Taiwan Neg.docx - Neg \u2013 Taiwan General Taiwan Independence Turn 1NC Reducing arms sales causes Taiwan to declare independence \u2013 signal of

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Unformatted text preview: Neg – Taiwan General Taiwan Independence Turn 1NC Reducing arms sales causes Taiwan to declare independence – signal of abandonment Tucker and Glaser 2011 – Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Professor of History at Georgetown University and at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, she has been a fellow at the Institute for Advanced Study, the Rockefeller Foundation (Bellagio Study Center), the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the United States Institute of Peace, Harvard University, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences as well as a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow; Bonnie S. Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at CSIS, where she works on issues related to Asia-Pacific security with a focus on Chinese foreign and security policy. She is concomitantly a nonresident fellow with the Lowy Institute in Sydney, Australia, and a senior associate with the Pacific Forum (“Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?” The Washington Quarterly Vol. 34, Issue 4) bhb The Obama administration should stop equivocating and move forward with arms sales. There will never be a good time to sell weapons to Taiwan. Diplomacy with China as well as congressional routines and requirements invariably intervene—what former deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs Randall Schriver has called "the tyranny of the calendar." Upgrading existing aircraft would be welcome, but Taiwan's aging and shrinking air force also needs new planes. Were the United States to wait and the F-16 C/D production line to close, Taiwan would have no other source. Washington might well be faced with the complicated dilemma of whether to sell even more advanced F35s. Washington ought to reassert its longstanding position to Beijing that sales do not promote Taiwan's separation from the mainland but, in the current phase of cross-Strait relations, create an environment for improved China–Taiwan relations . Indeed, in the past two years, the United States has sold almost $13 billion in weapons to Taiwan, and cross-Strait relations are in the best shape in decades. In the absence of U.S. backing, Taipei would likely be too insecure and Taiwan's leaders too vulnerable politically to negotiate with China. Arms sales, therefore, facilitate cross-Strait compromise and should not be anathema to Beijing. The United States should also accelerate dialogue with Taipei to promote increased U.S.– Taiwan trade, reduce Taiwan's growing isolation from regional and global trading blocks, and prevent yet more dependence on China. Refusing to talk about a broad range of economic issues through the only available dispute settlement mechanism, the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), because of minor, if politically thorny, problems like U.S. beef exports to Taiwan is a mistake. And progress should be made on commonplace but important requests from Taipei to join the U.S. visa waiver program and conclude a bilateral extradition agreement. Washington cannot sustain the U.S.–Taiwan relationship unilaterally. Taipei has to assign priority to strengthening ties with Washington, even as it improves relations with Beijing. This will require tackling difficult domestic political obstacles in Taiwan and should be a bipartisan endeavor. It will be increasingly important to conduct relations in an environment of trust and candor. There are risks to a strategy which strengthens rather than abandons U.S. ties to Taiwan. If Washington continues to support Taiwan, it must simultaneously find ways to convince Beijing that the United States does not seek to prevent an accommodation between Taiwan and China. The United States does not secretly promote independence or block progress in cross-Strait relations. Rather, U.S. policy aims at sustaining peaceful conditions in which Taiwan and China can reach a long-term modus vivendi by themselves. Although the Six Assurances and the Taiwan Relations Act attempted to keep the focus of U.S.–Taiwan relations on the United States and Taiwan, China has always been a critical variable and its importance is growing. But those who worry that Taiwan policy will set back U.S.