Unformatted text preview: 1. Question 9, page 421 in the book parts a and b (DON”T DO part c) 2. Question 6, page 469 in the book Notice that MC 1 = MC 2 =60 Do first parts a) to d) and then continue with the following questions e) Suppose that MC 1 = 60 but MC 2 =30. Compute the new Cournot-Nash equilibrium. f) If MC 1 = 60, MC 2 =30 and the firms form a cartel, how much should they agree to sell in order to maximize price and at what price? Does any of the two firms have incentives to cheat on this agreement?...
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- Fall '07
- Economics, English-language films, Following, Teaching assistant, The Final, WISCONSIN Economics