in terms of solidifying the spatial embeddedness of this group. To shift the current labour market location defining the migrant experience in Greece, migrant coalitions need to negotiate links beyond the ethnic community, extending to the local decision making apparatus, a condition reliant on authority groups also extending their reach to negotiate with migrant coalitions. References Anthias, F. and Lazaridis, G. (eds.) (2000): Gender and Migration in Southern Europe: Women on the Move, Oxford / New York: Berg Baldwin-Edwards, M. (2002): Southern European Labour Markets and Immigration: A Structural and Functional Analysis, available at: Baldwin Edwards, M. (2004): Immigration into Greece, 1990-2003: A Southern European Paradigm?, European Population Forum 2004, panel "International Migration: Promoting Management and Integration", Geneva, Switzerland, January 12-14, downloaded from: 214 Baldwin- Edwards, M. with Kyriakou, G. (2004): Statistical Data on Immigrants in Greece: An analytic study of available data and recommendations for conformity with European Union standards, conducted for the Migration Policy Institute, Greece Boyd, M. (1989): Family and Personal Networks in International Migration: Recent Developments and Research Agendas, International Migration Review 23:3, pp.638-670 Cavounidis, J. (2003): Gendered Patterns of Migration to Greece, Greek Review of Social Research 110, pp. 221-238 Cavounidis, J. (2004): Networks and Labour Market Opportunities: Female Migrant Experiences in Greece, Athens University of Economics and Business, Employment Observatory Research-Informatics, presented at `Economics and Sociology: Problems and Prospects', University Campus, University of Crete, Rethymno, Crete, Greece (8-10 September, 2004) Chletsos, M. (2003): The Labour Market in Greece: What Statistics Tell us About Employment, Employment Observatory Research-Informatics S.A. (PAEP), Athens, Discussion Paper No.3, January GRECO (2002): Evaluation Report on Greece, Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption, Strasbourg Gavroglou, S.P. (2003): Flexibility and Organisation of Work: Empirical Data From Greece and the European Union, Employment Observatory Research-Informatics S.A. (PAEP), Athens Gladstone, B. (2002): Comparative Analysis of Employment and Skills in Greece, Italy and the UK, The European Institute of Social Services (EISS), University of Kent, Canterbury, August, available from: Gould, H. (2001): Cultural and Social Capital, London: Creative Exchange Granovetter, M. (1973): The Strength if Weak Ties, American Journal of Sociology, 78(6) 1360-1280 Groutsis, D. (forthcoming): Globalisation and Labour Mobility Migrants Making Spaces, Migrants Changing Spaces: The Case of Overseas Qualified Professionals Entering the Australian Labour Market, in Hearn, M. and Michelson, G. (eds): Rethinking Work, Cambridge University Press Australia Herod, A. (2003): Workers, Space and Labor Geography, International Labor and WorkingClass History, No. 64 (Fall) 2003, pp. 112-138 Herod, A. and Wright, M.W (eds.) (2002): Geographies of Power: Placing Scale, Malden: Blackwell Publishing. Kasimis, C. and Kassimi, C. (2004): Greece: A History of Migration, downloaded from: Leventis, O. (2004): `Country Report: Greece'. Refugees' Contribution to Europe, RESOURCE Project, Athens: Social Work Foundation Levinson, A. (2005): The Regularisation of Unauthorised Migrants: Literature Survey and Country Case Studies. Regularisation Programmes in Greece, Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), University of Oxford Lianos, T. (2001): Illegal Immigrants in Greece and Their Choice of Destination, International Migration, 39/2, pp 3-28 Lianou, T. P. (2003): Recent Immigration into Greece. Working Paper 51, Centre for Economic Research (KEPE), Athens Markova, E. and Sarris, A. (1997): The Performance of Bulgarian Illegal Immigrants in the Greek Labour Market, Southern European Society and Politics 2(2), 57 77 Martin, S. (2005): Women Increasingly Migrate for Economic Reasons; Trafficking Also Rising, UN Report (March, 2005), New York, March 3 215 Massey, D. (1984): Spatial Divisions of Labour: Social Structures and the Geography of Production, London: Macmillan Narayan, D. (1999): Bonds and Bridges: Social Capital and Poverty, World Bank, Washington DC. OECD (2001): The Employment of Foreigners: Outlook and Issues in OECD Countries, Paris: OECD PAEP (2004a): Occupational and Skill Demand in the Hellenic Labour Market: Results of a Survey in Private Businesses - Synopsis of the Study, Employment Observatory ResearchInformation S.A., Athens PAEP (2004b): The Economic and Social Integration of Immigrants in Greece, National Employment Observatory Research Informatics S.A., Athens Pantazi, N. (2003): Female Migrant Skilled Labour and Current Employment Trends in Greece A Field Research, Athens: European Profiles Peck, J. (1996): Workplace: The Social Regulation of Labour Markets, New York: The Guilford Press Petronoti, M. (1996): Greece as a Place for Refugees. An Anthropological Approach to Constraints Pertaining to Religious Practices, in Jambresic Kirin, R. and Povrzanovic, M (eds.): War and Exile: Everyday Life, Zagreb: Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Research Petronoti, M. and Triandafyllidou, A. (2003): Recent Immigration Flows to Greece Special Issue, National Centre for Social Research (EKKE), Athens: National Book Centre Portes, A. (1998): Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology, Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 24, pp.1 24 Portes, A. (ed.) (1995): The Economic Sociology of Immigration: Essays on Networks, Ethnicity and Entrepreneurship, New York: Russell Sage Foundation Putnam, R.D. (1995): Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, Journal of Democracy, vol. 6, no.1 pp.65-78 Putnam, R.D. (1998): Forward, Housing Policy Debate, vol.9, no.1, pp. v-viii Sassen, S. (1995): Immigration and Local Labor Markets, in Portes, A. (ed.): The Economic Sociology of Immigration: Essays on Networks, Ethnicity and Entrepreneurship, New York: Russell Sage Foundation Tzilivakis, K. (2005): Migrants at Work, in Athens News (4/3/05), Athens: Lambrakis Foundation Woolcock, M. (2000): Why We Care about Social Capital?, Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration, no. 98, pp.17-19 Data Greek Population Census, 2001 Interviews Albanian representative, Interview: February, 2004, March, 2005, April, 2005 Bulgarian representative, Interview: March 2005 Georgian representative, Interview: March 2005 Greek Forum of Migrants attended meetings in March, April and May 2005 Polish representative, Interview: March 2005 Romanian representative, Interview: February, 2004 Ukrainian representative, Interview: March, 2005 216 217 EXCLUSION AND INCLUSION OF MOROCCAN MIGRANTS: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCES FROM ALMERA, SPAIN101 Martin Geiger 1) The empirical study reveals the significance of social actors (e.g. trade unions, immigrant organisations, local administration, NGOs, political parties and employers associations) in providing immigrants with access to social benefits. The study is based on fieldwork in the province of Almera (conducted in 2003 and 2004). It focuses on the social inclusion of Moroccan immigrants working in greenhouse agriculture. In contrast to a great variety of other studies concentrating on this issue, research has been conducted on social inclusion as an outcome of a local bargaining process, constituted by collective actors and their strategies to include or exclude migrants from different spheres and benefits of the receiving society. Against the background of the local situation, the implications of failing immigration and integration policies in connection with unbridled economic neo-liberalism will become evident. In the chosen local context the project of an inclusive society so far remains an unfulfilled dream - more financial, political and public support for migrants and organisations working in the field of inclusion is needed. Although the study didn't focus on Romanian migrants it could be however offer interesting insights, as since some years the number of Romanian migrant workers in Almera is growing, the dynamics illustrated in the local context could be applied to other contexts of new immigration countries. Keywords: European Union, Spain, Moroccan immigration, local actors, integration policies and strategies, local conflict, labour market, political and social participation 1) Martin Geiger (, a political geographer, is currently working towards his PhD at the Department of Geography at the Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universitt Bonn, Germany. In 2005, Mr. Geiger was appointed visiting lecturer and guest fellow at Universitatea din Vest de Timioara (Romania); he was Guest Editor of the special issue on migration of The Romanian Journal of European Studies (issue no.4/2005, available from Introduction Situated within the autonomous region of Andalusia, the province of Almera certainly is one of today's focal points of Moroccan immigration to Spain and Europe. In 2002, the number of foreigners living in this area was nearly twelve times higher than in 1991. This increase appears quite impressive in comparison to the total immigrant population of Spain, which in the same time experienced just a quadrupling. At the end of 2002, about 36,000 foreigners lived in the province of Almera and counted for more than seven per cent of the total 101 Thanks to a research scholarship granted by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) I have been able to conduct extensive fieldwork in the province of Almera in the time between summer 2004 and spring 2004. This paper, summarising the main results of a Master Thesis in Geography, reflects the local situation in the mentioned time period. However, it has to be mentioned, that although several years passed since my research, the situation concerning Moroccan migrants in the province of Almera has hardly changed. My paper could therefore be regarded as reflecting a still existing `status-quo' as regards the locally existing patterns of inclusion and exclusion. I am thankful to my supervisor Prof. Hans Dieter Laux (Dep. of Geography, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universitt Bonn, Germany) for his guidance and to Prof. Gunther Dietz (at the time of research professor at the University of Granada, Spain) for his local support and supervision during the time of my field studies. Furthermore, I would like to thank Marek Canek and Megan Shea (Multicultural Centre Prague) for their careful reading and editing of an earlier version of this paper (published on the website of in spring 2006). 218 population while the national average concerning the percentage of foreigners living in Spain was around three per cent102. More than half of the foreigners registered in the province of Almera at that time were of Moroccan origin. Two thirds of the Moroccan population were male, unmarried and belonged to the group of people between 20 and 30 years old (see Ministerio de Interior 2003: 80, 481, 484; INE 2003a). The significance of seasonal or return migration as well as family migration, especially with regard to Moroccan workers in agriculture (serving often for them as the first niche of the local labour market), has been very low. The attraction of the province of Almera as a destination for migrants is mainly due to the evolution of an internationally competitive greenhouse agricultural industry (see Checa 2003: 106-107). Paradoxically, this agriculture has evolved despite the fact that this province covers one of the driest areas in Europe. Before highly sophisticated technological innovations had been made, the possibilities for agricultural use were quite bad. The province of Almera therefore has been for centuries a traditional place of origin of emigrants. Its transformation into an area of destination has been induced by a dramatic agro-economic transformation, initiated in 1941 by the authoritarian government of General Franco. By drilling wells to exploit the salty ground water, the area became usable for agricultural purposes, mostly the production of vegetables under glasshouses. Small parcels of newly cultivated land were given to (Spanish) landless migrants from neighbouring mountainous areas and other parts of the Iberian Peninsula. Due to agricultural innovations and adaptations, the province of Almera soon experienced a remarkable growth in agricultural productivity. Since the year 2000, the area covered with greenhouses increased more than thirteen times. With approximately 25,000ha, the province of Almera then possessed more than 60 per cent of the Spanish and about 25 per cent of the total area covered with glass within the European Union (see Eurostat). Formerly impoverished, the area is now among the Spanish provinces with the highest rates of economic growth and lowest rates of unemployment (Ideal Granada, El Pas). Producing half of Spain's paprika output and about a quarter of all tomatoes, the province of Almera is one of the most important European exporters of vegetables (see INE 2003b; Eurosur Consultores 2003: 178-182). As a consequence of increased productivity, the new proprietors who once had been seasonal agricultural (migrant) workers on their own, became dependent on additional non-familiar workers (see Martnez Veiga 2001: 27). It has to be said that the international competitiveness of today's local greenhouse agriculture is largely dependent on 102 Until today the number of foreigners in Spain has risen considerably. Numbers given reflect the statistical data that was available at the time of empirical research. 219 the very low salaries migrants get for their work salaries that are often 15 Euros per working day and less (interviews with migrants). The local agricultural employment system is characterised by a high degree of informality and semi-legal or illegal employment practices (see Martn Daz 2003: 45-50). Due to an effective technological adaptation to natural conditions, seasonal variations of the agricultural production have been reduced drastically: Today, local farmers are for nine to twelve months per year in need of agricultural labourers of foreign origin. Although farmers still recruit on a day-to-day basis (a cheaper and more flexible system), it has to be stressed that this does not imply that their labourers therefore can be seen automatically as merely a seasonally employed workforce that may return to their country of origin or to other provinces like they "wish." The day-to-day recruitment often misunderstood as the employment of migrants who are only "seasonally" living in the province is hiding the fact that there is nearly no seasonality of agricultural production anymore and local agriculture is in need of high numbers of migrants all year-round as they have substituted the former family-based working force. Migrant workers in the agriculture of Almera - in contrast to the traditional construct of a seasonal guest-worker - have to stay temporarily flexible, have to be ready to take up work every time farmers want them to work (otherwise they get easily substituted by other workers) and are forced to stay within the province although some days, weeks or months they don't find guaranteed employment. In addition, the closure and fortification of Spanish borders to third countries, has on the first hand had the negative side-effect of forcing illegal migrant workers to stay in Spain and not return on a seasonal basis because the chances to get back (legally or illegally) have been drastically reduced. On the second hand, an illegal residence and employment status means that these workers remain even more bound to the local agriculture of Almera because this province, in contrast to other provinces and city regions of Spain, is characterised by an extremely low level of law enforcement. Any forms of control are a rare exception. It is estimated that per year up to 30,000 foreigners are employed in greenhouse agriculture, approximately half of them not possessing valid documentation. Although there have been some changes in the composition of the foreign workers population among agricultural labourers following the incidents of El Ejido (see below) when local farmers started to substitute Moroccan workers for Latin American and Eastern European workers, until today Moroccans form the biggest share of agricultural workers. Given the fact that most workers have an illegal residence status (therefore mostly unregistered) and against the background that in Spain there is a general lack of trustworthy and reliable statistical data with regard to legal as well as illegal immigrants as well as with regard to their employment 220 it is difficult to give exact numbers (see Martn Daz 2003: 47-48). This is also due to the fact that most migrant workers due to their illegal (unauthorised) employment are not registered in the social security system. In addition, the number of migrant workers can only be estimated because the overwhelming majority of contracts are made verbally. The employment and legal status of Third Country Nationals in Spain Spain, like many other contemporary societies affected by immigration, demonstrates a paradoxical situation: While the economy is in need of foreign, low-skilled and low-paid labour, migrants entry, permanent stay and employment are more and more restricted (see Brochmann 1999: 325). Since 2000 the Spanish foreigner's law (Ley de Extranjera) has been revised twice. In the case of third country nationals (Moroccan migrants belong to this group) who are not citizens of a member state of the European Union, the latest version (Law No. 8/2000, revision 2003) holds unrestricted access and residence possibilities for a longer period of time only for family members of legal migrants already present in Spain as well as acknowledged asylum seekers (see Martnez Atienza 2002: 304-358; Ley Orgnica 8/2000). Generally, possibilities for third country nationals to live and work in Spain, even temporarily, are reduced to a minimum. A visa to reside and work is only granted if the Spanish employer can prove that he has not found a Spanish worker. Furthermore, migrants can apply for employment opportunities only through Spanish embassies and consulates in their home country. Each initial work permit is then restricted to a distinct employment sector and working contract. As the job contract ends, simultaneously the work allowance and permit to stay become invalid (see Apap 2002: 173-174). In Spain as in other countries a sharp line has been drawn hereby to divide legal and illegal migrants by the existing legislation. While nowadays, citizens of other EU-countries are been granted far-reaching rights and privileges, third country nationals find themselves confronted by exclusion from nearly all possibilities to enter, reside or work under conditions of "legality." To a wide extent a consequence of Spain's membership in the European Union (EU), judicial restrictions together with more rigorous border controls are the instruments of Spain as the south-western guardian of the European Union to manage the "migration pressure" originating mostly from the African continent (see Goytisolo and Nar 2000: 122). Among other Southern and Eastern European countries, Spain is one of the main actors to put into effect EU restrictions on immigration according to the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam and the decisions of the European Council of Thessalonica in 2003. While Spain's foreigner law grants immigrants possessing legal residence permits extensive rights, the fight against illegal forms of migration results mainly in the withholding of civil, political 221 and social rights from those migrants without legal residence or employment status (see Table 1). With regard to agricultural employment in the greenhouses of the province of Almera, the majority of migrants do not possess a formally written work contract. In general, migrants are employed on a day-to-day basis; contracts exist only as verbal agreements. Locally, the presence of migrants with an illegal residence status who simultaneously do not possess a working permit is to a wide extent tolerated. Police controls are the exception. Although the current foreigners law holds severe punishment for employers recruiting illegal migrants (up to 60,000 Euros per illegally employed person, imprisonment up to 5 years), still today migrants with illegal status are able to find work in agriculture. The province of Almera, in contrast to other Spanish provinces, thus is an important staging ground for illegal migrants due to missing/inadequate controls. As a consequence, in front of administrations or police most migrants can hardly prove that a prolongation of their permit is economically justified or that they should be granted a legal status. Many migrants who have entered Spain and have started working under legal conditions often find themselves repeatedly in an illegal residence status (and thereby simultaneously are perceived as working illegally - that means without a valid employment permit that is directly depending upon their residence status). Generally these juridical categories are quite flexible. From time to time illegal migrants have been re-legalised by government campaigns. However, most immigrants afterwards have dropped again into an illegal status after the work contract, a prerequisite of the legalisation, ended (see Laparra and Martnez de Lizarrondo 2003: 53; Apap: 2000: 175; Tapinos 2000: 14; OECD 2000: 63-65). As a consequence, migrants often applied repeatedly for legalisation. At the beginning of 2004 it was estimated that more than one million people are living illegally within Spanish territory, hereby accounting for a third of Spain's foreign population (see ABC) to be in illegal residence status therefore rarely can be regarded as to be an exceptional case! As a consequence, at least this part of the foreign population as well as the rest of non-EU migrants who have to fear falling back into this status, do not possess a secure access to membership rights and can be considered as "margizens." Migrants are only eligible for permanent legal status, and according to Hammar (1990: 21; 1994: 188-189) then "denizenship," when they can prove five years of continuous legal status. Under the contemporary realities, the majority of Spain's immigrant population is therefore far away from this more stable "denizen status." In provinces like Almera the main factor determining the legal status of migrants has to be seen in consistence with the dynamics of the local labour market due to the high degree of informality and the non-existence of state controls it becomes evident that agricultural 222 workers are even more likely to live permanently in a insecure status on the edge between margizen- and denizenship or are effectively kept away due to economic interests and the inflexibilities of bureaucracy from becoming "denizens." The quest for inclusion: Migrants and the receiving context The social inclusion of migrants in Spain as a socio-political challenge is mainly delegated from the national to the regional (Autonomous Regions, for example Andalusia) and to an important part to the local level (provinces and municipalities). Established in 2001, the programme GRECO (Programa Global de Regulacin y Coordinacin de la Extranjera y la Inmigracin) is the main instrument for the social integration of immigrants in Spain. On the national level, GRECO is based on four goal organising principles, including: "the design and co-ordination of immigration as a desirable phenomenon for Spain" as well as "the integration of the foreign population who contribute actively to the economic growth of Spain" (own translation; see Martnez Veiga 2002: 614-652). It becomes evident that "integration" in this sense has a restrictive character: the integration of these "good migrants" is intended because they do contribute economically. A need for the integration of unemployed and older migrants as well as their dependents, not economically-active family members, is not foreseen in the national action plan (see Torres 2002: 63). While GRECO simultaneously emphasises the need for state action to fully guarantee the membership rights of migrants as granted in the foreigner's law and the Spanish constitution, in principle, integration is only foreseen for legal migrants who are willing to adapt and accomplish the economic pre-condition (see Torres 2002: 63). In the framework of this questionable concept most of the public funding for integration measures is being made. This is due to the fact that GRECO serves as the main instrument to co-ordinate different ministries and other political authorities and thereby heavily influences the approaches of these actors. Simultaneously, a co-ordination between the autonomous regions and the central state is intended by GRECO. Including principally an understanding of integration linked to control and pressure to adaptation, it seems problematic that in addition also most of the financial contributions from the central state to non-state actors also are distributed within the co-ordinating framework of GRECO (see Laparra and De Lizarrondo Martnez 2003: 52). Although this public funding of non-state actors, like humanitarian and immigrant organisations, is low and in comparison with other European countries reflects the young history of immigration in Spain, non-state actors are bound in their activities to the fundamental concept of integration. As a result, NGOs are limited in their activities; some assistance can only be given to legal migrants as integration is only foreseen for them. 223 However, indirectly these civil state actors are in some way entrusted with the quite delicate task of giving assistance to the huge number of illegal migrants living in Spain (see Arango 2000: 270). Thus, since its establishment, GRECO is criticised vehemently by non-governmental organisations, trade unions, political parties, immigrant organisations as also some governments of autonomous regions like Andalusia (see Laparra and De Lizarrondo Martnez 2003: 52; Zapata- Barrero, Adamuz and Martnez Luna 2002: 83, 88). Due to the autonomy of the Spanish regional governments in welfare, housing, culture, education and health service, regions like Andalusia have developed additional integration programmes. In some provinces especially affected by migration processes, local plans also exist. Most of these action plans on the sub-national level also stress the importance of non-state actors and delegate tasks and funding to these organisations (see Laparra and De Lizarrondo Martnez 2003: 37-39; ZapataBarrero, Adamuz and Martnez Luna 2002: 89; Agrela Romero and Dietz 2004). In the opinion of Zapata-Barrero et al. outsourcing and the delegation of public tasks to a multitude of actors are leading to a growing confusion about which institutions in deed are responsible for the integration of migrants in Spain (see Zapata-Barrero 2003: 71-75; Zapata-Barrero, Adamuz and Martnez Luna 2002: 83, 88-89). This leads to the assumption that the Spanish provinces are the most important political entities regarding immigrants inclusion, and civil state actors as well as authorities on this administrative level are the regulators of immigrants inclusion. Due to the mentioned juridical and bureaucratic practices of decentralisation and burden sharing (see also Agrela Romero and Dietz 2004 and Faraco, Amrute and Pfohman 2004), as well as the unbridled controlling economic dynamics of labour markets, the study focused on the province of Almera as a sub-national political entity and the specific situation in local agriculture. Confronted with a huge number of legal and illegal migrants, the local administration's capacity to act, to provide social benefits for economically welcomed migrants, is put to a key test. Since the year 2000 the issues of social inclusion have locally become even more sensitive and complicated than anywhere else in Spain. After the riots against Moroccan immigrants in the town of El Ejido, committed by several thousand Spaniards, following the murder of two farmers and a young woman by Moroccans, the whole province of Almera became a symbol for growing social conflicts and xenophobic tendencies within the Spanish receiving society (see for example Martnez Veiga 2001, Checa 2003 and Europisches Brgerforum 2000). 224 In the following empirical study, firstly, it was intended to analyse the social inclusion103 of Moroccan agricultural workers within the local context: To what extent are they members and included - in the understanding of having access to a certain range of social benefits - in different spheres of local society? While in a juridical and political perspective, immigrants are entitled to certain social benefits, like education or health care, this argument is based on the assumption that entitlements are translated into practice by various local actors, both of political authorities and civil society, in a locally specific bargaining process104. While describing the currently existing local pattern of inclusion, the local mechanisms of inclusion will be analysed by discussing the role, significance and the strategic behaviour of various actors who are involved in the local bargaining concerning immigrants inclusion: Which kind of inclusion mechanisms are utilised in the local context?105 How do local actors contribute to increasing (or minimising) Moroccan migrants inclusion? Inclusion locally evaluated Agricultural labour the gate to economic inclusion Certainly the most important sphere of immigrants inclusion within the local receiving society, it is the greenhouse agriculture and the existing working conditions within this locally important economic sector which have to be analysed. In general, working conditions for both illegal as well as legal immigrants are harsh in agriculture: NGOs like Mujeres Progresistas and Acoge are describing the current employment practices as "modern forms of slavery and exploitation in its extreme form." In addition to very low salaries, most immigrant workers suffer from high temperatures, herbicide and pesticide exposure, and resulting health problems. Claiming higher wages or better working conditions mostly results in losing one's job as a large number of other migrants is locally present and willing to work and to accept the conditions, however unsafe. The Spanish quota system for migrant workers (known as the "contingentes") is currently only applied in some exceptional cases. Local farmers prefer hiring workers in the traditional (informal) way, which allows them to pay low salaries and avoid taxes and social 103 The term "inclusion" (exclusion as the opposite) is hereby seen as a status constituted by the access (lack of access) of migrants to certain spheres and benefits (see also Kronauer 2002: 45-46) of the receiving society. 104 Inclusion (exclusion) in this sense is regarded as the extension (limitation) of migrants access to certain spheres and benefits. 105 To get access and understanding of the locally existing situation literature, statistics and media information (Ideal Almera and La Voz de Almera) have been analysed. In the following, various expert-interviews with local (place-based) actors have been conducted between autumn 2003 and spring 2004. The author would like to thank all interview partners, including representatives of the following organisations: ATIME and Al-Ittihad (Associations of Moroccan immigrants); Acoge, APDHA and Mujeres Progresistas (immigrant support groups); Critas and Cruz Roja (humanitarian organisations); CCOO, SOC and UGT (trade unions); Unidad de Inmigracin (Provincia de Almera), Oficina Municipal de Inmigracin (Roquetas de Mar) and Servicios Sociales (Vcar) (local authorities); Partido Popular (PP) (Political party); UPA, COAG and Coexphal (agricultural associations). 225 security contributions. In 2003, only one thousand migrant workers were granted a visa to work in the agricultural sector of Almera (see Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales) comparing this number with the above mentioned estimation of up to 30,000 migrant agricultural workers, and it becomes evident that informal recruitment practices are much more important than the contingent system. Authorities of the central and regional state, Police, Guardia Civil and tax inspectors, turn a blind eye towards local employment practices and conditions. Within this framework of missing and failed controls, exploitation of immigrants and their inclusion in an extreme form of marginalisation is locally guaranteed. As the foundation of local wealth and nearly every form of local development made in the last four decades within the province of Almera is linked directly to greenhouse agriculture, policies of protectionism are common. Farmers associations generally do not feel any responsibility for the improvement of employment conditions, stating repeatedly that they give some bread to poor people working for them and cannot give more, employment activities are similar to those the families of today's proprietors had to endure before, in the time when they had been agricultural workers on their own (interview with UPA and Coexphal). As agriculture is immersed in a crisis of shrinking benefits and increasing international competition (see Ruz Snchez 1998: 183 and Oliver 2003: 39), both political parties as well as local administrations are interested in protecting their clientele in the most important local sector of capital accumulation and their biggest section of the electorate. Claims to better employment conditions for employees seem inappropriate and dangerous within this crisis of local agriculture in contrast, it is even more important to produce more and to reduce local salaries (see Checa 2003: 142-144). Interest in employing illegal migrants therefore principally, rises, although central state authorities try to stop the illegal entry and residence of migrants. Representatives of local political parties, in general, show no interested in the integration of immigrants. Public and political discourse on this issue is either avoided or focuses exclusively on other topics like the criminal activities of immigrants or the claim to control Spanish borders more efficiently. The fact that the locally-created demand for migrants is the most important factor to explain the presence of immigrants is cut out from local political as well as media discourse. In contrast, farmers associations (UPA, COAG) see themselves as "flooded" with too many immigrants demanding work. Quite naturally, in their view, thereby local salaries are minimising. Against the strategic alliance, formed by the economical interest of farmers representing an important share of the local population, supported by political parties and local authorities, trade unions as well as organisations struggling for the rights of immigrants so far cannot exercise any bargaining power. Although trade unions and employers locally 226 have agreed on minimum salaries the lowest ones of all Spanish provinces this agreement is not transferred into practice. So far, local agriculture has been able to avoid the infiltration of trade unions: Immigrants engaging themselves in trade unions activities are often excluded from any form of agricultural employment. Due to the formulations of the Spanish foreigners law it is even forbidden for illegal immigrants to engage in or to affiliate with trade unions or to strike. As half of the local agricultural work force is constituted of immigrants in an illegal status, they are included in employment activities as lawless and extremely marginalised persons. Local humanitarian activists engaging themselves on behalf of immigrants have been repeatedly brand-marked (disgraced?) in public, like in the case of the representative of Mujeres Progresistas who had pamphlets set up in El Ejido claiming that she "play(s) with the bread of local farmers". The right to adequate housing Living mostly in an unstable juridical residence status, suffering from harsh working conditions, agricultural workers see themselves confronted with the lack of adequate housing. Although employed continuously in agriculture, so far no attempts have been made to provide accommodation by local farmers, due to the fact that from a juridical point they are not forced to do this when their immigrant workers are not contracted via the quota-system (contingentes). While farmers thereby avoid further labour costs, local administration feels no responsibility to construct houses for immigrants and emphasizes that "this is the task of their employers" (Unidad de Inmigracin). Especially when regarding the claims for adequate housing made by immigrants, their organisations and support groups, until today the construct of seasonal workers who work and stay only temporarily within the locality is reconstructed continuously: Why provide housing when they will leave soon? - This is the normal reaction and only answer when talking to both farmers as well as local administrations representatives. In addition, immigrant groups, some NGOs and trade unions also avoid discussing the construction of homes especially for agricultural labourers. In their views, this could lead to "bonded labour in the most extreme form" (Atime): immigrants reduced to pure labourers who have to work for their housing and would earn even less money than before and could be abandoned, left without home, when asking for too much. Political parties and local administrations also avoid putting housing projects for immigrants on their agenda. The fear of ghettos is widespread this although extreme segregation already exists (see Checa 2003). Most immigrants have either to construct their own huts out of plastic along the streets, next to the greenhouses or to pay exorbitant rents for accommodation. In most cases they have to 227 share their space with other immigrants to be able to pay rents for local residents consequently they seem to be "people working like slaves, living like animals people you don't like to look at and just cut out of your daily perception" (own interview). Social distance between receiving society and immigrants therefore grows. Especially Moroccan immigrants are confronted with xenophobia and do possess even more limitations of access to the housing market, following the incidents of El Ejido (Cruz Roja). As no attempts have been made by local administration, the government of the autonomous region of Andalusia as well showed only little engagement, humanitarian organisations like the local Red Cross (Cruz Roja) failed in providing accommodation for agricultural workers. The plan of Cruz Roja to establish homes, meeting centres and other facilities for immigrants has not been possible due to intense public pressure, the local residents fear of the creation of ghettos in their neighbourhood, and the agitation of political parties, certain administration officials and individuals. In the view of the conservative party Partido Popular, any housing projects would lead to an increased inflow of illegal migrants, further worsening the existing conflict. This opinion is shared by all other actors excluding humanitarian and immigrant groups. In conclusion, immigrants face a coalition of local actors who, for distinct reasons, show little or no engagement in their lives. Like state control failures regarding illegal immigration and illegal employment practices, regional and local administrations as well as employers are responsible for the severe housing conditions of immigrants. Negatively, there is also nearly no general public debate on these issues or pressure exercised by local civil society. Immigrants inclusion in the local housing market thereby is similar to the situation within the agricultural employment sector. Realisation of civil rights and political mobilisation Extensive limitations both for legal as well as illegal migrants are provided by the Spanish foreigners law within the sphere of political and civil rights (see Table 1). Eligibility and suffrage is only possible for third country nationals who have been naturalised, which is quite an exceptional case within the province of Almera as a prerequisite in most cases is a recorded continuous legal residence status of five years. Migrants without valid documentation are denied all kind of rights to initiate and to participate in public gatherings as well as in demonstrations. In contrast to legal migrants they also do not possess any right to form associations or to affiliate in other interest groups. Consequently, immigrants abilities to usurp the power of employers and to participate in the local bargaining process are extremely limited. For most immigrants "surviving, that means earning money and avoiding police control, counts" (SOC). In the view of the pro-human rights movement Apdha, 228 generally immigrants do not involve themselves in political activities for fear of angering the local population and outbreaks like had happened in El Ejido (2000). Repeatedly, riots against Moroccans are noted, but mostly not discussed in local media and political discourse. Moroccans are generally seen as creating social conflict, while xenophobic tendencies of local receiving society are played down to a wide extent, though most local residents are aware of the fact that they have been brand-marked nationally and internationally since the year 2000. Since then local farmers have intended to replace Moroccan workers by inviting Latin American and Eastern European labourers to work in local agriculture. Farmers hereby play a game by declaring these new workers as "the good ones" while stigmatizing Moroccans as "the bad ones" or by making use of the more stigmatized Moroccans by employing them as foremen for other immigrant workers and therefore extending the gap of intolerance and creating resentment against Moroccans among other immigrant groups. Due to the juridical regulations, the possibilities of mobilisation are extremely limited for Moroccans, especially in the case of illegal migrants. Despite this, in some cases Moroccans are initiating the first steps of mobilisation: Trade unions like SOC, UGT and CCOO emphasise the significance of certain Moroccan individuals intending to inform other workers about their rights and possibilities to mobilise. Due to a game of local farmers who play with different immigrant groups by favouring some while punishing others, so far only minor successes have been noted. Moroccans, as members of the most established immigrant group within the province of Almera, are becoming more likely to denunciate illegal employment practices- thereby, they "attract more anger and hate as (than) others" (Cruz Roja). So far, in the local context no social movement to support immigrants inclusion exists: the engagement for immigrants' rights is limited to small circles of activists and their organisations, which lack the general support of the public. While Moroccans are excluded from political parties and in the majority of cases also from trade unions and groups of the local receiving society like neighbourhood associations, some individuals are engaging themselves in local humanitarian organisations. Seen from this perspective, they have included themselves effectively in structures of the local receiving society, although this inclusion remains limited to some very specific groups. Some of these Moroccan activists intend to establish associations of Moroccan agricultural workers. So far, despite the high number of Moroccans living in the province of Almera, only few Moroccan organisations do exist whose engagement is directed towards the receiving society and claiming better living and working conditions. Most other Moroccan groups so far remain limited in the scope of activities and concentrate mainly on the construction of mosques. 