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Unformatted text preview: THE DICTATOR’S DILEMMA AT THE BALLOT BOX: ELECTORAL MANIPULATION, ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION, AND POLITICAL ORDER IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES By Masaaki Higashijima A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Political Science – Doctor of Philosophy 2015 ABSTRACT THE DICTATOR’S DILEMMA AT THE BALLOT BOX: ELECTORAL MANIPULATION, ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION, AND POLITICAL ORDER IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES By Masaaki Higashijima This dissertation explores the causes and consequences of authoritarian elections. When holding an election, the authoritarian leader faces a dilemma: In order to maintain his rule, he needs to win big in elections. Yet, the manipulation of election results risks losing some of the informational benefits of authoritarian elections – credibly showing regime strength and knowing the distribution of political support from the citizenry. Under the constraint of the electoral dilemma, the authoritarian leader designs authoritarian elections. The manners in which elections are designed, then, have important implications on post-­‐electoral political order in autocracies. Specifically, this study asks the following three questions. (1) Under what conditions do authoritarian rulers refrain from using serious electoral fraud such as election violence, electoral cheating, and the manipulation of electoral law? (2) When do authoritarian leaders decide to change their electoral system from Single-­‐Member Districts (SMD) systems to Proportional Representation (PR) systems? And, (3) when do authoritarian elections backfire on dictators in the form of protests and leadership turnover. In this dissertation, I argue that the power distribution between the dictator and political elites determines to what extent the dictator manipulates authoritarian elections. “Strong” dictators, who can mobilize regime supporters by using their financial resources in efficient ways, do not have an incentive to manipulate elections by resorting to extensive electoral fraud and maintaining SMD systems that may bias election results in their favor. By refraining from serious manipulation of election results, dictators can take advantage of elections to overcome the shortages of information under authoritarian rule. On the other hand, “weak” dictators, who lack financial resources or face strong oppositions, need to rely more on electoral manipulation because revealing their de facto weakness through election results may lead the elections to exert destabilizing effects on the political order. In order to test this theory, I conduct cross-­‐national statistical analyses and comparative case studies of the two Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. My empirical analyses demonstrate that autocrats with rich financial resources are more likely to refrain from extensive electoral fraud and shift electoral systems from SMD to PR. I also show that if the dictator fails to manipulate elections strategically when dealing with the electoral dilemma, then authoritarian elections may backfire on him. If the dictator employs excessive electoral fraud, then he is more likely to face popular protests because political elites are unable to make sense of de facto strength of the regime. On the contrary, if the autocrat fails to use sufficient levels of fraud, then election results may reveal the weakness of the dictator, leading to leadership turnover via a post-­‐electoral coup or an opposition’s victory at elections. Copyright by MASAAKI HIGASHIJIMA 2015 To My Parents, Kumiko and Toshiharu Higashijima v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am deeply indebted to the many people who have helped me complete this dissertation. First and foremost, I thank the members of my dissertation committee for their guidance and feedback during my years at MSU. The chair of my doctoral dissertation, Eric Chang, has been a tireless supporter since I began