EN BANC [G.R. No. 101344. October 1, 1992.] ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST, as Trustee of the Government of the ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST, as Trustee of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Republic of the Philippines, petitioner , vs. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JOB C. MADAYAG Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, C. MADAYAG Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br. 145, and JOHANNESBURG PACKAGING CORP Br. 145, and JOHANNESBURG PACKAGING CORP, respondents . Jose C. Sison, Fiorello E. Azura and Virgilio M. Alameda for petitioner. De Jesus & Associates for respondents. SYLLABUS 1. REMEDIAL LAW; ISSUANCE OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; NOTICE TO DEFENDANT NECESSARY; RESTRAINING ORDER; BASIC PURPOSE AND EFFECTIVITY PERIOD. — The law authorizing the issuance of a restraining order is Sec. 5, Rule 85, of the Rules of Court, as amended by B.P. 224 on 16 April 1982, which states — "SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice, issuance of restraining order . — No preliminary injunction shall be granted without notice to the defendant. If it shall appear from the facts shown by affidavits or by the verified complaint that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the judge to whom the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue a restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty days from date of its issuance. Within the said twenty-day period, the judge must cause an order to be served on the defendant, requiring him to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted, and determine within the same period whether or not preliminary injunction should be granted, and shall accordingly issue the corresponding order. In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is denied, the restraining order is deemed automatically vacated." Apparently, the basic purpose of a restraining order is to preserve the status quo until the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction, and that insofar as lower courts are concerned, its 20-day effectivity period is non-extendible. It automatically terminates at the end of such period without the need of any judicial declaration to that effect and the lower courts, including the Court of Appeals, have no discretion to extend the same. Only this Court can. It is settled that, generally, the exercise of sound discretion in issuing a restraining order by the lower court will not be interfered with. 2. ID.; ID.; NOT ALLOWED AGAINST THE ASSET PRIVATIZATION. — We agree with petitioner that no restraining order lies against it in view of Sec. 31 of Proclamation No 50- A dated 15 December 1986 which provides — "No court or administrative agency shall issue any restraining order or injunction against the Trust in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it. . . . Nor shall such order or injunction be issued against any purchaser of assets sold by the Trust to prevent such purchaser from taking possession of any assets purchased by him." In fine, We hold that
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- Summer '17
- Ian De La Cruz
- Appellate court, Injunction