229 The only pressure group organising strikes of agricultural workers is constituted of the small union of agricultural workers (SOC). In contrast to the bigger trade unions (UGT, CCOO) SOC is formed nearly exclusively of immigrants. As the established unions of the receiving country only possess limited bargaining power and show no interest in organising strikes, (not to mention the fact that their clientele is mainly formed by Spaniards), SOC, represents for most farmers a kind of trouble-making movement, and is cut off from public funding. For local immigrants associations, like Atime and Al-Ittihad, the main source for funding is the central and regional state. In general, local administration shows no interest in any humanitarian organisation and immigrant support groups. The common interest of the native resident population in keeping the status quo and protecting agriculture, so far, is blocking all attempts to improve the situation of migrants. Support remains limited to some grass-root initiatives. In the view of Apdha and other local organisations, it is also due to the great variety within the group of Moroccans (ethnic aspects, religious practices, values and regions of origin) that, so far, all attempts to form a significant pressure group have failed. One additional factor to explain the lack of engagement of most immigrants consists in the belief, shared by most immigrants, that they are only temporarily living within the local society of Almera, and will leave this area as soon as possible when they have been legalised or have found a better employment opportunity. The right to health care and social assistance According to the foreigners law, legal migrants and minors without consideration of their legal status can be regarded as nearly equal to Spanish citizens in their access to health care, education and welfare contributions, while in the national context important limitations to the mentioned benefits exist for illegal migrants, though within the Autonomous Region of Andalusia they possess unlimited access to health care. Since the introduction of the Andalusian health card (tarjeta sanitaria, see Junta de Andaluca 2003: 4), humanitarian organisations like the Red Cross shifted their activities towards social welfare, education and emergency assistance. With regard to health care, immigrants' inclusion is regardless of their juridical status as equal to Spanish citizens. Thanks to the engagement of the regional level, immigrants health is not dependant on the goodwill of local farmers, and health care centres are financed directly by the regional government thereby by-passing local administration. Unfortunately for the immigrants, this practice is not applied in regards to housing projects in the local context. Although there had been repeated attempts by the regional government, an improvement of housing conditions for immigrants failed due to the lack of cooperation of local administrations to grant construction land. 230 In comparison to health care, education and social welfare are simultaneously provided by local non-state actors and local administrations. Immigrant minors are able to get education regardless their juridical status in all public schools, access for them is also provided without limitations to kinder gardens and any other public education facilities until they are 18 years old. Financed by the central state, via GRECO and other programmes, and the regional and local administration, some possibilities for education are also open even for illegal immigrants. Concerning illegal immigrants, funding is extremely limited: most humanitarian organisations have reached the limits and can only assist a small share of the local immigrant population. With regard to social welfare, the involvement of non-state actors makes it possible for immigrants to get some assistance, although they originally do not belong to the traditional Spanish welfare system, founded basically on catholic church's involvement as well as familiar mutual assistance. Benefits for immigrants are mainly limited due to overall lacking financial resources and transfers, regardless if they are provided by the central state or regional government. Local agriculture, so far, has blocked every attempt to be included in the provision of welfare and other transfers to immigrants. Generally welfare, health care and education are seen by farmers as being an exclusive responsibility of central state, regional and local administrations. Almera - mirror and social laboratory By revealing the inclusion of Moroccan immigrants within the province of Almera it became clear that in the case of Spain, due to decentralisation and burden sharing practices, the locally existing circumstances are of high importance. The province of Almera owes much of today's wealth and development to greenhouse agriculture, depending heavily on cheap and flexible foreign labourers. The locally existing employment practices, highly informal and flexible, as well as the strategic alliance between farmers, civil society, political parties and local administrations protecting agriculture as the foundation of local wealth and development constitute a locally specific setting for inclusion. Due to the involvement of a majority of local residents in greenhouse agriculture and the existing informal employment practices, the presence of illegal migrants, as well as their exploitation is highly tolerated. Thanks to the involvement of other actors, like the regional administration of Andalusia and locally based non-governmental actors (in some part supported financially by the central and regional state), immigrants possess at least some access to important basic resources like health care, substantial welfare benefits and education. Regarding immigrants accommodation and their inclusion as neighbours into the local receiving society, migrants are facing severe problems that cannot be solved without the 231 engagement of the most important local key player: the agricultural sector. Unfortunately, local farmers in most cases feel an extremely limited social responsibility towards their workforce. So far, all measures for immigrants inclusion are regarded by the local economy as the exclusive responsibilities of state, regional and local administration. In principle, farmers are interested in keeping the status quo: firstly, to have a workforce constituted mostly of illegal migrants that is willing to work under poor conditions and is rather helpless due to their exclusion from local membership, and secondly a low engagement of local civil society in support of immigrants. Due to the historical evolution of greenhouse agriculture, until today a local agreement between political parties, farmers and administration representatives exists "not to touch" agriculture and to avoid troubles: for local incomes and taxes generated by agriculture are great. Given this local agreement, nearly no possibilities exist for non-state actors or public actors of the regional and national level to intervene and alter the currently existing situation. So far, immigrants inclusion regarding agricultural workers is constituted to a wide extent of pure grass-root initiatives based on humanitarian ideals. Generally these initiatives lack the public support of local civil society. This although the majority of the local population is quite conscious of the employment and housing conditions of immigrants - public pressure on local authorities is low. With regard to the local administrations action plan for immigration (Primer Plan Provincial de Inmigracin 2000-2003; Diputacin Provincial 2000) that emphasises the need to establish a co-operation of local actors in the field of immigrants integration, it has to be said that this intended co-operation has not been achieved so far. Most NGOs and immigrant groups have left the negotiating table because no real agreement on improving the situation of immigrants was possible due to effective policy blockage, applied by agricultural organisations, political parties as well as local authorities. Resulting from this, all attempts of the Andalusian government to mitigate immigrants' marginalisation and stop their exploitation within the province of Almera have failed. In 2000, the incidents of El Ejido were able to fundamentally change the Spanish context of immigration: using the images of El Ejido and stimulating public fear, the conservative party Partido Popular was able to win national elections. Consecutively, one of the first laws reformed and enforced by the new government was the foreigners bill. Since then, immigration policy is regarded as being an important pillar for national security. Repeatedly the debate on illegal migration led to severe diplomatic disturbances between Morocco and Spain. The terrorist attacks of March 9 (2004, Madrid) led to further tensions between natives and Moroccan and other Muslim immigrant communities in Spain. In 232 summary, immigration and integration in Spain remain linked to the illusion that increased border controls are the panacea to stop illegal migratory processes. The conservative government of Partido Popular until 2004 avoided to face growing realities for a long time: the only reaction towards a continuously growing number of illegal migrants (at the end of 2003 their number was estimated up to one million; see ABC) was according to the general pattern in most European states to put even more emphasis on border controls. Legalisation campaigns were repeatedly denied with the argumentation that this step would even increase the attraction of Spain as a destination for illegal migrants. In contrary to all statements made by the conservative party, as well as its successor, the Sot Government under Zapatero (formed in 2004), the huge Spanish informal economy - the most important employer of illegal migrants and most important pull-fact-creator - remained untouched. Despite the promises of the new sot government (formed by PSOE in 2004) to bring a fundamental change for illegal migrants and to guarantee them an existence in Spain under conditions of legality, most NGOs (ACOGE, APDHA etc.) supporting the inclusion of migrants into Spanish society heavily criticised the legalisation campaign that was conducted in the spring of 2005. Although PSOE intended to legalise all illegal migrants, only a limited share of illegal migrants has actually been able to legalise themselves some of the legalised migrants could in the mid-term future lose their status again as the precondition for legalisation remained the existence of a written employment contract - a document that most agricultural workers in Almera are unlikely to deliver. In addition, they had to deliver a proof that they had been inscribed in the local municipal register although this registration officially was not permitted any more following the reform of the foreigners bill in 2000 and a huge portion of illegal migrants therefore certainly avoided registration. However, it is important to emphasise that even those migrants who will become legalised will not possess a permanent working or residence permit! The new legislation as in former campaigns provides migrants only with a temporarily validation that remains to be bound to the existence of a contract. If legalised migrants lose their employment or if the contract ends and they are not able to find a new employment with contract they again will fall back into an illegal status. It is often said in debates among members of the public as well as between politicians and other decision-makers that the province of Almera is one of the "most conflictive and most problematic areas" of insertion and contact between native citizens and immigrant workers in Spain106. Unfortunately, this often seems then to serve as an excuse for outside 106 Empirical evidences from local field research and through text-analyses of local, regional and national newspapers as well as scientific literature on Almera. 233 (not locally place-based) actors not to intervene in this area. The province of Almera is somehow portrayed as locally unique in the sense that the outside world never will be able to understand what happens/happened here (the big transformation of this impoverished area into a competitive and rich region, the suffering the native population once had to accept), so that any intervention from the outside is likely not to work as the native-insiders do not accept any interference into their "daily struggle for survival" (high level of competition on the European and global agricultural market). Often immigrants are blamed for any locally existing problem the argument put forward is often that Almera suffers from its geographical position as a border region and staging ground for immigrants and that this region cannot cope with these high numbers of stranded people, storming this "helpless province" and thus creating social tensions. On the other side, however, the attractiveness and pull-effect of Almera's informal economy and the locally created benefits are somehow forgotten in this debate. This Spanish region is therefore often construed as an "exceptionally different case" a place that cannot be changed like other regions. This of course supports the further growth and existence of unbridled exploitation and xenophobia. Unfortunately, so far, no significant change of perspective has taken place: Almera might be a/the "worst-case scenario" in Spain, but little has been done to help and to de-stigmatize this area and bring this social laboratory, consisting of certain mechanisms of informal market insertion of migrants, high levels of exploitation but also high opportunities for clandestine residence of migrants, to a socially sustainable solution. Local and European realities The province of Almera clearly illustrates Europe's current migration dilemma: While European and national policy makers struggle hard to create more legal channels for highly skilled migrants (for example through the new "Hague Programme" for economic migration, currently promoted by the European Commission), economies on the local level, especially former traditional agricultural economies and their labour markets, generate economic benefits by employing and exploiting unqualified Third country nationals. While the focus of policy-makers lies on better ways to attract and recruit high-skilled migrants seen as generators for economic growth and as a "good" Europe should attract in order to show that it is competitive with other world regions in the global economy the existence and necessity of labour markets to employ low skilled migrants in "traditional" sectors like agriculture but also in basis services is somehow avoided. Often this is explained by the fact that policy-makers avoid this more important section of migrant workforce in order to avoid public backlashes as, 234 against the background of high unemployment in most European countries, policies to attract low skilled migrants would mean an "affront" to the native electorate. Almera stands only as one example (in addition to many other areas in Spain, Italy, Greece or Portugal) of the failure to implement an immigration policy, harmonized with Schengen and EU standards, on the national (central government) level that is rather the outcome of policy pressures imposed by other EU Member States and the necessity to become conform with the Schengen and EU-acquis than this migration policy actually recognizes the individual, nationally existing immigration reality in the country concerned, its specifics and dynamics on the actual local and regional level. Southern European border regions like Almera share the fact that local labour markets never have been regulated like labour markets in the Northern or Western European industrial societies. Consequently, the possibilities of the central government level and the overall European policy level to intervene are extremely limited. The only solution for the local problem would consist of intensified interventions by the central state to control and stop illegal employment of immigrants by transferring more financial and personal resources to the province of Almera as one of the most important entry-points for illegal migrants. The side-effect of such measures, however, would consist of an extremely decreased competitiveness of local agriculture in the European and world market, a likely increase in local unemployment rates as a result of stricter labour market controls that would also affect the native workforce and a further intensification of xenophobic discourses against immigrants. On the other side, border regions like Almera (in Southern Europe but also in the new Eastern European member states) suffer from the fact that these regions are often left alone with the side effects of European migration policies. Border regions traditionally are seen as spaces where the national government demonstrates its independence and demarcates its territory. As a consequence, border regions are used as spaces to demonstrate to certain categories of cross-border movers that they are either welcome in the country or in the other case are not welcome. Almera like other European border regions thereby clearly illustrates the perversion of current European realities: locally, both categories of migrants are economically and in the end also socially included in certain niches of the local society, economic benefits are created (low prices of products for European consumers, income and stability for local natives, taxes for the state) despite the fact that borders have been ignored. Although politicians in general emphasize that these local labour market niches should become regulated and controlled, however, to date very little (if any) progress has been made in Spain or elsewhere to change "traditional" informal (with regard to migrants thereby semilegal or illegal) employment practices that on the one side offer opportunities for immigrants 235 to "get in" but on the other side often simultaneously lead immigrants to "get trapped" in exploitive labour market and tense intra-society relations. As EU-Europe gets bigger and bigger, and the border lines are expanding and border regions are "moving" to the territory of mostly poor new Member states that are struggling on their own, more emphasis should be paid to border regions at the European level: this emphasis should not consist exclusively of measures to combat illegal cross-border movements in these border regions but also in strategies to effectively govern local labour market patterns and social dynamics in these areas. Border regions like Almera on one side have to serve as spaces where illegitimate cross-border movements have to be avoided but these regions are also in need of more support from the national and European level to manage their individual local immigration realities actively "on the ground": more support to strengthen and create social society structures and institutions is needed. Effective measures toward illegal immigration would consist of more effective controls of local labour markets and the fight against a local tolerance of illegal exploitation patterns on the other side, NGOs and migrants should be enabled to exercise their political, social and economic rights and supported in finding effective ways to include migrants and create socially sustainable and tolerant neighbourhoods. To construct an unwelcoming "cordon-sanitaire" on European grounds by tolerating xenophobic attitudes and exclusion mechanisms in the end is likely to create more negative side-effects for receiving societies than it is helping to defend borders that never will be absolutely tight and secure. Table 1 Share of rights for migrants in Spain, according to status of residence legal residence status (limited) freedom of movement (art. 38) (limited) equality in employment (art. 10 and 32) Unlimited access to health and educational services equal to citizens (art. 12) Access to social services and welfare benefits (art. 14) limited possibilities to perform political rights (e.g. art. 7 and 8) illegal residence status no right to enter, remain and work in Spain (art. 38) no affiliation in trade unions, no right to strike (art. 11) medical emergency treatment (art. 12) unlimited access to the educational and health service for minors (art. 9 and 12) only limited access to social services and welfare benefits (art. 14) no rights to organise and to participate in public gatherings and manifestations; no rights to affiliate in interest groups and to form associations (e.g. art. 7 and 7) 236 References ABC (2004): La directora del INE admite que en Espaa hay cerca de un milln de extranjeros no legalizados (10.03.2004) Agrela Romero, B. and Dietz, G. (2004): Non-Governmental Versus Governmental Actors? The Emergence of Multilevel Diversifications of Immigration Policy in Spain, in: Cornelius, W. and Tsuda, T. (eds.): Recent countries of immigration. Japan in comparative perspective. San Diego. Apap, J. (2002): The Rights of Immigrant Workers in the European Union. The Hague et al. Arango, J. (2000): Becoming a Country of Immigration at the End of the Twentieth Century. The Case of Spain, in: King, R, Lazaridis, G. and Tsardanidis, C. (eds.): Eldorado or fortress? Migration in Southern Europe; London: Hampshire Brochmann, G. (1999): Controlling Immigration in Europe, in: Brochmann, G. and Hammar, T. (eds.): Mechanisms of Immigration Control. A Comparative Analysis of European Regulation Policies; Oxford/New York Checa, F. (2003): Factores endgenos y exgenos para la integracin social de los inmigrados en Almera, in: Checa, F., Arjona, . and Checa, J. C. (eds.): La integracin social de los inmigrados. Modelos y experiencias. Barcelona Diputacin Provincial de Almera (2000): Primer Plan Provincial de Inmigracin 2000-2003. Almera El Pas (2003): El paro aumenta por tercer mes consecutivo y se situ en el 11,74% (5.12.2003) Europisches Brgerforum/Europisches Komitee fr die Verteidigung der Flchtlinge und Gastarbeiter (2000): Z.B. El Ejido. Anatomie eines Pogroms. Bericht einer Delegation europischer Brgerinnen und Brger ber die rassistischen Ausschreitungen vom Februar 2000 in Andalusien. Basel Eurostat (2004): Area under Glass. 1990-2000. [01.01.04] Eurosur Consultores (2003): Estadsticas y grficos, in: Gutirrez Escobar, J. A. (coor.): Anuario de la agricultura almeriense 2003. Almera Faraco, C., Amrute, S. and Pfohman, S. (2004): The Existence of Burden Sharing and Decentralisation in Spain, in: Blaschke, J. and Pfohman, S. (eds.): The Decentralisation of Asylum. Refugee Reception Procedures in the European Union. Berlin Goytisolo, J. and Nar, S. (2000): El peaje de la vida. Integracin o rechazo de la emigracin en Espana. Madrid Ideal Granada (2004): Diez provincias espaolas con el mayor crecimiento en el periodo 1995-2002 (14.01.2004) INE (2003a): Padrn municipal 1991-2002, Instituto Nacional de Estadstica INE, InternetDatabase. [11.12.03] INE (2003b): Superficie y Produccin de Hortalizas, Instituto Nacional de Estadstica INE, Internet-Database. [31.12.03] Junta de Andaluca (Consejera de Salud) (2003): Carpeta de salud para inmigrantes. Sevilla Kronauer, M. (2002): Exklusion. Die Gefhrdung des Sozialen im hoch entwickelten Kapitalismus. Frankfurt/Main Laparra, M. and De Lizarrondo Martnez, A. (2003): Integracin y polticas de integracin, in: Laparra, M. (ed.): Extranjeros en el purgatorio. Integracin social de los inmigrantes en el espacio local. Barcelona Ley Orgnica 8/2000, Boletn Oficial de Estado, No. 279, November 21st, 2003 Martn Daz, E. (2003): Mercados de trabajo e investigacin social en Andaluca, in: Serra Salomn, L. (coord.): II Seminario sobre la investigacin de la inmigracin extranjera en Andaluca. Sevilla Martnez Atienza, G. (2002): Ley y reglamento de extranjera. Ley orgnica 4/2000 de 11 de enero reformada por ley 8/2000 de 22 de diciembre. Disposiciones normativas. Jurisprudencia. Comentarios doctrinales. Madrid 237 Martnez Veiga, U. (2001): El Ejido. Discriminacin, exclusin social y racismo. Madrid. Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales: Trabajadores extranjeros. Contingentes 2003. [31.12.03] Oliver, A. (COAG) (2003): Anlisis de la rentabilidad del agricultor en el campo almeriense, in: Gutirrez Escobar, J. A. (coor.): Anuario de la agricultura almeriense 2003. Almera OECD (2000): Some Lessons from Recent Regularisation Programmes, in: OECD (Ed.): Combating the illegal employment of foreign workers, Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development Ruz Snchez, P. (1998): Hortcultura. Inmigracin y globalizacin. Apuntes para el caso almeriense, in: Checa, F. (ed.): Africanos en la otra orilla. Trabajo, cultura e integracin en la Espaa Mediterrnea. Barcelona Tapinos, G. (2000): Irregular Migration. Economic and Political Issues, in: OECD (ed.): Combating the Illegal Employment of Foreign Workers; Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development Torres, F. (2002): La integracin de los inmigrantes y algunos de los desafios que nos plantea, in: De Lucas, J. and Torres, F. (eds.): Inmigrantes. Cmo los tenemos? Algunos desafos y (malas) respuestas. Madrid Zapata-Barrero, R., Adamuz Garca, C. and Martnez Luna, I. (2002): Estructuras institucionales y redes de actores en las polticas de acomodacin de los inmigrantes en Espaa, in: Garca Castao, F. J. and Lpez, C. (eds.): La inmigracin en Espaa. Contextos y alternativas. Ponencias del III Congreso sobre la inmigracin en Espaa; Volumen II Ponencias. Granada Zapata-Barrero, R. (2003): Polticas de acomodacin de la inmigracin y administracin local. La gestin de la coexistencia, in: Guillot, J. et al. (eds.): Inmigraci i poders locals. Ciutats i Persones. Barcelona 238 239 REPRESSIVE FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL NETWORKS IN MIGRATORY PROCESS: CASE OF MOLDOVAN MIGRANTS IN ISTANBUL Bayram Unal 1) In this study, I aim at the repressive and suppressive functions of migrant networks on the single migrants. Here I exemplified these functions within the networks of Moldovan In-House Services Workers working temporarily in Istanbul, Turkey. The literature widely focused on the beneficial functions of the migrant networks from the point of rational individual. It is strongly highlighted that there would be different impacts of networks on different migrants at different stage of migratory process. In its simplistic overview however, networks are taken as granted as essential assets in one's decision towards migration. Furthermore, it has widely been assumed that each of the networks has independent functions in accordance to its internalized patterns and dynamics and those are positive and rational from the point of migrants. However, It is rarely highlighted the repressive functions of networks. These are concretized at the latest-developed stage of migratory process. I will analyze the repressive functions in details by developing multi-level network approach. Keywords: Migration, Network, Repressive Functions, Moldovan Women 1) PhD student at Binghamton State University, New York, USA. Contact: Introduction As it is widely argued, the migration over all is a social phenomenon triggered mostly by solely economic incentives and follow up these incentives incessantly (Massey and Espinosa 1997). If we may conclude that the economic relations are the set of social organization of production process (Marx 1990), then the migration should be defined as a social process as well in every respect. If we agree on the fact that the process is social, we are inevitably required to develop a societal approach. This is also important from the state policy points of view that need prevention of the further unwanted flows in the case of Romania. The lack of societal approach towards the flows of people in any destination is the primary reason beyond the failure of the state migration policies. In order to prevent unwanted migration, state agencies have mostly utilized the network approach in explaining migratory process. This frequent usage is of course not coincidental. The reason behind the common application of the network approach is clearly related with its power in analyzing the social relations within the migratory process. However, we have witnessed that the social relations at the beginning of the process developed by the migrants themselves may reshape the migratory process later on at the developed stage. From this statement, we may conclude that by solely focusing on the hitherto network approach we 240 always look for the social framework in which the process is developed in favour of migrant members. The contribution of the network approach to the explanation of migration is undoubtedly self-evident. The point I would like to focus here is not the essentials of network approach but rather the functional aspects of networks. Here I focus on the functions within the network of networks rather than the functions in a taken granted single framework where each network functions in its own dynamics in isolation from other networks. My argument is simple: First of all, networks are indubitably correlated with each other albeit the temporal and spatial differences. Second, the functions of networks might be critically different at each developmental stage of migratory process i.e., beginning, intermediary, and developed stages107. The point here is that the networked relations after certain level of institutionalization may act as repressive factors rather than supportive factors. The repressive functional aspect is not limited only to trafficking women into sex business as it was commonly argued in literature and in the United Nations' policies. Especially in an example of Moldovan In-House Services Workers (IHSWs) in Turkey, network of networks as a system expands its repressive and suppressive functions on Moldovan women migration. This is not the point considered sufficiently so far in arguments over networked social relations. We rarely highlighted the repressive functions of networks while emphases have always been on the beneficial functions from the point of rational individual108. We do not mention any repressive and suppressive aspects of network functions in migration except in trafficking women. In its simplistic overview, networks are taken as granted as essential assets in one's decision towards migration. Furthermore, it has widely been assumed that each of the networks has independent functions in accordance to its internalized patterns and dynamics and those are positive from the point of migrants. What I raise here is all about the coercive aspects of networks on migrants is that networks have also some requirements from single migrants while meeting with their needs. These aspects, I called repressive functions, are concretized at the latest-developed stage of migratory process. Before going into details, it is a pre-requisite to draw an introductory general framework over the migratory process and the well-known functions of networks in order to exemplify the repressive functions in different stages. Since the presence of repressive functions of networks at the latest stages of the migratory process do not force us to disregard the hitherto functions of networks at the 107 108 Here, the level of development in migration is materialized in its institutionalization level of network relations i.e. transportation, housing, services for visa and customs and so on at each stage. We do not consider possible irrational frameworks as well albeit most of the migration from Moldova to Turkey takes place in irrational incentives. 241 beginning of the same process, I would like to demonstrate these functions as I analyze the Moldovan migration from right at the beginning to the end. In the last part, I attempt to demonstrate the patterns and dynamics of repressive functions of networks. 1 Moldovan Migration in the Region: New Trend We have witnessed massive flows of people, especially women from ex Soviet countries in general and from Moldova in specific case to neighbourhood countries during the early 90s. As European Union presumed that these flows would be towards EU countries, the parliament on behalf of European polity has not only applied very strict closed-door policies but also forced the possible EU candidate members or members to implement the very same strict policies in order to control the migration (Baldwin-Edwards and Arango 1999; BaldwinEdwards and Schain 1994). Romania is one of these candidate member countries. We may speak of success of the members and candidate member countries for the application of the border-controls and restrictive entry policies. After closing the doors at members' borders, those migrants who cannot enter UE countries have headed towards neighbourhood countries. Furthermore, especially with the increasingly globalized economic and cultural relations, Istanbul became the major port not only for the demand but also for the distribution of the trafficked women migrants to neighbourhood countries and cities. The largest part of these groups of migrants has come to Turkey in relation to the suitcase trade and they involved in informal commodity trade until the year 2000. Migration flows to Turkey has of course neither begun nor limited with the suitcase trade. Flows are intermingled with sex business in the form of trafficking women and later on with domestic sector as well. There have been the times even migrants have no idea what they initially wanted to do. In many cases, those came for suitcase trade begun working in sex business in order to accumulate the limited capital or those came to earn more and more money in sex business (Ykseker 2003) have to cover themselves in domestic sectors. Moldovan women previously attaching to the Ukrainian migration networks for migrating to Turkey have gradually established their own transportation paths and then their network. It means direct transportation to the destination, thus the migration is possible for many migrants in terms of various costs. The initial flows have always been organized by individual efforts mainly done by friendship and later by family and community networks. Individualized efforts have been later on transferred into monetary benefits so needless to say that the institutionalization of networks turned out to be only inevitable choice for all kind of the migration at the end. In other words, migration as a process helped in developing network relations, and the networked relations in turn manage the migrants. 242 During the developing stage, functions of networks were always in line with the benefits of rational individual migrants. In other words, networks have been designed as tools to provide services to ease the process for single migrants. 