–China relations ought instead to persuade China that, in the absence of U.S. support, Taipei would likely lose confidence and put negotiations with the mainland on hold. An abandoned and isolated Taiwan might, in desperation, declare independence or even revive efforts to produce nuclear weapons, not pursue unification as Beijing assumes. So, in fact, U.S. support is not harmful, but helpful to China's interests. The course of cross-Strait relations does not lead inexorably in any one direction. Taiwan's options remain open. The United States wants Taiwan stable, peaceful, and democratic for the people of Taiwan, as a model to others in East Asia, and as assurance of U.S. credibility and dependability. The United States should not abandon its principled dedication to freedom of choice, but should strengthen it. Ext Taiwan starts a war post aff – they’d be scared Cole 11 J. Michael Cole, deputy news editor, Realism does not mean inhumanity Lastly, it is unlikely Taiwanese would go gently into the night and allow their hard-earned democracy and devoured by the wolves simply for the sake of regional stability, or because the US followed Glaser’s advice and “abandoned” them. They would resist, and from that resistance would come tremendous pressure on the US and its allies to act. In other words, besides highlighting his poor moral judgment, Glaser’s gamble freedoms to be could make armed conflict between the US and China more likely rather than less. DA – Deterrence – Chinese Invasion/Aggression 1NC – General/Short Chinese invasion of Taiwan is inevitable without deterrence secured by arms sales. Mazza 18 [Michael, visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where he analyzes US defense policy in the Asia-Pacific region, “The Coming Crisis in the Taiwan Strait,” accessible online at , published 06/28/18] // BBM “The people’s eyes are sharp. Whether this disputed issue can be resolved is an important indicator of how Taiwan people will view the future direction of relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.” So said Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council in a statement issued on January 31. The not-so-subtle warning to Beijing: Change course or say goodbye to your dream of Taiwan’s leaders believe the threat is acute. Less than a month after TAO announced the “31 measures,” the Tsai Administration unveiled its own “Four Directions and Eight Strategies.” The unification. This MAC statement was specifically in reference to China’s then-recent unilateral announcement of new commercial flight routes over the four directions are to “attract and retain talent in Taiwan by building a quality education and work environment, maintain Taiwan’s advantages in global supply chains, deepen capital markets and strengthen the cultural audiovisual industry.” Among other things, the eight strategies include “better financial and other support for academics and researchers, funding of innovators, helping businesses to reward talented employees, and improve [sic] the working conditions and pay for medical staff.” Even if the “31 measures” do not ultimately succeed in winning hearts and minds or attracting large numbers of Taiwan’s best and brightest to the mainland, Beijing will have succeeded in forcing Taipei to dedicate limited resources (for example, U.S. $3.4 billion for an innovation fund) to countering China’s effort. Explaining the Pressure Campaign What does Xi Jinping hope to achieve with his pressure campaign? Ideally, he would like to see Tsai Ingwen (not to mention the population at large) relent, accept the ’92 consensus, and embrace unification. Xi presumably knows, however, that storks do not play the piano. Even if Tsai was susceptible to such pressure, the trends on identity and views toward independence versus unification noted above have proven themselves largely unaffected by changes in cross-Strait Xi’s efforts to isolate Taiwan internationally and to gain global acceptance of China’s preferred “One China” are intended to reduce the potential for foreign interference in Beijing’s plans for the island. The fewer governments that maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan , the less foreign appreciation there is for Taiwan’s democracy, the less recognition of the objective reality of Taiwan’s independent statehood, and the more that others adopt the view that cross-Strait ties are an internal Chinese affair, the less foreigners will care about or aid the people of Taiwan in the face of Chinese assertiveness or aggression. Efforts to relations. narrative isolate Taiwan along with the mainland’s mounting military pressure on the island likewise are meant to convince Taiwan’s people that, ultimately, resistance is futile. Beijing’s message to Taipei has been clear: Whether from the sea or from the air, we can threaten you from all approaches. In the past, the Western Pacific had, in effect, provided strategic depth for Taiwan’s navy; in Chinese exercises around the island have the additional benefit of putting added strain on Taiwan’s aging, shrinking fighter inventory. While it wears down Taiwan’s military, China hopes to normalize the presence of its own forces on the waters and in the skies around Taiwan. Establishing such a new normal could make strategic and operational surprise easier for Beijing should it ever decide to use force. Finally, operating more frequently off Taiwan’s east coast, China seeks to end that advantage. Beijing hopes to turn Taiwan’s population against Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP. The latest example of efforts to do so came in the wake of China’s imposition of new flight routes over the Taiwan Strait. China Eastern Airlines and Xiamen Airlines scheduled and sold tickets for 176 round-trip flights between China