NOTES 9-10-07

NOTES 9-10-07 - POLI 150-001 Hegemonic Stability Theory...

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POLI 150-001 WEEK 4 9/10/07 Hegemonic Stability Theory International cooperation- in a lot of issues internationally, states have an issue between overlapping common and conflicting interest. International Politics- the environment of anarchy makes a problem on monitoring what countries do and punishing them if they do wrong. THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA [Prisoner’s Dilemma]- Individually rational decisions produce a collectively sub-optimal outcome. Basic game of the “rat” versus the “sucker”. There is one solution (equilibrium) to this game. Outcome is mutual defection. The strategic environment generates barriers to cooperation. Individually rational behavior Pareto inferior outcome Cooperation involves conscious policy coordination (Oye). Each actor changes behavior, contingent on adjustments in others’ behavior (Keohane). States have a hard time cooperating especially when the states have short term goals or horizons. Defection vs. Cooperation
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This note was uploaded on 09/20/2009 for the course POLI 150 taught by Professor Mosley during the Fall '08 term at UNC.

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NOTES 9-10-07 - POLI 150-001 Hegemonic Stability Theory...

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