Taiwan Negative - SDI 2019.docx - CASE CCP IL-1NC CCP response will be constrained Sputnik 19 citing Paul Huang who is an East Asian columnist for The

Taiwan Negative - SDI 2019.docx - CASE CCP IL-1NC CCP...

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Unformatted text preview: CASE *** CCP IL---1NC CCP response will be constrained Sputnik 19 ---- citing Paul Huang who is an East Asian columnist for The Epoch Times and master’s candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts University) along with Benjamin Cavender who is the Director of The China Market Research Group and MBA (Columbia University), “How Can Prospect of Taiwanese F-16 Procurement Affect US Trade Talks With China?” 3/26, Paul Huang, an East Asia military analyst, believes that China's verbal response to the sale of the improved F-16s will be strong, but noted that its practical steps will be milder and "far more constrained". Benjamin Cavender, principal of the Shanghai-based China Market Research Group, agreed with him, noting that Beijing has taken a firmer stance on Taiwan in recent years, trying to downplay all demonstrations of the island's "sovereignty". IL---Ext---No Retaliation Large scale Chinese retaliation is highly unlikely and small-scale backlash has no impact Sputnik 19 ---- citing Paul Huang who is an East Asian columnist for The Epoch Times and master’s candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts University) along with Benjamin Cavender who is the Director of The China Market Research Group and MBA (Columbia University), “How Can Prospect of Taiwanese F-16 Procurement Affect US Trade Talks With China?” 3/26, Huang listed a range of possible responses from China if Taiwan's procurement of F-16s is approved in the US. According to him, Beijing could cut ties between the two states' militaries, try to deprive Taiwan of its diplomatic allies, retaliate against companies involved in the production of F-16s, such as Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, or even intensify exports of sensitive military technologies to countries of concern to the US, such as Iran. The military analyst also drew up two extreme scenarios, although he marked them as "highly unlikely". One such scenario would have China cutting all diplomatic ties with the US, whereas in the other, Beijing would use the F-16 procurement as a pretext for launching military action against Taiwan. "It is extremely unlikely that the arms sales alone would be a factor in Beijing's strategic calculus in making such a decision, however", he said. The analyst noted, though, that most of these responses would either have only a mild effect or cause more trouble for Beijing than for Washington or Taiwan. He said that the Chinese Armed Forces are getting more out of their cooperation with their American colleagues than vice versa, and that military supplies to American rivals would only trigger counter-measures from the US against China. He also added that measures targeting US military contractors would have little effect , as their presence in China is minimal . It’s empirically denied from the threat of sanctions Tiezzi 15 — Shannon Tiezzi, Associate Editor for the Diplomat, Former Research Associate at the USChina Policy Foundation, M.A. in East Asian Regional Studies from Harvard University, B.A. in Chinese Language and Literature from the University of William and Mary, 2015. (“On Taiwan Arms Sales, China's Bark May Be Worse Than Its Bite”, The Diplomat, December 18th, 2015, Available Online at: 9-13-16) Interestingly, the promised sanctions against U.S. firms (which, as is the case today, were always a vague concept) never came . That may be in part because two of the firms involved in the 2010 sale – Boeing and General Electric – have major commercial interests in China. Actually following through on sanctioning these companies would have been a serious escalation in an already-tense relationship. In September 2011, the United States announced a $5.9 billion upgrade package for Taiwan’s F-16A/B fighter jets, to a fairly muted reaction from Beijing. Once again, a vice foreign minister (this time Zhang Zhijun) summoned the U.S. ambassador (then Gary Locke) to lodge a protest. Zhang warned the sale would “inevitably” take a toll on the overall relationship, especially military ties. Yet, even though one Chinese military officer urged China to “take revenge” in an article for the People’s Daily, Beijing didn’t take major steps to retaliate for the sale. A few U.S.-China military contacts were postponed, but nothing on the scale of 2010’s break. Part of that, however, may have been related to timing – Beijing was unwilling to create a huge issue in U.S.