Philosophy_of_science_wiki - Taken from Wikipedia "The...

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Nature of scientific concepts and statements [ edit ] Demarcation Main article: Demarcation problem Karl Popper contended that the central question in the philosophy of science was distinguishing science from non-science. [1] Early attempts by the logical positivists grounded science in observation while non-science (e.g. metaphysics ) was non-observational and hence nonsense. [2] Popper claimed that the central feature of science was that science aims at falsifiable claims (i.e. claims that can be proven false, at least in principle). [3] No single unified account of the difference between science and non-science has been widely accepted by philosophers, and some regard the problem as unsolvable or uninteresting. [4] This problem has taken center stage in the debate regarding evolution and intelligent design . Many opponents of intelligent design claim that it does not meet the criteria of science and should thus not be treated on equal footing as evolution . [5] Those who defend intelligent design either defend the view as meeting the criteria of science or challenge the coherence of this distinction. [6] [ edit ] Scientific realism and instrumentalism Main article: Scientific realism Two central questions about science are (1) what are the aims of science and (2) how ought one interpret the results of science? Scientific realists claim that science aims at truth and that one ought to regard scientific theories as true, approximately true, or likely true. Conversely, a scientific antirealist or instrumentalist argues that science does not aim (or at least does not succeed) at truth and that we should not regard scientific theories as true. [7] Some antirealists claim that scientific theories aim at being instrumentally useful and should only be regarded as useful, but not true, descriptions of the world. [8] More radical antirealists, like Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend , have argued that scientific theories do not even succeed at this goal, and that later, more accurate scientific theories are not "typically approximately true" as Popper contended. [9] [10] Realists often point to the success of recent scientific theories as evidence for the truth (or near truth) of our current theories. [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] Anti-realists point to either the history of science, [16] [17] epistemic morals, [8] , the success of false modeling assumptions, [18] , or widely termed postmodern criticisms of objectivity as evidence against scientific realisms. [19] Some anti-realists attempt to explain the success of our theories without reference to truth [8] [20] while others deny that our current scientific theories are successful at all. [9]
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This note was uploaded on 09/14/2009 for the course MCDB 20 taught by Professor Cooper during the Summer '08 term at UCSB.

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Philosophy_of_science_wiki - Taken from Wikipedia "The...

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