Aff+Neg - Drones - FFPSV.docx - AFF \u2014 Drones Notes Notes The 1AC is like many cards in this file overhighlighted The Asia-Pacific advantage is pretty

Aff+Neg - Drones - FFPSV.docx - AFF u2014 Drones Notes...

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Unformatted text preview: AFF — Drones Notes Notes The 1AC is, like many cards in this file, overhighlighted. The Asia-Pacific advantage is pretty self-explanatory. The Drone Prolif advantage is constructed to straight turn fill-in. Questions? Email [email protected] Background Current drone exports are governed by the MTCR. Kreps ‘14 — Sarah Kreps; Professor of Government and Adjunct Professor of Law at Cornell University. In 2017-2018, she is an Adjunct Scholar at the Modern War Institute (West Point). She is also a Faculty Fellow in the Milstein Program in Technology and Humanity at the Cornell Tech Campus in New York City. (4-13, "The Foreign Policy Essay: Preventing the Proliferation of Armed Drones," Lawfare, , //GrRv) [The MTCR] classifies technology into two categories: Category I systems, which exceed a range of 300 kilometers and a payload of 500 kilograms, and Category II systems, which are below that threshold. The guidelines state that exports of Category I systems are “subject to an unconditional strong presumption of denial”—that is, there is an assumption that countries will not export systems in this category. Category II systems are ‘subject to licensing requirements.’ Formerly, armed drones had to be sold through FMS — Trump made changes earlier this year that allow DCS sales. He didn’t change the MTCR — just the way the US interprets the regime’s restrictions. Mehta, 19 — Aaron Mehta (4-19-2018; "Trump admin rolls out new rules for weapon, drone sales abroad;" Defense News; ; //GrRv) Drone changes But where the U.S. is seeing a steep rise in competition is in the unmanned vehicle sector, particularly from China, who has made inroads into the traditionally U.S. dominated Middle East with their cheaper UAVs. With today’s announcement, the U.S. has made two tweaks to how it handles drone exports. The first is opening up the opportunity for companies to sell systems via Direct Commercial Sales process, under which a company and another nation can directly negotiate, rather than requiring a more formal Foreign Military Sales process, where the U.S. government acts as a go-between. DCS sales are seen as faster than FMS sales. Secondly, the government is eliminating rules that marked unarmed systems with laser-designator technology as “strike enabling,” which put them in the same category as armed drones, and hence received higher scrutiny. Kaidanow said the goal was to make sure “U.S. industry faces fewer barriers and less confusion when they are attempting to compete against other countries and marketing and selling those similar systems to our partners. “ it falls short of what was expected and hoped for by major producers of military drones. It had been expected that the new policy would reinterpret the “strong presumption of denial” clause in the Missile Technology Control Regime, an international arms control agreement among 35 nations that governs the While those changes will be welcomed by the UAV industry, export of missiles and drones, a second source explained. The current clause makes it difficult to approve the sale of category-1 drones capable of carrying 500-kilogram payloads for more than 300 kilometers. The Obama administration had set a standard of how it interprets the MTCR language that some in industry have complained is too strict, and had expected to see changed with this policy a “presumption of approval” for a specific set of allies and partners in Europe, the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region. However, changes to the MTCR remain on the table for the long “We are looking to ensure that the MTCR keeps pace with the dynamic quality.” term , with Kaidanow saying: That led to deals with American allies. Spetalnick, 17 — Matt Spetalnick AND Mike Stone; Reuters reporters, citing internal reports from Trump’s administration. (10-11-2017; "Game of Drones: U.S. poised to boost unmanned aircraft exports;" Reuters; ; //GrRv) The push is not only part of Trump’s “Buy American” agenda to boost U.S. business abroad but also reflects a more export-friendly approach to weapons sales that the administration sees as a way to wield influence with foreign partners, the senior official said. Under a draft of the new rules, a classified list of countries numbering in double digits would be given more of a fast-track treatment for military drone purchases , a second senior official said. The favored group would include some of Washington’s closest NATO allies and partners in the "Five Eyes" intelligence alliance: Britain, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, according to the industry source. Rachel Stohl, director of the conventional defense program at the Stimson Center in Washington, said if U.S. drone export rules become too lenient, they could give more governments with poor human rights records the means to “target their