midtermtwo - EC 206 Microeconomics II Second Midterm Exam...

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EC 206 Microeconomics II: Second Midterm Exam April 9, 2007 (Professor Glenn C. Loury) Instructions. Please answser each of the three questions below. You do NOT need to use separate blue books for each question, but be sure to put your name and ID # on each blue book that you turn in. You do not need to show every details of a calculation as long as you get the right answer and your thought process is clear. If you cannot completely solve a problem, then show me what you know by solving the parts that youcan .Goodluck ! 1. {35 points} Three bidders participate in the auction sale of a single object which is worth v i to bidder i ,whe re v i is uniformly distributed on the unit interval. Each bidder knows his own valuation, but not that of the other two bidders. (a) Suppose the auctioneer solicits sealed bids and sells the object to the highest bidder at a price
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