2 Defending Networks: Understanding the Networks As we evaluate the Moldovan migrant networks, especially during the institutionalization process, we have seen that almost all networked social relations have acted as catalyst in order to get closer the origin with destination in terms of conditions and possibilities. In other words, immigrants, former migrants and non-migrants are always networked by the surrounding sets of interpersonal associations based on the ties of kinship, friendship, gender and shared community origin (Boyd 1989; Brown and Mitchell 1988; Choldin 1973; Davis and Winters 2001; Faist and Ozveren 2004; Held et al. 1999; Hugo 1981; Kyle 2000; Miller Matthei and Smith 1996; Sassen 1995). It is also not surprising that the network relations at initial stage of migratory process are all about the personal or communal relations based on the shared culture, ethnicity, or social values. These cultural, ethnic and social commonalities inevitably require a model of organization of social relations contingent upon a social capital (Faist 2000). Organized social relations in this model are always ready to help the members. Therefore, at this stage of networks' development, the presence and formation of social capital does not require complicated social relations since the monetary expectation is explicitly out of question. Thus, it is almost impossible to reject the benefits of the networked social relations from the points of rational individual potential migrants. First of all, these networked correlations increase the likelihood of international movement of an individual, mainly members since they compose of a reciprocity and trust (Faist 2000). Migrants either in a community or in a small group of friends or family have always required a social support. In order to get support from other members, single individuals have to act in line with the assumed solidarity among the group. Thus, solidarity creates a trust and then trust, in turn, triggers the accumulation in solidarity. At the latest stages of networks in Moldovan case, we witnessed well-networked social relations based on the solidarity and reciprocity109. These sort of social relations have provided the continual framework where it lowers the costs and risks of movement and increase the expected net returns to immigration (Boyd 1989; Davis and Winters 2001; Massey et al. 1998; Portes 1995; Sassen 1995; Tilly 1990). The support 109 However, we are not always assuming that the solidarity is and would be playing decisive roles among the group or networked social relations at all level of network development. We also figured out the functions of un-solidarity at the latest stage of migration when the numbers of migrants became excessive, and the expected net returns are decreased. 243 form the community has necessarily established strong social relations between non-migrants at origin and migrants at destination as long as the expected return to the household has been relevant as primary asset. Therefore, in many instances, these relations have been responsible in an increase of numbers albeit the regulation efforts of the unwanted migration in any given destination by local authorities. For mainly this reason, many scholarly works focused on nature of the migration processes and on the systems and networks of inter-linkages between the origin and destination countries. Especially after 1980s, these linkages became the prima foci of all scholarly works. The scholars initially has questioned why does migration as a process develop and change over time, and why do they develop between particular countries and involve always certain migrants but not others? Scholars assumed some roles of networks on the migratory flow as taken granted. First of all, it is only possible to explain the continuation of a migration process from its initiation as long as we take the networked relations into account (Lim 1987: 421). Secondly, they argue that the prima foci of the migration may be shifted from economic to social and cultural motivations. At this point, the strength of networks is important and might be fed up by the cultural ties along with the socio-political environment in which the networks operate (Lim 1987). Thirdly, they highlighted the importance of the household unit as a primary unit to analyze rather than the individual migrant. "The central role of the family in making available resources for migration and in engaging in migration according to their stage in the life cycle was noted". (Lim 1987: 421) The Scholars highlighted the fact that once migration begun, it tends to expand over time nationally or internationally. The process became self-sustaining, reflecting the establishment of networks of information, assistance and obligations which develop between migrants in the host society and friends and relatives in the sending area (Boyd 1989: 442). Thus, Boyd argues that due to the links, movements are not necessarily limited in time and space. Furthermore, the networks have been seen as a bridging component of migration between macro and micro approaches, "meso" level approach (Faist 2000). This meso level approach requires an understanding that the concept of network helping the researcher who invoked structural explanations for migration while measuring migration as the movement of individuals or groups of individuals (Boyd 1989). It is simply because networked social relations both transmit and shape the effects of social and economic structures on individuals, families, and households (Boyd 1989:641-642). This is the essential statement for my counter argument as I focus later on. The networks as a methodological tool "permit understanding migration as social product not as the sole result of individuals' decisions made by 244 individual actors, not as the sole result of economic or political parameters, but rather as an outcome of all these factor in interaction" (Boyd 1989:642). This interrelationship between individuals and the structure highlights another aspect of migration process, namely cumulative causation. As I rephrase it networking overtime, it also highlights the inevitable accumulation of all kind of information in social and economic relations. Thus, the cumulative nature of the social relations within and between networks turned out to be a cause in the latest increment in the volume and the direction of migration. In Moldovan migration, right at the end of the developing stages, we witnessed that cumulative aspect of migratory process becomes structure itself (Castles and Miller 1993). As cumulative relationships were deeply developed, most of the families with a member or relative worked at least once previously in Turkey as domestic worker began planning to send their members to Turkey. This well observed accumulation in social relations is also decisive in performing the duties of networks in terms of informing and weighing the credibility of ideas that is crucial contribution to one's decision making towards migrating (Haddad and Lam 1994; Parrillo 1991; Pierce and Elisme 1997; Portes 1997). Here networks undoubtedly provide direct or indirect assistance to members of a community by providing information on job opportunities, housing, food, transportation, reducing the costs, enhancing the benefits and limiting the uncertainty of migration, thus increasing the net benefits of migrating (Boyd 1989). "Time, effort, and resources invested in such networks are to be cashed in the form of help, advice, or financial assistance when needed" (Wallace 1999). At this stage of networking, we see that the accumulation embedded in social relations is based on friendship or ethnicity regardless of monetary expectations beyond the reciprocity. Therefore, social capital at the early stage of networking has nothing to do with the monetary concerns (Faist 2000; Portes and Landolt 2000; Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993; Portes 1995). In the developing stage, the composition of networks such as ethnicity and gender inevitably influences the organization of migratory flows and serves to the possible migrants at origin. The composition of Moldovan-Russian networks in Istanbul serves towards shaping the patterns of migration whether it is represented by a certain ethnicity and gender, whether migrants go to one city rather than another and whether they find employment in certain occupational niches i.e., translator and In-House Service worker for Ukrainian and Moldovan women, respectively (Faist 2000). Furthermore, ethnic and gender dimensions of networks might be self-reproducing since each network members call her friends or relatives (Waldinger 1994). The form of networks we mention in turn accentuates the concentration of migrants from a certain country or region in certain occupations. Additionally, recent studies 245 show that women migrants may depend more on female networks as well as their own kin networks, and that they are more likely to choose occupations where the network of female migrants has already established a niche (Davis and Winters 2001; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; Kossoudji and Ranney 1984). This is another essential in understanding the repressive functions of networks as the composition of networks moves towards further institutionalization. I will return the details later on. Finally, various intermediaries also play a positive role in migratory process at the developing stages (Castles and Miller 1998). The demand for a specific type of work can be met through intermediary agents as an alternative means of recruiting labour over long distances110. Beside the agents, there might be a mediation based on sibling or friendship relations as well as direct contacts with the future employer (Eelens and Speckmann 1990). In other words, the direct principle intermediary might be the migrant who mediates the process through the local contacts for other possible migrants at origin looking for employment abroad. Most of the time, we found that employers might prefer to employ migrant(s) who has/have been recommended by someone whom they have employed previously. Likewise, employees might prefer to be employed by employers known by the pioneer migrant/s. This sort of personal intermediation plays a crucial role in order to avoid paying further fees to private commercial intermediary agents. Both direct and indirect intermediation aims at the employment of individuals in a particular activity at a particular place for a specified period of time by mutually and directly obtaining information (Prothero 1990). the subject of next title. As the network relations reach their peaks for each type and institutionalize further, migratory process works independently from the so called rational individual due to the pressure of network of networks. Following part will focus on the repressive functions of Network of Networks. However, this mediation has also been causing a contradictory development in migratory process. It will be 3 Rethinking Networks: Understanding the Network of Networks It is widely accepted that migration as a process is a sum of social relations. However, this is also intermingled process other than single isolated relations at different temporal and spatial frameworks. In other words, the networked relations in any migratory process are not limited among the certain people bounded with the limited social relations. For instances, commercial and institutional relations in a larger framework have been gradually developing over time in Recruiting agencies for domestic service workers in Middle Eastern and Asian countries are an example to legal regulation of demand and supply (Arnold and Shah 1986). 110 246 addition to the social relations in single networks. Therefore, I suggest establishing a multilevel network approach in order to understand the totality of relationships within communalized, institutionalized and commercialized framework: the network of networks. The reason I come up with the multi-level networking approach is the fact that the relationship among different networks that are established in different time and space is mutual and inclusive. This also reminds us the clandestine dynamics of the functions of networks within the multi-relational aspects. Therefore, here I see the networks as the social organizations based on kinship; commercial parts based on monetary benefits and institutional bodies based on the political interests at different time and space. The substance of the argument here is that the various repressive functions of the network of networks might be at work to some extend in accordance to the networks' primary purposes. The networks as they are established in response to specific purposes during the migratory process might well be transformed into the mechanism that is coercing the migrants to behave into certain way. At the age of global era, migration networks work as part of the migration industry between supply and demand. Therefore, they turned out to be part of the process as influential agents. Due to well organized networks of social relations and their commercial interests, migrants have faced with strictly predefined course throughout their migration process. At the certain level of migratory process, i.e., transportation, finding jobs, housing, and all other services, assumed to be eased by networks, the services have only been provided as a package in exchange of money. In other words, migrants, if they do want to migrate and work so, have to buy the services from the intermediaries as packed services. Therefore, bestowing these packed services to migrants in turn requires them to pay back their depths caused by the premigration services given by networks. These coercive exchange relations might be seen as identical with trafficking women for sex at first glance. However, resembling relations can be seen in domestic services as well. Here, women migrants have to sell their labour in exchange of the work in order to repay their depth paid them in advance. I will exemplify the repressive functions under three major categories. One is the Demand-Side Networks (DSN) consisting of those formed in order to manipulate the demand in mostly favour of Gagauz women for domestic services in Turkey. The second is the Supply-Side Networks (SSN), very much initiated with the social relations at origin. These consist of private commercial networks and migrant traffickers. In addition to these, I found other leading Single Intermediaries (SI) manipulating the social relations as part of the set of networks. These intermediaries consist of single "middle-woman", doorkeepers in Istanbul, and individuals (sometimes includes ex-security officers) in Laleli Moldovan Labour Market 247 located in Istanbul. They also include friendship and family networks since they work as single intermediary. They employ flexible strategies and act as both supply and demand sides as they needed. In many examples they moderate the flows of migrants between the supplyside and demand-side networks. Each of these might be seen as independent and isolated category in time and space at first glance since it is assumed that each has different functions to accomplish. However, as we approach the process in a holistic framework, we see the set of networks, the network of networks, in which each of these networks undertakes certain responsibilities of the process for the ultimate end that is the division of labour. 3.1 Demand Side Networks111 Due to the increasing demand for Gagauz women for core IHSs, the DSNs have headed towards specific Gagauz women other than women from different nationalities (Unal 2004). Here, one of the significant repressive aspects of network is not to give any chance to other migrant women entering to the specific IHSs, or to Gagauz women doing other works neither in household nor in commercial environment. In many interviews, I found out that the Gagauz women had an opportunity to find out a job only in core domestic works i.e., heavy cleaning, child-care, patient and elderly care and so on albeit their will to work in some other works such as picking up, villa-care, and translator. The opportunities working in other works except the core-domestic and care services have likely been blocked out by DSNs. Gagauz women are introduced as rustic and unkempt thus a modern slave within the house and care business. Like Gagauz women, we witnessed that the network barriers work against the employment of Azerbaijani, Bulgarian and Armenian women in IHSs as well. They except Armenians were implicitly allowed to work only in cooking and garden related jobs due to negative public images about them. The negative public perception is about the distrust to deceitful Azerbaijani domestic workers. For Bulgarian, we found that the most of the Bulgarian women are likely not able to work in any part of domestic works due to negative images as well. They are more likely employed in heavy construction- cleaning and corecleaning at home. Certain historical perceptions of Armenian women in Turkish public sphere are transferred into ethnic discrimination within the house-related business. It is found that the most of the Armenian women in Turkey can find jobs especially in the Armenian households of Istanbul and they are excluded from the In-House Services Labour market. Last but not least, the similar but the worst prejudice is relevant for Uzbek women in Istanbul. The DSNs Demand Side Networks at Istanbul example are those networked relations collecting the demand and to some extend organizing the supply in order to respond the specific demand under the chapter of Social and Personal Counseling Agents. 111 248 have always spread out the gossip about Uzbek women as they was prostitute since the many of the DSNs have no contact with Uzbek women at all. If they can find a work as domestic worker, their work contracts always force them to work in a partnership form [In-House Partnership Services (IHPSs)112]. It is because that most of the DSNs have attempted to persuade the households on that Uzbek women were for sexual interactions other than the domestic work. Following this negative images, most of the Uzbek women have to work in IHPSs other than in other forms of domestic works. According to the DSNs, there are certain people of nationality to do specific works in domestic sector. They witnessed and decided that the Ukrainian and Russian originated women have always looking for the works involving the love/sex. Therefore, the DSNs have always offered the work including sexual affairs to these women of nationalities. The DSNs believed that these women are happy only if they work in that kind of works and other women of nationalities cannot handle the partnership as much as these women can do. Thus, DSNs assign these women specifically for these kinds of work in order to "get rid of failing" in their business. Furthermore, in order to keep the profitable dominance at only house-related field, DSNs have always been offering Gagauz domestic workers and manipulating the demand towards working with themselves. These sorts of efforts have been soon echoed in the public images about all ethnic group of domestic workers in relation to the work they were assigned. Furthermore, age and the physical appearance become other influential sources of this constructed images. This statement has been supported by the very specific notes taken by the DSNs during the interviews with domestic workers. These notes are helpful in directing the specific women towards specific works in relevance of the age and physical appearance. Once the demand asks for sexual affairs under the cover of domestic work, DSNs have strictly given direction to the women accordingly in an unwritten contract. Even the contract is written, it is clearly made without getting the migrant women worker's opinion. Thus, the power of DSNs dictating the terms and conditions of work to migrants are highly visible and to some degree is inevitably causing the over work and performance. IHSWs have no chance to refuse this partial agreement at any time. IHPSs is a special field of in-house services including the light work such as tidying up, and dusting. The major parts of it are the partnership services such as going out, eating out and sharing the bedroom for sexual affairs. In these services, the woman turns to be lady of the house where is gives IHPSs and other services including heavy cleaning, laundering, and so on have been bought from other women. 112 249 3.2 Supply Side Networks (SSNs) These obligations are transferred from the previous chain of migration industry so called Supply Side Networks (SSNs). In other words, the IHSWs have been brought by SSNs according to the DSNs' order and have been turned over as commodity to the DSNs. The demand side networks encourage the SSNs to obtain such workers through accumulating the demands. Supply and Demand side networks as two sides of the coin, set up the specific migrant female worker's arrivals to Istanbul for working at specific IHSs. The SSNs simply define themselves that they are private agents helping the poor migrants to immigrate and find their first jobs. However, in immigration mechanism, these networks might also be repressive on the migrants in many cases. It is because that the supply networks are always in association with demand networks, meaning that the services for single migrants are set up in a single package. Let's take one of the financing SSNs as an example. This kind reaches to the women at origin willing to work In Istanbul by way of press, advertisements or recommendations and finance migrants' visa, travel, customs and accommodation payments. Later on, this network indebts the migrants for certain amount of money including its own profits. As networks spend more money on behalf of migrants, in every step of the migration process, it is obvious that those migrants are indebted more and more to the SSNs. Although the personal or friendship networks are likely less repressive for the single migrants, the single efforts gradually become dysfunctional due to the expected strategies of the households towards minimizing risks and maximizing total income. However, these SSNs are very much limited in their migratory patterns, especially in illegal cases such as residential and visa issues. It is seen that the individual efforts during the visa application and bordercross are getting both dangerous and inefficient. For instance, at the customs, SSNs' bribing on behalf of migrants provides minimum risky environment for both bribe taker and giver. This mechanism reduces the risk by preventing individual actions and their repetition. So, at this point the individual bribing does not work and is not encouraged. This does not mean that bribing mechanism does not work. On the contrary, it is further institutionalized in order to decreasing the risk factor. This reluctance also causes to increase the amount of bribe to be paid per person at single individual cases. With the institutionalization tendency, individual efforts encounter to obstruction and deceleration due to legal or illegal objections perpetually. Especially, just prior to migrants' return back to their country after long time illegal residency in Turkey, the dependency to SSNs is getting more and more obvious. The institutionalization forces potential migrants to work with SSNs and therefore the SSNs along with DSNs become the only authorities on setting the work and regulation 250 environment for migrants at the time of arrival or departure. From the beginning of the immigration process, the migrants being got into debt cannot be independent since they owe the networks for arranging their arrivals and departure or the demand side networks for hiring them. 3.3 Single Intermediary Networks (SINs) Another network where the repressive functions are seen based on ethnic and physical characteristics is the Single Intermediary Networks (SINs). These are usually single ethnic women working individually in a friendship or communal form and doorkeepers of high-rise residential buildings in Istanbul. These networks which are in different ethnic and gender structure also play partly an active role in association with the already established public perception. These invisible networks do not permit any single efforts to become successful without their confirmation. Among these networks especially doorkeepers can take an active part in this "image making" process within the residential-housing complex which they are responsible for and within other housing complexes in their neighbourhood. They are the significant agents of direct mediation through their personal relations especially after they establish themselves within a pattern of confidence. The trust for the demand side is threshold in hiring the lived-in domestic worker and must be established by third party. Thus, SINs become the third chain of controlling the demand's preferences in order to force single migrants to follow up the networks' rules. On the supply side, repressive functions can be seen in friendship or communal networks. These SINs are highly in a good position in trust-making at the demand side and in member-controlling at supply side. It is always easy for the families or friends to place their relatives or friends as domestic workers in the house where they worked previously. This is one of the most efficient methods in hiring or placing the domestic workers. However, these functions once again come with the packaged services, meaning with responsibilities. For instance, we found that many of the migrant women can only work in the field identified by their community albeit there are some other opportunities such as secretary and translator in other sectors. The negative image of working as secretary and translator in Turkey impedes the newcomers from working in any other work except those accepted by the community113. The community decides which member to be sent and which work to be done in order to earn money and for how long. In that communal relation, the member has to follow In the mind of community living in Moldova, working in Turkey as secretary or translator means being involved in prostitution. 113 251 up the certain rule as when, where, and how she can work. Many of Moldovan women working in Turkey declared their un-will towards working in domestic sector. What makes these women working in that sector is the repressive function of the communal or household networks. Conclusion The network of networks poses predefined certain course for the migrants in order to migrate and find a job. Therefore, I argue that the set of networks after certain points has nothing to do with lowering all costs or risks or increasing the expected net returns to migrants. After certain level of institutionalization, the network system fixes all costs and risks from the point of monetary profit. The process turns out to be "as is" for potential migrants willing to move. This institutionalization imposes on migrants to be part of it. Outside the set of networks moving for work turns out to be more dangerous and expensive for single migrants. In a process led by the set of networks migrants are caught up a trap of depth. The depth causes the bonded nature of relationships among migrants, network' agents, and demand side and in turn, that gives the agents or demand side a right of possession on migrants' labour. These bonded relationships point out the presence of trafficking of migrant women for domestic services similarly to sex-related works. In that, they have to work where they are placed by their intermediaries until they pay their depth back to them. This process without any contract acquires the nature of bonded labour relations until the migrants get their passport back. By means of set of networks, so called free and rational migrant women labour turns out to be bonded migrant labour to be sold out in return to pre-invested expenditures along with its interests. The Moldovan case evidently highlights this conclusion. References Arnold, F. and N. M. Shah (1986): Asian Labour Migration: Pipeline to Middle East. Colorado: West View Press Baldwin-Edwards, Martin and Joaqun Arango (1999): Immigrants and the Informal Economy in Southern Europe; London: Frank Cass Publishers Baldwin-Edwards, Martin and Martin Schain (1994): The Politics of Immigration in Western Europe. London: Frank Cass Publishers Boyd, M. (1989): Family and Personal Networks in International Migration: Recent Developments and New Agendas, International Migration Review 23(3), 638-670 Brown, Lee P. and Colleen Mitchell (eds.) (1998): Migration Research in the Asia Pacific: Theoretical and Empirical Issues; papers presented at a workshop sponsored by the Academy of the Social Sciences of Australia, Wollongong University April 1997; Asia-Pacific Migration Research Network, Migration and Multicultural Program, 252 Institute for Social Change and Critical Inquiry, University of Wollongong, Australia; Working Papers Series No.3; Wollongong, N.S.W.: APMRN Secretariat Castles, Stephen and Mark J. Miller (1998): The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, 2nd edition, Basingstoke: Macmillan Castles, Stephen and Mark J. Miller (1993): The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World. New York: The Guilford Press Choldin, M. Harvey (1973): Kingship Networks in the Migration Process, International Migration Review 7(2), 163-176 Davis, Benjamin and Paul Winters (2001): Gender, Networks and Mexico-US Migration, The Journal of Development Studies, 38(2), 1-18 Eelens, Frank and J. D. Speckmann (1990): Recruitment of Labour Migrants for the Middle East: The Sri Lankan Case. International Migration Review 24: 297-322 Faist, Thomas (2000): The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press Faist, Thomas and Eyup Ozveren (2004): Transnational Social Spaces: Agents, Networks, and Institutions, Ashgate: Burlington VT Haddad, T. and L. Lam (1994): The Impact of Migration on the Sexual Division of Family Work: The Case of Italian Immigrant Couples. Journal of Comparative Family Studies 25: 167-181 Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton (1999): Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture. Stanford: Stanford University Press Hondagneu-Sotelo, Pierrette (1994): Gendered Transitions: Mexican Experiences of Immigration. Berkeley: University of California Press Hugo, Graeme (1981): Village Community Ties, Village Norms and Ethnic and Social Networks: A Review of Evidence from the Third World, in G. F. Dejong and R. W. Gardner (eds.): Migration Decision Making: Multidisciplinary Approaches to Microlevel Studies in Developed and Developing Countries, pp. 186-224. New York: Pergamon Press Kossoudji, S. and S. Ranney (1984): The Labour Market Experience of Migrants: The Case of Temporary Mexican Migration to the U.S. International Migration Review 18 Kyle, David (2000): Transnational Peasants: Migrations, Networks, and Ethnicity in Andean Ecuador. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press Lim, Lin Lean (1987): IUSSP Committee on International Migration, Workshop on International Migration Systems and Networks [Conference Report], Centre of Migration Studies, Staten Island, New York, February 10-11, 1987. International Migration Review, 21(2), 416-423 Marx, Karl (1990): Capital, Volume I, London: Penguin Press Massey, Dougles, Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino and J. Edward Taylor (1998): Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium. Oxford: Clarendon Press Massey, Douglas and Espinosa, K. (1997): What's Driving Mexico-U.S. Migration? A Theoretical, Empirical, and Policy Analysis, in American Journal of Sociology, 102: 939-999 Miller Matthei, Linda and David A. Smith (1996): Women, Households, and Transnational Migration Networks: The Garifuna and Global Economic Restructuring, in Roberto Patricio Korzeniewicz and William C. Smith (eds.): Latin America in the World Economy, Westport: Praeger Parrillo, V. N. (1991): The Immigrant Family: Securing the Dream, Journal of Comparative Family Studies 20: 131-145 Pierce, W. J. and E. Elisme (1997): Understanding and Working with Haitian Immigrant Families, Journal of Family Social Work 21: 49-65 253 Portes, Alejandro (1997): Immigration Theory for a New Century: Some Problems and Opportunities. International Migration Review Vol.31, No.4, Special Issue: Immigrant Adaptation and Native-Born Responses in the Making of Americans (Winter, 1997), pp. 799-825 Portes, Alejandro (1995): Economic Sociology and the Sociology of Immigration: A Conceptual Overview, in Alejandro Portes (ed.): The Economic Sociology of Immigration: Essays on Networks, Ethnicity, and Entrepreneurship, pp. 1-41. New York: Russell Sage Foundation Publications Portes, Alejandro and P. Landolt (2000): Social Capital: Promise and Pitfalls of its Role in Development, Journal of Latin American Studies 32: 529-547 Portes, Alejandro and J. Sensenbrenner (1993): Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on the Social Determinants of Economic Action, American Journal of Sociology 98: 13201350 Prothero, Mansel R. (1990): Labor Recruiting Organizations in the Developing World: Introduction. International Migration Review Vol.24, No.2, Special Issue: Labor Recruiting Organizations in the Developing World (Summer, 1990), pp. 221-228 Sassen, Saskie (1995): Immigration and Local Labor Markets, in Alejandro Portes (ed.): The Economic Sociology of Immigration: Essays on Networks, Ethnicity, and Entrepreneurship, pp. 87-128, New York: Russel Sage Foundation Publications Tilly, Charles (1990): Transplanted Networks, in Virginia Yans-McLaughlin (ed.): Immigration Reconsidered: History, Sociology, and Politics, pp. 79-95, New York: Oxford University Press Unal, Bayram (2004): Sermaye Olarak Ya ve Eitim: Trkiye'de Ev-i Hizmet Sektrnde alian Kadinlar zerine Karilatirmali Bulgular (Comparative Findings on Age and Education as Cultural Capital in Domestic In-House Services in Turkey). Journal of Sociological Research 7 Waldinger, Roger David (1994): The Making of an Immigrant Niche. International Migration Review Vol.28, No.1, pp. 3-30 Wallace, Claire (1999): Crossing Borders: Mobility of Goods, Capital and People in the Central European Region in Avtar Brah, Mary J. Hickman and Mirtn Mac an Ghaill (eds.): Global Futures: Migration, Environment and Globalization, pp. 185-210. New York: St. Martin's Press Ykseker, Deniz H. (2003): Laleli - Moskova Mekii. Kayitdii Ticaret ve Cinsiyet likileri, Istanbul: letiim Yayinlari 254 255 PART III: BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARIBDIS 256 257 MIGRATION POLICIES FOR A ROMANIA WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION: NAVIGATING BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS114 Martin Baldwin-Edwards*) Romanian policy on migration is mainly shaped by adaptation to the EU acquis communautaire whilst neglecting other, less pressing, policy issues. Contemporary Romanian migrations are classified into six types (of which circular migration within Schengen is the most important) and existing research and data are summarized. Next, theoretical positions on emigration and skill levels are examined - the "brain drain" debate - and empirical evidence is adduced to show that, to date, Romania has achieved a "brain gain" through greater educational participation. The poor data on immigration into Romania are examined, with the tentative conclusion that low levels are increasing and may well be higher than recorded. Finally, the dangers of non-policy [Charybdis] are identified as being within the policy domains of labour market management, potential youth brain-drain, and relations with the Republic of Moldova. Keywords: migration, immigration, Romania, government policy, labour market, EU acquis *) Martin Baldwin-Edwards has been Co-Director of the Mediterranean Migration Observatory, Panteion University, Athens, Greece since 1999, and was also its founder. Currently, he was appointed as the Expert rapporteur for Greece and Cyprus within the EU-funded PROMINSTAT project co-ordinated by ICMPD (Vienna, April 2007-March 2008). He has authored over 60 publications on international migration, including The Politics of Immigration in Western Europe (ed. with M. Schain, 1994) and Immigrants and the Informal Economy in Southern Europe (ed. with J. Arango, 1999). He has lectured and researched in four UK universities and was Visiting Professor/Jean Monnet Fellow in International Migration at the European University Institute, 1997/8. In recent years, Baldwin-Edwards has served as a consultant or expert advisor to many international and governmental organizations, including the Council of Europe Parliamentary Committee on Migrations, ECRE, the Papandreou-ISTAME Foundation, the East-West Institute, the United Nations, the International Organization for Migration, MARRI (regional Balkans intergovernmental body), the Global Commission on International Migration, the UN Economic Commission for Europe, the Migration Policy Institute (USA), the EUMC RAXEN network, ECRI (Council of Europe) and the governments of Greece and Italy. Contact: Introduction In the run-up to EU membership, Romania like other CEE countries has had to make massive adjustments to modernise, reform and adapt to the acquis communautaire. In the area of migration, this has affected three areas of policy in particular border controls, political asylum laws and practices, and human rights protection of minority groups (Peers, 2005). In general terms, the EU has little or nothing to say on emigration issues (a fundamental right to leave one's country), on return migration (again, a fundamental individual right) or on who is legally admitted to the territory for employment purposes. The acquis does contain stringent requirements on the handling of illegal immigrants without EU/EFTA nationality, on country 114 In Greek mythology, Scylla was a sea monster who lived underneath a dangerous rock at one side of the Strait of Messia, opposite the whirlpool Charybdis. She threatened passing ships and in the Odyssey ate six of Odysseus's companions. 258 of first asylum and avoiding multiple applications within the EU (Dublin Convention II), and moderately strong recent legislation on the rights of long-term legal residents (>5 years' residence). There is also weak legislation on family reunification measures (the latter currently challenged by the European Parliament in the European Court of Justice). However, the EU rules give no prescription for handling the matter of immigration policy and the labour market deliberately so, as there exists a wide range of approaches across Europe. Nor does EU policy give any direction whatsoever for the promotion of economic development despite clear warnings in recent years about the demographic shift and future labour market problems with both pensions and old-age dependency ratios. Indeed, the policy suggestion from the UN Population Division (UN 2000; UN 2004) is that Europe will need massive unprecedented immigration to survive these demographic changes. Romania is currently under great pressure to conform to the acquis requirements in order to be admitted into the EU (Spendzharova, 2003; Mitsilegas, 2002)115. My proposition in this paper is that in recognising the Scylla of a difficult adjustment to EU membership, Romania would do well to keep in sight the dangers of non-policy [Charybdis] for her national interests in the spheres of economy, polity and society. If my thesis is correct, the specificities of the Romanian case need to be ascertained and emphasised, and firm policy control maintained by the Romanian authorities. This is particularly important since the Romanian migration situation looks already complex and seems set to become more so; furthermore, many structural factors suggest strong similarity with previous and current patterns of both emigration and immigration concerning Greece. In this paper, first I outline Romania's recent emigration history, followed by a more detailed analysis of its contemporary characteristics. Next, I focus on what may prove to be a problem in the future brain-drain and skill losses, along with their ameliorative counterpart of migrants' remittances. The issue of immigration into Romania is then addressed, which closely fits the Scylla and Charybdis analysis as border controls are largely EU-directed, whereas future labour market needs for immigration may seem too far in the future to worry about. Finally, I conclude with a section on policy issues: here, I try to identify what seem likely to arise as the most demanding structural issues in the management of immigration, emigration and economic development of Romania. 