Proliferation Core - UTNIF - 2019.docx - Proliferation Core \u2013 UTNIF \u2013 2019 This file was created by Jash Shah Danish Khan Sebastian Garcia Milton

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Unformatted text preview: Proliferation Core – UTNIF – 2019 This file was created by Jash Shah, Danish Khan, Sebastian Garcia, Milton Rosenbaum, Terra Hernandez, Violet Freeney, Ashmit Bhatnagar, Nathan Rich, Samuel Hill, Munish Shah, Marshall Clifton, Theo Januski, Daisy Jagoditsh, Ruth Walters, James Hartline, Bindi Kaplan, Daniel Christ, and Annabelle Niblett, with support from Sohail Jouya, Khalid Sharif, and Mason Marriott-Voss. Generics Prolif Good Generic Nuclear Weapons Make the World Safer Waltz 2017 (Kenneth Waltz, prominent scholars of International Relations, “Is Nuclear Proliferation Good for the World?”, The Geoplotics, November 9, 2017, , MTC) There are two opposing theories regarding the question of proliferation and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. After the advent of the nuclear age, nuclear weapons have been a central topic for debate within academia, foreign-policy communities and think tanks. Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan, two prominent scholars of International Relations have proposed two different theories to address the problem. Kenneth Waltz was an advocate of nuclear proliferation. He was a strong supporter of ”rational deterrence theory”. He believed the world would be safer if more countries had nuclear weapons. According to Waltz, proliferation would bring more peace for the following reasons: Nuclear weapons make war less likely because nuclear weapons encourage both defense and deterrence. The possibility of total annihilation in a nuclear war makes states more careful and miscalculation more difficult. Nuclear weapons dissuade attack both on home territory and on vital strategic interests. Weak and small countries will not use nuclear weapons irresponsibly. There is a good chance that they will be defeated in a conventional war. Nukes are their last resort, so they will save their nukes for final battles. They will only use those nukes if survival is at stake, certainly not for reckless invasion. It is not possible to completely stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons because states will continuously attempt to improve their security environment. In a nuclear war both parties will be destroyed, so no one will be tempted to use nuclear weapons in a war. Nuclear weapons act as a deterrent force; meaning, if you have nuclear bombs other countries will be discouraged to initiate a war in the first place for the fear of nuclear annihilation. A state calculates the costs and benefits before going to war. If costs outweigh benefit then there will be no incentives to start a war. In a nuclear war, there are no benefits; it will only increase your costs, so nuclear weapons can prevent wars. The acquisition of nuclear weapons makes states ‘exceedingly cautious’ and they will not fight if they can’t win much and stand to lose everything. Prominent realist thinker John Mearsheimer supports Kenneth Waltz by stating that “nuclear weapons are a superb deterrent” (New York Times 1998). Weak Nations are easy to mess with, leads to laundry list of impacts Shellenburger 2018 (Michael Shellenberger, President of Environmental Progress, “Who Are We To Deny Weak Nations The Nuclear Weapons They Need For Self-Defense?” Forbes, Aug 6, 2018, , SH) In Quentin Tarantino’s film, “Inglorious Bustards,” a German SS officer arrives without warning at a French family’s modest dairy farm. The year is 1940, the first year of the Nazi occupation. The officer is accompanied by several heavily-armed men and is exceedingly polite. He asks the French farmer if he can come inside. The farmer, with his young daughters hovering nearby, allows him to enter. The officer tells the farmer he has been tasked with finding a Jewish family that has gone missing. The farmer says he heard they fled to Spain. At that moment, the camera slowly pans to below the wooden floorboards where we see the family trembling in quiet terror. Why was the Jewish family forced to hide under its neighbor’s floor? Because the French farmer (and the nation who his character symbolized) lacked deterrence. What is deterrence? The word comes from the Latin deterrere which means, literally, “to frighten away from.” To scare someone away, you need power. The Germans felt comfortable invading France because they knew the French lacked it. In July 1942, Nazi-collaborationist French police arrested 12,884 Jews, including 5,802 women and 4,501 children and held them captive in a sports stadium. A witness testified: All those wretched people lived five horrifying days in the enormous interior filled with deafening noise ... among the screams and cries of people who had gone mad, or the injured who tried to kill themselves." A few days later they were sent to Germany in cattle wagons and became some of the first to die in Auschwitz’s gas chambers. Of the 75,721 Jewish French citizens and