and Taiwan that would use the new, disputed air routes. Taiwan refused approval for the flights given its ongoing objection to the new flight paths and, as a result, the two airlines canceled all 176 flights, affecting hundreds of Republic of China citizens living on the mainland who had planned trips home for the Lunar New Year. China, of course, blamed Taiwan for their inconvenience. The use of economic leverage noted above is likewise intended to turn voters against the DPP. The CCP surely hopes that Taiwan voters, considering narrowly defined self-interest, will return the KMT to power in 2020. The Coming Crisis A KMT government would likely accept the ’92 consensus as the basis upon which cross-Strait relations can proceed, but unification will remain out of reach. Beijing may recall the public blowback to Ma Ying-jeou’s 2011 campaign suggestion that talks on a peace treaty were within reach. A KMT government might be amenable to closer cross-Strait ties, but then again, given the events of Ma’s second term and the societal trends noted earlier, it might not be. As Ellen Bork has noted, even Ma, while running for Taipei Mayor in 1998, described himself in the Taiwanese language as a “new Taiwanese” rather than a mainlander. During his first presidential campaign, Ma ruled out unification during his tenure as President, promising not to undermine the country’s sovereignty, which, he said, There is little reason to believe those trends can be reversed or that Taiwan’s people will begin to consider unification more favorably despite the CCP’s continued repressive rule. Indeed , over time, it seems more likely that the KMT will move closer to the DPP on the issue of cross-Strait ties rather than the reverse. Put simply, un-coerced unification is not in the cards. As a result, barring a fundamental Chinese rethink on Taiwan—and there is no evidence to suggest one might be in the offing—Beijing is likely to rely ever more on coercive measures in its dealings with Taipei . In was for the citizens of the island to decide. In other words, the KMT is constrained by the changing popular views on identity and unification that are so troubling to Beijing. 2013, Xi Jinping told Taiwan’s delegate to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, former Vice President Vincent Siew Wan-chang, that unification should not be delayed: “The issue of the political divide that exists between the two sides must step by step reach a final resolution, and it cannot be passed on from generation to generation.” These comments were perhaps the first that Xi wants unification on his watch, or at least significant progress toward it. His one-on-one meeting with Ma Ying-jeou in 2015, his work report to Beijing is not eager to use force, but the temptation will only grow as Taiwan remains unbending in defense of its de facto independence and as China continues to carry out its pressure campaign without incurring substantive costs. Under such circumstances, accidents and miscalculations become more likely, with the potential for dangerous follow-on effects. Xi may not want to pass on the indicator the 19th Party Congress, and the pressure campaign all likewise suggest that Taiwan is a priority for Xi. question of unification to the next generation of Chinese leadership, but it is the freedom of future generations that Taiwan’s leaders believe they must defend now. If there is a middle ground Taiwan’s challenges are significant, but not insurmountable. Put simply, it must counter Chinese efforts to isolate it; counter Chinese psychological operations targeted at Taiwan’s population; and enhance its defensive capabilities and, thus, its ability to deter military actions. For Taiwan, these three lines of effort should be mutually reinforcing. Particularly in light of the Vatican’s seeming determination to here, it is exceedingly hard to discern. Taiwan’s Options establish diplomatic ties with Beijing, it is difficult to see how Taiwan could expand its stable of diplomatic allies, at least in the near term. Even so, diplomatic relations are not the be-all and end-all in determining, to use Taiwan’s preferred jargon, a nation’s “international space.” Nor is inclusion in international organizations, though certainly Taipei will not give up on participating in ICAO, the WHO, and others that matter to Taiwan’s interests. Taiwan is deeply enmeshed in the global economy as a major trading economy and an occupant of a key position in global supply chains, notably in the high-tech space. A further embrace of free market principles could make the island into a major site for global business. Were that to proceed, countries like Germany, France, and Canada might not maintain diplomatic ties with Taipei, but they would prioritize the island’s security and stability in the Strait if the likes of Siemens, BNP Paribas, and Manulife were deeply invested in Taiwan. It is for this reason, in part, that Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy, which seeks to develop economic and cultural ties to countries in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Australasia, is so important. It