115 See CEC (2005) for the latest information on this point. 259 1 A short history of Romanian migrations Twentieth century migration flows were dominated by ethnic emigration, in particular of Germans and Jews, although a central reason for emigrating during the communist period was the oppression of the regime (Ethnobarometer 2004: II.1). After the fall of the regime in 1989, migration changed completely for Romania. It is possible to identify several phases in this short history of post-1990 emigrations, as shown below: 1990-1993: mass permanent emigration of ethnic minorities [German, Hungarian] plus Romanians fleeing political turmoil and poverty. The latter tended to apply for political asylum in the West, peaking at 116.000 applications in 1992 (Ethnobarometer 2004: II.2). 1994-1996: low levels of Romanian economic migration to western Europe [mainly for seasonal or illegal work], along with continued very low levels of ethnic migrations and asylum-seeking 1996-2001: the development of several parallel trends and increases in emigration, making this a complex phenomenon to analyse: (a) Permanent migration increasingly to the USA and Canada, rather than legal migration to European countries (OECD 2001: 232) (b) the emergence, especially since 1999, of illegal "incomplete" or circular migration to European countries, for illegal work (Sandu et al. 2004: 6) (c) growth of trafficking in migrants, a phenomenon overlapping illegal migration but distinguished by violence and abuse by traffickers/employers. This type of migration is thought to be predominantly of females for sexual exploitation, and increasingly of minors [see below]. (d) from 1999, a small usage of labour recruitment agreements with various European countries [Germany, Spain, Portugal, Italy] (Diminescu 2004; Barbin 2004) (e) some return migration of Romanians, notably from Moldova (OECD 2004: 259), as well as a developing circular migration of Romanians between Germany and Romania (see OECD 2005: 260). Over this period, the age structure and educational level of (permanent) migrants also changed, making emigration a potential issue of brain-drain [see below]. 2002-to date: elimination of the Schengen visa requirement promoted a rapid growth in circular migration, even to the extent that Romanians who had previously been "stranded" in Schengen countries were able to return to Romania to enter the circular migratory system (Ethnobarometer 2004: II.3). With the possibility of 3 months' legal tourist stay, a sophisticated circular migration system developed, focused primarily on Italy and Spain (IOM 2005). This new strategy succeeded in evading European labour market controls by migrants' working illegally for 3 months essentially, job-sharing with other Romanians in a carefullychoreographed "pass the job" dance. Along with emigration, a new phenomenon of immigration emerged after 1989. This had various forms, including illegal transit migrants trying to reach other European countries; the arrival of small but increasing numbers of asylum-seekers since Romania signed the Geneva Convention and Bellagio Protocol in 1991 (OECD SOPEMI 2003: 244); and a slowly increasing stock of foreigners with temporary permits 66.500 in 2002 (OECD SOPEMI 2005: 260). Although the statistical service for Romania (Institutul Naional de Statistic) has produced data on emigration, these seem to relate only to permanent declared emigration and hardly reflect the real extent of the migration phenomenon for Romanians. Kaczmarczyk and Okolski (2005: 5) cite a recent study on quality of emigration and immigration data for a 260 wider Europe: in the study, Romania is ranked as the very worst for quality of emigration data, although comparable with much of central Eastern Europe for immigration data. From the census data of 1992 and 2002, one can see a decline in the recorded population of Romania of about 1.13 million persons. Only 330.000 of this decline is accounted for by natural population increase, leaving a residual of net migration at about 800.000 persons.116 There are recorded inflows of about 70.000 for this period (Constantin et al. 2004: 39), so the actual emigration should be at least some 900.000 persons, or 4,2% of the 2002 population. However, these data are misleading, because circular illegal migrations are unlikely to be captured by a census, or indeed any other usual statistical measure. Thus, the real extent of Romanian participation in migration has to be evaluated by other means. 2 Characteristics of contemporary Romanian emigration As noted above, the contemporary migration patterns of Romanians are extremely complex, including the following types in rough order of magnitude: o Circular migration [as false tourists] with illegal employment in the Schengen area o Temporary legal migration through bilateral or other arrangements o Permanent emigration to OECD countries [mainly non-EU] o Circular migration between Germany and Romania, legal transit and employment o Trafficked migrants for prostitution or labour services o Romanian asylum-seekers in EU and North America (a) Circular migration within Schengen This type of incomplete migration (Okolski 2001) is extremely difficult to identify and estimate the extent of it. Recent survey research in Romania throws some light on the phenomenon, as do the latest data on Romanian presence in Spain and Italy. An IOM 2005 field survey of 1.348 households suggests that 15% of the Romanian adult population has worked abroad since 1990, while up to 10% is still abroad [depending on the season]. 9% of surveyed households reported at least one member abroad about 850.000 persons (IOM 2005: 6). The evolution of temporary emigration is shown to have increased markedly since 2000, with a doubling of respondents with work experiences abroad every 24 months. IOM believes that circular migration has now stabilised, as survey results for migration intention show a reduction since 2002 (when 15-17% of the adult population expressed a desire to travel for work) and some dampening of enthusiasm for labour 116 Own calculations from Census data and annual births/deaths, published in Constantin et al. (2004: Table 3) 261 migration in 2005 (around 12%). This decline may be related to the reduced remittance levels per household, dropping from 265 in 2003 to 200 in early 2005, although total remittances to Romania have been increasing continuously. Of those working abroad, only 53% declared that they had a legal contract. The favoured destinations (as in 2003) are still Italy and Spain, but with Italy slightly less attractive at 31% and Spain more attractive since 2003 at 20%. The changed perception may well be linked to the latest immigrant regularization in Spain, which legalized some 110.000 Romanians in 2005 (Arango and Jachimowicz, 2005). The 2003 Italian regularization had 143.000 Romanian applicants, making it the leading foreign nationality in the legalization programme. Thus, by 2005 Spain had recorded 175.000 Romanians with residence permits (OPI 2005: Table 2) and Italy 249.000 (CENSIS). Portugal does not seem to have been so attractive for Romanians, with only 11.000 recorded there, along with 29.000 Romanians with residence permits in Greece in 2003-4 (Baldwin-Edwards 2004a). Thus, across southern Europe alone there seem to be at least 500.000 Romanian migrant workers, most of whom have recently received legal status. Although there are doubtless more Romanians illegally working in southern Europe, some of the estimations of numbers are incredible. Simina (2005: 13) reports figures (from the Romanian authorities) of 1,4 m in Spain and Italy, or 1m in Italy; and from Italian authorities, estimates of 1,5-2,5m Romanians on Italian soil. These figures are not obviously consistent with survey data from Romania, but can actually be more easily explained as the result of circular migration. It is possible that Italian records can show over one million different Romanians who have worked in Italy in the last two years or even one year; however, this does not mean that at any one point in time there is anything approaching that number of Romanians in Italy. This flawed interpretation of information arises from imposing a traditional view of migration on the complex and ever-changing realities of the well-choreographed circular migration patterns of many central-east European countries (Kaczmarczyk and Okolski 2005: 18-20). Recent research has started to expose the complexity and dynamics of circular migration of Romanians, linking it explicitly with rural-urban migration and the return to rural areas by internal migrants , as well as more limited `human capital' attributes of the rural migrants (Sandu 2005b: 570). Another aspect of the limited human capital analysis, as opposed to `relational capital'117, is that it impedes the conversion from temporary into definitive migration (Sandu 2005b: 572). Using multiple data sources in an econometric model of temporary migration, Sandu (2005a) tries to identify linkages between levels of human capital, type of migration (work or tourism), place of origin and reasons for migration. 117 rather than the personal attributes of the individual, this refers to his/her connections and networking 262 He finds that higher education and high life satisfaction are associated with tourism migration; temporary labour migration is associated with rural areas, return migration from cities and lack of commuting employment, large communes (>6500), high unemployment, gymnasium educational level, a high proportion of youth, and large presence of religious minorities. The most important single predictor of work emigration is living in Moldova. The most important predictor of non-migration is poverty, i.e. the poorest regions of Romania do not migrate for employment: this is predominantly the strategy of middle income rural areas. Ethnicity is also irrelevant, with the exception of some linkage between ethnic German migration networks and the Roma, as it is predominantly ethnic Romanians who participate in circular migration. A very crude estimate of the numbers involved would be that (according to season) it is probably in the range 600.000-1.000.000 for this category, at any one time. However, as explained above, the total number of Romanians participating in this circular migration is considerably higher. (b) Temporary legal migration through bilateral arrangements Two broad clusters of institutions in Romania which are concerned with migration can be identified: these consist of formal institutions (state, NGO and private sector) and informal institutions (Sandu et al. 2004: 10-11). The informal institutions are of diverse types, therefore difficult to enumerate, and involved with the facilitation of migration both legal and illegal. These institutions exist largely because of the incapacity of the state, and are associated with social and other networks, bribery, corruption, institutional failure inter alii. Such informal institutions have been identified with illegal immigration into southern Europe (Baldwin-Edwards, 1999: 2): the Romanian story is the other side of the coin, concerning emigration mechanisms. Romania's formal institutions are mostly state managed, and these apparently did not exist until 2001 (Diminescu 2004: 65) with the creation of the Office for Labour Migration, Oficiul pentru Migraia Forei de Munc (OMFM). The functions of this office are to implement international labour migration treaties with Romania, to recruit and place labour in foreign countries with which Romania does not have treaty arrangements, to provide work permits to foreigners in Romania, and to co-operate with other labour institutions in Romania, the EU and elsewhere (Sandu et al. 2004). Diminescu (2004) considers the establishment of the OMFM, along with changes in visa requirements, to be part of the continuous Romanian adjustment to the EU acquis; Sandu et al. (2004: 10) are more inclined to see it as "an alternative to private recruitment agencies". 263 Romania has bilateral labour recruitment treaties with Germany (1990, 1993, 1999), Spain (2002), Portugal (2001) and less importantly with Switzerland (1999), Hungary (2000) and Luxembourg (2001) (Diminescu 2004: 66-67; OECD 2004, Annex 1.A). There remain substantial gaps in coverage, such as no agreements with Italy or Israel the latter with estimated 60-90,000 illegal Romanian workers in 2002 (Diminescu 2004: 70). According to Constantin et al. (2004: 81), the OMFM figure for recruitment by bilateral agreement in 2003 was 43.189 persons, an increase from 2002. More recent data up until August 2004 show that 97.500 people were placed by OMFM (Sandu et al. 2004: 10): presumably this latter figure is a cumulative total. Table 1 Romanians granted work visas abroad, 2002 and 2003 Country Belgium Greece Germany Work visa type Long sejour work visas Work visas Total Seasonal work Contracts of contingency 18 month contracts Total Self-employed Employees Work permits Work visas Total Seasonal workers Employees Total Business visas Seasonal work permits Work visas Self-employed work visas 2002 N contract types N visas 58 119 23,656 2003 N visas 164 27,799 19,350 4,172 134 11,974 37 11,937 34 456 4 2,395 1,888 507 1,820 1,541 127 22 130 40,516 68,649 912 19,947 Italy Finland France Luxembourg Spain Sweden 15,319 TOTAL SOURCE: Constantin et al. (2004), Table 17 However, much recruitment continues to be done by private agencies, particularly for those countries without bilateral treaty (Diminescu 2004: 68). Data for such recruitments is not centralised or properly collated, and is available only from foreign embassies in Bucharest. Constantin et al. (2004:81-85) conducted such research: Table 1 above shows the award of work visas for 2002 and 2003. As can be seen, the total figure for 2003 is over 50% higher than the OMFM recruitment figure presumably through the inclusion of data for Italy, some 30.000 persons in 2003. However, Germany has been since 1991, and still remains, the primary locus of legal labour migration for Romanians: one calculation is that since the 1991 264 treaty, Germany has recruited over 155.000 Romanian workers on the basis of group contracts (Constantin et al. 2004: 83). Despite this limited degree of success, the numbers even since 2002 are rather small in comparison with the numbers of Romanian applicants for legalisation in Italy and Spain, and also in comparison with the IOM survey data of Romanians abroad. Thus, legal recruitment takes a clear second place to illegal work and/or illegal migration to southern Europe and elsewhere. After much criticism that the Romanian state had not adequately protected the rights of Romanians abroad in terms of level of pay, working conditions and social insurance, in 2004 the Government established yet another state institution for the management of emigration (Sandu et al. 2004: 11). The Department for Labour Abroad is, like the OMFM, part of the Ministry of Labour; its functions include improving the protection of Romanians working abroad, building a network of embassies, Romanian communities and observers abroad, and securing a permanent relationship between migrants and Romanian institutions. It is also involved with NGOs such as the IOM, in trying to publicise the dangers of illegal migration. Presumably, it is this new institution which instigated the 2005 decree-law resulting in the confiscation of passports from some 3.000 Romanian overstayers in the Schengen area, when they returned to Romania (Amariel 2005). (c) Permanent emigration to OECD countries Data on notified permanent change of country are the only data on emigration available from the Romanian statistical service. As previously noted, the first modern phase of emigration (1990-93) consisted principally of minority ethnic groups and was sizeable. After 1993, the numbers dropped from the initial high of 44.000 in 1990, and have now apparently stabilised at around 10.000 per year. Figure 1 [below] shows the annual data for permanent emigration over the period 1991-2003. Looking in more detail at the characteristics of these migrations, the Appendix gives some breakdowns by gender, age group, ethnicity, destination and educational level. Several trends can be discerned from these data. First, the proportion of women emigrating seems to predict the trends in total magnitude, with 1-2 years' lag: there is no obvious migration explanation for this, although doubtless a sociological one. 265 Figure 1 Permanent emigration from Romania, 1991-2003 Secondly, the initial importance of ethnic German migration 1990-94 was rapidly diminishing after 1995 (although that year's higher total emigration figure automatically reduces the proportion). Thirdly, we can see the changing destination countries, starting with Germany predominant in the first half of the 1990s, and increasingly focusing on the USA, Canada and "others" (Italy in the latter category). Fourthly, age groups seem to fluctuate wildly, but with a clear increase in persons under 18 since 1998 at 37% of the total. Finally, looking at educational level, we can see some clear patterns: the early migrations (1990-93) had a very high proportion of people with only primary school education 50% in 1990, 38% for 199194. Over the period 1990-99, the proportion of those with secondary education increased slowly (stabilising at 25-30%) while those with university education increased continuously from 6% in 1990 to 19% in 1999. More recent data (see below, section 3) show that the proportion of university graduates continued rising, reaching 28% in 2001 (Pnescu 2005: Figure 3.2). However, the current magnitude of permanent emigrations is fluctuating around 10.000 per year, which is a very low emigration rate in comparison with many countries. Although the total number of permanent emigrants over the period 1990-2003 is just over 250.000 (Constantin et al. 2004: Table 3), the data do not take account of return migrations, which partly offset the original emigrations. Return migration over the period 1996-2002 is recorded as totalling 66.500 persons (OECD SOPEMI, various years). The peak returns seem 266 to have been in 2000 and 2001: in 2001 some 11.000 Romanians with their residence abroad returned to live in Romania, of which 9.000 were returning from Moldova (OECD SOPEMI 2004: 259). In 2002, the total returns were lower, at 6.600 (OECD SOPEMI 2005: 259). (d) Circular migration between Germany and Romania Although there are not high quality data on the continuous flows of Romanians between Germany and Romania, Table 2 gives some indicative measures. Ethnic German migration flows have more or less ceased, therefore most migration to Germany is now the result of bilateral agreements (as discussed above) and apparently increasing continuously. The gender ratio is more or less even, with most work in agriculture (77%) or hotels and catering (16%); there are also several thousand Romanians employed by Romanian contractors in Germany, mainly in construction, food processing and mining (OECD SOPEMI 2005: 259). The return flows do not apparently match the inflows into Germany, even with lag: this may indicate a data problem, or continued residence of Romanians in Germany. The recorded stock of Romanians in Germany, declining according to Table 2, is actually increasing markedly. This is because of the award of German nationality to Aussiedler: some 6-10.000 Romanians a year received German citizenship until 1999, when Germany stopped recording the data118. However, even with the incomplete German data, it is clear that stocks of Romanians have been increasing on an annual basis since 1996. Table 2 Migration flows between Germany and Romania, stocks in Germany (000s) 1996 Outflow of ethnic Germans from Romania Inflows of Romanian nationals Outflows of Romanian nationals Stock of Romanian nationals in Germany 4.3 17.1 16.6 100.7 1997 1.8 14.2 13.6 95.2 1998 1.0 17.0 13.5 89.8 1999 0.9 18.8 14.7 87.5 2000 0.5 24.2 16.8 90.1 2001 0.4 20.3 18.6 88.1 2002 0.3 24.0 17.6 88.7 SOURCE: OECD SOPEMI (2001; 2005), Romania country chapters (e) Trafficked migrants for prostitution or labour services For some time now, European policy-makers, practitioners and academics have identified a "Balkan route" for trafficking and/or smuggling119 of migrants (e.g. Salt and Stein, 1997: 4757), with clear links made between older drug trafficking routes, their interruption by war and organised criminal gangs branching out into people-smuggling and trafficking (Lindstrom, 2004). In the case of the Balkans, some of the most detailed investigation of any region in the 118 Dietz states that 90% of Aussiedler are given German nationality almost immediately, and that Romanian Aussiedler in particular were strongly soed in German customs (Dietz, 2002: 35) 119 For the distinction, which increasingly is being questioned, see the UN protocols on trafficking and smuggling. 267 world has been made since 2000, with research undertaken or financed by the IOM, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, the ILO, UNICEF and the OSCE, amongst others. One of the most authoritative recent reports identified 6,256 victims between January 2000 and December 2004, with the primary countries of origin as Albania, Moldova and Romania (and to a lesser extent, Bulgaria and Kosovo) and the primary countries of destination or transit as being Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro (Surtees, 2005:1217). Table 3 (below) reproduces their summary data. Over the period 2000-2004, 90% of victims were from only 5 countries (28% from Albania, 26% from Moldova, 17% from Romania, 10% from Bulgaria and 9% from Kosovo). There is also a significant number from the Ukraine (6%), but from other countries the numbers identified and assisted are very small indeed. Table 3 Number of identified and assisted trafficking victims 2000-2004, Stability Pact Country of origin of victim Albania Moldova Romania Bulgaria Kosovo, Province of BiH Serbia Croatia Montenegro fyRo Macedonia SEE countries subtotal Ukraine Russia Belarus Georgia Other Other countries subtotal Total numbers of victims trafficked into, via or from South Eastern Europe 2000 219 319 163 46 54 0 0 0 0 0 801 68 7 8 0 3 86 887 2001 445 382 261 96 67 0 1 0 0 0 1252 97 22 9 3 0 131 1383 2002 375 329 243 164 165 8 10 1 2 0 1297 104 21 1 2 5 133 1430 2003 345 313 194 172 192 17 13 1 3 14 1264 47 5 2 0 11 65 1329 2004 366 300 193 143 90 39 21 6 5 12 1165 41 4 1 2 14 62 1227 Total 1750 1643 1054 621 568 54 45 8 10 26 5779 357 59 21 7 33 477 6256 SOURCE: Surtees (2005: 31-32) The Stability Pact Report states that in the case of Romania, for 2003 and 2004 the vast majority (85%) of identified victims were trafficked for sexual exploitation and around 10% for labour in domestic work, agriculture, industry inter alia. Around 4% were trafficked for begging and petty crime (Surtees 2005: 438). All victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation were female, although the report notes the existence of trafficking in minor males for this purpose. In 2003 and 2004, victims were predominantly [around 70%] aged 18-25, but there were also 16% and 27% trafficked as minors in those two years (Surtees 2005: 440). 40-50% of victims were from Moldova, and educational levels were slightly below average for 268 Romania. Data on ethnicity are not collected, but there is a note that Roma are overrepresented in trafficking for labour or begging (Surtees 2005: 463). Countries of destination were numerous (22), although 42% went to EU countries in 2003, and 56% in 2004. This increase is associated with the Schengen visa removal. The two primary destinations in 2004 were Italy (30%) and Spain (15%); in 2003, Macedonia was the primary destination at 38%. A 2003 ILO study (Ghinraru and Linden 2004) of forced labour from Romania, sampling returned migrants in Romania who had previously migrated, tried to distinguish between the characteristics of trafficked and non-trafficked forced labour migrants. They found women to be over-represented in the trafficking category, especially minors. Educational level proved to be a clear indicator, with successful migrants having the most formal education, followed by non-trafficked forced labour, and with trafficked migrants having the least. There was no indication of ethnicity as an issue for trafficking or forced labour. Specifically focused on children, another ILO study (IPEC 2004, 2005) drew somewhat different conclusions, although with very small sample size. Around 33% had been involved in prostitution, around 20% in dancing or massage and another 20% in begging (IPEC 2004: 1-2). However, those data include "internal trafficking": when restricted to cases of trafficking to another country, the 42 cases [some 75% of the total] consisted of 30 victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation [70%]. These latter data are consistent with the Stability Pact data. THE IPEC Report concludes that the children identified tended to be 14-17 years old, with little education or were school drop-outs, and came from families with economic problems. They also suggested that street children and Roma are extremely vulnerable to trafficking. All of these studies, as elsewhere in the world, have been unable to estimate the real extent of trafficking and also to distinguish it clearly from voluntary illegal migrations and forced labour. The ILO study perhaps comes closest to doing the latter, but no indicative numbers are available. In the absence of clear data, it is impossible to identify trafficking as the major problem claimed in some quarters. Nevertheless, even if the numbers involved are miniscule in comparison with the hundreds of thousands of Romanian migrants, the lives of children and those in need of protection appear as a major public policy issue. (f) Romanian asylum-seekers The original massive numbers of asylum-seekers from Romania were in the early 1990s, peaking at 116,000 in 1992, but by 1996 were below 10.000 (Ethnobarometer 2004: II.2). Of these early 1990s asylum-seekers, most went to Germany and more than half were Roma. For 269 example, in 1992 Germany received 104,000 Romanian asylum-seekers, of which 63,000 were Roma (Ethnobarometer 2004: VII.3). However, most of them were probably rejected or remained as illegal immigrants (Dietz, 2002). Despite massive improvements in both political stability and economy, in 2004 there were still 4,218 Romanian asylum-seekers for that year (UNHCR 2005: Table 7), along with some 2.000 outstanding applications prior to that. It is not clear whether the asylum-seekers are ethnic Romanians or Roma, as UNHCR does not record such data. The average recognition rate for 2004 was 10.6% -- one of the lowest rates for any nationality. The main country of application for 2004 was Italy (with 1,015 cases) and a very low recognition rate of 2.9%; the second country of choice was France, with 852 applications (UNHCR 2005: Table 8). It is unclear whether these continued asylum applications are of a genuine nature, or simply a mechanism to effect migration for labour. Along with similar patterns and numbers for Bulgarians, they remain a curiosity item within the wider Europe. 3 The controversial issues of brain-drain and skill losses The concept of "brain-drain" or flight of human capital was developed in the 1950s explicitly looking at the emigration of leading scientists to the United States from the UK, Canada and USSR. By the 1970s it was being used in a more general sense to refer to the emigration of those with tertiary education (Rapoport, 2004: 90). A consensus developed that the emigration of skilled professionals is harmful to the country of origin120 since valuable human capital is lost, and impedes economic development which might otherwise have occurred. Against this loss of human capital should be placed the receipt of workers' remittances, which frequently constitute a critical resource for economic stability. However, in the longer term, the return of skilled emigrants was seen as desirable; a modern alternative is the notion of "brain circulation", encouraging the mobility of skilled personnel between different countries. Recent scholarship has advanced an alternative approach to skilled emigration, with more sophisticated dynamic models producing more optimistic and less clear-cut results (Commander et al. 2004: 41). In such models, although there is still the same negative effect of skill losses (a "drain" effect), there is another beneficial effect encouraging human capital formation ("brain gain") (Commander et al. 2004: 34). If skilled emigration is seen as a desirable option by the remaining population, there will be a tendency for increased participation in tertiary education in order that people might have the chance of future 120 In economic jargon, it constitutes a "negative externality" 270 emigration. A crucial next stage concerns the uncertainty of individuals' future migration, such that considerably less than 100% of those who received higher education will actually emigrate. (Various reasons and mechanisms are posited for this asymmetry.) However, some other authors dispute the potential size of this positive effect, claiming that it cannot counter the predominantly negative effects arising from skilled emigration, so the net effect is likely to be either zero or negative (e.g. Schiff 2006: 203-4). In the Balkan region, discussion of skilled emigration is inclined toward the pessimistic view of predominantly brain drain (e.g. Horvat, 2004; Bagatelas and Sergi, 2003; Henry et al., 2003). However, there is some reason to think that Romania might not be a typical case, and it is necessary to examine the available data. Below, I look at empirical data on skill levels of emigrants, followed by some survey data on intention to migrate. Next is a brief examination of changes in educational provision and participation, and their possible links with emigration patterns. Finally, I conclude with a `balance-sheet' approach121 to the costs and benefits of Romanian migration, and a prognosis for the immediate future. (a) Sources of data on Romanian emigration and skill or educational levels As previously noted, the low quality or even existence of data on Romanian emigration is a serious problem. Data on educational levels, age etc. are available only for registered permanent emigrants [see Appendix]; there appear to be no published data on the characteristics of Romanians granted work visas and/or contracts abroad, although the nature of their employment might be usable as a proxy122. A second source of potential data lies in the records of host countries: OECD has recently started to collate these, but the data are incomplete especially as Romania is not an OECD member123. A third source of data is from detailed surveys; Pnescu (2005) analyses one such survey of Romanians in Germany, which has a high quality methodology and allows clear comparisons to be made. Another study is that made by Radu (2003), which also reaches strong conclusions. Insofar as mass circular migration is concerned, it is inevitable through its illegality that little or no official data are available. We are completely dependent upon survey data, for information on skill levels of the temporary labour migrants. Fortunately, there is a reasonable quantity of such surveys (IOM 2005; Sandu 2005a, 2004; Lzroiu 2003a) allowing some qualified conclusions to be drawn. 121 122 This is comprehensively developed in Wickramasekara (2002) Simina (2005: 20) reports that in 2004, 71% of contracts requested were for the agricultural sector and 10% for industry and construction work. 123 In particular, no data are available from Italy or Romania (OECD-SOPEMI 2005: 149) 271 (i) Permanent Emigrants' Characteristics The Appendix shows the trends in permanent emigration from Romania over the period 199099.124 Bearing in mind the initial mass exodus in 1991, rapidly declining and eventually stabilising since 1999 [see Figure 1, above], there is a clear trend for permanent migrants to be higher education graduates (reaching 28% in 2001), under the age of 18, and increasingly migrating to the USA and Canada, rather than to Germany. Detailed destination country data up until 2003 (Sandu et al. 2004: Table A.2) reveal that, in absolute terms, emigration has diversified since 2002. In particular, migration to Germany has picked up again (circa 2.000 a year), has stabilised at just under 1.000 to Hungary, and has been at high levels to Italy since 1994 (1.300-2.200). The USA and Canada are still attractive, but neither has exceeded 2.000 since the year 2000. There remain clear declines since 1997 in the numbers going to Austria, France, Sweden, Greece, Israel and Australia. Given the selectivity shown by the immigration policies of the USA and Canada, we might expect the Romanian emigrants going there to be highly qualified: there is some evidence supporting that conclusion (Radu 2003: 30). Equally, the upsurge of migrants to Germany may be linked with Romania's impending EU membership, and the perception of greater life chances in an EU country. The close cultural links between Romania and Italy are well-known, and suffice as an explanation for the popularity of that destination since 1994. It is unclear from the data where very young (<18) migrants are going: it seems likely that they form a large part of the renewed migration to Germany, as well as to Italy. The OECD data collection on skilled migration, although omitting Italian data sources, concludes that there are 613.000 Romanians in OECD countries, of which 26.3% are highly skilled (OECD-SOPEMI 2005: Table II.A2.6). These data do not include Spain or Italy, although the vast majority of Romanians there are thought to be temporary labour migrants. The ratio of 26% is not unusual in international comparison, and in fact is a lot lower than many countries at a similar level of economic development. Pnescu (2005) utilises the survey conducted by Straubhaar and Wohlberg of East European migration into Germany, 1992-94. This was a period of fairly high Romanian migration to Germany: 63,000 in their survey, or 34,000 from the Romanian data (Sandu et al. 2004: Table A.2).125 The survey's results show high skill levels in the Romanian stock of migrants [0.21%, one of the highest from CEE, compared with 0.13% for the German population], but the lowest ratio of skills in migration flows [0.1%, cf. 0.39% for Bulgarians] over that period. Pnescu offers no explanation for this, but the aggregation of migration types 124 125 Pnescu (2005) provides data for the period 1995-2001, i.e. the same data, but including two more recent years. From this discrepancy, we might conclude that they were a mix of permanent ethnic German migrants, asylum-seekers, and labour migrants. 272 is clearly the reason. The early emigration flows to Germany were predominantly of ethnic Germans, whereas 1992-94 was a period of mass asylum-seeking, of which over 50% were Roma. Presumably, the ethnic Germans were of far higher educational level than the asylumseekers; there were few labour contracts awarded before 1994, so that category also is largely irrelevant.126 We might conclude, therefore, that the main loss of Romanian skills was through ethnic German migration, which has largely discontinued. Radu (2003) uses data from two waves of the Romanian Integrated Household Survey, provided by the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and matches them with data from the German social insurance system (IABS). He concludes that Romanian migrants in Germany are positively selected in both observable and unobservable characteristics, thus implying skill losses or non-utilisation in Romania. The data extend to the late 1990s, and show an upward drift in the average educational level of migrants, constituted by a stable ratio of low education migrants and an increasing ratio of highly educated migrants (Radu 2003: 30). Thus, there is a clear polarisation of skills in permanent emigrants to Germany; Radu notes also that more high-skilled migrants chose non-EU destinations over this timeframe. (ii) Temporary Migrants' Characteristics There are two subcategories of such migration, and we know relatively little about either! Temporary legal labour migration the smaller of the two has already been discussed above [see section 2.b]. There were circa 70,000 work visas granted in 2003 [see Table 1, above], but there appear to be no data on the characteristics of the Romanian workers. In 2003, out of the three main receiving countries (Germany, Italy, Spain), most of the known contract types were for seasonal work: in Germany, 23,243 out of 27,799, in Spain, 14,808 out of 15,319, and unknown work contracts for the 19,947 Romanians in Italy (Constantin et al. 2004: 81). Presumably, therefore, the great majority of the legal temporary workers are with low/medium skills. The second category considerably larger is that of illegal circular migrants [see section 2.a]. For information on such migrants we are dependent upon survey data: here, I use the latest IOM survey (IOM 2005), the recent work of Dumitru Sandu (Sandu 2005a) and a 2003 survey conducted by CURS (Lzroiu 2003: 23). There is a concordance of results from the surveys, namely that the majority of these migrants are male [unlike permanent migrants who are an equal balance of gender], tend to be graduates of gymnasium and vocational schools but not of higher education, and are aged 15-44. Sandu characterises the typical 126 The datasource used was the EU Labour Force Survey, which is very weak on establishing distinctions between types of immigrant. 