victowy bwiefs.pdf - Resolved The benefits of the United States federal government’s use of offensive cyber operations outweigh the harms

victowy bwiefs.pdf - Resolved The benefits of the United...

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Unformatted text preview: Resolved: The benefits of the United States federal government’s use of offensive cyber operations outweigh the harms. November/December 2019 PF Brief* *Published by Victory Briefs, PO Box 803338 #40503, Chicago, IL 60680-3338. Edited by Lawrence Zhou. Wri en by Pia Dovichi, Ryan Jiang, Kate Selig, Devon Weis. Evidence cut by Chris Conrad and Lawrence Zhou. For customer support, please email [email protected] com or call 330.333.2283. This product is licensed to [email protected] by Victory Briefs. Any distribution or modification of this file not explicitly allowed by the terms of purchase (including removing or obscuring this text or sending to anyone outside Tristan Roark's school) is a violation of copyright. Please report illicit distribution of this file to [email protected] Contents 1 Topic Analysis by Devon Weis 7 1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.2 The Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.3 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.3.1 What is a Cyber-a ack? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.3.2 Who Conducts Cyber-a acks? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1.3.3 Why Cyber-a acks? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1.3.4 What is an Offensive Cyber Operation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 1.3.5 Past Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Affirmative Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 1.4.1 Deterrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 1.4.2 Norm Se ing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 1.4.3 Solvency Route . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Negative Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 1.5.1 Intensifying the Cyber Arms Race . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 1.5.2 Spiraling Escalation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 1.4 1.5 1.6 2 Topic Analysis by Kate Selig 18 2.1 Topic Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.1.2 Wording . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.1.3 Cyber Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.1.4 Current Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Aff Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 2.2.1 Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 2.2.2 Preventing Escalation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Neg Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 2.3.1 24 2.2 2.3 Defensive Tradeoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 This product is licensed to [email protected] by Victory Briefs. Any distribution or modification of this file not explicitly allowed by the terms of purchase (including removing or obscuring this text or sending to anyone outside Tristan Roark's school) is a violation of copyright. Please report illicit distribution of this file to [email protected] Contents 2.3.2 3 Creating A Cyber Arms Race . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 2.4 Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 2.5 Concluding Thoughts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Topic Analysis by Ryan Jiang 29 3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 3.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.2.1 Resolutional Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.2.2 General Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.2.3 Relevant Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 3.3.1 War! What is it good for? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 3.3.2 Affirmative War Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 3.3.3 Negative War Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 3.3.4 Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 3.3 3.4 4 5 Topic Analysis by Pia Dovichi 44 4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 4.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 4.3 Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 4.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Pro Evidence 52 5.1 Deterrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 5.1.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 5.1.2 Psychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 5.1.3 Punishment Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 5.1.4 Defense Fails . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 No Escalation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 5.2.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 5.2.2 Non-State Hacking Worse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 5.2.3 Not Significant Enough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 5.3.1 Election Meddling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 5.3.2 Grids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 5.3.3 Democracy Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 5.2 5.3 3 This product is licensed to [email protected] by Victory Briefs. Any distribution or modification of this file not explicitly allowed by the terms of purchase (including removing or obscuring this text or sending to anyone outside Tristan Roark's school) is a violation of copyright. Please report illicit distribution of this file to [email protected] Contents 5.3.4 5.4 Infrastructure Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 5.4.1 China Cyber Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 5.4.2 Defense Fails . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 5.4.3 Military Tech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 5.4.4 Deterrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 5.4.5 IP Theft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 5.4.6 Prefer New Ev . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 5.4.7 AI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 5.4.8 Diplomacy Fails . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 5.4.9 Heg Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 5.4.10 China Bad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 5.5 6 Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 5.5.1 Capability High . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 5.5.2 Threat Growing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 5.5.3 Middle Ground Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 5.5.4 Deterrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 5.5.5 Empirically Successful . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 5.5.6 Recent A acks Successful . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 5.5.7 War Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 5.5.8 Economy Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160 5.5.9 Strait Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162 Con Evidence 6.1 6.2 165 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 6.1.1 OCOs High . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 6.1.2 Fails – Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 6.1.3 Fails – Empirics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170 6.1.4 Framing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174 6.1.5 Allied Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176 6.1.6 Civil Military Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 6.1.7 International Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182 Escalation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196 6.2.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196 6.2.2 Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198 6.2.3 Security Dilemmas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 4 This product is licensed to [email protected] by Victory Briefs. Any distribution or modification of this file not explicitly allowed by the terms of purchase (including removing or obscuring this text or sending to anyone outside Tristan Roark's school) is a violation of copyright. Please report illicit distribution of this file to [email protected] Contents 6.2.4 Miscalculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 6.2.5 Proportionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201 6.2.6 Proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203 6.2.7 Repurposing/Copycats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206 6.2.8 Controllability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210 6.2.9 High Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 6.2.10 Civilian Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213 6.2.11 Grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215 6.2.12 Nuclear Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 Offensive Deterrence Wrong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221 6.3.