Egypt: Security and EconomyMark Cooper, ‘The transformation of Egypt’Cooper argues that regardless of doctrine and policy, leaders and the extent of foreign aid, theunderlying structural problemswere too great for gov to overcome. Major decisions on FP grew outof internal problems internal affairs of Egypt were as important in directing political events aswere international affairs. Post 1952 marked by two dramatic international events: the ME war of June 1967 and Sadat’s“mission of peace” to Jerusalem in Nov 1977. But internal factors are as important a cause of international manoeuvres. The crisis of the etatistregime in the mid-1960s was a critical factor in causing the 1967 war and a crisis of the semi-liberalregime in the mid-1970s was critical factor in causing the efforts to achieve peace in 1977. Byunderstanding the nature of both regimes, the dynamics of their crises and the links between them,we can understand the startling change that occurred in international events.Importance of domestic Egyptian factors in creating both internal and external crises. The politicaleco created the pressures which seem to have undermined its health.Transformation of the political economy had a tremendous impact.It was institutions that created the conditions for change. Institutions, weak as they were, sustainedthe regime through the defeat of June 1967 and the death of Nasser in sept 1970. Few regimessurvive a defeat of this magnitude and even fewer survive their leader’s death. Yet the regime inEgypt survive both. It transformed from within: liberalisation of the economy and the politysimultaneously.This book offers an interpretation that links the nature of the political and eco pressures placed onthe regime in the 1967-77 period to the nature and juxtaposition of the institutions through whichthose pressures played. Causes and consequences of the 1967 war: Nasser began to gamble in international affairs in orderto relieve the pressure that were building on his regime: it was an attempt to pull off a foreign policymove as a solution to domestic problems domestic crisis before the war. The problem was the political economy (breakdown of statecapitalism alliance) thus precarious negotiating position. After the war, defeat increased the pressure on the regime. Escalation of conflict with the elite, rise inanti-regime violence. This change from below forced the regime to restructure the political ecoLiberalisation as a result: eco would be liberalised, more private activity and depoliticization of thepublic sector to try to quiet the domestic scene by turning away from ‘dogmatic socialism’ but did notproduce any real eco improvement.Nasser’s legacy was a guarantee of instability: symbolic and emotional void. The regime survived butit did not thrive. Inability to make far-reaching changes and to accomplish a great deal. The search fordomestic solutions was halting and its tendency to turn to external manoeuvres to relieve thepressure was reinforced.