273 circular work migrants as "young ethnic Romanians of medium level education, who worked or travelled abroad, are dissatisfied with their living conditions, and live in high unemployment localities of more developed counties in the region of Moldova" (Sandu 2005a: 19). Similarly, IOM concludes that the migrants are of medium level education, performing non-manual semi-skilled or skilled work (IOM 2005: 15). In more detail, the 2003 CURS survey showed that 71% of migrants were male, 57% with vocational qualifications or gymnasium graduates, and 52% from urban areas. They note also a greater representation of unemployed persons (14%) and ethnic Hungarians (14%) roughly double the national proportions. Thus, in both categories of temporary labour migration there seem to be few migrants with high-level skills: they are predominantly with medium level education or vocational training. It is doubtful that such migration, even if permanent, would constitute a brain-drain, and temporary forms definitely do not. (b) Survey data on intention to migrate The most detailed data on Romanian intentions to migrate are from a survey conducted in 2002 by the European Commission's Eurobarometer (Krieger 2004). As these are now out of date, they need to be read in conjunction with more recent surveys, for which I use the IOM 2005 data. In comparison with the other candidate countries (excluding Turkey) Romanians and Bulgarians showed the greatest intentions of migration: 5% with a `general intention', 3.2% with a `basic intention' and 2% with a `firm intention'. These compare with averages for the 10 acceding countries [AC (10)] of 3.1%, 1.3% and 0.8% respectively. With the category127 of `general intention', this shows the highest level of 19.1% for Romanian respondents aged 15-24 with this intention, compared with 10% for AC (10). Romania also showed the highest proportion of women wishing to migrate, at 4.2% compared with AC (10) of 2.7%. By educational level, Romania (along with Bulgaria) showed extreme differentiation with the other candidate countries. For all educational levels, Romanians were more inclined to migrate: however, unusually high ratios of people with only primary or secondary education were interested in emigration. The other remarkable figure concerns students: 18.6% were interested in migrating, a figure above even that for Turkey. Table 4 below shows the data. 127 Despite the standard country samplesize of 1.000, as well as clustering the results into similar groupings, only the category of `general intention' has enough respondents to be statistically significant for detailed breakdowns. 274 For most other analytical subcategories, Romania does not look exceptional, other than some 50% naming financial problems as their motivation for emigration.128 What seems fairly clear from the 2002 survey is that along with a greater tendency for, or intention of, migration, Romania is distinguished by a polarisation of emigrants' human capital (Radu 2003: 29), emphasising the upper and lower ends of the scale i.e. highly skilled and unskilled. However, Romania also shows a youth emigration tendency, with young people much more inclined to migrate than in most other EU candidate countries. This is particularly visible in the case of current students in Romania, who have twice or more the rate of intended migration found in most AC (10) countries. Table 4 Persons in 2002 with general inclination to migrate, by educational level (%) Primary 15 yrs Poland Bulgaria, Romania Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia Turkey Hungary, Czech Rep, Slovakia Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania AC 10 average ACC 13 average 0,6 4,0 0,2 3,6 0,7 1,3 0,7 2,7 Secondary 16-19 yrs 2,5 4,6 1,0 7,4 1,6 2,6 2,1 3,5 Tertiary 2,7 3,7 3,2 15,1 2,7 3,0 2,8 4,8 Still studying 13,3 18,6 7,6 11,6 9,1 8,9 11,3 12,7 SOURCE: Eurobarometer data, 2002, cited in Krieger (2004: Table 13) The survey data of IOM are apparently not comparable with the Eurobarometer survey, in that the CURS 2003 survey reported that 18% of the adult population wished to migrate for employment [cf. 5% in the EU survey], with 3% desiring permanent emigration. The latest 2005 survey found 12% of adults interested in labour migration within the next year, and 4% desiring permanent emigration (IOM 2005: 9). It is therefore not possible to evaluate whether the Eurobarometer 2002 survey results still hold, although intuitively one might think that they do, as the IOM data neither correlate with nor obviously contradict them. (c) Changing educational provision in Romania During the 1980s, Romania exhibited a major structural discrepancy of high enrolment rates at the pre-tertiary level and very low rates at the tertiary level; after 1990, a mirror pattern occurred, with increasing tertiary levels of both enrolment rate and absolute numbers allied with declining pre-tertiary rates (OECD 2003: 278, 322). Also, in comparison with other CEE 128 The survey also allows the answer `job reasons' and it is difficult to see how this distinction can be anything other than arbitrary. 275 countries, Romania's tertiary enrolment rates were exceptionally low in the early 1990s. Table 5 shows the trend across the CEE region, 1990-2001. Table 5 Enrolment in tertiary education, as % of age cohort 1990 Bulgaria Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia 31,1 16,0 --21,7 9,7 --24,5 1992 31,4 14,6 15,1 23,4 16,1 16,1 28,2 1994 35,4 20,8 20,9 26,1 19,7 18,7 31,5 1996 41,2 --23,5 --22,5 22,1 36,1 1998 43,5 26,1 33,4 45,7 21,3 26,5 52,8 2000 40,8 29,8 40,0 55,5 27,3 30,3 60,6 2001 37,7 33,7 44,1 58,5 30,4 32,1 66,0 SOURCES: Pnescu (2005: Table 3.6); UNESCO (2004: Statistical Annex, Table 9) The increase in Romania's tertiary enrolment rate is remarkable, taking it from under 10% in 1990 comparable with Albania or Macedonia (UNESCO 2004) up to a lavish but acceptable level of 30% in 2001. Although data are not available for the years after 2001, the projected numbers are even higher because after 2002 the age cohort increased (OECD 2003: 322), with private tertiary education expanding to accommodate the increased numbers. Looking at labour force outcomes, Pnescu (2005: Table 3.8) shows an increase of over 60% of the labour force with tertiary education over the period 1994-97, again taking Romania up from the bottom of the CEE countries to a more respectable level of 12,4% of the labour force. Although it is difficult to disaggregate the various causal factors for increased participation in tertiary education in Romania, the trend even contradicts the 1996-99 recession which could have caused limited access because of budgetary constraints (Pnescu 2005: 128). Other analysts too comment on the extraordinary rise of tertiary education in Romania (Tascu 2002: 213; Mihilescu 2004: 354). Thus, it is difficult not to conclude that Romania in particular, but also the other CEE countries, experienced precisely the education-migration linkage which is predicted by the "brain gain" theorists. In the only study focused on this, the author reaches the clear conclusion that this is indeed the case, and Romania has benefited from a gain in human capital as a consequence (Pnescu 2005: 128). (d) Constructing a balance-sheet of the effects of Romanian migrations The older debate on `brain drain' massively oversimplified the issues, since it is necessary to take an overall view of changes in human capital. To this end, Williams and Balz (2005: 441-2) posit a range of possible positions associated with skilled labour migration; these are: 276 o o o o o o Brain exchange [(temporary) flows between core economies, with efficient use of human capital] Brain drain [(permanent) transfer of human capital from less to more developed economies] Brain overflow [(permanent) transfer of human capital through underutilization in countries of origin] Brain waste [ineffective utilization in the transferred human capital] Brain training [human capital enhancement through mobility in education] Brain circulation [human capital enhancement through temporary mobility, which is used more effectively upon return] Of these, we can identify brain drain and possibly brain waste as having occurred in the early phase of emigration from Romania primarily with ethnic German migration. Throughout the 1990s and beyond, there was an increasing proportion of graduates amongst those who permanently migrated: this is presumably brain overflow leading to brain drain, but in rather small numbers up until the present. There is no evidence at this time of brain training (such as Romanians undertaking postgraduate education in EU countries)129, of brain circulation or of brain exchange: these should be viewed as policy objectives, which require serious consideration by the Romanian state. A final category of brain drain has not obviously appeared, but warrants further investigation: this is youth brain drain (Balz et al. 2004: 5). Given that the emigration intentions of Romanian students [see Table 4, above] are quite high, it matters greatly whether their future emigration falls into the category of simple loss of human capital or one of the other more positive types. What of the mass circular migrations shown by Romanians in the last decade, particularly those going to Italy and Spain? All available evidence (see section 3.a.ii) suggests that few graduates participate in such migrations, and skill losses are minimal. Generally, emigration of low-skilled workers is likely to be beneficial for developing economies (World Bank 2006: 64) by reducing unemployment; it can also reduce underemployment and help to raise labour force participation. In the case of Romania, this appears to have occurred, given that unemployment rates are fairly low. Along with internal migration, which Sandu has shown is linked with external migration propensity, circular migration has also helped with poverty reduction in Romania. This is primarily through remittances, and has benefited a large swathe of Romanian society with the notable exception of the poorest regions. The actual level of recorded remittances has been increasing in aggregate reaching some 2 billion in 2004 (EUbusiness, 04/08/2005) whilst the level of individual remittances has declined (IOM 2005). This might suggest an increased participation in circular illegal 129 There is some limited academic mobility, but small numbers (300 per year), cited in Lzroiu (2003a), Appendix 7 277 migrations over the last few years, as a stable number of participants would presumably remit less in aggregate. However, there appear to be no data on source countries of remittances. Limited data from Italy for 2003 show only 6.9 million sent to Romania for that year (ISMU 2005): two explanations can be offered for the low figure. First, these are only formally recorded remittances, which frequently constitute a fraction of informal transfers, especially by illegal workers and between countries with geographical proximity; secondly, higher remittances may originate from the USA and Germany, where recent skilled emigrants have gone. It is likely that both explanations pertain, with very different patterns of remitting behaviour of temporary and permanent migrants. Overall, the fears of brain drain are overshadowed by the positive effects on educational participation, remittances, and the apparently small number of university graduates who have actually emigrated. Bilateral recruitment agreements have also been important (see section 2.b) although such agreements seem to have been largely for semiskilled and unskilled workers: however, they have potential for opening up temporary employment abroad for university graduates, in place of permanent emigration. Thus, the problem is more for the future utilising the increased human capital which has been created as well as actively encouraging brain training and brain circulation (Ackers, 2005). These are important aspects of government policy, which will be addressed in the concluding section. 4 Immigration into Romania (a) Data on immigration into Romania Since 1991 no records were kept before that date immigration into Romania has slowly but surely followed an upward trend. Figure 2 below shows the recorded data, along with a fitted trendline. The extrapolation suggests an inflow of 16.000 per year by 2007 the probable date of Romania's EU accession: although this level of immigration may seem unlikely at this time, membership of the EU does constitute a pole of attraction for both legal and illegal immigration. Another projection, using net migration, has been made by Kaczmarczyk and Oklski (2005: Table 4). They suggest an annual yearly increase of 4.2% increase in net migration, such that by 2022 another 1,8% of the Romanian labour force would be immigrants. This level is the lowest projected for any CEE country in their forecasts, however. 278 Figure 2 Immigration dynamics in Romania From 1997 onward, the bulk of immigrants have come from the Republic of Moldova, although the first half of the 1990s had seen predominantly EU immigration into Romania Germans, French and Austrians (Constantin et al. 2004: 52). The 2002 Census recorded significant numbers of Italians, Turks and Chinese, after Moldavians as the leading immigrant group. Table 6 below gives the principal immigrant nationalities found in the 2002 Census. Table 6 Principal immigrant groups in Romania, Census 2002 Country of origin Rep. of Moldova Italy Turkey China Germany Greece Syria USA TOTAL N 3.576 2.378 2.344 1.943 1.767 1.681 1.180 1.129 27.910 % 12,8 8,5 8,4 7,0 6,3 6,0 4,2 4,0 100,0 SOURCE: Constantin et al. (2004: 63) 279 However, it seems that the Census considerably under-recorded the presence of foreign nationals, who number 28.000 only 0.13% of the total recorded population in 2002. Evidence to support this claim can even be found in official data, since the legally present immigrants in 2002 numbered 1.400 with permanent residence status, 50.100 with temporary residence permits and another 16.400 registered for education or training (OECD-SOPEMI 2005: 260). Table 7 below gives a breakdown of principal nationalities with temporary residence permits. Although Moldavians are still the most numerous at 8.100 (more than double the Census figure), there are also very large numbers of Chinese and Turkish nationals, along with Italians, Greeks and Syrians. On average, 51% of the 66.500 came for business, with Chinese at 96% (OECD SOPEMI 2005: 261). Another source states that in 2002 about 30.000 legal immigrants (45%) were partners in mixed capital or foreign companies, 7.000 were experts or technical support staff, and 17.000 involved in education (Ethnobarometer 2004: II.4). Table 7 Stock of foreign nationals with temporary residence permits, 1999-2002 Country of origin Rep. of Moldova China Turkey Italy Greece Syria Others subtotal Study reasons TOTAL 1999 6.900 6.700 5.200 4.600 5.100 3.400 14.100 44.100 17.800 61.900 2000 8.200 7.100 7.000 5.300 5.000 3.300 16.000 49.600 19.800 69.400 2001 7.600 7.500 5.300 4.700 4.500 3.700 16.600 49.800 16.600 66.400 2002 8.100 7.600 5.300 4.600 3.700 3.600 16.500 50.100 16.400 66.500 SOURCE: OECD-SOPEMI (2005: 260) Yet another official source of data on immigrants the Authority for Aliens [Autoritatea pentru Strini (ApS)], within the Ministry of Administration and Interior calculated the immigrant presence in Romania at 72.859 for 2002. However, its figures over the period 2000-2003 chart a precipitous decline, shown in Table 8, below. Reconciling these different data sources is next to impossible, since the methods of data collection and processing are unknown. In particular, the spectacular decline shown in Table 8 is not easy to explain. Constantin et al. (2004: 64) suggest that it is directly linked with more effective policing of the borders, citing total refusals of entry in 2001 of 62.000, in 2002 of 81.000, and in 2003 of 80.000. If their suggestion is correct, then the tighter border controls can be seen as impacting mainly on illegal short-term or circular migrants probably petty traders. The principal 280 nationalities of those refused entry were Hungarians (33%), Moldavians (25%), Serbs (18%), Ukrainians (7%), Bulgarians (6%) and Turks (3%). The principal reason for refusal of entry was lack of a means of subsistence some 57%, in 2003. Table 8 Number of aliens registered by the Authority for Aliens (ApS) 2000 Non-EU EU (15) TOTAL 74.354 28.328 102.682 2001 61.737 23.609 85.346 2002 53.521 17.336 70.857 2003 32.479 10.278 42.757 SOURCE: Constantin et al. (2004: Chart 10) Asylum seeking, although still at low levels in Romania, showed a clear upward trend up until 2001, after which it dropped to half the level of that year. The principal nationalities of spontaneous asylum applicants are Iraqi, Somali, Indian and (only recently) Chinese. As of beginning 2004, Romania hosted some 2.000 refugees (UNHCR 2004). It should be noted that the number of asylum applicants in Romania is but a small fraction of Romanians applying for political asylum elsewhere in Europe (see section 2.f): this constitutes a rather strange case for a country about to accede to the EU. Table 9 below shows the trend in asylum applications, 1994-2003. Table 9 Asylum applications, 1994-2003 1994 647 1995 634 1996 588 1997 1.425 1998 1.236 1999 1.670 2000 1.366 2001 2.431 2002 1.151 2003 1.077 SOURCE: UNHCR (2004) (b) Policy issues Other than the 1991 legislative changes on refugees and asylum-seekers, almost all policy initiatives concerning immigration, emigration and border controls have been undertaken since 2000.130 Arguably, all have been dictated by the EU acquis, as a precondition for Romania's accession to the EU (Simina, 2005) and have made a considerable change in the management of migration and borders. In particular, Government Ruling no. 802/2001 strengthened the border with the Republic of Moldova which now requires passports for its crossing (Lzroiu, 2003a: 82). This is reported as having led to serious tensions with the Republic of Moldova (Skvortova, 2004) along with allegations from Moldavians that it is 130 See Lzroiu (2003a: Appendix 2) and Constantin et al. (2004: 28 + Appendix) for details 281 both an encouragement of illegal migration and an incitement to acquire Romanian passports (Gheorghiu, 2004). On the question of how many Moldavians actually hold Romanian passports, there seems to be little and contradictory information. Jandl (2003) estimates some 3.000 persons with dual citizenship, but emphasises the historical connections between the two countries and former ease of acquisition of Romanian nationality. Others, e.g. Simina (2002) note the phenomenon of forged Romanian passports being used by Moldavians. Clearly, the whole issue of nationality, identity and international borders between Romania and the Republic of Moldova is set to become problematic, even though at this time Romania allows visa-free entry of citizens of the Rep. of Moldova. The use of Romania as a country of transit migration has been a focal point of adjustment to the EU acquis. Expert assessment tends to concur that most of the problems have either been solved, or are well on the way to a solution (Simina, 2002; Futo et al. 2005). Migration apprehension statistics for the 17 CEE countries show reductions of 20% in both 2002 and 2003, which can be interpreted as an indicator of success in limiting illegal frontier crossings (Futo et al. 2003: 40, 51). In the case of Romania, the drop has been even more dramatic from 32.000 apprehensions in 2001, to 3.000 in 2002. However, most of this relates to Romanian citizens, who benefited from the visa-free Schengen movements from 2002. There do remain, therefore, questions about the extent of transit migration and illegal immigration into Romania, as forged documents and other modes of entry are increasingly being used. Insofar as the number of immigrants on Romanian territory is concerned, we should be sceptical about the very low (and contradictory) figures available from state agencies. Romania has a flourishing black economy, an intimate historical-cultural link with Moldova, and probably employs rather more illegal immigrant labour than Romanian state authorities currently admit to. In the absence of detailed empirical studies of the informal labour market, it is not possible to say much more on this point. However, it is very likely that the real extent of immigrant presence in Romania is considerably higher than current estimates. This is relevant for future inflows, most particularly upon EU accession, as they are likely to be extremely high. Such inflows, taking the examples of other new EU countries, will consist of all forms of migration asylum-seeking, illegal entry, forged documentation, visaoverstayers, inter alia. Thus, Romania will need to be ready for hitherto unknown levels of immigration pressures. 282 5 Policy directions Scylla and Charybdis As outlined in the Introduction, Romania has been highly aware of the imperatives of adjustment to the EU acquis, and has made significant progress in so doing since about 2000. These changes include the establishment of border controls (both entering and exiting Romania), asylum law, immigration law, and from 2006 Romania plans to implement fully the EU visa regime (Constantin et al. 2004: Appendix 2). Visa restrictions vis--vis Turkey and the Ukraine have been implemented since 2003. It is also noteworthy that Romania has made some attempts to control the exit of Romanians to the Schengen zone, with a large number of exit refusals since 2001 and more recently the confiscation of passports from those who broke the Schengen 3-month tourism duration (see section 2.b, above). Whilst most if not all of these actions were a necessary burden for EU accession, they also have costs attached to them. The circular migration of Romanians, as we have shown, is economically beneficial, both in terms of remittances and the Romanian labour market. The implementation of asylum mechanisms is costly, with no obvious economic benefit; and the visa restrictions imposed on regional neighbours is an impediment to crossborder economic activity as well as damaging to Romania's foreign relations. The introduction of a labour immigration mechanism may well prove useful in the near future, but at this time looks suspiciously like a bureaucratic formality. The nature of Charybdis While Scylla has been highly visible, Charbydis is merely lurking unseen in deeper waters. There are several aspects of these unseen dangers labour market management and economic development; demographic shift and its implications; and regional economic and foreign relations. Taking first, the labour market issues. So far, Romania has survived with a nonpolicy of labour market management; the result has been limited skilled emigration, mass circular migration, and a functioning but uncompetitive labour market. Without the introduction of strong policy, the status quo is unlikely to continue: there is the danger that youth skilled emigration will escalate out of control, that returning migrants are excluded from the labour market, and that the gain in human capital over the 1990s turns into a clear brain drain. The policy direction needed is one that simultaneously opens up the labour market to real competition whilst conceding that there will probably be significant brain overflow through lack of high skilled employment opportunities. Therefore, a complementary policy is needed an internationalization of promoting educational mobility, job mobility and scientific exchanges across borders [brain training, brain circulation and brain exchange]. Concrete policy proposals in this area are not easy to achieve, and will require real 283 political determination: without this, Romania is unlikely to make significant economic progress. The demographic shift has not gone unnoticed (e.g. SAR, 2003), but the usual solutions proposed are not generally effective. For example, how does a state promote fertility rates? Or a reduced dependency ratio? Whereas many EU countries have serious structural problems with demographic shift, in the case of Romania the solution lies more obviously in economic development. With higher participation rates, raised worker productivity levels, reduced circular migration, there should not be great problems with ageing of the population. However, without the reforms outlined above, it is probable that the demographic shift will actually exacerbate any economic failings. The third main attribute of Charybdis's character consists of the potential damaged regional relations, with non-EU countries. These are already evident with the Republic of Moldova, and presumably will deteriorate further when the EU visa regime is implemented by Romania. Cross-border economic activity is particularly important between North Eastern Romania and Moldova, and seems to have been impeded. Suitcase trading and small business activity, particularly involving Turks, appears to have been disrupted by visa and immigration controls; whilst EU asylum rules have started to attract people from more distant regions, who have little to offer economically. Both regional trade and investment are likely to be important for Romania, although FDI and trading from the EU are obviously important opportunities. Some general conclusions Thus, whilst EU accession is important for Romania, and does provide a sense of direction for economic progress, there are no specific guides to assist Romania in what will doubtless turn out to be an idiosyncratic journey. However, some conclusions might be drawn. First, the key to emigration and immigration in Romania lies in skill levels: both Romanian emigrants and immigrants in Romania exhibit highly polarized skills, with few in the middle range. This contradiction is somewhat unusual, and suggests serious dysfunction in the labour market. Labour market reform looks essential. Secondly, the experiences of Greece look relevant. Greece experienced massive emigration in the 1960s [some skilled, mainly unskilled] and in the 1970s return migration. Many of the returnees found that their skills were not usable, because of employment mechanisms which favoured connections over skills. In fact, generally the low-skilled in Greece found it easier to get highly paid employment, through political favours. Greece also experienced in the 1980s low unskilled/semiskilled immigration alongside highskilled EU immigration, all co-existing in a highly segmented labour market. With the mass immigration 284 of Albanians in the 1990s, Greece suddenly acquired an immigrant population of nearly 10%. Although creating their own jobs, and filling unfilled vacancies, the Albanian immigrants may have inadvertently impeded economic development. Greek workers moved to higher positions, little capital investment was made and productivity gains were the result of cheap labour rather than economic progress. Now, Greece is unable to compete with other EU production systems, and is both quality and price uncompetitive. The analogy is with the Republic of Moldova whose nationals constitute the main potential source of immigration into Romania. Finally, it is almost inevitable that membership of the privileged economic club of the EU will make Romania a gateway for illegal migrants, asylum-seekers, false tourists, and every other type of migration imaginable. The cost of administering controls will be high, and the social shock of adjusting to mass immigration could also be high. It is vital that this negative aspect of EU membership is counterbalanced by economic development and improvements in quality of life for the Romanian people. References Ackers, L. (2005): Moving People and Knowledge: Scientific Mobility in the EU', International Migration, 43/5, pp. 99-131 Amariel, R. (2005): Romania: Limited Exit, Transitions Online, Feature article, 14 Oct. 2005. Available from Arango, J. and M. Jachimowicz (2005): Regularizing Immigrants in Spain: A New Approach, Migration Information Source, September 1st. Available from Bagatelas, W. and B. Sergi (2003): The Balkans `Brain Drain' Its Meaning and Implications, South East Europe Review, 4/2003, pp. 7-12 Balz, V., A. Williams and D. Kollr (2004): Temporary versus Permanent Youth Brain Drain: Economic Implications, International Migration, 42/4, pp. 3-34 Baldwin-Edwards, M. (2004a): Statistical Data on Immigrants in Greece, Athens: Mediterranean Migration Observatory and IMEPO, Interior Ministry of Greece. Available from Baldwin-Edwards, M. (2004b): Sustainable Development and Emigration: The Contemporary Balkans and the EU, South East Europe Review, 1/2004, pp. 9-14 Baldwin-Edwards, M. (1999): Where Free Markets Reign: Aliens in the Twilight Zone, in M. Baldwin-Edwards and J. Arango (eds.): Immigrants and the Informal Economy in Southern Europe, London: Frank Cass Barbin, J.-G. (2004): Recruitment of Nurses in Romania by the Friuli-Venezia-Giulia Region in Italy, in OECD (2004) CEC (2005): Key findings of the 2005 Comprehensive Monitoring Reports on Bulgaria and Romania, MEMO/05/395, Brussels: Commission of the EC, October 25 Commander, S. et al. (2004): The Brain Drain: A Review of Theory and Facts, Brussels Economic Review, 47/1, pp. 29-44 Constantin, D.-L. et al. (2004): The Migration Phenomenon from the Perspective of Romania's Accession to the EU, Bucharest: European Institute of Romania 285 Dietz, B. (2002): East-West Migration Patterns in an Enlarging Europe: The German Case, The Global Review of Ethnopolitics, 2/2, pp. 29-43 Diminescu, D. (2004): Assessment and Evaluation of Bilateral Labour Recruitment Agreements Signed by Romania, in OECD (2004) Ethnobarometer (2004): Ethnic Mobility in Romania, Rome, Italy: Ethnobarometer. Available from Eurostat (2005): News Release: European Demography, 136/2005, 25 October 2005 Ferro, A. (2004): Romanians Abroad: A Snapshot of Highly Skilled Migration, Higher Education in Europe, 29/3 Futo, P., M. Jandl and L. Karsakova (2005): Illegal Migration and Human Smuggling in Central and Eastern Europe, Migracijske I etnicke teme 21 (2005), 1-2: pp. 35-54 Gheorghiu, V. (2004): Borders, Visas, Migration and the Republic of Moldova, SdostEuropa Mitteilungen, 02-03/2004, Positionen Gheu, V. (2005): Migrations et incidence sur la rpartition spatiale de la population et sur les structures par sexe et ge en Romanie, au niveau national et rgional, paper presented at the conference "Migrations, Crises and Recent Conflicts in the Balkans", 27-29 October 2005, Beograd: mimeo Ghinraru, C. and M. Van der Linden (2004): Trafficking of Migrant Workers from Romania: Issues of Labour and Sexual Exploitation, Geneva: International Labour Office Henry, A. et al. (2003): Four accounts of `brain drain' in the Balkans, South East Europe Review, 4/2003, pp. 13-26 Horvat, V. (2004): Brain drain. Threat to successful transition in South East Europe?, Southeast European Politics, 5/1, pp. 76-03 IOM (2005): Risks of irregular migration to EU countries 2003-2005: what has changed?, Bucharest: IOM Mission in Romania IPEC (2005): Child Trafficking The People Involved. A Synthesis of Findings from Albania, Moldova, Romania and Ukraine, ILO, Geneva: IPEC Programme IPEC (2004): Rapid Assessment of Trafficking in Children for Labour and Sexual Exploitation in Romania, ILO, Geneva: IPEC Programme ISMU (2005): Rimesse degli immigrati per alcuni paesi di destinazione. Anni 1992-2003. Fonte: Ufficio Italanio dei Cambi, Milano: Fondazione Iniziative e Studi sulla Multietnicit. Website: Jandl, M. (2003): Moldova Seeks Stability amid Mass Emigration, Migration Information Source, December. Available from Kaczmarczyk, P. and M. Oklski (2005): International Migrations in Central and Eastern Europe: Current and Future Trends, UN Expert Meeting on Migration and Development, New York: United Nations Krieger, H. (2004): Migration Trends in an Enlarged Europe, Report for the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Dublin. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the EC Lzroiu, S. (2003a): More `Out' than `In' at the Crossroads between Europe and the Balkans, Vol. IV Romania, of Migration Trends in Selected Applicant Countries, Vienna: International Organization for Migration Lzroiu, S. (2003b): Romanians Go Global, Early Warning Report, Romania, January Lindstrom, N. (2004): Regional Sex Trafficking in the Balkans, Problems of PostCommunism, 51/3 Mihilescu, I. (2004): Restless Youth: Emigration and Enterprise in Romania, Higher Education in Europe, 29/3 Mitsilegas, V. (2002): The Implementation of the EU Acquis on Illegal Immigration by the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 28/4, pp. 665-682 286 OPI [Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigracin] (2005): Extranjeros con tarjeta o autorizacin de residencia en vigor a 30 de septiembre de 2005, Madrid: Ministero de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales OECD-SOPEMI (various years): Trends in International Migration, Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Available from OECD (2004): Migration for Employment, Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Available from OECD (2003): Reviews of National Policies for Education: South Eastern Europe, Vol. 2, Paris: OECD Okolski, M. (2001): Incomplete Migration: A New Form of Mobility in Central and Eastern Europe, in C. Wallace and D. Stola (eds): Patterns of migration in central Europe, Basingstoke: Palgrave Pnescu, C. (2005): Brain Drain and Brain Gain, in New Patterns of Labour Migration in Central and Eastern Europe, Cluj Napoca: Public Policy Center (CENPO). Available from Peers, S. (2005): Revising EU Border Control Rules: A Missed Opportunity?, Statewatch Analysis, 5 July 2005. Available from Radu, D. (2003): Human Capital Content and Selectivity of Romanian Emigration, Working Paper No. 365, Luxembourg Income Study Rapoport, H. (2004): Who is Afraid of the Brain Drain? Human Capital Flight and Growth in Developing Countries, Brussels Economic Review, 47/1, pp. 90-102 SAR (2003): Society: A Demographic Time Bomb?, Policy Warning Report, August, Bucharest: Romanian Academic Society Salt, J. (2005): Current Trends in International Migration in Europe, Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publications Salt, J. and J. Stein (1997): Migration as a Business: The Case of Trafficking, International Migration, 35/4 Sandu, D. (2005a): Patterns of Temporary Emigration: Experiences and Intentions at Individual and Community Levels in Romania, paper presented at the "Workshop on Development and Patterns of Migration Processes in Central and Eastern Europe", Migration Online Project, Charles University of Prague, August 25-28 Sandu, D. (2005b): Emerging Transnational Migration from Romanian Villages, Current Sociology, 53/4, July 2005, pp. 555-582 Sandu, D. et al. (2004): A Country Report on Romanian Migration Abroad: Stocks and Flows after 1989, Prague: Multicultural Center. Available from Schiff, M. (2006): Brain Gain, in . zden and M. Schiff (eds): International Migration, Remittances and the Brain Drain, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan and World Bank [forthcoming] Simina, O. (2005): Next in Line: Romanians at the Gate of the EU, SISEC Discussion Paper 2(1)2005, February, Timisoara: School of High Comparative European Studies (SISEC), University of West Timisoara. Available from Simina, O. (2002): Romania Source Country and Transit Country for International Migration, SISEC Discussion Paper 1(1)2002, October, Timisoara: School of High Comparative European Studies (SISEC), University of West Timisoara. Available from Sinpeng, A. (2005): Migration Policy, Transitions Online, 21 November 2005. Available from Skvortova, A. (2004): The Moldova-Romania Cross-Border Cooperation, EXLINEA Newsletter 3, June 2004, Free University of Berlin. Available from: Spendzharova, A. (2003): Bringing Europe In? The Impact of EU Conditionality on Bulgarian and Romanian Politics, Southeast European Politics, 4/2-3, pp. 141-156 287 Surtees, R. (2005): Second Annual Report on Victims of Trafficking in South-Eastern Europe, Regional Clearing Point, Stability Pact for SEE, Geneva: IOM Tascu, M.-V. et al. (2002): The Problem of Post-Communist Education: The Romanian Example, The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies, 27/2, pp. 203-226 UN (2004): World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision, New York: United Nations UN (2000): Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations? New York: United Nations UNESCO (2004): Education for All: Global Monitoring Report 2005, Paris: UNESCO UNHCR (2005): 2004 Global Refugee Trends, Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR (2004): UNHCR Statistical Yearbook for 2003, Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Wickramasekara, P. (2002): Policy Responses to Skilled Migration: Retention, Return and Circulation, Paper 5E, Perspectives on Labour Migration, International Migration Programme, Geneva: ILO Williams, A. and V. Balz (2005): What Human Capital, which Migrants? Returned Skilled Migration to Slovakia from the UK, International Migration Review, 39/2, pp. 439-468 World Bank (2006): Global Economic Prospects, Washington DC: The World Bank 288 Appendix 289 ROMANIA, PART OF THE EUROPEAN AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE. LEGAL ASPECTS Alexandru Mircea1) Anca Cristina Pristavu2) "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country", said the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But the states keep the right to refuse the access of certain migrants, the right to select those who wish to enter or live within the national territory. International law only covers the right to leave a country and the right to return, which are guaranteed: granting a would-be migrant the right of entry to another country's territory is part of that country's sovereignty, and it could not be imposed through international treaties. The road to establish a genuine Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is still a long one. The right balance between Freedom, Security and Justice needs to be ensured. Security and law-enforcement policies need to be developed with `freedom' as point of departure. Immigration and asylum are the main issues in the Hague agenda alongside the prevention of terrorism. Romania shall contribute to fulfilling these objectives starting with 01.01.2007, when becoming a European Union Member State. Therefore, Romania, as an accession country, is decided to define its policy in the field of Freedom, Security and Justice and to plan its further activities according to the priorities established in the Hague Programme. By the date of Romania's accession to the EU, Romania shall have defined its priorities, shall have amended its legislation and procedures, in accordance with the objectives and the measures adopted by the EU Member States in implementing the Hague Programme. After this date, Romania shall participate in the EU decision-making process, with a view to establishing and implementing the priorities of The Hague Programme. Keywords: The Hague Programme, Justice and Home Affairs, Romania, migration Associate Professor, LLD. State Secretary for Liaison with the Parliament and European Affairs, Ministry of Administration and Interior, Romanian Government. 2) LLB (International Law, Chiinu 2001), BS in Public Administration (Sibiu 2002) and MA in Political Sciences (Oradea 2005). 2nd secretary in the Permanent Representation of Romania to the European Union in Brussels, dealing with Home Affairs issues from the EU perspective. Contact person: 1) Europe appears caught up in its own dilemma: Europe needs migrants, Europe fears migration Despite the disproportionate attention that has been given in the scientific debate to immigration pressures on the United States, there have been other major migration streams around the world. These too have been driven by a combination of demographic and economic trends as well as by political upheavals. As Europe entered the 1990s, profound political and economic changes were transforming it. In Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Soviet regime and the fall of the Iron Curtain let to large westward flows in the early 90s from The authors wish to thank Mr. Vasile Drgoi, director of National Refugee Office, and Mr. Tiberiu Trifan, director of Authority of Aliens, both within the Ministry of Administration and Interior, Romania, for their valuable contribution to the preparation of relevant data. In the same time, the authors acknowledge the support from the part of Mr. Ovidiu Simina, the person who launched the idea of this paper and co-ordinated the preparatory debate. 