ps10sol_09

# ps10sol_09 - Cornell University Economics 3130 Problem Set...

This preview shows pages 1–2. Sign up to view the full content.

Cornell University Economics 3130 Problem Set 10 Solutions 1. Using any method, ﬁnd all the Nash equilibria (in pure and mixed strategies) of the game. Brieﬂy explain the steps you take in ﬁnding the equilibria. Player 2 Player 1 L C R T 3,4 4,2 2,1 M 1,7 3,8 0,0 B 1,0 1,1 4,3 The pure strategy Nash equilibria are (T,L) and (B,R). We have discussed several ways to ﬁnd them. To ﬁnd mixed strategy Nash equilibria, notice ﬁrst that M is strictly dominated by T. Even after eliminating M, none of Player 2’s strategies are dominated by a pure strategy. However, C is dominated by a mixed strategy of .5 L and .5 R. If we ask the question, will P2 every play a mixed strategy involving C, the answer is no because any probability that the individual gave to the choice of C could be divided between L and R and thereby increase the expected payoﬀ. With C removed, it is simply a 2-by-2 game. As we discussed in class, we ask if there is a probability p of playing T and 1 - p of playing B that leads P2 to be indiﬀerent between L and R. π

This preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full Document
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

## This note was uploaded on 08/29/2009 for the course ECON 3130 taught by Professor Masson during the Spring '06 term at Cornell.

### Page1 / 3

ps10sol_09 - Cornell University Economics 3130 Problem Set...

This preview shows document pages 1 - 2. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document
Ask a homework question - tutors are online