Solicitation_Attempts_Conspiracy[1]

Solicitation_Attempts_Conspiracy[1] - Solicitation/Attempts/

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Unformatted text preview: Solicitation/Attempts/ Accomplice/Conspiracy Hypos Evaluate D's liability and X's liability under the common law in the following circumstances: Question 1 D says to X, put "poison" in V's drink. The "poison" is a white powder that D knows to be baking soda but that X believes to be poison. Is D guilty of soliciting X? Is X guilty of a crime? Answers to # 1 D not guilty of solicitation because D does not have the specific intent that X commit the crime. (If you are unclear on this point, please review Dressler's solicitation chapter.) X not guilty of conspiracy because there is no agreement, and not guilty of attempted murder because X has not committed any acts dangerously close to completing the crime. Question 2 Same facts as (1). X puts the white powder into the drink. Answers to # 2 X guilty of attempted murder because she has the intent to kill and has come dangerously close to succeeding; assuming that this is factual impossibility, it is no defense that the powder could not kill V. D not guilty as an accomplice because D does not have the specific intent that the crime occur. (Again, see Dressler if you are unclear.) Question # 3 D says to X, put poison in V's drink. Both think it's poison, but in fact it's baking soda. Answers to # 3 D guilty of solicitation of murder; D has solicited (actus reus) and has the specific intent. X guilty of nothing at this point; no conspiracy (no agreement); no attempt (no dangerous proximity). Question # 4 Same facts as (3), except that X now says "OK." Answers to # 4 Both are guilty of conspiracy under traditional common law, which does not require an overt act. Mens rea (specific intent to agree and specific intent to commit the object crime) and actus reus (the agreement) are present. Question # 5 Same facts as (4), except that X puts the powder into V's drink. Answers to # 5 Both parties are liable for (a) conspiracy (which does not merge) and (b) attempted murder, X as the principal and D as the accomplice (both have the specific intent and X reached dangerous proximity). Question # 6 D says to X, put this stomach medicine in V's drink. D knows it's actually poison; X thinks it's stomach medicine. Answers to # 6 D not guilty of solicitation under common law because X merely an innocent instrument. D liable for attempted murder of V? D has the mens rea. The issue is the actus reus whether the solicitation itself is sufficient for attempt (jurisdictions are split). X not liable no mens rea, no actus reus. Question # 7 A and B agree to rob Bank 1 and Bank 2. The plan is for A to drive a getaway car, and for B to enter the bank and use a gun to take cash from a teller. B agrees to provide the car. Unbeknownst to A, B then contacts C and asks C to steal a car to use in the getaway. C does so. A and B then rob Banks 1 and 2, with A driving the getaway car. The next week, B and C rob Bank 3. Question 7(a) Is A liable for the theft of the car under traditional principles of accomplice liability? Is A liable for the theft of the car as an accomplice under the natural and probable consequences doctrine? Is A liable for the theft of the car as a co conspirator under Pinkerton? Answers to # 7(a) Under the general rule of accomplice liability, no aiding/abetting the theft, no intent to aid/abet the theft, no intent that the theft occur; A not liable. Under Pinkerton, is the theft a reasonably foreseeable crime committed by a coconspirator? Compare facts of Pinkerton and make the arguments. Same foreseeability analysis applies under the N & P consequences doctrine. Question 7(b) Is A liable for the robbery of Bank 3 under traditional principles of accomplice liability? Is A liable for the robbery of Bank 3 as an accomplice under the natural and probable consequences doctrine? Is A liable for the robbery of Bank 3 as a co conspirator under Pinkerton? Answers to # 7(b) Traditional principles of accomplice liability? No, for same reasons as 7(a) above. Natural and probable consequences doctrine? Even assuming it was all part of the same crime, was the robbery of Bank 3 crime reasonably foreseeable? Debatable; probably not. What if B kills a bank guard during robbery of Bank 1? A liable under this doctrine? Likely yes; part of the same crime, and reasonably foreseeable. Pinkerton? Without more facts, probably not. There seem to be two separate conspiracies, and A does not seem to be part of the conspiracy between B & C to rob Bank 3. A can only be liable for reasonably Question 7(c) Can A be tried in a case charging a single conspiracy among A, B, and C with the car theft and the robbery of Banks 1, 2, and 3 as the object crimes? Answers to # 7(c) Without more facts, probably not; there would have to be some facts that A knew that others were participating in the conspiracy and that the conspiratorial goals included the robbery of additional banks. ...
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