290 countries like Romania, Bulgaria, Poland or Russia and other former Soviet countries. These flows came in addition to a rapidly rising number of asylum seekers. Starting with the 90's, Europe faced a new era of migration: migration as an asset and a challenge. After 1990, European migration was mainly driven by economic purposes. In accordance with the international law, an international migrant is a person who lives temporarily in a country of which he is not national. As the term migrant refers to cases where the decision to migrate has been taken freely by the individual concerned (without the intervention of external compelling factors), migrants are differentiated from refugees and asylum seekers. According to the Convention on Migrants' Rights, the term migrant worker refers to a person who is to engage, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he/she is not a national. This definition therefore encompasses both documented and undocumented migrants. "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country", says the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Article 13(2). As one of the innate rights of a human being, the right to migration has been articulated both in the international law, especially in the Common Declaration of Human Rights, the International Pacts of Civil and Political Rights, the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 New York Protocol concerning the status of refugees, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (articles 18, 45.2) and in the national law131. Even the Holy See proclaims itself in the widely understood right to migrate: the Vatican is of the opinion that legal protection of the right to migrate should also comprise all forms of voluntary migration. "Personal human rights comprise also the fact that any individual can migrate to this country where he hopes to provide for needs of his and his family is the easiest possible way. And that is why it is a duty of these being in national authority in the state to receive the in-coming foreigners and to comply with the migrants" said the Pope John XXII in his encyclical Pacem in Terris. Pope John Paul II said in his Laborem exercens that any human being has the right to leave the country of his origin in search for opportunities of living in another country, too. At present, cross-border movement is a top priority issue on the government agendas and during the intergovernmental discussions. Over the past 15 years, the number of people crossing borders in search of a better life has been rising steadily. In the beginning of the 21st century, one in every 35 people is an international migrant. If they all lived in the same place, it would have been the world's fifth-largest country. In Europe, as elsewhere, international migration has become a topical issue in public, political and academic debates. Most We consider that the international law only covers the right to leave a country and the right to return, which are guaranteed: the granting a would-be migrant the right of entry to another country's territory is part of that country's sovereignty, and it could not be imposed by international treaties. 131 291 European countries are experiencing increased flows of immigration. Already millions of immigrants have come to stay, first in north-western Europe but increasingly also in the southern regions, and the odds are that many more immigrants will follow in the coming decades. The immigration flows have been triggered by several causes, including family reunification, political persecution, ecological disasters, or disparities in economic opportunity, and so forth. These flows show a tremendous variation in size and spatial distribution. Whatever the causes of international migration or the criteria of migrants' selection at the borders are, old and new immigrations have obviously produced all sorts of social, cultural, political and economic changes, and had an impact on general trends in various specific ways. In response to these developments, the governments initiated a series of legislative reforms. These covered all areas related to immigration, including entry, residence, employment and asylum. All countries, even those where large proportions of population are themselves descendants of immigrants, tensions have occurred between new arrivals and parts of the native population. Such tensions are partly invoked by the perception of unchecked flows of new immigrants as well as anti-immigrant political parties. Opponents of migration fear adverse impacts on the labour market, public finances, on social conditions and on the distribution of income. Proponents of migrations note the positive economic role that immigrants can play, for instance in term of addressing specific labour shortages and the problems linked to ageing populations. "One of the biggest tests for an enlarged European Union, in the years and decades to come, will be how it manages the challenge of immigration. If European societies rise to this challenge, immigration will enrich and strengthen them. If they fail to do so, the result may be declining live standards and social division" (part of the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's speech, delivered to the European Parliament on 29 January 2004). The road to establish a genuine Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is still a long one. The right balance between Freedom, Security and Justice needs to be ensured. Security and law enforcement policies need to be developed with `freedom' as point of departure (Apap and Carrera 2003). Freedom of movement is one of the fundamental principles upon which the European Union was once founded. The recent and unprecedented EU enlargement was, however, accompanied by a chain reaction of restrictions introduced by the EU-15 to curb prospective migration from the new Member States. The enlargement of the European Union on the 1st of May 2004, gave the nationals of the 10 new Member States the right to move relatively freely around the whole EU territory. The potential consequences of this new 292 freedom have fuelled the debate in the 15 EU states (the so-called EU-15), where many feared that migrants from the new members will swamp their labour markets and strain their welfare systems. When dealing with the old new comers, from countries where there were fears of mass migration, workers had to wait at least seven years before they could seek jobs in other countries on an equal basis with natives. Under the enlargement treaties, the EU-15 nations restricted the right of accession nationals to their labour markets for up to seven years. During the negotiations with Turkey, there is likely to be a debate over whether there should be a longer-than-seven-year wait for Turks, whether the EU should allow freedom of movement when certain indicators are met, or whether individual EU Member States should have discretion in when to allow the freedom of movement. Restrictions take place despite a widespread recognition that Europe needs to import foreign labour in the view of the gloomy demographic forecasts, in the face of ageing populations and low birth-rates, as well as the prospects of a collapsing social security system. The EU-25 has 455 million residents, compared to 295 million in the US. There can be no doubt that the European societies need migration. Europeans are living longer and have fewer children. By 2050, if current demographic trends continue, without immigration, the population of EU-25 will drop to under 400 million residents (Annan 2004), but the US will have 420 million. With low fertility rates, net migration already accounts for a significant proportion of population change in the EU. For example, without migration, Germany, Greece and Italy would have experienced a loss of population and Sweden would barely have grown. Italy, for example, has a dubious distinction of having both the oldest population and the lowest birth-rate in the world. Without immigrants, its population will shrink from 57 million today to 41 million in 2050. In Germany, the EU's largest nation, the number of senior citizens is projected to increase by 50% over the next three decades. A UN study from 2000 acknowledges that during the first half of the 21st century, the population of most developed countries shall become smaller and older, as a result of a below-replacement fertility and an increased longevity (Visco 2000). In the absence of migration, the declines in the population size will be even greater than those projected and the population ageing will be more rapid. The numbers of migrants needed to offset these declines in the working-age population are significant larger than those needed to offset total population decline. If retirement ages remain as essentially as it is today, increasing the size of the working-age population through international migration is the only option in the short to medium term to reduce declines in the potential support ratio: if Germany do not accept 500,000 immigrants a year, it would have had to rise its retirement age to 77 in order to have enough workers to finance pensions for the 293 elderly. In other words, Europe will have to double its intake in migrants over the next 50 years just to maintain its population level. Anti-immigration sentiment has risen in Europe over the past few years, and many governments are under subsequent pressure to curb the growing problem. The EU estimates there were at least a million of irregular migrants in the EU-15 Member States in 2004132. IOM counted the number of irregular foreigners in Western Europe at three million in 2000, and ILO noted that, if 15 percent of the 22 million foreigners were irregular, their number would be of 3.3 million133. With an average net legal immigration of nearly 1 million persons per year, the inflows in the 1990s were the largest since the year 1945. This number does not reflect the extent of illegal immigration. The types of migrants and countries of origin have also diversified, with a dramatic increase in the number of immigrant women, as well as unprecedented peaks in the number of asylum-seekers. All Member States are concerned. Spain, Italy, the UK and Germany together account for 70 per cent of the net inflow of immigrants. Former countries of emigration, such as the southern Member States and Ireland, also became countries of immigration over the last decade. On the other hand, illegal immigration is one of the most sensitive issues in Europe: a growing trend of illegal entry has been observed across the EU over the last decade. Spain intercepted an average of 1,000 migrants a month trying to slip into Southern Spain or the Canary Islands in 2004. Creation of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: the Hague Programme The goal of constructing an 'Area of Freedom, Security and Justice' across the European Union was agreed at the Tampere EU Summit of 1999 (Finland). The Tampere Programme was a five-year agenda that came to an end in 2004. The evolution at the European Union level regarding the establishing of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice for all is presented in the Appendix no.2. In June 2004, the Commission presented a Communication134 taking stock of the implementation of the Tampere Agenda and setting future guidelines for a new Justice and Home Affairs agenda for the years to come. The Tampere Programme was followed by the Hague Programme, which is a five-year programme for closer co-operation in justice and home affairs at EU level from 2005 to 2010. The programme's main focus is on setting up a 132 133 134 COM(2004) 412 final, 04/06/2004, Brussels, A group that maintains links to such estimates is the Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants ( Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Assessment of the Tampere Programme and Future Orientations, COM(2004) 401 final, Brussels, 2.6.2004 294 common immigration and asylum policy for the European Union member states. Following the Council discussions in July and October 2004, the Dutch Presidency produced a new programme for justice and home affairs (now referred to as 'freedom, security and justice') for the years 2005-2010, to be known as the Hague Programme. On 10 May 2005 the Commission produced a roadmap implementing the Hague Programme which identifies ten specific priority areas for 2005-2010135. Immigration and asylum are the main issues in the Hague agenda alongside the prevention of terrorism. EU leaders agreed to use qualified majority decision-making and codecision in the fields of asylum, immigration and border control issues. Legal immigration remains subject to unanimity. In the field of asylum, immigration and border control, the Hague programme contains the following key measures: a common European asylum system with a common procedure and a uniform status for those who are granted asylum or protection by 2009; measures for foreigners to legally work in the EU in accordance with labour market requirements; a European framework to guarantee the successful integration of migrants into host societies; partnerships with third countries to improve their asylum systems, better tackle illegal immigration and implement resettlement programmes; a policy to expel and return illegal immigrants to their countries of origin; a fund for the management of external borders. Schengen Information System (SIS II) - a database of people who have been issued with arrest warrants and of stolen objects to be operational in 2007 common visa rules (common application centres, introduction of biometrics in the visa information system) In the fields of justice and security, the Hague programme highlights the following key measures: police information to be available between all EU countries (threats to the security of another EU state must be communicated immediately); address the factors that contribute to fundamentalism and to the involvement of individuals in terrorist activities; make greater use of Europol, the EU's police office, and Eurojust, EU's judicial cooperation body; ensuring greater civil and criminal justice co-operation across borders and the full application of the principle of mutual recognition. The roadmap for 2005-2010136 lists ten key areas for priority action: Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on The Hague Programme: Ten priorities for the next five years. The Partnership for European renewal in the field of Freedom, Security and Justice, COM(2005) 184 final, Brussels, 10.5.2005 136 Council and Commission Action Plan implementing the Hague Programme on strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union, Official Journal C 198, 12.08.2005 135 295 fundamental rights and citizenship: development of policies enhancing citizenship, monitoring and promoting respect for fundamental rights; the fight against terrorism: prevention, preparedness and response; migration management: developing a common EU immigration policy and countering illegal migration; internal and external borders, visas: further develop an integrated management of external borders and a common visa policy, while ensuring the free movement of persons; a common asylum area; integration: maximising the positive impact of migration on society and economy; privacy and security in sharing information: balancing the need to share information among law enforcement and judicial authorities with privacy and data protection rights; fight against organised crime; civil and criminal justice: effective access to justice for all and the enforcement of judgements; freedom, security and justice: reviewing the effectiveness of policies and financial instrument in meeting the objectives of freedom, security and justice. Romania shall contribute to fulfilling these objectives starting with 01.01.2007, when becoming a European Union Member State. Therefore, Romania, as an accession country, is decided to define its policy in the field of Freedom, Security and Justice and to plan its further activities according to the priorities established in the Hague Programme. By the date of Romania's accession to the EU, Romania shall have defined its priorities, shall have amended its legislation and procedures, in accordance with the objectives and the measures adopted by the EU Member States in implementing the Hague Programme. After this date, Romania shall participate in the EU decision-making process, with a view to establishing and implementing the priorities of The Hague Programme: (1) Fundamental rights and citizenship: creating fully-fledged policies Romanian authorities pay a great importance to the fundamental rights of its citizens. Considering these fundamental rights, stated in the European Constitution, we appreciate that the measures of the Action Plan of the Hague Programme will enable a uniform implementation of the EU acquis in all the Member States and, implicitly, the possibility to amend its provisions, according to the real situations at a given moment. (2) The fight against terrorism: working toward a global response All Romanian authorities with prerogatives in the migration field are cooperating with the national security bodies, in order to prevent and fight against terrorism. They are exchanging information regarding the suspected aliens of committing terrorism acts. 296 (3) A common asylum area: establish an effective harmonized procedure in accordance with the Union' values and humanitarian tradition The Romanian asylum system is harmonized with the EU Acquis and the international standards in the field. The Romanian authorities have taken the appropriate measures for strengthening the inter-institutional cooperation framework. At present, at the level of the National Refugee Office of Romania, a complete training programme for the national services in the asylum field is on-going. At the same time, the relevant Romanian authorities are cooperating with the international bodies (e.g. UNHCR, IOM) and national NGOs, in order to develop joint programmes concerning the asylum issues. The Romanian authorities are underpreparations in order to develop actions for making use of the European Refugee Fund by 2007. As regards the resettlement policy, Romania welcomes the development of the EU Regional Protection Programmes and Resettlement Schemes, as well as the establishment of the common return procedures, agreed by all Member States. The Romanian authorities consider that, beside the currently allocated funds, the establishment of a Return Fund at the European level will constitute a positive element for the implementation of the return policies. (4) Migration management; defining a balanced approach Romania pays a great importance to a balanced approach to migration management. Romania has defined its policy in this field in a National Migration Strategy. In the initiative of aligning the national policy to the EU objectives, set out by this strategic document, a crucial role is given to the process of drafting annual action plans for implementing the National Migration Strategy and to the institutions represented in the Co-ordination Group, created on this purpose. All the national bodies with prerogatives in the migration field are involved in drafting and carrying out the activities in the Action Plan. Also, in this respect, Romania pays a great importance to the development of the research, analysis and statistical component, as well as to the contribution to the annual reports on migration and asylum statistics produced at the EU level. Romania welcomes the adoption of the EU Framework Regulation on the collection of migration and asylum statistics and of the Commission Decision establishing a secure webbased information network for Member States migration services, which will enable the exchange of information in the field, at the European level. As regards the development of the policy on legal migration, particularly the economic migration, the Romanian authorities will participate at the public consultation on the Green Paper on economic migration. 297 (5) Integration: maximising the positive impact of migration on our society and economy Romanian authorities pay a great importance to the development of an efficient integration policy of the persons granted with an international form of protection, in order to prevent isolation and social exclusion, by carrying out individual integration programmes and granting them access to education, labour market, social protection and housing. Romania in the age of international migration: the year 2002 Starting with 1990, many Romanians chosen to leave Romania (both legally and illegally) for living or working in another country, most of them definitively: Romania is considered as a source country for the European and international migration (Simina 2002). For Romania's migration, the year 2002 was very important: it was the year when the European Union had lifted visa for Romanians travelling within the Schengen Area. That year is now considered as turning point in the migration phenomenon. As regards Romania's illegal migration, the migration studies mention three migration mechanisms: the transit migration, the Romanians' emigration to European Union and the circulatory migration of workers. Illegal transit migration is the mechanism through which third country nationals immigrate to countries in the Central and Eastern Europe, including to Romania, so that they could further emigrate to the European Union (EU-15). Transit migration through Central and Eastern Europe (and thus through Romania, as well) consists in a growing number of illegal emigrants, some of them meeting the criteria for which they apply for asylum, but who prefer not to do so in Central and Eastern Europe for different reasons, so that they could transit to the European Union. This is a relatively new phenomena and it has been found out that its main characteristics are illegality and the involvement of criminal networks in human trafficking (Constantin et al. 2004). Illegal migration of Romanians means that Romanian nationals leave legally Romania and enter legally EU Member States, but stay illegally in an EU country after the legal stay period expires (3 months within the following 6 month after the first departure in a certain period of time, after 2002, or overstaying the compulsory visa, in the time before the year 2002), or they leave as tourists or students but, reaching the country of destination they perform lucrative activities on the black market, or they are entering and illegally stay on the territory of an EU Member State (generally after illegally crossing the Romanian border) (Constantin et al. 2004: 25-26; Simina 2002). Starting with the year 2002, the "national trend" was the circulatory migration (Lzroiu 2004). Circulatory migration by means of migratory networks (legal or illegal) 298 refers to the alternative movement between the country of origin and one or more of the countries of destination. Migrants leave and work abroad for a period of time (sometimes, not for overstay the visa-free period of three months/90 days), return in Romania and stay for a period of time (generally no more than three months), then leave again for working abroad. During the period of their staying back to Romania, other emigrants replace them at the work. That means that one migrant worker works for three months and then comes back to Romania: a friend or a relative replaces him/her for the next 3 months and so on. Through the migratory networks, those who want to temporarily migrate abroad receive help and support from the previous migrants. This intention to migrate abroad seeking a job is more likely among people living within communities with a high circulatory migration rate. In areas where others have left before, more will leave, in places where other migrants have succeeded and where the signs of success are apparent, migration will be higher (Constantin et al. 2004). It is very difficult to produce an estimation of the documented and undocumented migrants. But it is well known that most of Romanian migrant workers left Romania and entered the European Union Member States as tourists. They were already having arrangements for work in the black market. As legal measures against irregular migrants were taken by the Romanians authorities, starting from the interdiction to leave Romania up to 6 years, overstaying the visa period (three months as tourist) becomes problematic. So a new way to secure the long-term job was "invented" by Romanians: two or three persons were "sharing" the same job position each three-month period of time as to avoid overstaying (Lzroiu 2004: 27). In the European migration framework, Romania had to manage an unstable equilibrium: to secure the borders against the illegal migration (and sometimes... even against its own citizens!), to assure the observance of human rights (the freedom of movement is recognised to all Romanian citizens, as one of the fundamental rights) and to protect people in need of the international protection (refugees and asylum seekers). Romania is not only a country that made important efforts to join the European family, by introducing the necessary legal provisions in the national legislation, but it is already part of one, whole Europe, ruled by law. To have a competitive economy and an equitable welfare system means to have good laws and to firmly implement those laws. Regarding migration and asylum, Romania implemented the major European legislation. Appendix no.1 presents the concordance between the latest European Union acquis and the Romanian legislation in this regard. 299 The creation of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, through the implementation of European Union acquis in the Romanian legislation, leads the Romanian Government to reform the police and border guard system. Starting with the year 2003, the new Ministry of Administration and Interior (MAI it was created as the result of a merging process between the former Ministry of Interior and the former Ministry of Public Administration), through its specialized structures, ensures the upholding of the Romanian state border regime, the regime for aliens in Romania, manages the records of the aliens who were granted the right of stay in Romania (the National System of Aliens' Registration), implements Romania's policies intended for refugees, organizes and coordinates the issuance and the general registration of identity and travel documents. Within the Ministry of Administration and Interior, the institutions having attributes in the field of migration are: the Romanian Border Police, the Authority for Aliens, the Department for Passports and the National Office for Refugees. The main institution, with competences in securing the borders and fighting against the illegal international migration targeting Romania as transit country, and on the other hand in controlling the border (the present and the future external border of the European Union), is the General Inspectorate of Border Police (Inspectoratul General al Poliiei de Frontier IGPF), within the Ministry of Administration and Interior. Together with the Authority for Aliens (Autoritatea pentru Strini ApS) and the National Refuges Office (Oficiul Naional pentru Refugiai ONR), IGPF was one of the major institution that hardly struggled to finalize the negotiation process on the 24 Chapter Justice and Home Affair (the last Chapter concluded just before the December 2004 European Council, that agreed on concluding the process and inviting Romania to sign the Treaty of Accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union on 25th of April 2005, in Luxembourg). In July 1999, the Border and Immigration Police (PCTF) and the Border Guards (Grnicerii) merged as "the new" Romanian Border Police (nowadays, the Border Police is organised as a general inspectorate: Inspectoratul General al Poliiei de Frontier IGPF). Some police officers from the Border Police were sent to guard the so-called "green border" (as border guars, even if they were untrained for this new mission, mostly linked at that time to a military service, than to a police job), and contrariwise lot of former border guards (military trained officers, without studies or training in the field of documents' control and immigration police activity; some periods before the 90's, the border guards were part of the Army, being trained in such way) were put to control the passports in the border checking points and to assist the customs bodies during their specific activities related to the transportation of goods across the border. In this way, the new management of the border tried 300 to oblige both former border and immigration policemen and former border guards to learn the new job: a European-style border police, where the police officers are involved as professionals both in the fight against immigration and trans-national crimes and in the border management activities, with large competences within the border area. At the beginning of 2001, the Romanian Border Police took the first important (and real) measures to strengthen the border control and to secure the border. Until 2001, with the exception of the commissioned and under-commissioned officers (generally with military training and studies), all the border guards were young men (conscripts, sometimes without specific skills) enrolled in the one-year compulsory military service. They had to learn to be professional guards in less than one year, and after the end of the military service (when they eventually learned the rules to secure the border) they were sent home definitively. The main part of the former Border Guards was busy with the training of those young guards: there was the same problem each year, with each new generation (contingent) of conscripts (unfortunately, as the military service as a border guard was never seen as a nice job far away from cities and often in isolated areas mostly conscripts with unfinished studies or with low skills were attracted in this service). Only the former border policemen were trained as police officers, being graduates from the Police Schools or even from the Police Academy (Law bachelors). Starting with 2001, professional guards were enrolled in Border Police and the service at the green border was speed. The new Romanian Border Police was born and a new legislation on border regime and on border policing was adopted in 2001. Nowadays, there are no more conscripts at the borders all the police border officers are professionals. With the support of EU funds from the pre-accession programmes, the Border Police endowment was modernized and new techniques were acquired, in accordance with the European standards. Romanian authorities had taken some other legislative measures and police measures. Here are some of the most important pieces of legislation that entered into force during that period of intense legislative transformations: o The republished Romanian Constitution (2003) guaranties the right of free movement, each Romanian citizen benefiting the right to emigrate and to return to the country. o The new Laws of the Romanian border regime and of the Romanian Border Police were put in force in 2001. o Since 2002, all border police forces (like the whole police system in Romania) were demilitarised. o After the announcement of entering the Schengen area for tourism purposes without a visa (as starting with January 1st, 2002), the Government issued an Government emergency ordinance OUG no.144/2001, which established compulsory rules, conditions and formalities for Romanians to cross the national border: health insurance for the whole journey, car insurance for the EU area or a return ticket (if travelling with other means of transport than own car), proof of the travel purpose 301 o o o o o o o (Romanians were not allowed to work during the self-declared tourism journey), proof of funds for the whole journey, a limited period of travel (90 days) per each semester, not having been returned by the EU Member States, and so on. The Government Ordinance OG no.84/2004 modified the regime of passport in Romania and introduced the possibility for the passports to be retained and the right to use a passport to be suspended up to five years, in case that Romanians do not comply with the European Union migration requirements, or have been convicted as criminal offenders abroad. At the same time, the Border Police was allowed to interrupt the journey of Romanians who were not fulfilling all the conditions requested by the national law in order to travel abroad. As the migration issues became more important for the Romanian administration, the Government approved the decision HG no.577/2003 (modified and completed by HG no.280/2004 and HG no.855/2006) setting up Autoritatea pentru Strini ApS (the Authority for Aliens) as an autonomous institution, subordinated directly to the Ministry of Administration and Interior, with legal personality, that carries out the tasks assigned to its competence it by law, regarding the status of aliens in Romania, combating illegal stay, as well as regarding the management of the records of aliens who were granted the right of stay in Romania. The basic law that regulates the circulation of foreign persons in Romania (Law regarding the aliens' regime in Romania) entered into force as the Government Emergency Ordinance OUG no.194/2002, approved with amendments by Law no.357/2003. This piece of law contains provisions for regulating the admission on the Romanian territory, the conditions for temporary or permanent stay and the necessary measures which have to be taken by the Romanian authorities when the aliens are in illegal situations on the national territory. In drafting that law, the ApS spets benefited from the experience of the experts from the EU Member States within a Twinning Covenant (Swedish Migration Board and Danish Immigration Service). When it was adopted, the law transposed the EU Acquis in the field of migration by the end of 2001. Taking into account the tasks assumed by Romania within the negotiation process, and because everything can be improved, the ApS spets drafted new legal documents modify to and to complete the 2002 Aliens' Act. At the moment, the European acquis in the migration field is fully transposed up to 2004. In order to fully transpose the European acquis (Directive 38/2004/EC) the Romanian authorities adopted the Government Emergency Ordinance no.102/2005 on the free movement of citizens of the Member States of the European Union and the European Economic Area on the Romanian territory, with further modifications and completions. The new legislation establishes accelerated procedures for registering the residence and for granting the right of permanent residence on Romanian territory. It also provides the procedures for restricting the right of free movement on the Romanian territory of the European Union citizens and their family members on grounds of public order, national security or public health. Granting of rights and obligations to the foreign citizens who benefit of a form of protection in Romania, in equal conditions to those applicable in the case of the Romanian citizens, was regulated by the Government Ordinance no.44/2004 regarding the social integration of the foreigners that acquired a protection form in Romania. The National Refugee Office deals with protection of refugees. The Law no.678/2001 on combating the trafficking in human beings regulates the prevention and the fighting against the traffic in human beings as well as the protection and the assistance granted to the victims of such traffic. The Government Decision no.616/2004 approved the Romanian National Strategy on Migration. 302 Romania adopted an active and flexible policy in the area of controlled immigration, adapted to the national, regional and international conditions, including by closely monitoring the admission and stay of aliens. A special status was granted to citizens of the European Union Member States and of the European Economical Area. For aliens coming from countries with a high migratory potential are elaborated specific procedures, which includes conclusion of international agreements and conventions. With a view upon a durable economic development, in accordance with Romania's national interest, the policy in the field of controlled immigration also pursued the attraction and access of foreign investors. Consequently, the policy with the purpose of carrying out commercial activities was addressed with priority to investors with a high economic potential and implemented by the competent governmental institutions in co-operation with organisations relevant in the field. The policy on admission for working purposes offers the possibility of access of aliens on the Romanian labour market, taking into consideration both the need to protect the internal labour market as well as Romania's economic interests, i.e. using a utilitarian approach. National Migration Strategy137 In order to establish a unitary conception on immigration management at national level, the Government approved in 2004 the National Migration Strategy and an inter-institutional mechanism for its implementation, fact which led to the gathering of all institutions with competences on migration at the same discussions table. The strategy was implemented through annual action plans which ensured the achievement of important objectives through a coordinate effort of the involved institutions in the field of regular migration, preventing and combating illegal migration, asylum, social integration and return/voluntary repatriation of the aliens with illegal stay. The National Migration Strategy was approved by the Romanian Government through HG no.616/2004. It stipulates the general principles and guidelines in establishing the Romanian policies on admission, stay, and leaving the territory by aliens, labour force immigration, granting the international protection forms, preventing and combating the illegal immigration and stay. For its implementation an inter-institutional mechanism was set-up and approved through HG no.1708/2004 having the role of coordinating the activity of all institutions with competences in this field. This mechanism is formed by an Inter-ministerial Coordination Group and a Technical Secretariat. 137 The authors wish to express their gratitude to Mr. Dorin epu, Autoritatea pentru Strini, for his support in preparing the data related to the Authority of Aliens (Autoritatea pentru Strini), within the Ministry of Administration and Interior. 