refugees in total who were rounded up, fewer than 2,000 survived. In “Inglourious Basterds,” the scene ends, symbolically, with the French farmer forced to betray his Jewish neighbors. As the farmer weeps, the German soldiers spray machine-gun fire at the floorboards above where the Jewish family is hiding. They kill every member of the family except for the teenage daughter who flees the home that has become a charnel house. How does a weak nation-state like France level the playing field with a more powerful adversary like Germany? By obtaining a weapon capable of wiping out its major cities. Twice victimized and humiliated by its neighbor, France after World War II set off to build a nuclear bomb that, had it been available before 1940, would have deterred the German invasion. Can anyone blame France for getting the bomb? Of course not. After all, Germany’s war upon its neighbors resulted in the deaths of 50 million people. But that didn’t stop the U.S. government from trying to prevent France from building a nuclear weapon. Senior Kennedy administration officials in 1962 described France’s nuclear program as “foolish, or diabolical — or both.” How could the U.S. deny France the means with which to defend herself? By promising to protect France with its own nuclear weapons through what is called “extended deterrence.” French President Charles de Gaulle didn’t buy it. He felt that “the United States would not risk New York or Detroit to save Hamburg or Lyons,” noted the New York Times, “if faced with a choice between the destruction of Western Europe and a Soviet-American missile exchange.” A nuclear-armed France, U.S. officials warned, “could lead to a proliferation of nuclear powers,” reported Ronald Steel in Commentary, “that is, to demands by other allies, especially Germany, for nuclear status.” The identical argument was later made against China, India and Pakistan, and is now being made against allowing North Korea and Iran to possess nuclear weapons. Nukes create stability not only through deterrence but also the elimination of threats Bhaskar 2017 (Mark Bhaskar, columnist, "The Utility of Offensive Nuclear Weapons in the Modern Era", Georgetown Security Studies Review, 12-3-2017, , N.R) Discussing the potential, or even necessary, use of nuclear weapons by the United States in any reputable forum usually invites near-universal condemnation. Such a strong reaction proves that the “nuclear taboo,” best described in Nina Tannenwald’s 1999 essay, is alive and well. As per this taboo, using nuclear weapons is unethical, always disproportional, and political suicide for any leader.[i] However, recent surveys of the American public and assessments of the situations in North Korea and Iran indicate that this taboo is weaker than previously thought and that it restricts the ability of policymakers to defend the United States. In fact, the American people are more than willing to use nuclear weapons against an adversary as long as certain conditions are met. Those conditions originate in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and there are certain strategic parallels between the United States’ confrontation of the Empire of Japan in 1945 and the potential for conflict with North Korea or Iran in the present. Leaders, both elected and otherwise, tend to avoid discussions about using nuclear weapons due to the “widespread popular revulsion against nuclear weapons and widely held inhibitions on their use.”[ii] However, an August 2017 study by the MIT Press illustrates that US officials have little to fear in terms of domestic opinion. In the study, 59% of Americans said that, during a war with Iran, they would approve of a nuclear strike killing 2 million Iranians as long as the strike saved the lives of 20,000 US soldiers. Indeed, 63% of Americans would accept 100,000 Iranian casualties in a conventional airstrike with the same stipulation regarding US soldiers. Based on these results, the creators of the study concluded that, “the majority of Americans prioritize protecting US troops and achieving American war aims, even when doing so would result in the deliberate killing of millions of foreign noncombatants.”[iii] Another survey conducted in 2009 for the book Paying the Human Costs of War put forth a similar dilemma with North Korea. When asked how to rate the importance of limiting American military deaths versus limiting DPRK civilian deaths, 52% of respondents concluded that limiting American deaths was “much more” or “somewhat more important.”[iv] The article “Atomic Aversion” shifts the focus of nuclear weapons use to efficacy. In a scenario in which al-Qa’ida was building a nuclear bomb in Syria, 77.2% of those surveyed said they would support a presidential decision to use nuclear weapons against al-Qa’ida if nuclear weapons were deemed twice as effective as conventional weapons in carrying out a successful strike. The message from such studies is clear: US leaders have a popular mandate to use nuclear weapons, even against civilian targets, as long as American combatants are saved and US objectives are achieved.