Bennett - Legal Positivism and the Rule of Law - the Hartian Response to Fuller's Challenge.pdf - Legal Positivism and the Rule of Law the Hartian

Bennett - Legal Positivism and the Rule of Law - the Hartian Response to Fuller's Challenge.pdf

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Unformatted text preview: Legal Positivism and the Rule of Law: the Hartian Response to Fuller’s Challenge by Mark John Bennett A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Juridical Science Graduate Department of Law University of Toronto © Copyright by Mark John Bennett 2013 Legal Positivism and the Rule of Law: the Hartian Response to Fuller’s Challenge Doctor of Juridical Science Mark John Bennett Faculty of Law University of Toronto 2013 Abstract This study analyses the way that legal positivists from HLA Hart onwards have responded to Lon L Fuller’s challenge to positivism from the idea of the rule of law. The main thesis is that Hart and contemporary legal positivists working in the Hartian tradition have yet to adequately respond to Fuller’s Challenge. I argue that the reason for this is the approach they take to dealing with Fuller’s principles of the rule of law, which either (i) proceeds on the basis of the positivist perspective without engaging with Fuller’s wider anti-positivist arguments, or else (ii) accepts Fuller’s claim that the rule of law is part of our concept of law but does not acknowledge any effect of this on what determines legal validity (the content of legal norms). In both cases, I argue that tensions and problems result from a lack of engagement with Fuller’s anti-positivism. On the one hand, positivists have failed to show why their account of the nature of law better reflects our understanding of law than Fuller’s. On the other, the concessions that positivists have made to Fuller’s arguments are often detached from other elements in their theories, raising the question of whether the positivist response to Fuller is coherent. ii In addition, by closely analysing the major positivist accounts of the rule of law, this study challenges a number of orthodox interpretations that confuse our understanding of the positivist response to Fuller. I show that most positivists accept that there is something morally valuable about a legal system’s conformity to the principles of the rule of law, and that there is always some kind of at least minimal conformity to those principles in any legal system. By noticing what concessions positivists have made to Fuller’s understanding of the rule of law, I aim to both (i) shift the debate to the remaining disputes with the Hartian positivists, particularly on issues such as the ‘derivative approach’ and the ‘validity Social thesis’, and (ii) identify areas of fruitful engagement with Fuller, such as the question of judges’ moral obligations to law. iii Acknowledgements Thank you to: My supervisor David Dyzenhaus, who always demanded the best argument I could make. The members of my committee, Arthur Ripstein and Hamish Stewart, and to Simone Chambers who was previously on my committee. William Lucy, my external examiner, and Vincent Chiao, my internal examiner, for raising important further questions at the oral examination. Rayner Thwaites, for unwavering support and sage advice. Julia Hall, for solving many problems. The Connaught Fund at the University of Toronto, for financial assistance. Victoria University Faculty of Law, for travel assistance. Family, friends, and colleagues, in New Zealand and Canada, for many kinds of support and good cheer. Charley, for a new kind of joy amidst the toil. And most of all Sarah, who knows exactly what it took and what it means. iv Contents Abstract ................................................................................................................................................... ii Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................ iv Contents .................................................................................................................................................. v Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 1 Legal Positivism and the Rule of Law: the Hartian Response to Fuller’s Challenge ................................ 1 Chapter 1: The 1958 Hart–Fuller debate ................................................................................................ 8 1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 8 1.2 Hart’s Holmes lecture: the meaning of the separation of law and morals ................................. 9 1.2.1 Restating the positivist separation thesis ........................................................................... 9 1.2.2 The ‘utilitarian distinction’ ................................................................................................ 10 1.2.3 Legal positivism against natural law ................................................................................. 12 1.2.4 Positivism in practice: Nazi Germany and its aftermath ................................................... 18 1.3 Fuller’s response – the inner morality of law............................................................................ 21 1.3.1 Fidelity to law and the concept of law .............................................................................. 21 1.3.2 Fuller’s conceptual scheme ............................................................................................... 24 1.3.3 The morality of law itself ................................................................................................... 24 1.3.4 Fidelity to law and injustice............................................................................................... 26 1.3.5 Fidelity to law and the Nazi regime ................................................................................... 28 1.4 Does Hart offer an account of fidelity to law? .......................................................................... 33 1.4.1 1.5 Hart’s contradiction revisited............................................................................................ 37 Conclusion: an exchange yet to become a debate on the rule of law ...................................... 39 Chapter 2: Legality in The Concept of Law and The Morality of Law .................................................... 43 2.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 43 2.2 Hart’s The Concept of Law and Fuller’s Challenge .................................................................... 44 2.2.1 Hart on the concept of law................................................................................................ 45 2.2.2 Internal point of view as law’s moral foundation? ........................................................... 48 2.2.3 Classical natural law challenges to legal positivism .......................................................... 50 2.2.4 Modern natural law challenges......................................................................................... 51 v 2.2.5 Revisiting the Nazi example .............................................................................................. 53 2.2.6 Hart’s discussion of Fuller’s internal morality of law ........................................................ 56 2.3 Fuller’s rejoinder – the morality of law ..................................................................................... 58 2.3.1 Law as a moral ideal .......................................................................................................... 59 2.3.2 The principles of the rule of law........................................................................................ 63 2.3.3 The Principles Explained.................................................................................................... 65 2.3.4 The Internal Morality as Duty and as Aspiration............................................................... 71 2.4 The Moral Value of Formal Legality .......................................................................................... 73 2.4.1 An internal morality of law? .............................................................................................. 73 2.4.2 The moral value of the rule of law .................................................................................... 76 2.5 Fuller’s Critique of Hart and his reply to critics ......................................................................... 77 2.5.1 The critique of Hart ........................................................................................................... 77 2.5.2 The reply to critics ............................................................................................................. 80 2.5.3 Managerial order and legal order ..................................................................................... 82 2.6 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 86 Chapter 3: The Rule of Law in Hart’s Review and Later Writings ......................................................... 88 3.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 88 3.2 Hart on the moral value of the rule of law................................................................................ 88 3.3 Hart’s review of The Morality of Law ........................................................................................ 