303 The Inter-ministerial Coordination Group is composed from decision-making representatives of the member institutions (Ministry of Administration and Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Labour, Social Solidarity and Family, Ministry of Education and Research, Ministry of Health, National Institute for Statistics, and Romanian Agency for Foreign Investments). The Group is chaired by the Head of Order and Public Security Department within Ministry of Administration and Interior, helped by 2 vice-presidents (the Heads of Autoritatea pentru Strini and Oficiul Naional pentru Refugiai). The main task of the Group is to monitor the implementation of the objectives of the Strategy through the action plans and the accomplishment of the obligations and commitments assumed by Romania in this field. The Group meets quarterly, or whenever necessary. On the agenda of the reunions of the Co-ordination Group are subjects of common interest for the member institutions in order to take the necessary decisions for a better management of migration, analysis of the implementation stage of the actions included in the Action Plan, identification of the problems encountered in accomplishing some activities, as well as discussing the proposals for solving them, drafting of future Action Plans. The Technical Secretariat is composed by the appointed staff from Autoritatea pentru Strini and Oficiul Naional pentru Refugiai and its main attributions are to maintain contacts with the member institutions of the Group and with other bodies in migration field, to draft the necessary documents for carrying out the Group activities, to organize of the meetings of the Group. Up to now, two yearly action plans were implemented in 2005 and 2006. The 2006 National Migration Strategy Action Plan had the following objectives: Developing the legislative framework in the migration and asylum field and it harmonisation with the European Acquis; Intensifying the activities for preventing and combating of illegal stay and illegal work; Increasing the level of coordination of the institutions with competences in the field of social integration of aliens; Developing the logistical and human resources capacity of the institutions with competences in managing the migration and asylum; Increasing the level of professional skills of the staff within the institutions with tasks in the field of migration and asylum. Taking into account the new status of Romania, as a Member State of the European Union, the inter-institutional Group drafted a new strategy, which aims at setting-up the guidelines for Romanian policies in the immigration field, according to the national interests and in correlation with the policies and programmatic documents adopted at the European Union level, as well as guarantying the migrants' rights. 304 This strategy on immigration envisages a four-years period (2007-2010) and represents the next step made by Romania in its efforts for modernising the process of managing immigration on national territory. It is desired to establish in a simple and direct manner the objectives to be taken into account at national level for a better approach of the phenomenon for the Romanian society. Along this period, Romanian authorities will establish and coordinate concrete measures and actions in the field of immigration, which should be framed by the guidelines established by the current Strategy. The first result of the institutional transformation and the implementation of the "new legislation": the rate of immigrants succeeding in crossing illegally the border decreased continuously (Simina 2002: 14). The most important result of all transformation within the Ministry of Administration and Interior, and the Ministry of Justice competences (and within the Romanian society as a whole, not only in the regard of migration, asylum, justice, and human rights): Romania will join the European Union by January 1st, 2007! Negotiation of Romania to join the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice Chapter 24 Justice and Home Affairs The negotiation process for Romania's accession to European Union represented a sustained and continuous effort made by the governmental institutions in order to reach a compatibility level with Member States in the legislative and institutional framework. In this context, the Romanian Government paid a great attention in tackling the immigration issues, as an important part of the justice and home affairs field, the more so as, from the accession date, our country becomes a Member State at the Eastern external borders of European Union. The legislative reform meant the adoption of a package of normative acts in order to ensure the line up to the communitarian legislation and to other international legal instruments, which the Romanian state is a part to. The enforcement of a modern legislative framework imposed the reform of the institutions with competences in this field, the necessary instruments for implementing an efficient management of immigration and asylum phenomena on the Romanian territory being achieved in this way. The European Union accession negotiations The Ministry of Administration and Interior was the key-institution for the negotiations on Chapter 24 Justice and Home Affairs (see Box no.1, below), a chapter which comprises a range of complex issues on border control, migration, visa policy, aliens' regime, asylum, police and customs cooperation, judicial cooperation on criminal and civil matters. 305 On 30 November 2001, the Romanian Government sent to the EU-Romanian Accession Conference the Position Paper on Chapter 24 Justice and Home Affairs, which had an annex on the Schengen Action Plan. The document was drafted by the negotiation delegation on Chapter 24 JHA, under the coordination of the Ministry of Administration and Interior and of the Ministry of European Integration, according to the procedure set out in the HG no.273/2001. Besides the Position Paper sent by Romania, the European Commission asked for several clarifications during a special meeting organized in Brussels on 8 February 2002. The answers to these questions were drafted in a new document, which was approved by the Romanian Government and sent to Brussels, during the Accession Conference on 22 February 2002. Box no.1 Chapter 24 - Justice and Home Affairs: Schengen Action Plan Reform of Justice Personal Data Protection Visa Policy External Borders Migration Asylum Police Cooperation and Fight against Organized Crime Fight against Fraud and Corruption Fight against Terrorism Fight against Drugs Customs Cooperation Judicial Cooperation in Civil and Criminal Matters Romania opened the negotiations on Chapter 24 JHA on 19 April 2002, making a rapid progress in several fields, which were extremely sensitive for some of the member states. Based on the experience of the other candidate countries, Chapter 24 JHA proved itself to be a tough one during the accession negotiations. This chapter was one of the most complex and sensitive files, and the negotiation process took sometimes six or more years of hard work to be closed. After opening of the negotiations, the Ministry of Administration and Interior started an intense monitoring process, together with the other institutions involved in the negotiation delegation, in order to fulfil all the engagements assumed by Romania to meet the accession criteria. The Complementary Position Paper on Chapter 24 Justice and Home Affairs, amended and completed in accordance with the Common Position of the Member States, was approved by the Government and sent to the EU Commission on 3 February 2003. In order to speed up the negotiation process and to make credible the information sent in the previous Position Papers, the Romanian authorities decided to present on 24 September 2003 a new 306 Additional Information Document. This document included progress registered by Romania both in Justice and in Home Affairs fields, since the last Complementary Position Paper. The European Commission sent Romania a Common Position of the Member States on 29 January 2004. This was the starting point for the Romanian authorities to draft the 2nd Complementary Position Paper as well as to revise the Schengen Action Plan. The purpose of drafting these documents was to reflect the latest progress achieved by Romania and to highlight the general conception and the action plans for implementing the European Union Acquis, as well as to prove the technical and administrative effectiveness of the Romanian authorities, together with the great will of the Romanian Government to fulfil all the engagements assumed during the negotiation process. The 2nd Complementary Position Paper and the revised Schengen Action Plan were drafted and sent to the Ministry of European Integration on 28 June 2004. Both documents were approved during the Government meeting on 8 July 2004. On 8 December 2004, the Council of the Permanent Representatives of the Member States agreed on the draft Common Position of the European Union on the status of negotiations on Chapter 24 JHA, as drafted by the European Commission, and concluded that, technically speaking, the negotiations on Chapter 24 JHA were closed. On 17 December 2004, the European Council agreed, in Brussels, upon the closure of Romania's accession negotiations to the EU and established the day of signing the Accession Treaty of Romania and Bulgaria in April 2005, after having obtained ascent of the European Parliament. On 13 April 2005, Romania received the ascent of the European Parliament and the Accession Treaty to the EU was signed on 25 April 2005. According to the calendar set for European Union accession, Romania will join the European Union on 01.01.2007. The status of an observatory country to the European Union Closing the negotiations meant the ending of a process and the beginning of another, a much more comprehensive and difficult one. This meant for Romania to speed up the rhythm of achieving all the assumed engagements during the accession period, to increase the quality of the European Union Acquis implementation process and to ensure a strict monitoring of all the activities. The most important phase of closing the negotiations for Romania was the mentioning of the two safeguard clauses, one of which was on Chapter 24 Justice and Home Affairs. This special safeguard clause could only be activated after the qualified majority vote of the Member States in the Council of European Union, if Romania would have not fulfilled any of 307 the following requirements. The activation of the safeguard clause means that Romania's European Union accession date may be postponed by one year. The seven requirements on Chapter 24 were the following: The implementation without further delay of the Schengen Action Plan. Obtaining a high level of control and surveillance at the future external borders of the EU. The development and the implementation of an updated and integrated Action Plan and Strategy for the reform of the judiciary. The considerable acceleration of the fight against corruption and specifically against the high-level corruption by ensuring the strict application of the anti-corruption legislation and of the effective independence of the National Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office. The conduct of an independent audit of the results and impact of the current National Anti-Corruption Strategy as well as the revision of the protracted criminal procedure by the end of 2005. The adoption by March 2005 of a clear legal framework for the respective tasks of, and cooperation between, the gendarmerie and police. The development and implementation of a coherent multi-annual strategy to fight organized crime. Both in the pre-accession period and after signing the Accession Treaty, several peer review missions took place in Romania for monitoring the progress in the field of Justice and Home Affairs. The European Union evaluating experts analysed the implementation of the EU Acquis, the capacity building and the training of the personnel in the law enforcement bodies. As mentioned in the reports drafted by these evaluators, Romania has a coherent Justice and Home Affairs system. The measures taken and the rhythm of their implementation are guarantees for Romania's progress in this field. On January 1st 2007, Romania will change its status one more time: from observatory country to the European Union will become Member State of the European Union, with full rights and full obligations. Conclusions During the 20th century, Europeans were no strangers to social, economic and political change, but their major challenges focused mainly on the intra-European construction of a stable, prosperous and capitalist democracy. Nowadays, one of the major challenges is the flows across borders. Immigration consistently occupies the headlines. Connected to the demographic change, economic growth and state reform, immigration is often presented by politicians as having mostly negative effects. It is usually connected to undeveloped or slowing economies, high unemployment, loss of nationals' jobs and anti-immigration sentiments, crime and terrorism.. Both academic researchers and European media are 308 wondering whether Europe will further concentrate its efforts on how to admit and integrate the new immigrants, especially the non-Europeans. "Due to restrictions on the free access to employment for nationals of the new Member States, the founding idea of the European Communities i.e. to unite people and not only economies seems to be only half-achieved." (ECAS 2005: 30) A "frontier-free" Europe cannot be attained by a mere `deregulation', but it should host a networking of other controls. Typically, of course, border controls are simply checking the movement of persons from one place to another, perhaps in the form of more regular and random internal checks of forms of identity, or requirements to register a domicile (Shaw 2000: 380). Fears and scepticism in the West and hopefulness and optimism in the East are some of the factors which have prompted research done on the potential outcomes of a liberalised migration. Two of the most relevant indicators for determining the quantity of migrants are the implementation of the Schengen Acquis and the economic support for a higher growth. The new EU legislation would inevitably cause conflicts with previous bilateral agreements between the accession and non-accession countries. Moreover, the differences between GDPs of old and of new EU Member States are a strong argument in favour of migration. Anyway, Europe should not become a continent of reinforced borders and police persecution of immigrants. "We have to be a Europe of integration. We must ask ourselves: does Europe have to be a fortress? Yes, it does. It has to be a fortress of values", argued Anna Diamantopoulou, former European Commissioner for Employment and Social Affairs138. The ability of the Union to succeed in substantially managing larger migratory inflows in the future will influence its overall capacity to master the economic transformation and social change. "All countries have the right to decide whether to admit voluntary migrants (as opposed to bona fide refugees, who have a right under international law). But Europeans would be unwise to close their doors. That would not only harm their long-term economic and social prospects. It would also drive more and more people to try and come in through the back door by asking for political asylum (thus overloading a system designed to protect refugees who have fled in fear persecution), or by seeking the help of smugglers, often risking death or injury in clandestine acts of desperation on boats, trucks, trains and planes. Illegal immigration is a real problem, and States need to cooperate in their efforts to stop it especially in cracking down on smugglers and traffickers whose organized crime networks exploit the vulnerability and subvert the rule of law. But combating illegal immigration should be part of a much broaden strategy. Countries should 138 As quoted by the un-official record of the "The Economic and Social Implications of Migration" panel discussion held at The European Policy Centre and the King Baudouin Foundation, Brussels, June 17, 2003. 309 provide real channels for legal immigration, and seek to harness its benefits, while safeguarding the basic human rights of migrants". (Annan, 2004) We do hope that our above mentioned arguments have successfully contributed to the scientific debates related the creation of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice within the European Union, and Romania could be seen as it is: a Partner, an important part of this Area, which fully deserves the rights obtained with hard efforts. Among them, the right to join the European family on January 1st, 2007. References Alexandru, Felicia (2006): Romania on the Way toward EU Membership, Central European University, Centre for EU Enlargement Studies, CEU/CENS 01/06, Budapest: Central European University; retrieved from Annan, Kofi A. (2004): Why Europe Needs an Immigration Strategy, published in newspapers throughout Europe, New York: United Nations; retrieved from: Apap, Joanna and Sergio Carrera (2003): Progress and Obstacles in the Area of Justice and Home affairs in an Enlarging Europe, in Romanian Journal of European Affairs, Vol.3. No.2, September, Bucharest: European Institute of Romania, pp. 65-85 Balzacq, Thierry, Didier Bigo, Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guild (2006): Security and the Two-Level Game: The Treaty of Prm, the EU and the Management of Threats, CEPS Working Document No.234, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, January 2006 Carrera, Sergio (2004): What Does Free Movement Mean in the Theory and Practice in an Enlarged EU?, Centre for European Policy Studies, CEPS Working Document No.208/October 2004 Constantin, Daniela-Luminia et al (2004): The Migration Phenomenon from the Perspective of Romania's Accession to the European Union, Pre-Accession impact Studies II, Study no.5, Bucharest: European Institute of Romania ECAS (2006a): Report on the Free Movement of Workers in EU-25: The Functional Arrangement Two Years after Enlargement, European Citizen Action Service, Brussels, July ECAS (2006b): Report on the Free Movement of Workers in EU-25: Who's Still Afraid of EU Enlargement, European Citizen Action Service, Brussels, October ECAS (2005): Report on the Free Movement of Workers in EU-25: Who's Afraid of EU Enlargement?, European Citizen Action Service, Brussels, September Government of Romania (2004): Government Decision no.616/21 April 2004 for approving the National Strategy on Migration, published in the Official Journal no.406/6 May 2004, Bucharest IGPF (2004): Press Dossier, General Inspectorate of Border Police (IGPF), October 14, Bucharest IOM (2004): Return Migration: Policies and Practices in Europe, International Organization for Migration, Geneva: IOM, January Lzroiu, Sebastian (2004): More `Out' than `In' at the Crossroads between Europe and the Balkans, in Migration Trends in Selected Applicant Countries, Volume IV Romania, Vienna: International Organization for Migration Lzroiu, Sebastian (2003): The Risks of Irregular Migration to the European Union. Perceptions and Trends, Bucharest: IOM Mission in Romania 310 MAI (2005): Evaluarea activitii Ministerului Administraiei i Internelor n anul 2004, Directorate for Information and Public Relations, Bucharest: MAI, January MAI (2004): Cartea Alb a Ministerului Administraiei i Internelor 2001-2004, Directorate for Information and Public Relations, Bucharest: MAI, November Mircea, Alexandru (2004): Contribuia Ministerului Administraiei i Internelor la ncheierea capitolelor de negociere n vederea aderrii la Uniunea European, in Grigore Silai (ed.): Europa ntre cei 15 i cei 25, Timioara: Editura Universitii de Vest Radeva, Mariyana (2004): East-West Migration in the Context of an Enlarging European Union: New Opportunities and New Challenges, in (Un)Freedom of Movement: Migration Issues in Europe. Part I., EU Monitoring and Advocacy Program (EUMAP), retrieved from RFE/RL (2003): Romania to sanction citizens expelled from EU countries, RFE/RL Newsline, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 26; retrieved from 260903.asp Rusu, Laureniu (2004): Migraia ilegal, segment important al crimei organizate transfrontaliere (Illegal Migration, Important Part of Trans-border Organised Crime), in Frontiera, No.10/2004, Bucharest: IGPF, pp. 22-24 Sniu, Marian Florian (2004): Accomplishing the Commitments towards the European Union Essential Premises for Romanian's Integration, in Revista Romn de Studii Internaionale, No.1/2004, Asociaia de Drept Internaional i Relaii Internaionale (ADIRI), Bucharest: ADIRI, pp. 114-127 Shaw, Jo (2000): Law of the European Union, third edition, New York: Palgrave Macmillan Simina, Ovidiu Laurian (2005a): Borders in the Contemporary Europe: the Geography of European Migration, in Lia Pop, Cristina Matiua (eds.): European Identity and Free Movement of Persons, pp.248-272, Oradea: Editura Universitii din Oradea Simina, Ovidiu Laurian (2005b): Next in Line Romanians at the Gates of the EU (Emigrants, Border Control, Legislation), in SISEC Discussion Papers, No.II/1, February, Timisoara: SISEC Simina, Ovidiu Laurian (2003a): Migration Fake or Threat? It Is Romania a Real Risk for the European Space After the Enlargement Process, as Source for European Migration?, n Lszl Lehoczy and Lszl Kalmr (ed.): 4th International Conference of PhD Students (2003), Vol. ,,Economics 2", Miskolc: Miskolci Egyetem, pp. 439-446 Simina, Ovidiu Laurian (2003b): Romania as Source for International Migration, in: Lazar Cistelecan (ed.): Economia i societatea romneasc la nceputurile mileniului trei (Romanian Economy and Society at the Beginning of the Third Millennium) (2002), Vol. I, Trgu Mure: Editura Universitii Petru Maior, pp. 444-457 Simina, Ovidiu Laurian (2002): Romania, Source Country and Transit Country for International Migration, in SISEC Discussion Papers, No.I/1 October, Timioara: SISEC UNHCR (2003): Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries, January to November 2003, Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) van Selm, Joanne and Tsolakis, Eleni (2004): The Enlargement of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Managing Migration in a European Union of 25 Members, Migration Policy Institute (MPI), Policy Brief May 2004, No.4., retrieved from Visco, Ignatio (2000): Immigration, Development and the Labour Market, presentation at the conference Migration: Scenarios for the 21st Century, Rome, 12-14 July 2000 311 Appendices Appendix no.1 European Union Acquis Implementation in Romania: Asylum and Migration ACQUIS IMPLEMENTATION IN ROMANIA Council Regulation is a binding EU legislation and it shall apply directly, upon accession Council Regulation is a binding EU legislation and it shall apply directly, upon accession Law no. 122/2006 on asylum in Romania Law no. 122/2006 on asylum in Romania ROMANIAN LEGISLATION Council Regulation is a binding EU legislation and it shall apply directly, upon accession Council Regulation is a binding EU legislation and it shall apply directly, upon accession Law no. 122/2006 on asylum in Romania Law no. 122/2006 on asylum in Romania Aligned Law no. 122/2006 on asylum in Romania Aligned Aligned Aligned Law no. 122/2006 on asylum in Romania Law no. 122/2006 on asylum in Romania Law no. 122/2006 on asylum in Romania EUROPEAN UNION ACQUIS Asylum Council Regulation (EC) No 2725/2000 of 11 December 2000 concerning the establishment of "Eurodac" for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention Council Regulation (EC) No 407/2002 of 28 February 2002 laying down certain rules to implement Regulation (EC) No 2725/2000 concerning the establishment of EURODAC for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national Commission Regulation (EC) No 1560/2003 of 2 September 2003 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national Council Directive 2001/55/CE of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between EU Member States in receiving such persons. Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country ACQUIS IMPLEMENTATION IN ROMANIA ROMANIAN LEGISLATION Aligned Aligned Law no. 306/2005 for the approval of GO no. 113/2005 on the amendment and completion of GEO no. 194/2002 on the regime of aliens in Romania Law no. 306/2005 for the approval of GO no. 113/2005 on the amendment and completion of GEO no. 194/2002 on the regime of aliens in Romania Law no. 306/2005 for the approval of GO no. 113/2005 on the amendment and completion of GEO no. 194/2002 on the regime of aliens in Romania Law no. 306/2005 for the approval of GO no. 113/2005 on the amendment and completion of GEO no. 194/2002 on the regime of aliens in Romania Aligned Aligned Aligned Aligned EUROPEAN UNION ACQUIS nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted Migration Council Regulation (EC) No 415/2003 of 27 February 2003 on the issue of visas at the border, including the issue of such visas to seamen in transit Council Directive 2004/81/EC of 29 April 2004 on the residence permit issued to third-country nationals who are victims of trafficking in human beings or who have been the subject of an action to facilitate illegal immigration, who cooperate with the competent authorities Council Decision 2004/573/EC of 29 April 2004 on the organisation of joint flights for removals from the territory of two or more Member States, of third-country nationals who are subjects of individual removal orders Decision of the Executive Committee (SCH/Com-ex (98)18 rev) of 23 June 1998 on measures to be taken in respect of countries posing problems with regard to the issue of documents required for expulsion from the Schengen territory Commission Decision of 8 June 1988 setting up a prior communication and consultation procedure on migration policies in relation to non-member countries Art. 22 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 on the gradual abolition of checks at the common borders, Schengen, 19 June 1990 Council Directive 2004/82/EC of 29 April 2004 on the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data Council Decision 2004/14/EC amending the third subparagraph (basic criteria for examining applications) of Part V of the Common Consular Instructions Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents Council Directive 2003/110/EC of 25 November 2003 on assistance in cases of transit for the purposes of removal by air Council Decision 2004/15/EC of 22 December 2003 amending point 1.2 of Part II of the Common Consular Instructions and Aligned Law no. 306/2005 for the approval of GO no. 113/2005 on the amendment and completion of GEO no. 194/2002 on the regime of aliens in Romania Law no. 306/2005 for the approval of GO no. 113/2005 on the amendment and completion of GEO no. 194/2002 on the regime of aliens in Romania Law no. 452/2006 for the approval of GO no.34/2006 on the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data Law no. 482/2004 on the amendment and completion of GEO no. 194/2002 on the regime of aliens in Romania Objectives: Representation procedures were set up Law no. 482/2004 on the amendment and completion of GEO no. 194/2002 on the regime of aliens in Romania Law no. 482/2004 on the amendment and completion of GEO no. 194/2002 on the regime of aliens in Romania Task: - To amend GEO 194/2002, by including special provisions 313 EUROPEAN UNION ACQUIS drawing up a new Annex thereto - ACQUIS IMPLEMENTATION IN ROMANIA Introduces a new annex to the ICC, including a table with the existing representation formulas. Council Decision 2004/17/EC amending point 1.4 of Part V and point 4.1.2 of Part I of the Common Consular Instructions (requires visa applicants to have travel insurance in most cases) Council Regulation 2004/377/EC of 19 February 2004 on the creation of an immigration liaison officers network Regulation (EC) No 491/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2004 establishing a programme for financial and technical assistance to third countries in the areas of migration and asylum (AENEAS) Objectives: Health/travel insurance is mandatory, when applying for a visa. Health/travel insurance should cover any repatriation costs because of medical reasons, emergency health assistance and/or emergency care in a hospital. This insurance should cover all Schengen countries. It provides the minimum costs covered by this insurance. - It provides the exemptions on this rule. Council Regulation is a binding EU legislation and it shall apply directly, upon accession Council Regulation is a binding EU legislation and it shall apply directly, upon accession ROMANIAN LEGISLATION of a visa to be issued for/by Romania by/for another Schengen country, as well as its application mechanisms upon our accession to the Schengen Area. Drafting Deadline: 2008 Task: - To amend GEO 194/2002 upon our accession to the Schengen Area. Drafting Deadline: 2008 The programme set up by this Regulation shall be in force during 1 January 2004 to 31 December 2008. Source: Selection of EU and Romanian pieces of legislation, as collected by Anca Pristavu (mid 2006). 314 Appendix no.2 An Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Chronological Development 2006 Treaty of Prm (2005) enters into force on September 23rd, as being ratified by Austria, Germany and Spain. The rest of signatory partners follow the procedures of ratification; Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, Finland, Sweden and Romania have formally notified their wish to join the treaty, while Czech Republic, Ireland, Poland and the UK have expressed qualified interest. During the Germany Presidency (2007), it will be submitted a proposal for a Council Decision that would integrate parts of Prm Treaty into the EU's Third Pillar. Labour market: European Commission revised the situation of transitional arrangements regarding labour mobility; on May 1st expired the first period (two year) of restrictions for labour mobility within the enlarged EU. Each Member State notified maintaining the restrictions or not. By 2009, none of the EU15 Member States should apply any limitations to their labour markets. In the second part of the year, even if some academic studies showed that the new members of he EU benefit to the UK economy and the threat of labour workers' invasion is not real, the UK and Ireland expressed fears against a possible large flow of labour migrants from Romania and Bulgaria, as following the accession of January 1st, 2007. Some states, even some of those who joined European Union in 2004, expressed intentions to limit the accession of Romanian and Bulgarian workers for a limited period of time. Schengen implementation in full by all 25 Members States was postponed until late 2008. Luxembourg Presidency, April 25: Romania and Bulgaria signed the Accession Treaty to the EU, accepting the full Schengen Acquis starting with the first day of their accession, as scheduled for January 1st, 2007. The French and Netherland referenda put the EU Enlargement and the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty in trouble, as the population chose "NO", by voting against the Constitution provisions and rejecting it. The debate on the form and the opportunity of such a Constitution is still fuelling the politic discourse and the public opinion along European Union. Treaty of Prm: on May 25th, seven EU Member States signed the Treaty of Prm (Austria, France, Germany, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and Spain) to promote cross-border cooperation, combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration. The Hague Multi-annual Programme. On 4-5 November, five years after Tampere, the European Council adopted a new programme known as "The Hague Programme", to strengthen the European Union (EU) as an area of freedom, security and justice over the next five years. This programme reflects the ambitions of the constitutional treaty. Constitutional Treaty. In October, the heads of state and government signed a treaty establishing a constitution for the EU in Rome. The Charter of Fundamental Rights is incorporated into the text of the treaty. The co-decision procedure between the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers for the adoption of European laws or framework laws becomes the rule (even if there are still several exceptions), including in the field of justice, freedom and security. This treaty must be ratified by the parliaments or the people of all the member states before it comes into effect. Switzerland joined Schengen Area, by signing the Schengen Convention on October 16 (ratified by referendum on June 5, 2005). The Schengen Convention and Dublin Convention provisions are to be implementation in full by 2008. Free movement of workers from A8 States (the 8 new EU Member States from Central and Eastern Europe) was restricted by the EU15 Member States (only United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden accepted workers without restrictions). The transitional arrangements included in the Accession Treaty (2003) of the new 10 Member States established the scheme of `2+3+2' to be use in order to progressively permit free labour mobility within EU25. The first period of two years expires on May 1st, 2006, when the EU15 Member States should communicate further measures to protect their national labour markets or to permit free access to all nationals of the EU25. Derogations only apply to the free movement of workers and not to the freedom of establishment or neither to carry out of selfemployed economic activities; nor it apply to students, pensioners, tourist and other persons. Enlargement. The accession of 10 new countries became effective on May 1st. These countries must apply the community legislation relating to justice and home affairs. Full implementation of Schengen acquis should end in October 2007. Eurodac. On 15 January, the European data base Eurodac became operational. It enables a member state to compare fingerprints of asylum seekers or foreign citizens who are legally on its territory, in order to verify whether they have submitted an asylum application in another member state. Eurojust. Eurojust was set up on 28 February, and its offices are in The Hague. Eurojust consists of high level judges and prosecutors from all member States. Its mission is, in liaison with Europol, to co-ordinate investigations and prosecutions in the field of cross border organised crime. Family reunification. On 23 September, the Council approved the first directive on legal immigration, aiming to facilitate family reunification for nationals of non member countries residing legally in the territory of one of the member states. 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1995 1994 1993 The UK introduces its `Vision Paper' for processing asylum claims in `transit' centres outside the EU, and returning asylum seekers to those centres or to reception centres in countries neighbouring their own in their regions of origin. The plan has been effectively dropped. Thessaloniki Conclusions (Greek Presidency) ask the European Commission to look at new ideas such as an EU-wide resettlement programme, and pilot programmes for building capacity to protect more refugees in a better way in their regions of origin. It also put the policy and political spotlight squarely on issues of immigrant integration. Seville Council (Spanish Presidency) makes a decision to try to speed up the implementation of the Tampere Programme. European arrest warrant. On 13 June, the Council adopted a framework decision for the implementation of the European arrest warrant. This system provides for faster and more efficient procedures. The European arrest warrant is now in effect in all member States, except Italy and the Czech Republic. The Danish Presidency draws up a "Road Map" of the work ahead on border control, immigration, asylum and cooperation with third countries, in an attempt to reinforce the need for decisions and action. Asylum. On 20 July, the Council adopted the first decision on a common asylum policy. It related to the granting of temporary protection in the event of massive influx of displaced persons. Terrorism. After the terrorist attacks in New York (11 September), on 20 September the Council approved a European action plan to fight terrorism, which would be revised after the Madrid terrorist attacks in 2004. In 2002, the Council approved a framework decision to combat terrorism, which gave a common definition of terrorist acts and set a minimum level for penal sanctions for this type of crime. Laeken Conclusions (Belgian Presidency) notes the slow progress of building a common European asylum system. In the light of 9-11, the focus in Laeken in December 2001 was inevitably on security issues. Some governments pointed to the Commission as the cause of the slow progress on the asylum agenda items, although proposals were on the table and discussions within the Council were under way. Fundamental Rights. The Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission, meeting in Nice (France) in December, proclaimed the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. Tampere. At the special summit at Tampere (Finland), EU leaders agreed to make the EU "a unique area of freedom, security and justice". In the wake of Tampere, the Council adopted an Action Plan (1999-2004), which included a strategic framework and a five year programme. The Amsterdam Treaty (1997) enters into force. A timetable is set out for moving to full community activity on asylum by 2004. An "Area of Freedom, Security and Justice" is to be created for EU Member States, with free movement for citizens and a common asylum system. Five directives (binding agreements) should be made on asylum. Several immigration policy decisions should also be made. A five-year deadline is set for the first set of agreements. Schengen is incorporated into the European Union's basic laws as part of the Amsterdam Treaty, with special provisions for Denmark, and an opt-out for the UK and Ireland. All other EU Member States have adopted Schengen, and Norway and Iceland also participate. Tampere Summit meeting sets out a clear agenda for developing the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. The elements on this agenda are a common asylum system, managed migration and partnership with countries in regions of origin. This agenda is set out as "Milestones for progress on the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice": promoting the project of developing an area of free movement, in which citizens would feel assured of an environment of security and justice. Austrian Presidency proposals question the continued relevance of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Vienna Council Conclusions set out a technical path for future European discussion of asylum issues contained in an action plan drafted by the Commission, and endorsed by the Council, which set out a path of priorities for pursuing the various aims of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Amsterdam: Adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam in October. This treaty "Communitised" part of the field of "justice and home affairs" (visas, asylum, immigration, movement of persons, etc.), moving asylum and immigration into `semi-community' activity, with unanimous voting required, and a shared right of initiative for the European Commission, while decisions are taken by the Council of Ministers (of Justice and Home Affairs) of the EU. Agreements would be binding, and should be the basis for a Common Policy. The UK and Ireland are allowed to `opt-in' on each agreement. Denmark has a full opt out. Amsterdam led to the establishment in 1999 of a Directorate-General for "Justice and Home Affairs" within the European Commission. The Dublin Convention (1990) enters into force. The Schengen Agreement (1985) and Schengen Convention (1990) come into effect, removing borders between the Schengen Members (the original five plus Spain and Portugal). Europol. An EU police co-ordination bureau was set up, charged with collecting and analysing information connected with ongoing investigations. The convention which formally established Europol was signed on 26 July 1995. After ratification it came into effect on 1 January 1999. Its headquarters are in The Hague. The Treaty on European Union (1992) enters into force. The Treaty attempted to convert the `common-market citizenship' into a broaden idea of `Union citizenship'. If free movement was firstly understood as an economic phenomenon (the individuals hold economic freedoms), the Treaty of European Union offers a political and social 316 1992 1990 1986 1985 view; the rights of exit, entry and residence was extended to all nationals of the Member States without any discrimination on ground of nationality. Maastricht Treaty on European Union signed. The new EU Treaty recognised the subject areas of "justice and home affairs" as coming under European responsibility. These subjects form a "third pillar" where the decisionmaking occurs through inter-governmental co-operation. Informal cooperation on asylum and migration issues was converted to formal cooperation among governments. They set out to discuss issues like the definition of a refugee, intending to make inter-governmental agreements, which would be non-binding. The treaty also recognises EU citizenship. Schengen Convention signed, preparing for implementation of the 1985 Agreement, and putting practical matters in place for uniform visas, for example. The Schengen Implementing Agreement introduced various measures meant to compensate the apparent security deficit resulting from the abolition of internal border control. One of these key security tools was the establishment of the Schengen Information System (SIS), developed later on to enable the authorities designated by each Member State to have access by automated search procedure to alert on persons and property for the purpose of border checks and other police and customs checks. Signing of the Inter-governmental Dublin Convention determining which Member State is responsible for assessing an asylum claim. The Single European Act: Provided for the creation of a single market which guarantees free movement of goods, capital, services and persons. Establishment of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Immigration and Asylum. This was the first, informal arena for discussion of immigration and asylum issues in the European Communities of 12 Member States. Schengen Agreement negotiated and signed. Frustrated by the absence of movement on bringing down internal frontiers for the movement of people, which was hampering intra-EC movement of goods, a sub-group of 5 European Community Member States (Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, France and Luxembourg) signed on June 14 an agreement for the free movement of persons within their territory through the gradual abolition of checks at their mutual frontiers. The Schengen agreement would subsequently be incorporated into the Amsterdam Treaty signed in 1997 and implemented in 1999. The provisions about free movement of persons have been applied by 13 of the EU-15 Member States. The United Kingdom and Ireland chose not to apply these arrangements, while the 10 new member States who joined in 2004 still have to put into place measures enabling them to join the Schengen area by October 2007. European Commission, "Information and Communication" Unit, Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and Security, Brussels, November 2004 See also Carrera (2004), van Selm and Tsolakis (2004), Simina (2005a): Appendix no.1, and Balzacq et al. (2006). Sources: __________ The authors acknowledge the support offered by Ovidiu Simina, who compiled data and information regarding the most important events regarding the creation of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. 