own civilians.” More background Gettinger, 15 — Dan Gettinger; (3-6-2015; "What You Need to Know About Drone Exports;" Center for the Study of the Drone; ; //GrRv) Background The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) establishes the principles that govern the export of American arms, technical data for weapons, or defense-related services to foreign nations. It invests the President with the authority to oversee all exports and to ensure that those exports are consistent with American foreign policy objectives. The 1976 act authorizes the transfer of weapons to “friendly countries,” so long as those countries can meet certain standards. The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) set in place the export regulations for weapons to ensure that American companies are complying with the restrictions and requirements set forth in the AECA. Under the ITAR, any American citizen who wishes to sell weapons or defense services to a foreign buyer must obtain authorization from the Department of State. On January 15, 2014, the Obama administration released Presidential Policy Directive 27 (PPD-27), an update to the United States Conventional Arms Transfer Policy that is meant to ensure that American arms exports do not undermine U.S. policy. PPD-27 replaced a similar 1995 statement on weapons transfers and establishes a set of criteria that each transfer must meet. Read On: “United States Releases New Arms Transfer Policy” – Rachel Stohl // Stimson Center The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is a voluntary international partnership established in 1987 of 34 countries including the United States. The MTCR establishes that there will be a “presumption to deny” exports of missiles or unmanned aerial vehicles that have a range of at least 300 km and are capable of carrying a payload of at least 500 kg. The partnership isn’t necessarily an international ban on the export or use of these systems by foreign nations; the MTCR strives for a set of international guidelines regarding the export of missiles and drones. Read On: “MTCR Annex Handbook” The Department of State Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) is charged with reviewing the permanent sale or export of defense articles and services, including all the items listed on the U.S. Munitions List. The DDTC seeks to ensure that each export complies with existing American and international standards, and also meets U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives. The DDTC processes around 3,500 requests each month. 1AC 1AC — Plan Plan: The United States federal government should substantially reduce Direct Commercial Sales and Foreign Military Sales of armed unmanned aerial vehicles from the United States to nations involved in border and political disputes, civilian harm, human rights violations and nonadherence to enduser agreements. Plan: The United States federal government should substantially reduce Direct Commercial Sales and Foreign Military Sales of armed unmanned aerial vehicles from the United States. 1AC — Advantage — Asia-Pacific Advantage (One) is the Asia-Pacific: Trump is reigniting drone exports to the Asia-Pacific — spurs Chinese and North Korean arms races and culminates in crisis escalation. Romaniuk et al., 18 — Scott N. Romaniuk is a Ph.D. candidate in International Studies (University of Trento). His research focuses on asymmetric warfare, counterterrorism, international security, and the use of force. Tobias Burgers is a doctoral candidate at the Ott-Suhr-Institute (Free University of Berlin) where he researches the rise and use of cyber and robotic systems in security relations, and the future of military conflict. (1-20-2018; "The US Is Revising Its Drone Export Policy. What Does That Mean for East Asia?" The Diplomat; ; //GrRv) Increased drone sales and exports, however raises some concern. One such problem resides in the area of their application as instruments in anti-terror operations. Increasingly drones are becoming the go-to global policy tool against terrorists and insurgents; in some cases, their use against organized criminals has been considered. Drone strikes worldwide are on the rise and the list of nations conducting drone strikes against terrorists (or suspected terrorists) has expanded considerably since the early years of drone strikes. In the Asia-Pacific, the use of drones for extrajudicial killings has yet to become the norm, with only a few nations having conducted drone strikes inside their own borders. For reasons discussed in our prior article, this practice seems unlikely to take hold in the region. However, as Sarah Kreps and Micah Zenko outlined in a Foreign Affairs article in 2014, the proliferation of drones increases the risk of armed conflict and could fuel an arms race. With actors across the AsiaPacific increasing their defense budgets and with heightened tensions over territory and resources, the risk exists that other nations (i.e., North Korea and China) could seek to counter U.S. efforts in the drone export field. Given a handful of volatile situations in the Asia Pacific