[v] With this mandate, it falls to policymakers to determine the standards for carrying out a nuclear attack. Here there is only a single precedent: the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. From these attacks, one can extract three conditions under which the US would use a nuclear bomb. The first is intractability of the opponent. Against Japan, the United States initially tried diplomatic incentives, and later economic coercion, to bring about an end to their imperial expansion—but to no avail. Despite a vicious fire-bombing campaign that killed between 240,000 and 300,000 Japanese people and severe military defeats in Burma, Manchuria, and various Pacific Islands, the Japanese government would not surrender. Kamikaze and banzai tactics, as well as the decision to draft elderly men and women into the military indicated that Japan was preparing for a last stand.[vi] From this information, one can conclude that the United States should only consider using nuclear weapons against an adversary who does not respond to diplomatic, economic, or military means of coercion. The second and third conditions are the high cost of a conventional campaign against an adversary and that adversary’s second-strike capabilities. The Allies estimated that the invasion of the Japanese home islands—Operation Downfall—would result in over 500,000 Allied casualties and require more than 1.3 million American personnel. The fighting itself, given Japan’s steadfast defenses of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, was expected to last until 1947. The estimated number of Japanese dead from the operation varies widely, yet nearly all place the total in the millions. [vii] By comparison, the atomic bombs inflicted over 200,000 casualties on Japan and killed twenty American, British, and Dutch prisoners of war.[viii] Just as important, unlike the future Soviet Union and Maoist China, Japan had no substantial defenses against the atomic bomb, nor could they respond with a nuclear attack of their own. From this information, one concludes that nuclear weapons should only be used in the event that a conventional campaign will incur too high a cost in blood and treasure, and if the enemy cannot retaliate in kind. North Korea and Iran are modern adversaries that fit these three conditions—intractability, prospect of a costly conventional campaign, and lack of nuclear retaliation capability—albeit to varying degrees. In the case of the DPRK, the United States has tried to end their nuclear program through diplomatic negotiations under three separate administrations[ix], as well as through what some consider “the toughest-ever” economic sanctions.[x] The result of such efforts is that North Korea has approximately 30 nuclear warheads[xi] and possesses an ICBM that can target the continental United States, which the DPRK tested as recently as November 28.[xii] A conventional attack, in either the form of an airstrike against suspected nuclear sites or a ground-based invasion, would be ineffective and horrific in terms of the human and economic costs. North Korea is a national fortress, with an army over one million strong, vast quantities of long-range artillery, and its own chemical weapons capabilities.[xiii] Under Kim Jung Un, the DPRK more than satisfies the first two conditions of intractability and a potential high-cost conventional campaign. On the third condition, while the United States and its allies possess the missile defense capabilities to defend against a limited North Korean ICBM attack, a more substantial launch could overwhelm defensive systems.[xiv] A decision to use nuclear weapons against the DPRK would have to hinge on effective missile defense. As for Iran, it fulfills two of the three strategic conditions: the prospect of a high-cost conventional war and the lack of second-strike capability. The presence of the third condition—intractability—is subject to debate. Iran has a powerful military—with 934,000 known personnel—and both the size and terrain of Iran heavily favor them in a defensive conflict.[xv] Iran also has a high nuclear threshold, meaning that it could develop nuclear weapons quickly if it wished;[xvi] although, as of this writing, it possesses no warheads and its missile defenses are geared towards countering cruise missiles and other ground-to-ground projectiles—not ICBMs.[xvii] Regarding Iran’s intractability, proponents of the JCPOA point to the agreement as evidence that Iran’s leadership, particularly under President Hassan Rouhani, is moderate and open to negotiation. However, the JCPOA could end prematurely for a number of reasons, such as actions by the Trump Administration or Rouhani’s potential overthrow by IRGC hardliners, despite the clear popular mandate conferred on him by the election in May.[xviii] Regardless of the JCPOA and Rouhani’s efforts at domestic reform, Iran has not changed its expansionist foreign policy—instead remaining engaged in destructive conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen and actively threatening US allies in the Middle East.