90 3.3.1 The Standard interpretation: efficacy, not morality ......................................................... 90 3.3.2 An Alternative interpretation ............................................................................................ 92 3.3.3 The moral value of legality? .............................................................................................. 94 3.3.4 Only instrumental? ............................................................................................................ 95 3.4 Hart’s other discussions of the morality of legality .................................................................. 98 3.4.1 The Concept of Law ........................................................................................................... 98 3.4.2 Hart’s encyclopaedia article ............................................................................................ 100 3.4.3 Legality in Punishment and Responsibility ...................................................................... 103 3.4.4 Conclusion on the rule of law’s moral value ................................................................... 106 3.4.5 Placing the Moral Value question and the Relationship question .................................. 107 3.5 The relationship between law and legality ............................................................................. 108 3.5.1 Hart’s general conceptual position ................................................................................. 109 3.5.2 Legality as a condition of law’s effectiveness ................................................................. 111 vi 3.5.3 The rule of law and the existence of norms .................................................................... 112 3.5.4 The rule of law and law’s being in force ......................................................................... 113 3.5.5 The rule of law and law’s function .................................................................................. 115 3.5.6 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 118 3.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 119 Chapter 4: Raz’s conception of the rule of law ................................................................................... 122 4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 122 4.2 Raz on the moral value of the rule of law ............................................................................... 124 4.2.1 The moral value of legality? ............................................................................................ 125 4.2.2 The instrumental argument ............................................................................................ 127 4.3 Raz on the relationship between law and the rule of law ...................................................... 130 4.3.1 Challenging Fuller’s concept of law ................................................................................. 130 4.3.2 Raz’s position on the law/rule of law relationship .......................................................... 131 4.3.3 Does this minimal conformity create minimal moral value? .......................................... 134 4.3.4 Does Raz successfully refute Fuller? ............................................................................... 137 4.4 Minimal conformity and the authority of law ......................................................................... 139 4.4.1 Raz’s concept of authority............................................................................................... 139 4.4.2 Doubts about Raz’s minimal conformity position? ......................................................... 144 4.4.3 Raz’s response? ............................................................................................................... 145 4.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 147 Chapter 5: Recent Legal Positivism on the Rule of Law’s Moral Value ............................................... 151 5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 151 5.2 Recent legal positivism on the rule of law’s moral value........................................................ 154 5.2.1 A typology of moral value ............................................................................................... 154 5.2.2 Marmor and Gardner’s acceptance of moral value ........................................................ 155 5.2.3 Waldron on the moral complexity of the rule of law...................................................... 159 5.3 Kramer’s resistance to the moral value thesis ........................................................................ 161 5.3.1 Kramer’s initial critique of Fuller’s moral value claims ................................................... 162 5.3.2 Prudential reasons for compliance ................................................................................. 165 5.4 A resolution? Identifying the moral and instrumental value of the rule of law ..................... 168 5.5 The moral complexity approach in the other recent positivists ............................................. 171 5.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 175 vii Chapter 6: Recent Legal Positivism on the Relationship Question ..................................................... 177 6.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 177 6.2 The Fullerian and anti-positivist view: law as legality ............................................................. 179 6.3 Waldron’s normative positivism ............................................................................................. 181 6.3.1 Law as a moral idea ......................................................................................................... 181 6.3.2 The concept and the rule of law ..................................................................................... 183 6.3.3 Threshold and aspiration ................................................................................................ 185 6.3.4 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 186 6.4 Derivative necessary conformity: Marmor and Kramer ......................................................... 187 6.4.1 The derivative approach.................................................................................................. 188 6.4.2 Marmor ........................................................................................................................... 191 6.4.3 Kramer ............................................................................................................................. 198 6.4.4 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 201 6.5 Gardner’s core and limit views of law and legality ................................................................. 202 6.5.1 Legal validity as independent from the rule of law......................................................... 202 6.5.2 The rule of law as a second sense of ‘legality’ ................................................................ 204 6.6 Mapping the positions on the Relationship question ............................................................. 208 6.6.1 Concerns about the Separation thesis? .......................................................................... 209 6.6.2 Agreement that LP rules out legal obligation to rule of law ........................................... 211 6.6.3 Normative Inertness ........................................................................................................ 213 6.6.4 The Motivation for and Coherence of Recent Positivism’s Responses ........................... 215 6.7 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 217 Chapter 7: Legal Positivism and the Rule of Law in Shapiro’s Legality ............................................... 220 7.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 220 7.2 Legality as planning ................................................................................................................. 221 7.3 Legality and the rule of law: Shapiro’s response to Fuller’s Challenge ................................... 225 7.3.1 The relationship question ............................................................................................... 225 7.3.2 The derivative approach.................................................................................................. 228 7.3.3 The Moral Value question: four kinds of benefits........................................................... 230 7.3.4 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 234 7.4 Legality and interpretive methodology ................................................................................... 236 7.4.1 The planning theory’s practical implications .................................................................. 236 viii 7.4.2 Shapiro’s response to inclusive legal positivism ............................................................. 237 7.4.3 Shapiro’s response to Dworkin’s theoretical disagreement argument .......................... 239 7.4.4 Shapiro’s own interpretive methodology ....................................................................... 241 7.4.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................
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