region, such a scenario seems not entirely unlikely. In our prior articles on this website, we outlined how unmanned systems could become the non-human equivalent of Russia’s “little green men.” Kreps and Zenko discussed the possibility of this in their article. To date, such a scenario involving the use of drones for political incursions has only occurred once: China flew an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) into Japanese airspace over the East China Sea. The scenario not been repeated since. If the United States were to re-ignite its drone export operations, notably to states willing to take risks in their respective conflicts, the possibility that Reapers and Predators would be used for offensive political purposes would likely increase, feeding into the an arms race. A scenario in which, for example, the Philippines employs U.S. (armed) UAVs to contest China’s air dominance over the South China Sea is not entirely unlikely. The drone market has proven to be a lucrative business and one that the United States has done well in. Having observed the earning potential in the realm of drone exports, China entered the market with a bang and quickly soared to an impressive position in drone manufacturing and sales. Seeing its regional and global market position challenged, the Chinese defense industry could opt to market its drones more aggressively and at even lower prices than they have been sold in the past. Such a counterreaction could fuel UAV export competition and subsequently serve as the ideal means for a regional unmanned arms race developing. UAV arms racing is the only scenario for regional escalation. Romaniuk et al., 18 — Scott N. Romaniuk is a Ph.D. candidate in International Studies (University of Trento). His research focuses on asymmetric warfare, counterterrorism, international security, and the use of force. Tobias Burgers is a doctoral candidate at the Ott-Suhr-Institute (Free University of Berlin) where he researches the rise and use of cyber and robotic systems in security relations, and the future of military conflict. (8-2-2016; "Unmanned Systems and Manned Conflict in East Asia;" The Diplomat; ; //GrRv) Both conflicts have seen a rapid rise in political and security tensions — foremost after the recent arbitral tribunal verdict and through the deployment of military, rather than non-military (fishermen) or para-military (coast these tensions are politically manageable, and will likely not escalate into full military conflict, at least for the time being. Despite recent military deployments and aggressive naval action, the focus among all actors, regional (Vietnam, China, Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, and Indonesia) and international (the United States and Australia, among others) is to maintain a (fragile) peace. guards) assets. Nevertheless The rise and increasing use of robotic technology could drastically alter that peace, giving rise to an escalation of tension and hostility in which sustained, albeit likely limited, conflict could become a possibility. This relates to two factors: first, the likelihood that so-called unmanned systems will be deployed in such conflict; second and subsequent, the still-obscure role of unmanned systems in these conflicts. The role and importance of unmanned systems will only further increase in the near future. Given the operational and economic advantages of unmanned systems, it is likely that their current and stilllimited deployment will increase quickly over the next few years, as they have unique capabilities and qualities that would make them ideal for use in both the SCS and ECS. They can remain at sea or in the air for extended periods, patrolling thousands of miles of land and sea — ideal for the extended geographical distances of the SCS and ECS. The development, procurement, and operational costs of unmanned systems are significantly less, making them available for regional actors with limited military budgets. From a quantitative perspective, we can expect that the use of unmanned systems in both conflicts will become more widespread. On a qualitative level, they have the endurance suited for large-scale and extended intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) roles. Indeed, medium and high altitude unmanned systems, such as the Global Hawk and China’s Xianglong Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) are able to conduct surveillance of thousands of square miles within a single day. They could provide states with better means and opportunities to enhance their ISR capabilities, thereby enabling better situational awareness by providing enhanced audio and visual ammunition in addition to evidence for media wars over both conflicts. These advantages, unique abilities, and relatively limited costs make it likely that we will see more unmanned systems on, below, and above the waters of both seas. Indeed, an analysis of regional unmanned system capabilities show that nearly all actors have, to different extents, such capabilities. China has over the course of the last decade developed a wide array of unmanned