[xix] The fact remains that Iran is actively sabotaging the United States and its interests in the region. The purpose of this article is not to advocate for a first-use nuclear weapons policy for the United States. However, nuclear weapons retain offensive utility within certain parameters. North Korea and Iran have developed into uncompromising adversaries against whom a conventional campaign would prove long and bloody. Unlike Russia and China, neither country yet possesses the ability to threaten the United States with a comparable nuclear stockpile or to deter the US with substantial missile defense systems. There are certainly risks to using nuclear weapons, and the international security environment after their use would fundamentally change—maybe unrecognizably so. But key conditions of nuclear weapon use in 1945 are present today, and to not consider the use of nuclear weapons in the North Korean and Iranian cases does a disservice to the American people. Nuclear deterance works – countries with nukes don’t go to war; mutually assured destruction. Shellenberger; 2018; (Michael Shellenberger, environmental writer, "Who Are We To Deny Weak Nations The Nuclear Weapons They Need For Self-Defense?,", Forbes, 8-6-2018, , djc) In Quentin Tarantino’s film, “Inglourious Basterds,” a German SS officer arrives without warning at a French family’s modest dairy farm. The year is 1940, the first year of the Nazi occupation. The officer is accompanied by several heavily-armed men and is exceedingly polite. He asks the French farmer if he can come inside. The farmer, with his young daughters hovering nearby, allows him to enter. The officer tells the farmer he has been tasked with finding a Jewish family that has gone missing. The farmer says he heard they fled to Spain. At that moment, the camera slowly pans to below the wooden floorboards where we see the family trembling in quiet terror. Why was the Jewish family forced to hide under its neighbor’s floor? Because the French farmer (and the nation who his character symbolized) lacked deterrence. What is deterrence? The word comes from the Latin deterrere which means, literally, “to frighten away from.” To scare someone away, you need power. The Germans felt comfortable invading France because they knew the French lacked it. In July 1942, Nazi-collaborationist French police arrested 12,884 Jews, including 5,802 women and 4,501 children and held them captive in a sports stadium. A witness testified: All those wretched people lived five horrifying days in the enormous interior filled with deafening noise ... among the screams and cries of people who had gone mad, or the injured who tried to kill themselves." A few days later they were sent to Germany in cattle wagons and became some of the first to die in Auschwitz’s gas chambers. Of the 75,721 Jewish French citizens and refugees in total who were rounded up, fewer than 2,000 survived. In “Inglourious Basterds,” the scene ends, symbolically, with the French farmer forced to betray his Jewish neighbors. As the farmer weeps, the German soldiers spray machine-gun fire at the floorboards above where the Jewish family is hiding. They kill every member of the family except for the teenage daughter who flees the home that has become a charnel house. Nuclear Bombs As Weapons of the Weak How does a weak nation-state like France level the playing field with a more powerful adversary like Germany? By obtaining a weapon capable of wiping out its major cities. Twice victimized and humiliated by its neighbor, France after World War II set off to build a nuclear bomb that, had it been available before 1940, would have deterred the German invasion. Can anyone blame France for getting the bomb? Of course not. After all, Germany’s war upon its neighbors resulted in the deaths of 50 million people. But that didn’t stop the U.S. government from trying to prevent France from building a nuclear weapon. Senior Kennedy administration officials in 1962 described France’s nuclear program as “foolish, or diabolical — or both.” How could the U.S. deny France the means with which to defend herself? By promising to protect France with its own nuclear weapons through what is called “extended deterrence.” French President Charles de Gaulle didn’t buy it. He felt that “the United States would not risk New York or Detroit to save Hamburg or Lyons,” noted the New York Times, “if faced with a choice between the destruction of Western Europe and a Soviet-American missile exchange.” A nuclear-armed France, U.S. officials warned, “could lead to a proliferation of nuclear powers,” reported Ronald Steel in Commentary, “that is, to demands by other allies, especially Germany, for nuclear status.” The identical argument was later made against China, India and Pakistan, and is now being made against allowing North Korea and Iran to possess nuclear weapons. The widespread assumption is that the more nations have nuclear weapons, the more dangerous the world will be. But...
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