working on this project. Eric always encouraged me to ask interesting questions and solve the puzzles with provocative theory and rigorous empirical methods while drawing a big picture. Eric’s mentoring made it possible for me to complete my graduate work and I owe much of my success thus far to his guidance. Cristina Bodea provided helpful comments on dissertation manuscripts to sharpen my arguments. I was also very fortunate to have the opportunity to work with her on multiple research projects and could learn an important part of academic life -­‐-­‐ how to publish work in journals. Ani Sarkissian agreed to be my mentor when I arrived at MSU and continued to serve as a committee member. She gave practical tips and useful suggestions for me in how to conduct fieldwork and interviews in Central Asia, as well as good advice to write competitive funding proposals. Also serving on my dissertation committee, Christian Houle has always pushed me to think harder about the logic behind my arguments and provided useful feedback on my empirical analyses. Beyond my dissertation committee, my gratitude goes to other members of MSU faculty and staff. Ben Appel, Ravi Bhavnani, Mike Bratton, Mike Colaresi, Jeff Conroy-­‐ Krutz, Eric Freedman, Brian Silver, and Jakana Thomas have been important teachers who provided invaluable feedback and suggestions on my research projects. The vi Department Chair, Charles Ostrom, and three Graduate Directors, Steve Kautz, Melinda Hall, and Thomas Hammond, provided me with generous financial support to conduct several field trips and make presentations at various academic conferences. Karen Battin helped me with every administrative need, whereas Rhonda Burns and Sarah Krause processed my NSF grant by patiently making a long list of receipts that I received in the field. I would also like to express my special thanks to my MSU colleagues for their friendship, thoughts and careful proofreading on my papers: Fang-­‐Yu Chen, Hyun Jin Choi, Tolgahan Kinay Dilgin, Ebru Eren-­‐Webb, Sung Min Han, Dan Hansen, Petra Hendrickson, Shih-­‐Hao Huang, Brian Kennedy, Nicholas Kerr, Alon Kraitzman, Bob Lapton, Jerry Lavery, Helen Lee, Hsin-­‐Hsin Pan, Chunho Park, Peter Penar, Wen-­‐Chin Wu, and Fangjin Ye. Outside of MSU, I would like to thank Allyson Benton, Annette Fath-­‐Lihic, Rich Frank, Rob Franzese, Olli Hellmann, Sarah Hummel, Yusaku Horiuchi, Pauline Jones Luong, Tom Le, Mike Miller, Svend-­‐Erik Skaaning, Daniel Stockemer, Netina Tan, Jan Teorell, Matt Wilson, and Matt Winters for their invaluable comments, feedback, and encouragements on my dissertation research at various stages. The Electoral Integrity Project (EIP) led by Pippa Norris kindly invited me to contribute one of my dissertation chapters to a forthcoming edited volume, as well as gave me several chances to present part of my dissertation project at EIP workshops, for which I really appreciate. Without my professors in Japan, I would not have even thought of studying in the United States for my doctoral degree. I would like to thank Hideko Magara, Takayuki Ito, Masaru Kohno, and Ikuo Kume for their moral support and mentoring since I began to study Political Science at Waseda University. I would also like to thank Takeshi Iida, vii Yuko Kasuya, Takeshi Kawanaka, Keiichi Kubo, Ryo Nakai, Katsunori Seki, Kengo Soga, Atsushi Tago, Shin Toyoda, and Yuki Yanai for their comments and suggestions on my dissertation project. Over the years, I have been supported by the following fellowships and grants which allowed me to conduct language study, field research, and dissertation writing: National Science Foundation Dissertation Improvement Grant (#1323671), Fulbright Scholarship, Akino Yutaka Award, Tokyo Foundation SYLFF Research Abroad Award, Suntory Foundation Research Grant for Young Scholars, Konosuke Matsushita Memorial Foundation Research Grant, Waseda University GLOPEII Research Grant, MSU Political Science Department Fellowship, and MSU Dissertation Completion Fellowship. I conducted fieldwork in Almaty and Astana, Kazakhstan and Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. I