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221 6.3.2 Err Neg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228 6.3.3 RCT Wrong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229 6.3.4 A ribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230 6.3.5 Transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232 6.3.6 Proportionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234 6.3.7 AT Ba lefield Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235 Defensive Posture Good . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236 6.4.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236 6.4.2 Defense Low . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240 6.4.3 Active Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241 6.4.4 Hardening Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242 6.4.5 Intel Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244 Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245 6.5.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245 6.5.2 Escalation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246 6.5.3 Crackdowns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252 6.5.4 AT Signaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253 China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257 6.6.1 Security Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257 6.6.2 Copycats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261 6.6.3 Spillover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264 6.6.4 Defense Be er . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265 6.6.5 AT China Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267 6.6.6 AT IP Theft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269 5 This product is licensed to [email protected] by Victory Briefs. Any distribution or modification of this file not explicitly allowed by the terms of purchase (including removing or obscuring this text or sending to anyone outside Tristan Roark's school) is a violation of copyright. Please report illicit distribution of this file to [email protected] Contents 6.7 6.8 6.9 Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271 6.7.1 OCOs Fail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271 6.7.2 Retaliation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272 6.7.3 Militarization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274 6.7.4 Stuxnet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279 North Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284 6.8.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284 6.8.2 AT Nuclear Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285 Cyberterrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287 6.9.1 Deterrence Fails . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287 6.9.2 Low Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289 6.9.3 AT Cybercrime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294 6.9.4 AT al-Qaeda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295 6 This product is licensed to [email protected] by Victory Briefs. Any distribution or modification of this file not explicitly allowed by the terms of purchase (including removing or obscuring this text or sending to anyone outside Tristan Roark's school) is a violation of copyright. Please report illicit distribution of this file to [email protected] 1 Topic Analysis by Devon Weis Devon Weis is the Director of Public Forum at Victory Briefs. Devon graduated from New York University in the winter of 2017 as a Politics major with a double minor in Philosophy and History. At NYU he was a semifinalist of the Global Debate Competition, and served as the VP of the school’s American parliamentary debate team for two years. Devon has been involved with Public Forum Debate for about 9 years, competing at Suncoast High School in Florida, and coaching since then. In addition to working freelance with a number of teams around the country, Devon was the head Public Forum Debate Coach at Byram Hills High School for three years, coaching the school’s first ever TOC qualifiers. Most recently he coached the 2019 NSDA national champions. Throughout his career, teams he’s coached have made it to late outrounds at a variety of tournaments like CFL Nationals, TFA State, Princeton, Harvard, Penn, Lexington and the Sunvitational. 1.1 Introduction As the sun sets on the BRI, it’s finally time to step into yet another two-month topic, Nocember. November/December resolutions are generally pre y good given the wide array of tournaments to a end but be wary as current events are more liable to change during the course of a two-month topic. This topic will be featured at a bunch of high-quality tournaments, so it’s best you get acquainted with it as soon as possible. 1.2 The Resolution Without further ado, “Resolved: The benefits of the United States federal government’s use of offensive cyber operations outweigh the harms.” 7 This product is licensed to [email protected] by Victory Briefs. Any distribution or modification of this file not explicitly allowed by the terms of purchase (including removing or obscuring this text or sending to anyone outside Tristan Roark's school) is a violation of copyright. Please report illicit distribution of this file to [email protected] 1 Topic Analysis by Devon Weis Right off the bat this resolution looks pre y straightforward. The United States federal Government (USFG) engages in offensive cyber operations (OCOs), and you need to convince judges whether this is on net a good or bad thing. Two big picture considerations. First, this is a truth testing resolution rather than a policy style topic. This means the affirmative doesn’t “change” anything about the world; the aff and neg just disagree about whether or not the benefits of OCOs outweigh the harms. It’s descriptive, not prescriptive. Second, the resolution is in present tense. If an affirmative team stands up for constructive and reads 4 minutes of “OCOs have been good” in case, then I don’t think that’s sufficient to affirm. It’s not too difficult to make the argument that OCOs have been good, and, therefore, they will continue to be good; however, I think the neg can argue that while OCOs have had some success in the past, continuing them at this specific point in time is a bad idea for X, Y, Z reasons. At its core, I think this topic is fundamentally about whether or not US power projection is a good thing, and the se ing of the debate - cyberspace - is all that really sets it apart. With that being said, let’s talk about what’s happening now in the world of cyberoffense, and what exactly OCOs are. 1.3 Background Here’s the current lay of the land. 1.3.1 What is a Cyber-a ack? Put simply, cyber-a acks are a empts to infiltrate or dismantle tech infrastructure with the intent to steal data or damage the operation of the target. Thus, the two main forms of cyber-a acks are those targeted at companies, and those targeting US military or government agencies. For example, the US Air Force alone faces over 1 million cybera acks daily.¹ The article linked in this footnote gives a good summary of the different kinds of cyber-a acks and some prominent examples.² ¹h ps:// ²h ps:// ack-recent-examples-show-disturbingtrends.html 8 This product is licensed to [email protected] by Victory Briefs. Any distribution or modification of this file not explicitly allowed by the terms of purchase (including removing or obscuring this text or sending to anyone outside Tristan Roark's school) is a violation of copyright. Please report illicit distribution of this file to [email protected] 1 Topic Analysis by Devon Weis 1.3.2 Who Conducts Cyber-a acks? Most of the big players on the international arena are engaged in some form of cyber offense. US News writes that China and Russia are the two biggest sources of cybera acks, associated with 108 and 98 incidents respectively, between 2006 and 2018.³ It furthers that Iran, North Korea, India and the United States were also implicated in a number of these incidents, finding that Japan and Australia were the only two countries that weren’t the source of any cyber incidents in the time period. However, many of these states also deny taking any part in these operations, preferring to instead hide behind non-state hacking groups as a proxy. These proxies have been dubbed “cyber mercenaries” by Tim Maurer, and they are increasingly common in the digital realm, particularly in states like the US, China, Russia, Iran and Syria.⁴ The risk of states contracting hackers based in other countries to cover their tracks is not unrealistic, and further complicates the deterrence debate.⁵ 1.3.3 Why Cyber-a acks? Cyber-a acks are predominantly focused on accessing protect...
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