-China relations only a few months before a heavily anticipated tour of the United States by then president-in-waiting Xi Jinping. Xi’s February 2012 visit to the U.S. was seen as a display of his foreign policy prowess ahead of his actually assuming China’s top leadership roles; Beijing needed the visit to go off smoothly. Meanwhile, Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou, who had spearheaded a warming of cross- strait relations during his first term, faced reelection in January 2012. China’s leadership may have decided to cut Ma a break by not lashing out over the arms sale, in the hopes he would win reelection (and he did). So, with that background, what should we make of this week’s reaction from Beijing? First, it’s interesting that China summoned the U.S. charge d’affaires, rather than Ambassador Max Baucus himself, to lodge its protest – that suggests a more moderate response. Military relations will likely suffer in the short term, but given the intense work both sides have put into institutionalizing those ties since 2011, a serious break a la 2010 would be a huge blow, and likely farther than Beijing wants to go for the smallest Taiwan arms sale yet of the Obama administration. The proposed sanctions on U.S. companies are interesting, as it provides a new lever for Beijing to pull when responding to these arms sales. And despite what many observers dismiss as pro forma responses from China, it should be noted that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan remain the top issue of concern listed by Chinese military officials when discussing the relationship. But Beijing has made the sanctions threat before and not followed through – much as the Obama administration has yet to follow through on its threat to sanction Chinese companies profiting from cyber espionage. The threat alone remains a useful policy tool, and Beijing may again decide that warnings – rather than action – are enough. CCP---1NC No CCP lash-out or diversionary war Hewitt 15 [Duncan Hewitt is Shanghai correspondent for Newsweek/IBT Media. He was previously a BBC correspondent in Beijng and Shanghai, and also worked for the BBC World Service in London, focusing on East and Southeast Asia. He studied Chinese at Edinburgh University, and first lived in China in the late 1980s. His book ‘Getting Rich First – Life in a Changing China’ (Vintage UK, 2008) looks at the social changes unleashed by China’s economic reforms. ] Victor Shih, a specialist in China's political economy and international relations at the U niversity of C alifornia, San Diego, agrees that, in challenging times, “'Stability trumps all', as the Chinese saying goes -- I think this is more true today than ever before.” Some observers have argued that a weaker Chinese leader, faced with a slowing economy, might be more prone to provoking confrontation, raising the potential for clashes between China’s fast-modernizing military, and regional rivals with whom relations have been tense, including U.S. allies such as the Philippines, Taiwan or Japan. The latter has just angered Beijing by passing laws allowing its military to engage in overseas actions as well as simply self-defense, for the first time since World War II. However, Lam says that a more chastened Xi may need “a foreign policy success” with the U.S. more than before -making the chances of an accord on cybersecurity, foreign investment in China, or even some form of agreement over the future of the S outh C hina S ea, a little more likely on this trip. “Xi is still strong -- no other faction in China can threaten him at the moment,” Lam says, “but we have seen some dents in his armor, and not everyone is happy.” A serious military confrontation with the U.S. over the South China Sea is the last thing Xi needs at present, Lam adds. “A skirmish would cause panic in China," he says. "It would hit the economy, the stock market might collapse -- and they can’t afford that.” Over the past two years, Lam says, the world has seen a more assertive China flexing its muscles -- without planning to go too far in provoking others. CCP resilient – no alternative, reforms solve, public polls prove support, and empirical trends Heath 15 ---- Timothy, M.A. in Asian Studies (George Washington University), Senior International Defense Research Analyst at RAND, former Senior Analyst for the USPACOM China Strategic Focus Group, “No, China’s Not About to Collapse,” The Diplomat, 3/13, The CCP’s liabilities are well known . These include an antiquated political identity, cumbersome ideology, and widespread disenchantment with Marxism among the public (and among more than a few party members). CCP-led government has failed to provide adequate services, ensure rule of law, and has long tolerated corruption, malfeasance, and widening inequality. Many of these vulnerabilities have persisted for years, and some have worsened over time. The party’s advantages are less often discussed, but these bear reviewing if one is to evaluate the viability of CCP rule. One of the most overlooked, but important, assets is a lack of any credible alternative . The party’s repressive politics prevent the formation of potential candidates, so the alternative to CCP rule for now is anarchy. For a country still traumatized by its historic experience with national breakdown, this grants the party no small advantage. To truly imperil its authority, the CCP would need to behave in so damaging a manner as to make the