am grateful to Department of Public Administration at KIMEP University in Almaty and the Social Research Center at American University of Central Asia in Bishkek for sponsoring me while I was a researcher in the field. I would like to thank Meruert Makhmutova, Ellina Malina, Nurseit Niyazbekov, and Medet Tiulegenov for introducing me to politicians, researchers and NGO activists whom I should interview. Kamila Mustafina, Gulden Suleimenova, Aizhamal Sydykova, Bermet Zhumakadyr, and Kalys Zhumakadyr provided valuable research assistance. I am grateful as well to many politicians, researchers and opposition leaders who agreed to have interviews with me, as well as a lot of citizens in both countries who talked frankly about what they think about politics in their countries. This research was approved by the MSU Office of Regulatory Affairs (IRB#x13-­‐590e) viii Last but not least, I would never have completed this dissertation without my family’s support. Soon after having married me, my wife, Yuko, came with me to the States for my PhD study. Since then, she has sacrificed everything for me. When facing the numerous difficulties during this journey, she was always far more optimistic and positive than myself and enjoyed life in Michigan on her own way. Shuh and Soh, our sons who were born in Michigan, have been an important source of energy as well as good timekeepers when I worked on this dissertation. My parents-­‐in-­‐law, Akiko and Takehide, have been very supportive and helped our endeavor to the States in various ways. My grandmother, Kimie, cheerfully welcomed us every time when we came back to Fukuoka and played with our kids. Finally, my parents, Kumiko and Toshiharu, have always believed in me and let me do what I really want to do since I was little. I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my parents for their love and steadfast support over the past three decades. ix TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES……………………………………………………………...…………………....xiii LIST OF FIGURES………………………………………………..…………………………..…….xvi CHAPTER1 INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………...........................1 1.1 Three Puzzles of Authoritarian Elections…………..…………………………….8 1.1.1 Electoral Fraud……………………………………………..……………………….....8 1.1.2 Electoral System Change……………………………….………………………..10 1.1.3 Post-­‐Electoral Political Order………………………….………………………11 1.2 Theory and Argument in Brief……………………………………………………...13 1.3 Methods and Research Design……………………………………………………...19 1.4 Contributions………………………………………………………………………………22 1.5 Outline of the Dissertation……………………………………………………………25 CHAPTER 2 ELECTORAL DILEMMA AND THE MANIPULATION OF ELECTIONS………….................................................................................................................27 2.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………………...27 2.2 The Electoral Dilemma in Dictatorship………………………………………….30 2.3 Electoral Fraud and the Manipulation of Policy Instruments……….35 2.4 Power Distribution between the Dictator and Elites………………………38 2.4.1 Financial Resources……………………………………………………………….40 2.4.2 Organizational Bases…………………………………………………………......43 2.4.3 Opposition’s Strength…………………………………………………………….45 2.5 Cross-­‐National Statistical Analysis of Electoral Fraud……………………47 2.5.1 Data and Methodology…………………………………………………..……….47 2.5.2 Results……………………………………………………………………………….....57 2.5.3 Robustness Check and Additional Data Analysis……………………..61 2.6 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………..67 CHAPTER 3 THE CHOICE OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS IN DICTATORSHIPS………………………………………………………………..………………….69 3.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………………..69 3.2 Literature Review………………………………………………………………………..73 3.3 Electoral System Change in Electoral Authoritarianism.………………..79 3.4 Cross-­‐National Statistical Analysis….…………………………………...……….86 x 3.4.1 Sample: Electoral Authoritarianism………………………………………..86 3.4.2 Dependent Variable: Effective Electoral Threshold……...