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Unformatted text preview: • Is there redundancy? NASA’s culture led to acceptance of problems • Decided design could tolerate damage • Added incrementally to amount and seriousness of damage • Anomalies seen as normal • Ignored events that suggested possibility of catastrophic failure NASA’s organizational failures contributed to accidents • Budgetary constraints • Culture of risk • Weak safety system What can we learn about ethics in large organizations? Ethical people can normalize risk Communication is difficult in large, complex organizations But individuals are still responsible Need for real leadership and vision at NASA...
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This note was uploaded on 07/12/2009 for the course ENGR 101 taught by Professor Swinontek during the Summer '08 term at UCSB.
- Summer '08