certainty of political chaos and economic collapse preferable to the continuation of CCP rule. A party that attempted to return to extreme Mao-era policies such as the catastrophic Great Leap Forward could perhaps meet that threshold. But despite the numerous superficial comparisons in Western media, little about the current administration policy agenda resembles classic Maoism. The second major political advantage lies in improvements to the party’s effectiveness in recent years. In a major paradigm shift, the CCP redefined itself as a “governing party” whose primary responsibility rests in addressing the myriad economic, political, cultural, ecological, and social welfare demands of the people. It has carried out ideological and political reforms to improve its competence and effectiveness accordingly. The Xi administration has refined, but upheld, the focus on increasing the nation’s standard of living and realizing national “Chinese dream.” Although the party has rightly come in for criticism for moving slowly and inadequately on these issues, the policy agenda nevertheless appears to resonate with the majority of Chinese citizens. Independent polls consistently show that the party has in recent years enjoyed surprisingly strong public support. When weighing the party’s political liabilities against its assets, therefore, the evidence suggests that the CCP faces little danger of imminent collapse . Improvements to its cohesion, competence, and responsiveness, combined with a policy agenda that resonates with most Chinese and the lack of a compelling alternative outweigh the persistent political liabilities . The party’s overall political stability throughout the 2000s, despite massive political unrest generated by breakneck economic growth, underscores this point. revitalization, objectives embodied in the vision of the CCP---Ext---No War No lash-out Gilley 4 – Bruce Giley, former contributing editor at the Far Eastern Economic Review, M.A. Oxford, 2004, China’s Democratic Future, p. 114 the risks, even to a dying regime, may be too high . An unprovoked attack on Taiwan would almost certainly bring the U.S. and its allies to the island's rescue. Those forces would not stop at Taiwan but might march on Beijing and oust the CCP, or attempt to do so Yet through stiff sanctions, calling it a threat to regional and world peace. Such an attack might also face the opposition of the peoples of Fujian, who would be expected to provide logis¬tical support and possibly bear the worst burdens of war. They, like much of coastal China, look to Taiwan for investment and culture and have a close affinity with the island. As a result, there A failed war would prompt a Taiwan declaration of independence and a further backlash against the CCP at home, just as the May Fourth students of 1919 berated the Republican government for weakness in the face of foreign powers. Failed wars brought down authoritarian regimes in Greece and Portugal in 1974 and in Argentina in 1983. Even if CCP leaders wanted war, it is unlikely that the PLA would oblige. Top officers would see the disastrous implications of attacking Taiwan. Military caution would also guard against the even wilder scenario of the use of nuclear weapons against Japan or the U.S.47 At the height of the Tiananmen protests it appears there was consideration given to the use of nuclear weapons in case the battle to suppress the protestors drew in outside countries.48 But even then, the threats did not appear to gain even minimal support . In an atmosphere in which the military is thinking about its future , the resort to nuclear confrontation would not make sense . are doubts about whether such a plan could be put into action. Qualitative and quantitative studies disprove diversion – Falklands and invasion of Cyprus Fravel 10 ---- M. Taylor, Cecil and Ida Green Career Development Associate Professor of Political Science and member of the Security Studies Program (MIT), “The Limits of Diversion: Rethinking Internal and External Conflict,” Security Studies 19(2), 10/26, available via MIT Open Access The stakes in the validity of the diversionary hypothesis are deceptively high . As a domestic-level explanation of international conflict, it offers one of several important alternatives to rationalist explanations of war based on the state as a unitary actor.6 Strong empirical support for diversion would confirm another pathway to international conflict, complementing those based on rationalist approaches. By contrast, limited support for cast doubt on one class of second-image theories of international conflict. Despite two decades of renewed research, cumulative knowledge on diversion remains elusive . Quantitative studies contain mixed and often contradictory empirical results regarding the relationship between internal and external conflict. Some diversion would studies find a positive relationship between indicators of domestic dissatisfaction and threats or uses of force in analysis of U.S. behavior7 and in cross-national studies.8 By contrast, other research identifies a weak or