would lessen Taiwan’s economic reliance on the mainland, while enhancing its own value in the eyes of many countries where China exercises significant influence. Taiwan can also think creatively about engaging in international forums. Its hosting of the first-ever Ketagalan Forum in August 2017 and Yushan Forum in October 2017 is a step in this direction. As Taiwan’s answer to the Shangri-La Dialogue, the dual forums focused, respectively, on Asia-Pacific security issues and on connectivity with the countries included in the New Southbound Policy. Former Vice President Dick Cheney delivered an address at the former. Several former senior government officials from regional countries—including former Vice Presidents and Foreign Ministers—attended the Yushan Forum, along with prominent scholars. Tsai Ing-wen addressed both conferences and met with participants, which in the latter case included a current U.S. government official. The high-level participation is promising for future iterations of the forums and for Taiwan’s engagement with the broader region. Taipei could also consider how it can better use the international organizations in which it does have membership to expand its international space. For example, with U.S. support or perhaps with the United States in the lead, Taiwan might establish one or more issue-specific “caucuses” within the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation grouping to coordinate approaches at annual meetings. Doing so would Taiwan should also continue to deepen its unofficial relations wherever possible. The United States will remain Taiwan’s most important foreign partner, but countries like Japan, Australia, and India may be willing to expand their dealings with Taipei as Beijing increasingly infringes on their own interests. Quiet cooperation on issues such as cyber security, disaster relief, and democracy promotion is particularly promising. Expanding Taipei’s international space in these ways can reverse the island’s allow Taiwan to engage more deeply with a number of countries in a relatively non-provocative way. Broadly speaking, increasing isolation and counter the perception, which China seeks to promote among the island’s population, that Taiwan stands alone in the world. The Tsai government must also counter the Chinese narrative that problems in cross-Strait ties are due to her intransigence. On the one hand, this requires a relatively straightforward public relations effort. The challenge, however, is not simply one of effective government communications. Over the past decade, China’s influence on Taiwan’s media expanded in troubling ways, according to Chien-Jung Hsu, a researcher at Australia’s Monash University: First, the PRC uses economic affiliation as a means to coopt some Taiwanese media. It attempts to manage the ownership, editorial content, coverage, and criticism of China in various media by enabling pro-Beijing tycoons to acquire media on the island. . . . Second, as the political orientation of business leaders generally pivots on their businesses, the PRC puts pressure on those Taiwan media owners who have invested or intend to invest in China. Thus, those media outlets will tend to side with China or self-censor on any issue related to China. . . . Third, the Chinese authorities publish various types of advertorials disguised as news coverage in Taiwanese media. This placement tactic facilitates political influence by providing a source of advertising revenue, often thereby making Taiwan’s media into virtual propaganda agents of the Chinese authorities. . . . Above all, increasing and closer cross-Strait economic ties have put China in a dominant position with respect to some Taiwan media. These challenges are difficult to tackle without impinging on freedom of the press or free markets. One option would be for Taiwan’s government to establish an independent media watchdog commission, with half of the members coming from the DPP and half from the KMT. The commission would report on foreign business ties and overseas investments of media conglomerates and their owners, while also tracking and identifying advertorials (essentially, advertisements presented as news coverage). Taiwanese law already outlaws such advertorials; the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the People of the Mainland Area bans advertisements from China without prior approval. But enforcement is difficult. More effective enforcement and steeper fines may be necessary to curtail the practice. Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan should also consider imposing a reporting requirement on the Mainland Affairs Council. Each year, in classified and unclassified formats, the MAC should issue a report to reassure the population that Taiwan’s fate is not at the mercy of the C hinese Communist Party, Taipei must field a military capable of deterring aggression and of successfully defending the is...
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  • Fall '16
  • Jamie Lindfors
  • Republic of China, Political status of Taiwan

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