317 LABOUR MARKET DISTORTIONS AS NEW CHALLENGES BEYOND THE EU ENLARGEMENT: THE ROMANIAN CASE Grigore Silai1) Ovidiu Laurian Simina2) The paper is a contribution at the scientific debate of migration and mobility issues in the context of an enlarged European Union (EU-27). We consider that Romania, a country with a labour market that faces distortions, will benefit from migration on short term, but will need to import labour force in order to maintain the development trend. Remittances, as result of Romanians emigration after 2002, helped the economic development of the country in the last years (remittances' inflow doubled the FDI). As a response to the media debate regarding Romania's emigration, we consider that the fear of mass migration from Romania following the year 2007 is not justified. While the European (and mostly British) media cries on the threat of Bulgarians and Romanians' emigration, as following to the 2007 accession, the scientific reports say that the A8 countries' migration benefits to economy of the EU15 countries. In the same time, the Romanian media and the Romanian entrepreneurs announce the `Chinese invasion' and the lack of labour in construction, industry and even agriculture. We see labour as goods: the economic theory say that goods are moving with the prices, the highest price attracts (more) goods. Romania is not only a gateway for the East-West international migration (like Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece for the South-North direction), but a labour market in need of workers. While a big part of the labour force is already migrated, mostly to the SE Europe (some 2.5m workers are cited to be abroad, with both legal and illegal/irregular status), the Romanian companies could not find local workers to use them in order to benefit from the money inflow targeting Romania in the light of its new membership to the European Union (foreign investments and European post accession funds). Instead of increasing the salaries, the local employers rather prefer to `import' workers from poorer countries (Moldavians, Chinese, Ukrainians, who still accept a lower wage as compared to the medium wage in Romania, but bigger enough as compared to those from their countries of origin). Keywords: labour migration, labour market distortions, South-Eastern Europe Syndrome, network effect, decision making, motivation, need for esteem JEL classification: F22, F24, J61, J70, O15, O52, R23 Jean Monnet Professor, Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence, West University of Timisoara, Romania PhD Student, Faculty of Economic Sciences, West University of Timisoara, Romania Correspondence author: OP1CP372, 010145 Bucharest 1, Romania; Mobile: +40-722-664.130; Fax: +40356-814.937; E-mail:, web: 2) 1) Introduction When the ten new EU Member States celebrated the accession with the sound of car horns, toasts and the symbolic removal of border barriers between "the East" and "the West" on May 1st 2004, it was a historical moment for the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). But the The authors thank the participants in the International Labour Migration Seminar Labour Migration - A Solution or an Obstacle for Development, organised by Centrul pentru Politici Publice (CENPO) on 10-12 November 2006 in Cluj-Napoca, especially to Prof. Oded Stark, Bonn University, for the valuable comments and useful advices they received on the draft presentation. The authors are grateful to the anonymous peer reviewer who commented an earlier version. 318 removal of barriers remained symbolic since then, because the old Member States [the socalled EU15/old or core Member States], have imposed restrictions (transition period) on the free movement of citizens from A8 states as according to the rule "2 + 3 + 2" (the term "A8" is used to describe the workers of the new Member States [EU10], with the exception of Cyprus and Malta). The free movement of labour allows a worker from one Member State to look for employment in another Member State on same basis as a national, without any restrictions or discrimination. These restrictions were put in place as some EU Member States feared a substantial influx of immigrants from the CEE countries, due to their economies' characteristics. On the other hand, huge celebrations are planned in Bucharest, marking a historic New Year for this country at the beginning of the year 2007, when it will be Romania's turn to celebrate the entry into the European Union [and to face labour movement restrictions for its citizens for at least 2 years]. While most EU nations have already placed restrictions on workers from both new member states, it is expected that free trade and movement will help Romania rise to higher levels of prosperity, as exemplified by the Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004. The year 2007 could be seen as a turning point both for the European Union and for Romania, one of the newest Member States which join the European family just before its 50th anniversary. With 27 members, the European Union faces with a new stage of development and needs new institutions and new rules. We believe that our paper bring an important contribution at the debates on European migration, having in mind the issues we propose. We chose Romania as case study because we consider it as the best example for proving that the history is cycling and we do not need to reinvent the wheel1: we could analyse the migration phenomena at a small scale and to extend the previsions to the European Union as a whole. Romania could be seen as an experimental country and a laboratory for analysing the policies and links between migration and development. Even if the population decreased year after year in the last decade2, Romania is a big country from the demographical point of view, the second large country in the Central and Eastern Europe after Poland. In this way is an important source for economical migration. Being a borderline country for European Union, is a transit space for migration flows too. From an important source for European migration in the last decade, Romania tends to become a target for labour migration from non-EU countries. Taking in account the fact that 1 To understand the reasons why it is no need to discover what was already happened, was said or even wrote in the field of migration, see van Krieken (2004). 2 According to the 2002 Population and Housing Census data, Romania had 21.6 million inhabitants, being the ninth among the European countries (21,680,974 inhabitants as of March 18, 2002, while the 1992 Census registered 22,810,035 inhabitants, a decrease of 1.1 million people during a period of ten years, an average decline of 0.5% per annum, due to the lower birth rate and negative balance of emigration). Source: Census of Population and Dwellings, March 18-27, 2002, Romanian National Institute of Statistics (INS); available at: 319 45% of the Romanian population [still] lives in rural areas3, where the rural workers could hardly find jobs nowadays (the males are agriculture workers, while the females are homekeepers), Romania acts as a major actor both on the seasonal agricultural market and on the illegal prostitution market within the European Union. People from rural areas or with an agricultural background have a higher propensity to migrate (they may accept easily the socalled `dirty' or `degrading' activities and hard jobs). Analyzing the dynamics and structural mutations in Romania for the period 1977-2002, at the level of the major groups of occupations, the officials of the Ministry of Labour, Social Solidarity and Family mention that, `in the context of the general decline in the employment population, there was a substantial decrease in the size of the groups; "skilled workers in agriculture, forestry and fishery" (of 1559.4 thousand persons) and "skilled workers" (a group which includes generically, according to the 2002 classification both "craftsmen and skilled workers in handicrafts, in setting and maintaining machines and equipment" and "machine and equipment operators and machine, equipments and other products fitters" which decreased by 1553.9 thousand persons). The size of the group of "unskilled workers" also decreased (by 403.1 thousand persons) and so did the group of `technicians and related workers' (by 106.7 thousand persons)' (MMSSF 2006). In the same time, Romania is changing the status of accession country which still implements the European acquis; nowadays Romania tries to build proper post-accession strategies in order to benefit from the experiences of the previous waves of enlargement, to apply the implemented pieces of legislation and to continue to reform the economy. After the 2007 accession, Romania will be a member state, and the present movement of workers from Romania to the other member states will become `mobility within the European Union', will be no more `European migration'. Our study focuses on the enlargement consequences beyond the celebration moment. Romania is not only a source of emigrants and a gateway for East-West international migration (in the same way likes Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece for the South-North direction), but a labour market in need of workers. Romania faces new challenges as soon as our country joins the European club. With a labour market already confronted with distortions, Romania is twice more tempting for migrant workers' flows. As result of Romanians emigration after 2002, remittances have sustained the economic development of the country in the last years (remittances' inflow have doubled the FDI last years; Almost half of the Romanian population lives in rural areas: 45.1% on July 2005 (according to the Statistical Yearbook 2006, Chapter 2. `Population', Graph. 2.G2), as compared to 47.3% in 2002 and 45.7% in 1992 (Census of Population and Dwellings 2002, Vol.5, Population, Households and Dwellings, Structure of population by areas, Graph. 3), Source: National Institute of Statistics 3 320 unfortunately, the remittances are mostly seen as compensatory measures for helping the family for bad economy or bad luck, not generally acting as source of capital for economic development). We consider that Romania benefits from migration on short term, but needs to `import' labour force in order to maintain the present development trend. We did comparative analysis and a wide, complex approach of the problem in discussion. We studied the experience of countries that accessed to the European Union in the previous waves of accession, to compare the evolution of migration phenomena from that period with the migration of the CEE countries within the last decade. Some studies carried out before the 2004 accession expressed the aware of the mass migration from the eight CEE countries (so-called A8 countries) to the EU15 Member States as following the date of May 1st, 2004. The situation is quite different that it was forecasted some years ago. With the exception of the case of Great Britain (one of the three states which allowed free movement of labours from the A8 states), the number of migrants is much less significant than has been portrayed in much of the media. The experience of previous enlargements of the European Union shows that initial scepticism and fear of being "flooded" by migrants from the new members, with resulting attempts to restrict migration, have been unfounded. At the present, after less than three years of membership with the EU, the figures shows that Poland was the major "threat" for the EU labour market and the welfare system at a whole, in the condition that UK was a country which directly attracted the Polish workers4. Due to the lack of data and of scientific research as regarding the effects (both financial and non financial) of migration and of remittances on the Romanian economy, the scientists and decision makers could hardly design economic policies to manage the migration issues: there are no migration trends available, as resulted from generally certified data5, nor predictions beyond the Romania's accession to the European Union6. According to our observations, we consider that Romanian labour market faces specifics phenomena, distortions, and some problems and difficulties occur as following the 2007 accession to the EU. In our research we use the theory of distortions of the labour market and the `new' For detailed comments or figures regarding the Polish migration to the UK and the myth of Polish Plumbers, see Reichlov (2004: Ch.7 and 8), CNTR (2006: Ch.6), Saleheen and Shadforth (2006: 378, Table A), Portes and French (2005), ippr (2006a and 2005), Gilpin et al (2006) and Salt (2006: 22-25). 5 Due to the fact the governmental institution do not use standard criteria when collecting data regarding the migration from/to Romania, the national statistics could hardly be recognised/certified by the researchers from abroad. 6 The migration studies are rather new on the Romanian `scientific market': mostly with sociological background, the Romanian authors would hardly join their efforts to promote the launching of a dedicated migration centre and/or to prepare a comprehensive scientific publication, covering all areas of research. The studies of the scientists from abroad uses the few data available at the local level, maybe revealed during international academic conferences or meetings, and those communicated to the international institution by governmental bodies. Romania seems to be the sole state within the EU25+2 without a speed institution to prepare/deliver speed scientific research/education/training/publications on mobility and migration. In the framework of the Jean Monnet European Centre or Excellence within the West University of Timisoara, the authors propose the including of the migration and mobility studies [legal, economical and sociological approach] into the academic curricula at the national level and the creating of a migration centre and a dedicated web-based e-library on Romanian migration []. 4 321 economy of migration. The migration decision is taken after the would-be migrant analyse for himself the costs and benefits of migration (regardless of its form, legal or illegal). We used microeconomic analysis on the basis of functions of utility (maximisation of utility of migration), costs (minimisation of costs incurred, from the point of economic and social costs, and maximisation of benefits; the cost of opportunity). For data processing, we used synthesis (international press survey and synthesis of the major theories regarding the international migration, benefits, remittances and development), classification, static and dynamic comparative analysis, induction and deduction. Romania, a country in need of workers? The bitter taste of "Strawberry Jam" Especially after the biggest wave of European Union enlargement, we noted that the economic literature, both at the global/European level and in Romania, widely targets the migration issue. The 2004 enlargement of the EU with 10 new Member States has opened up the societal and policy debate in many EU countries, debates being centred on whether or not borders should be opened to allow the free movement of workers, and also on the effects of this core freedom of the European Union. Migrants' quota, financial flows/remittances, development and fear of Eastern immigrants were preferred subjects for media. More and more events deal with migration and mobility matters. The European Commission celebrates the European Year of Workers' Mobility 2006, in order to raise the awareness on mobility consequences at European level, to promote the exchange of good practices, and to inform about the benefits and costs of both geographical mobility and job or labour market mobility, the realities of working in another country and the rights of the migrant workers. The current EU labour market policy agenda encourages more mobility of the European workforce, specifically across [internal] borders. The academic research debates the way the remittances [money resulted from migration] are used, in order to increase the economic development, both at local/national scale in the origin and destination countries, and at the European level. During the 20th century, Europeans were no strangers to social, economic, and political change, but their major challenges focused mainly on the intra-European construction of stable, prosperous and capitalist democracies. Nowadays, one of the major challenges is flows of people across borders. Immigration consistently occupies the headlines. Connected to demographic change, economic growth and welfare state reform, immigration usually connected to slowing economies, high unemployment, loss of nationals' jobs, antiimmigration sentiments, crime, and terrorism is often presented by politicians as having 322 mostly negative effects. Both academic researchers and the European media are wondering that Europe's future will largely turn on how to admit and integrate the new immigrants, especially the non-Europeans. Starting with the year 2005, and most pregnant after the first semester of the year 2006, when the European Commission requested the official positions from the Member States as regarding the free access to the labour market for the new members, the European media chose migration as a core issue for the public debate. Massive immigration has long troubled the Western Europeans who tend to blame the rise of crime and drugs in their cities on illegal immigrants accusations not entirely without justification, but at the same time accusations that have frequently been exaggerated. An especially frightening aspect is a surge in official and public associations of migrants and migration with criminality. These include frequent news reports that attribute both particular incidences and rising general crime rates to foreigners or immigrants, putting immigration control in the same category as crime, arms and drug control, and the generalized use of the terminology of illegal migrant or illegal alien. [...] It is now commonly said that xenophobia and racism against migrants are caused by immigration, or sometimes more specifically, by irregular "illegal" migration. By extension of demagogic logic, the victims are the cause, and by removing or stopping these causes, the problem can be resolved. Draconian measures, and violence against foreigners, can only be encouraged by the combination of language of illegality, the terminology of combating illegal migration as if it were an enemy in military confrontation and the banal association of irregular migration with crime, arms, drug trafficking and terrorism. (Taran and Geronimi 2003:10) The European Union single market implies the existence of the four freedoms, and in this way the freedom of movement of peoples [workers] is the core of the European Union project. `Wir riefen Arbeitskrfte und es kamen Menschen'7, said Swiss writer Max Frisch (1965): people in movement mean fundamental human rights to protect. `Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country', is wrote in the Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But no legal document offers the migrant the right to enter any country! One can see scary news into printed media all over the Europe (and especially in the UK). We noted that, suddenly, they `chose' Romanians [all Romanians were seen as wouldbe emigrants] as being the `public enemy' for the European Union welfare and its social protection system, as soon as Romania joins the European Union in 2007. The EU citizens were warned of a flood of benefit-hungry Romanian immigrants. Nobody knows how many Romanians are living in the Great Britain (we believe that the majority of British hardly know 7 We asked for manpower and we got human beings / We called for labour, and human beings came. 323 where Romania is on the map!), but we consider that most who want to work in the UK have already been there for years (mostly with illegal/irregular status)8. Of course, after accession, Romanians already on the British territory will prefer to stay there and maybe some relatives/friends will join them. As Reichlov (2004) reveals, `barriers to labour mobility may discourage workers already resident in the EU from their return to home country, because they would typically lose residence and employment rights in the destination state' (Reichlov 2004: 51). The Romanians will chose to move to places where they feel welcomed and where migration networks are already well established. Deliberate or not, application of restrictive policies corresponds to increasing vilification of migrants [foreigners] in press, political discourse or public sentiments (Taran and Geronimi 2003: 1). `Unfortunately, the debate is often hijacked by negative, populist slogans, which can inhibit the formulation of sound and balanced migration policies' (Ghosh 2005: 163). On the other had, `due to restrictions on the free access to employment for nationals of the new Member States, the founding idea of the European Communities i.e. to unite people and not only economies seems to be only halfachieved' (ECAS 2005: 30). A very interesting portrait of the British environment regarding the pressure created by the media as regarding the migration phenomena could be seen at Berkeley, Khan and Ambikaipaker (2006): the fifth chapter of their study analyses the frequency of immigration reportages, presenting excerpts from the headlines that contributed to the `moral panics in the media' between the late 1960s and the year 2004 (see Table 1). The general tone of the surveyed reportages were merely negative and `contributed to a receiving social context where constructive debate is difficult', while the positive stories are generally infrequent, and the reaction from the counterpart journals is often represented by attacks on the credibility of such positive approaches (Berkeley, Khan and Ambikaipaker 2006: 24-30). Table 1 UK press coverage comparison on immigration and asylum seekers (year 2004) News Immigration Asylum seekers Times 340 195 Telegraph 144 83 Independent 243 161 Guardian 226 173 Mail 234 117 No. of reportages Source: Berkeley, Khan and Ambikaipaker (2006: 24, Table 6) Immigration and asylum are key topic in the British media which maintain in the public perception the idea of a perpetual crisis about immigration, while opinion polls express the 8 Krieger (2005: 9) reports that 40 to 45% of newly registered migrants from the new Member States in the second half of 2004 lived already in the UK before the 1 May 2004. As Romanians do not have strong Diaspora in UK, is hardly to imagine that the figures will show bigger amount of immigrants soon after Romania's accession to the EU on 1 January 2007. 324 increasing concern on such subjects (immigration is seen up to 40 per cent most important issue facing Britain) and evidence that newspapers have a great impact on these sentiments (Berkeley, Khan and Ambikaipaker 2006: 33, Table 8). Within the last 30 years, the UK media coverage's attention was changed from "nonwhite" Commonwealth issues to the anxiety over asylum seekers and migration from the new Member States of the European Union and elsewhere (Table 2). If the subjects of immigration debates changed, the negative tone of the articles/discussion never changed, increasing panic about mass influxes of hungry workers, criminal behaviour, welfare state crisis and cultural differences (Berkeley, Khan and Ambikaipaker 2006: 25). Table 2 Historical perspective on moral panics in the media Moral panic Folk devils Mass influx Period 196872 `Bogus' dependants `Sham' marriages `Bogus' students TB carriers Kenyan Asians Ugandan Asians High birth rates of `coloured' immigrants 2004 `Bogus' asylum seekers Welfare `cheats' HIV carriers Cultural pathology and illiberal differences Welfare state crisis Desirable immigrants Eastern European Gypsies EU economic migrants and students Asylum seekers in `Middle England' Under-aged marriages Sikhs, Gang masters Chinese Muslims Polygamy Sikhs, Muslims Terrorism and flag burning Turbans Sikhs Sexual promiscuity Muslims Hijab Muslims Sexual promiscuity Africans West Indians Indolence Gypsies Housing, hospitals and legal Housing, hospitals and schools aid White Old Commonwealth with `kith White Zimbabweans with `kith and kin' rights and kin' rights Source: Berkeley, Khan and Ambikaipaker (2006: 29, Table 7) Anti-immigration sentiment has risen in Europe over the past few years, and many governments are under subsequent pressure to curb the growing problem. Aware of the general interest on anti-immigration headlines and stories, the political parties joined this media debate regarding immigration pressure, by proposing a sort of measures to increase their popularity among the sensitive British electors: immigration tribunal, immigration laws, detention camps, abolition of judicial review, annual quotas or even withdrawal from the 1951 convention on refugee and the European Convention on Human Rights (Berkeley, Khan and Ambikaipaker 2006: 25). Zaiceva (2006) mentions that the intensive political pressure, mostly created by the media, was the reason for imposing the transition periods for the free movement of labour like those requested by the UK in the framework of the new accession waves to the European Union: `Experiences with previous European integration suggests that migration flows do not increase after opening up the borders. [...] In spite of income differentials, however, the flows of immigrants from these new members were small' (Zaiceva 325 2006: 2-3). Strielkowski and O'Donoghue (2004) underline the fact that the EU accession doesn't mean uncontrolled immigration into the core EU Member States: The main factors leading to the international migration are economic, not the EU accession, or any other accession [...] the accession is in no way leading the increase/decease in the flow of labour there are other factors that explain this process (if occurs at all) and accession is not among them. The increase in labour migration which presupposed by the demographic and labour market factors will happen anyway, regardless to the accession process and tendencies. (Strielkowski and O'Donoghue 2004:12) On the other hand, what the European media missed in the public debate is the fact that, as starting with January 1st, 2007, the workers from Romania could not `migrate' anymore, but become `mobile'. International migrant is a person who temporarily lives in a country of which he/she is not national. As the term `migrant' refers to cases where the decision to migrate has been taken freely by the individual concerned (without the intervention of external compelling factors), migrants are differentiated from refugee and asylum seekers. According to the Convention on Migrants' Rights, the term `migrant worker' refers to a person who is to engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he/she is not a national. This definition therefore encompasses both documented and undocumented migrants9. Adding the European Union and the single labour market elements, we should understand the `migrant' from any of the Member States of EU25+2 as a `mobile worker' looking for better opportunities. In this way, the `illegal' issue shifts to `irregular' in the case the employment of a national of a new Member State faces restrictions within the period of transitional closing of the labour market (depending of the case). The external migration (across the external borders of the EU) is transformed in the Romania's case in an internal migration (Romania itself becomes an external border). As citizens of a Member State with full rights within the European Union, Romanians will be part of the common European labour market, and their movement for labour opportunities abroad will be considered as inter-European migration or rather EU mobility. `The political context in both sending and receiving countries is crucial to the existence of irregular migration. While political instability in sending countries can also be a prime driver of irregular migration, it is the policies of receiving countries that create irregularity. In short, a migrant only becomes `irregular' if they have been defined as such by immigration laws and regulations in receiving countries. Salt (2006: 32) reports that `the geographical distribution of flows has become more complex as irregular migrants and their facilitators develop new routes in response to governmental measures against them [...] Formerly the largest group were from Romania and former Yugoslavia, but numbers of these have fallen'. 9 326 Box no.1 Migration fuelled both the print and electronic media in the last years Press articles excerpts from the international media survey on migration Between January and September 2006, Italian border patrols have intercepted 16,000 illegal immigrants (Le Monde, December 19, 2006) Nearly 30,000 undocumented immigrants from Africa landed on Spain's Canary Islands during 2006, more than four times as many as during 2005 ( EU talks on immigration reform after nearly 30,000 undocumented immigrants from Africa have landed on Spain's Canary Islands this year, more than four times as many as during all of 2005 (The Raw Story). New immigration plans top agenda of EU ministers meeting European Union justice and interior ministers opened day-long talks in Brussels today [12.05.2006] which are expected to focus on new immigration plans and efforts to step up controls of the bloc's southern borders. Plans include the creation of European job placement agencies in African nations, where welleducated locals workers can apply to obtain temporary work in an EU country for a restricted period of time and would return home with newly-acquired skills. Against the popular belief, the majority of undocumented migrants to Italy do not arrive by sea but by land, overstaying their visas (Financial Times, Oct 2006) According to the FT, only 15% of the undocumented migrants arrive by sea. The agricultural sector provides numerous jobs for these migrants who unfortunately found themselves compelled to work in extremely poor working conditions. According to the National Institute for Statistics [from Spain], 1,010,404 foreigners live undocumented in Spain. The two main countries of origin are Romania and Bolivia (El Pais, August 2006) According to the Interior Ministry, there would be between 200 and 400.000 undocumented immigrants in France (Liberation, August 22, 2006) UK Immigration from Eastern European countries 40 times more than expected in 2006 In 2006, the UK has received 400,000 asylum and citizenship applications from citizens of Eastern European countries, while the government had predicted 13,000. (Daily Mail, UK May 24, 2006) In 2005, more than $230 billion was sent home by migrants worldwide Money sent home by migrants worldwide increased from $102 billion in 1995 to an estimated $232 billion in 2005. The share of global remittances going to developing countries has also increased from 57% in 1995 ($58 billion) to 72% in 2005 ($167 billion). (United Nations General Assembly, May 2006) In 2005, 34% of the world migrant population lived in Europe, 28% in Asia & 23% in Northern America (United Nations General Assembly, May 2006) In 2005, there were 190 million migrants in the world According to the UN, in 2005, 190.6 million people are considered to be migrants (154.8m in 1990). 115.6m of them settled in developed countries (82.4m in 1990) while 75.2m resettled in developing ones (72.5m in 1990) and 10.2m are now living in less-advanced regions (11m in 1990). (United Nations General Assembly, May 2006) 327 Therefore, there is an intimate relationship between immigration regulation and irregular migration (ippr 2006b: 8). Table 3 shows the differences between the terms used in relation with [let's say] non regular migration: illegal, irregular, undocumented and unauthorised migration. We noted that more and more press articles analyse the Romanian accession vs. the European Union and Romanian labour market: Romania seems to need workers and in the following period may even `import' foreign workforce. The Romanian media and the Romanian entrepreneurs announce the `Chinese invasion' and the lack of labour in construction and industry. Table 3 Terminology in migration debate: Irregular vs. Illegal Source: ippr (2006b: 6, Table 1 Terminology) We rather have problem with finding available workers on the Romanian labour market. While a big part of the labour force is already migrated, mostly to the SW Europe (more than 2.5 m workers are believed to be abroad, with both legal and irregular status), the Romanian companies could not find local workers to use them in order to benefit from the money inflow targeting Romania in the light of its new membership to the European Union (foreign investments and European post accession funds). 328 The idea of this research rose from an empirical survey of the [economic] media, looking for information related to migration subjects10. We considered the following supposition: a Romanian constructor has migrated to an EU Member State some time ago11. As we know, since the visa lifting dated back to 2002, Romanians travel freely within the European Union, for the purpose of tourism. Our constructor could emigrate as a tourist who forgot to come back after the passing of the 90 days of `tourism' period, or could be the beneficiary of a labour contract based on the intergovernmental agreement on workers' exchange [contingent workers]. As results of his hard work abroad, he/she earns money to send it home: most of the emigrants send money home, to support their families, wife and kids remained home. He would intend to invest his money too. In his opinion, building a house is a good investment, so he decides to build a house in his back home village. As the Romanian constructor [or farm-worker, house-keeper, or even student, researcher, engineer] is visiting Romania usually twice a year, generally for short vacations during Christmas and/or Eastern, he is not able to build this house by himself (even if building houses may be his job). The simplest option: hiring some neighbours/former colleagues/other worker from his village/region to build his new house, for the time he definitively return home. But usually the majority of the workers from the same villages migrate together, that means no workers were found [the migration throughout close relationship/networks supported the myth of the Romanian constructor, vs. the myth of Polish plumbers `flooding' the UK after 2004]. Our constructor with residence in an EU state must find a construction company to replace his or his former colleagues' work. But who could work for such a company, if the workers are already gone abroad, as supposed before? A solution for the construction company to solve the problem is to replace the missing labour force with immigrants (maybe from Moldova Republic, Ukraine or even the far eastern China). We carried out a survey of the (economic) media on migration, by collecting statements from certain on-line and printed media especially from Romania, UK, France, Spain and Belgium. The EU citizens seem to be scary of migration threat (or, at least, the media tries to influence us to believe this). In parallel, we noted that more and more news present new trends on the Romanian labour market: even is one of the major sources for the European labour migration, Romania seems to need workers and in the following period may `import' foreign workforce. Box no.1 and Box no.2 presents the most significant excerpts from the media coverage and articles' titles collected during our research. 11 We used this example having in mind that the European media have created the so-called myth of Romanian constructor, opposite to that of the Polish Plumber. The majority of empirical studies show that working in construction is the main employmen...