nonexistent relationship between these same variables.9 Indeed, the gap between the intuition underlying diversion as a motive for conflict and existing quantitative research that Jack Levy noted in 1989 continues to characterize this research program today.10 Given the mixed empirical results in recent quantitative research, this article offers a different type of test of the diversionary hypothesis. In particular, I extend efforts to employ case study methods to test the hypothesis systematically and against alternative explanations in specific episodes of historical interest.11 Adopting a modified “most likely” approach to theory testing pioneered by Harry Eckstein, I examine two cases that should be easy for diversionary theory to explain: Argentina’s 1982 seizure of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands and Turkey’s 1974 invasion of Cyprus. In these episodes, high levels of domestic political unrest preceded the escalation of salient disputes that leaders could manipulate to rally public support or demonstrate their competence as statesmen. These cases should be homeruns for the diversionary hypothesis, but they are in fact quite difficult for it to explain . In these cases, the relationship between domestic political conflict and dispute escalation is weak at best , as the onset and magnitude of social unrest was only linked loosely with decisions to use force. Leaders’ statements and reasoning provide little evidence for diversion as a central motivation for escalation. Instead, a standard realist model of international politics and the dynamics of coercive diplomacy offer a more compelling explanation of Argentine and Turkish decision making.12 Leaders in these states chose force in response to external threats to national interests, not internal threats to their political survival. The psycho-social explanation for diversion is illogical – This evidence also proves your studies suck – rally too short/can backfire, selection effect dissuades, alternate measures for peace – tons of history goes neg Fravel 10 ---- M. Taylor, Cecil and Ida Green Career Development Associate Professor of Political Science and member of the Security Studies Program (MIT), “The Limits of Diversion: Rethinking Internal and External Conflict,” Security Studies 19(2), 10/26, available via MIT Open Access My findings have several implications for the literature on diversionary war theory. At the most general level of analysis, the lack of support for the diversion hypothesis in Argentina and Turkey complements those quantitative studies of diversion that do not identify a systematic and significant relationship between domestic politics and aggressive foreign policies, including the use of force.127 In addition, the modified most likely research design used in this article raises questions about those quantitative studies that do provide empirical support for diversion because it demonstrates that despite the presence of domestic unrest, the underlying causal mechanisms of diversion may not account for the decisions to use force. The lack of support for diversion raises a simple but important question: why is diversion less frequent than commonly believed, despite its plausible intuition? Although further research is required, several factors should be considered. First, the rally effect that leaders enjoy from an international crisis is generally brief in duration and unlikely to change permanently a public’s overall satisfaction with its leaders.128 George H. W. Bush, for example, lost his reelection bid after successful prosecution of the 1991 Gulf War. Winston Churchill fared no better after the Allied victory in World War II.129 Leaders have little reason to conclude that a short-term rally will address what are usually structural sources of domestic dissatisfaction. Second, a selection effect may prevent embattled leaders from choosing diversion. Diversionary action should produce the largest rally effect against the most powerful target because such action would reflect a leader’s skills through coercing a superior opponent. At the same time, leaders should often be deterred from challenging stronger targets, as the imbalance of military forces increases the risk of defeat and thus the probability of losing office at home. Although the odds of victory increase when targeting weaker states, success should have a much more muted effect on domestic support, if any, because victory would have been expected .130 Third, weak or embattled leaders can choose from a wide range of policy options to strengthen their standing at home. Although scholars such as Oakes and Gelpi have noted that embattled leaders can choose repression or economic development in addition to diversionary action, the range of options is even greater and carries less risk than the failure of diversion. Weak leaders can also seek to deepen cooperation with other states if they believe it will strengthen their position at home. Other studies, for example, have demonstrated that political ...
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