syllabus - 2 Adverse selection in the used car market(pp...

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Economics of Asymmetric Information 109 Fall 2007 Instructor: Igor Kopylov This course will focus on the effects of asymmetric information (i) in the markets for traditional economic goods and resources, such as labor, insurance, used cars, credit, etc and (ii) in auctions and bargaining problems. The textbook for the class is Incentives: Motivation and the Economics of Information by Donald E. Campbell Some lecture notes (though incomplete) will be available. The grade for the course will be based on two midterms and a final examination. Each midterm is worth 30% of the grade. The final is worth the remaining 40%. There will be regular homework assignments, but they will not be graded. We will proceed as follows. 1. Introduction: Asymmetric Information, Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard.
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Unformatted text preview: 2. Adverse selection in the used car market. (pp. 269–271) 3. Adverse selection in the credit markets. (pp. 272–279) 4. Adverse selection and signalling in the labor market. Separating and pooling equilibria. Intuitive refinements. (pp. 290–302) 5. Bundling and Product Quality (pp. 280–290) 6. Midterm 1 (October 29) 7. Moral Hazard in the market for auto insurance (pp. 179–186 + notes). Risk aversion and expected utility. (pp. 112–117) 8. Moral hazard in the labor market. (Chapter 4 + the scanned chapter of Kreps’s book) 9. Midterm 2 (November 26) 10. Auctions. (Chapter 6, pp. 349–362 + notes) 11. Voting. (Chapter 7, pp. 386–396)...
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