………….88 3.4.3 Key Independent Variable: Natural Resource Wealth………………90 3.4.4 Statistical Method……………………………………………………...…………..92 3.4.5 Results………………………………………………………………………...………..94 3.4.6 Robustness Check………………………………………………………………….95 3.5 Testing Causal Mechanisms…………………………………………….…………..96 3.5.1 Natural Resource Wealth and Authoritarian Regime Support.....97 3.5.2 Electoral Systems and the Pro-­‐Dictator Bias………….……….….….102 3.5.3 PR Systems Inhibit Pre-­‐Electoral Opposition Coalitions….……..108 3.6 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………...…………..111 CHAPTER 4 POLITICAL MANIPULATION OR FISCAL MANEUVERING? THE CASE OF KAZAKHSTAN….....…………………………………………………………………114 4.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………....114 4.2 Limited Liberalization……………………………………………………………...116 4.3 Growing Dominance of Ruling Parties Since 1995……………………..121 4.4 Electoral Manipulation in Kazakhstan……………………...……………….126 4.4.1 Electoral Fraud…………………………………………………………………..127 4.4.2 Electoral System Change: From SMD to PR……………………….…135 4.5 The Dictator’s Mobilization Power……………………………………………140 4.5.1 Natural Resource Wealth as a Source of Patronage……….……..143 4.5.2 Centralization of Governing Institutions………………...…….……..152 4.5.3 The Dominant Party, Nur Otan………………………………...…………157 4.5.4 Weakening of Opposition……………………………………...……………159 4.6 Political Business Cycles in Kazakhstan……………………...…………….164 4.7 Conclusion………………………………………………………...……………………172 CHAPTER 5 PROTESTS AND LEADERSHIP TURNOVER AFTER AUTHORITARIAN ELECTIONS……………………………………………………………..173 5.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………..……………173 5.2 Literature Review…………………………………………………………………..178 5.3 Dictator’s Calculus over Electoral Manipulation……...……………….181 5.4 Backfiring at the Ballot Box…………………………………………………….184 5.5 Cross-­‐National Statistical Analysis…………………………………………..189 5.5.1 Data and Modeling Strategies………………………...…………………189 5.5.2 First Model Specification: A Mobilization Model…...……….….191 5.5.3 Second Model Specification: Turnover and Protests……….…196 xi 5.5.4 Results…………………………………….…………………………...…………199 5.5.5 Robustness Check...………………….……………………………..………..202 5.6 Conclusion……………………………………………….……………………………203 CHAPTER 6 THE FAILURE OF STRATEGIC FRAUD AND POPULAR PROTESTS: THE CASE OF KYRGYZSTAN……………………………………………….204 6.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………...…..204 6.2 From Electoral Democracy to Electoral Authoritarianism………..206 6.3 The Weakening of Akaev’s Mobilization Power……………………….211 6.3.1 Financial Resources: Gold and Aid……………………...………….…212 6.3.2 Decentralization and Lack of Organizational Bases……………215 6.3.3 Emerging Opposition…………………………………………...…………..220 6.4 Electoral Fraud and the Rise of Massive Protests: Comparing Elections in the Akaev Regime………………………………...…………….222 6.4.1 The 1995 Elections: Relatively Fair Elections and the Durable Akaev Regime……………………………………………………………...……….222 6.4.2 The 2000 Elections: Electoral Manipulation and the Absence of Large-­‐Scale Protests…………………………………………………...………...224 6.4.3 The 2005 Elections: Electoral Fraud, Popular Protests and the Collapse of the Akaev Regime………………………………………………..226 6.5 Conclusion………………………………………………………………...………...229 CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION……...…………….…………………………………...………….231 APPENDIX….…..………………………………………………………………………………...…238 BIBLIOGRAPHY….………………………………………………………………………………..270 xii LIST OF TABLES Table 2.1: Determinants of Electoral Fraud in Dictatorship……...……...………57 Table 3.1: Determinants of Electoral Systems in Electoral Authoritarianism…………………………………………………………………………………..94 Table 3.2: Dictators’ Performance at the Ballot Box……………...………...…..…100 Table 3.3: The Pro-­‐Dictator Bias under Majoritarian Electoral Systems.…104 Table 3.4: Electoral Systems and Pre-­‐Electoral Coalitions in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes…………...……………………………………………………………109 Table 4.1: Time-­‐Series Change in Electoral Fraud in Kazakhstan (1995-­‐ 2007)………………………………………………………………………………………………….127 Table 4.2: Electoral System Change and Effective Electoral Threshold in Kazakhstan………………………………………………………………………………………….135 Table 4.3: Percentage of Central Government Transfers in Total Revenues of Regional Governments…………………………………………………………………..