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Unformatted text preview: 4. In the extensive-form game described below (considering only pure strategies) locate (a) all the Nash equilibria and (b) all the subgame perfect equilibria. 2 A B U 0, 0 0, 1 D 1, 0 2, 2 L R 1 w 1 0.5 6 5. Consider the usual Battle of the Sexes , described below. 2 B ’ S ’ B 4, 2 0, 0 S 0, 0 2, 4 Suppose this game is going to be played slightly differently. First, player 1 is allowed to decide if this game will be played simultaneously (action S) or if player 2 will move first and then player 1 (action F). After 1 chooses between S and F, the game Battle is played accordingly. (a) Describe this full game by drawing a game tree. [Do not use any payoff matrix in the tree. That is, display the full tree.] (b) Suppose after player 1 chooses between S and F, player 2 is not told what player 1 has chosen. Describe the full game tree for this game. 2 1...
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- Spring '08
- Game Theory, 1 W, Kaushik Basu