systems and has slowly become one of the world’s leaders in unmanned systems development. It is developing and producing sophisticated Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) such as the Dark Sword. In addition, it has already operationally deployed other UAVs such as the CH-4, an UAV that bears a stark resemblance to the MQ-9 Predator. It is also developing and is partly capable of deploying Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs). Japan possesses the U.S. developed Global Hawk, a long endurance, high altitude UAV, and a number of smaller UAVs. It too is aiming to develop UUVs for maritime security purposes. Vietnam recently revealed an advanced high-altitude long endurance unmanned system with a range of 2,500 miles that can remain in flight for up to 35 hours . Vietnam’s HS-6L is the product of nearly 10 years of development and will likely be used to maintain constant Orbiter 2 and Orbiter 3 drones from Israel have likewise also become part of Vietnam’s arsenal. surveillance on Chinese military deployment and activity in contested SCS waters. The Philippines has also turned to unmanned systems in the SCS rivalry. According to Defense World, the Philippine Defense Department’s Modernization Program includes several projects that will result in the supply of surveillance systems, including drones. Interest in acquiring American Predator drones is also largely evident. Taiwan, too, has developed a wide array of unmanned systems in recent years, among others the Chung Shyang II UAV and a newly developed MALE UAV, which resembles the U.S. MQ-9 Predator. The United States – the world’s leader in unmanned robotic development – has already deployed its unmanned systems (the Global Hawk) in East Asian airspace. Last April, U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, while aboard the aircraft carrier USS Stennis sailing in the South China Sea – an unmistakeable signal for China – stated that the United States had operational UUV capabilities and would deploy them as Washington saw fit. His visit signaled the determination of the United States to stand firmly alongside its ally, the Philippines, in the wake of a stout China posture in the area against its much smaller but equally-determined neighbors. The deployment of unmanned systems would, however, not need to directly lead to contested waters, airspace, and increasing tension. Thousands of vessels and planes fly and sail through both seas monthly, without leading to it is the possible purpose for which these systems could be used that could give rise to increasing tensions and possible violent conflict. Unmanned system are relatively easy to spot, making their military value, beyond ISR roles, relatively limited. However, this obvious visibility makes them ideally suited for political purposes: They are perfect tools for highly visible intrusions into opposing actors’ airspaces or sea zones. Such actions would fit within the strategy or tactics of the infamous salami slicing tactics, or as what James Holmes refers to as small stick diplomacy: Small, minor actions, which are not imminent (major) security threats, but which over time would contest actors’ control, dominance and sovereignty[.] violent military conflict. Rather, the absence of human operators creates advantages for the intruding actor. As no direct human interaction is possible – like The utility of unmanned systems, vis-à-vis manned systems, is that communication between pilots within visual range, or crew of naval vessels – the opposing forces are limited to only if an actor seeks to communicate, warn, and to deter the intruding systems, it would need to relay this effort by means of an extensive and time consuming process: It would need to go up and through various military and diplomatic channels, after which the entire communicational effort would need go back down to the operators of the intruding unmanned system. This is a lengthy, cumbersome process and one during which an unmanned system could remain in the contested air or sea space. If, however, an actor would decide to not pursue this lengthy process it can only decide to damage or destroy the intruding systems. This would be a significant escalation, as it would be the destruction of military material — a novelty in a region of increasing tension — and could be met with a strong political and possible military response. Within the framework of the public relations and media wars, it would make the two possibilities: communication or the use of violence. However, defender look like the aggressor. unmanned systems well when he described such operations: “In effect they dare you to escalate.” As such, the use of unmanned systems could favor those seeking the offensive, intrusive use of such systems for political purposes. Particularly actors with significant military powers and the upper hand could play this game of dare-to-escalate. They could engage in a James Holmes summarized the situation of what to do with intruding game of maritime bluff, where they seek to outmaneuver opposi...
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