Austere truth pluralism1Filippo Ferrari Sebastiano Moruzzi Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen 1.Truth pluralism: strong vs. moderate In its most generic formulation truth pluralism is the thesis that there is a plurality of ways of being true. This contrasts with truth monism: there is just one way of being true. The most prominent incarnation of pluralism is domain-based: there are several ways of being true because different properties are truth-relevant for different domains. Thus, correspondence to reality might be the property relevant to the truth of <Mt. Everest is extended in space> while coherence with the body of law might be the property relevant to the truth of <Martha Stewart’s insider trading is illegal>.2This is the type of pluralism found in the work of prominent pluralists such as Crispin Wright and Michael P. Lynch.3Strong pluralists reject the monist idea of a single truth property that applies across the board—a generictruth property. Rather, there is a plurality of properties t1, …, tnthat reduce or constitute truth for less than all-encompassing ranges of propositions. Thus, the truth of <Mt. Everest is extended in space> reduces to its corresponding to reality and the truth of <Martha Stewart’s insider trading is illegal> reduces to its cohering with the body of law. However, no truth-reducing property—i.e. none of t1, …, tn—reduces truth for all propositions. Truth is many, not one. By contrast, moderate pluralists seek to accommodate the key point of monism andthe key point of pluralism. Put in a slogan: truth is both one and many. To achieve the combination of unity and diversity, moderate pluralists adopt a network analysis, characterizing a unique concept truththrough a collection of core principles. These principles pin down truth’s role within a larger 1We are grateful to a number of people for discussions that have helped shape our thinking about truth pluralism, including: Jc Beall, Elke Brendel, Colin Caret, Aaron Cotnoir, Douglas Edwards, Will Gamester, Nathan Kellen, Jinho Kang, Junyeol Kim, Michael P. Lynch, Erik Stei, Andrea Strollo, Elena Tassoni, Joe Ulatowski, Cory D. Wright, Crispin Wright, Andy Yu, Luca Zanetti, and Elia Zardini. We are especially grateful to Jeremy Wyatt for very extensive and helpful comments on an earlier version of this chapter. 2Angle brackets are used to represent propositions. 3Wright (1992), (1998), (2001), (2013); Lynch (2001), (2004), (2006), (2009), (2013), (2018). See also Cotnoir (2013a); Edwards (2011), (2012), (2013), (2018a), (2018b); Ferrari & Moruzzi (2019), (forthcoming); Gamester (forthcoming); Pedersen (2006), (2010), (2012a), (2012b), (2014); Pedersen & Edwards (2011); Kim & Pedersen (2018); Pedersen & Lynch (2018); Pedersen & Wright (2012), (2013a), (2013b); Yu (2017). A different kind of truth pluralism, motivated by considerations on semantic paradox, has also attracted attention in the literature. See, e.g., Beall (2013), Cotnoir (2013b), Scharp (2013).