…….152 Table 4.4: Political Business Cycles in Kazakhstan (1995-­‐2008)………….…167 Table 4.5: Electoral Cycles, Organizational Strength, and Fiscal Resources................................................................................................................................168 Table 5.1: The First-­‐Stage Model Predicting Electoral Fraud………………….194 Table 5.2: Probit Analysis of Post-­‐Electoral Turnover and Protests………..199 Table C2-­‐1: Descriptive Statistics of Chapter 2……………………….……………..238 Table C2-­‐2: List of Authoritarian Countries (1977-­‐2004)………………………239 xiii Table C2-­‐3: Additional Analyses…………………………………………………….…….240 Table C2-­‐4: Alternative Definition of Political Regimes – Boix, Miller and Rosato (2012)……………………………………………………………………………………..241 Table C2-­‐5: Alternative Definition of Political Regimes – Polity IV…………242 Table C2-­‐6: Alternative Measure of Natural Resources – Change in Oil-­‐Gas Value per capita…………………………………………………………………………………..243 Table C2-­‐7: Alternative Measure of Natural Resources – 3 Years Moving Average of Oil-­‐Gas Value per capita………………………………………………………244 Table C2-­‐8: Alternative Measure of Natural Resources – Haber and Menaldo (2011)………………………………………………………………………………………...………245 Table C2-­‐9: Region-­‐Clustered Robust Standard Errors………………………….246 Table C2-­‐10: Additional Controls…………………………………………………...……247 Table C2-­‐11: Alternative Methods – Fixed Effects and Regional Specific Effects…………………………………………………………………………………………………248 Table C2-­‐12: Alternative Methods – Random Intercept Models……………..249 Table C3-­‐1: Descriptive Statistics of Chapter 3……………………………………...252 Table C3-­‐2: List of Electoral Authoritarian Countries (1946-­‐2007)…..……253 Table C3-­‐3: Including Polity IV as a Control Variable……………………………..254 Table C3-­‐4: Region-­‐Clustered Robust Standard Errors………………………….255 Table C3-­‐5: Using a Different Measure of the Effective Electoral Threshold …………………………………………………………………………………………………………...256 Table C3-­‐6: Limiting Sample into 1970-­‐2007………………………………………..257 xiv Table C5-­‐1: Descriptive Statistics of Chapter 5…………………………………...…259 Table C5-­‐2: Alternative Measure of Political Regimes……………………………261 Table C5-­‐3: Using the Electoral Fraud Variable per se…………………...………262 Table C6-­‐1: Political Business Cycles in Kyrgyzstan (1995-­‐2013)…………..268 xv LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1.1: Democracies and Autocracies in the World (1945-­‐2010)…………3 Figure 1.2: Elections in Authoritarian Regimes (1946-­‐2008)……………………..4 Figure 2.1: Variation in the Level of Electoral Fraud in Authoritarian Regimes (1977-­‐2004)………………………………………………………………………...….48 Figure 2.2: The Different Effects of Natural Resource Endowments between Dominant-­‐Party and Non-­‐Dominant-­‐Party Regimes……………………………..…59 Figure 2.3: The Marginal Effect of Natural Resource Endowments Conditional upon Ethnic Organizational Power……………………………………....60 Figure 2.4: Additional Analysis……………………………………………………………....65 Figure 3.1: Hypothesis and Causal Mechanisms for the Origins of Electoral Systems in Electoral Authoritarianism………………………………………...……..…..83 Figure 3.2: Effective Electoral Threshold in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes………………………………………………………………………………………………..89 Figure 3.3: Regional Variations in the Effective Electoral Threshold in Electoral Authoritarianism………………..……………………………………………...……90 Figure 3.4: The Magnitude of the Pro-­‐Dictator Bias Conditional upon Regime Strength (Vote Shares of Ruling Parties)…………………….…………….106 Figure 3.5: Effect of Electoral Systems on Pre-­‐Electoral Opposition Coalitions.…………………………………………………………………………………….…..…110 Figure 4.1: Increasing Dominance of Regime Parties in Kazakhstan……….123 xvi Figure 4.2: Effective Electoral Threshold in Kazakh Parliamentary Elections (1994-­‐2007)……………………………………………………………………………………….136 Figure 4.3: Economic Growth and Fiscal Revenues in Kazakhstan (1993-­‐ 2008)………………………………………………………...
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