SE A ST 1 - (Week 3) Urbanism

SE A ST 1 - (Week 3) Urbanism - 2. Urbanism in Southeast...

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Unformatted text preview: 2. Urbanism in Southeast Asia The discussion of cities in Southeast Asia faces several puzzling facts. As a whole the region is only slowly urbanizing and the overall degree of urbanization is comparatively low. In most countries the major proportion of the labour force is still employed in agricultural production. The societies appear as predominantly rurally oriented ones in which life in an urban environment is rather an exception. In contrast to the impression of Southeast Asian societies as rurally based or oriented are the big cities with several million inhabitants like Jakarta, Manila and Bangkok." The impression that these big cities are alien to genuine Southeast Asian society is strengthened by the multi-ethnic composition of the population, and the fact that all are recently-founded cities, with the exception of Bangkok, founded by a 1 colonial power as a centre for administration and exploitation.” Jakarta, with Manila the oldest of the present capital cities, was founded under the name Batavia by the Dutch. Rangoon, although founded in 1750 by Alaungpaya after a war against the Mon empire of southern Burma under the name "End of Strife", remained a small town until it became the centre of British colonialism in Burma following the second Anglo-Burmese war in 1852. Singapore was founded in 1819 by Raffles, and Manila in 1571 by the Spanish. Bangkok, “The official number of inhabitants given for these cities is usually misleading. Bangkok for example has officially some 6 million inhabitants. This number includes only those who are officially registered in Bangkok and who reside in the area defined as Bangkok Metropolis. In real terms (including the suburbs which officially belong to other provinces and including those living in Bangkok without official registration) the population is estimated to be at least some 8 to 9 million people. I‘°‘0ther cities already existed prior to colonial penetration. Batavia was founded by the Dutch at a former, unimportant Kratong (Palace), and Rangoon was founded in the seventeenth century by Alaungpaya, following the conquest of the Mon Kingdom, below the sacred Swedagon Pagoda with the name "End of Strife". Singapore had already existed for a long time as a settlement of Chinese traders and fishermen. Even Bangkok and Thonburi are not newly founded cities but already had a long history as minor places in the Ayudhya kingdom. The predeCesaors of the colonial capitals and the current primate cities had, however, only a very limited significance. 26 formerly a village at a bend of the Chao Phraya river opposite the harbour town of Thonburi, was founded in 1782 by Rama I as the new capital of Siam. The overall low degree of urbanization combined with the concentration of the urban population in one heterogeneous, metropolitan and international rather than national primate city, together with the fact that these primate cities are young (hardly older than 200 years) and with the exception of Bangkok, founded by colonial powers, reinforces the impression that urbanism is alien to Southeast Asian culture and society. In this regard McGee (1967) argues that "The Southeast Asian city is a mosaic of cultural and racial worlds each invoking the memory of other lands and people" (McGee 1967:240. Similarly, Ginsburg (1976) describes the big cities of Southeast Asia as "essentially alien to the Southeast Asian landscape" (Ginsburg 19763). Due to their early development and founding as "head-links" or "bridgeheads" of the colonial powers, the big cities are multiethnic, multicultural and metropolitan rather than national, with commercial rather than cultural ties between city and hinterland (Ginsburg 1976:3ft). Comparing Malay and Chinese urbanism, the existing cities in Malaysia and partly Indonesia are based on Indian or Islamic concepts of the city as a centre, while in the Malay context the centre is the palace (Kraton) or the central mosque, but not a city. ' All big cities in Southeast Asia strongly display the features of "primate cities". As Chong (1976) shows, all capital cities in Southeast Asia are by far the biggest city in the country”, with a population of several times the population of the second biggest city, they are all the capital city, the major port, location for the headquarters of business and administration, cultural and social centres and prime location for industrial production (Chong 1976:166ff). The urbanization process is concentrated in these primate cities, in which already up to half of the overall urban population resides, and which still have growth rates exceeding the overall growth rate of the urban population. Rapid urbanization centred in one primate city leads to several problems like congestion, pollution, slums etc. So far all attempts of the states and municipal administrations to control and reduce the pressure on the primate city has failed (Kasadra, J ., Parnell, A. M. 1993). "It can be argued also that the overwhelming dominance of the primate city inhibits the growth of lesser cities and that the larger cities will expand more rapidly than the lesser ones. There are in effect only a limited number of services to be performed by cities within a predominantly village and folk society, although it may be industrializing l3Of course, these ideas are developed predominantly by urban intellectuals, and the concept of village society tends to be imaginary and does not reflect reality in the rural areas. slowly, and the g: services. Thus, ev functions tend to b cities" (Ginsburg between modern, v to exist. In the co involution, and the type economy. Laq which between 20 of a folk culture wi‘ urban culture. From these points 6 and Westemization already existed in E of these were of q during that time t "Urbanism in Sour towards independe formation and syst- continuation of thi: natives to an alien é Following Werthei differentiated: the ' urbanization are clo I. The city as a cent In this pattern, the 6 way stations of the within the capital ci and the main templu the sacred world. institutions were or danger was that the to gain independenc were integrated. Thi regularly in Southea "Territorial control of Sack, as control over town of the rather as are untied theast "The 1g the .sburg :o the Jrnent 1e big , with .sburg .es in )f the in) or ities". 1r the ion of )n for :s and zation of the rig the IS like ricipa] failed lming [iii the effect hin a rlizing id the 27 slowly, and the great cities continue to posses a Virtual monopoly of these services. Thus, even as a society changes, new and increasingly complex functions tend to be performed by institutions already established in the primate cities" (Ginsburg 19763). But even in these big primate cities, a dualism between modern, westernized institutions and seemingly rural life-styles seems to exist. In the economy, Armstrong and McGee (1980) speak of an urban involution, and the coexistence of a firm-type modern economy with a bazaar- type economy. Laquian (1972) discusses the slums in the big primate cities (in which between 20 to 50 percent of the urban population lives), as continuation of a folk culture within the city, or as link-ages between rural folk culture and the urban culture. From these points of view urbanism appears as alien, as an effect of colonialism and Westernization. This impression is contradicted by the fact that cities have already existed in Southeast Asia for the last twothousand years, and that some of these were of quite a considerable size, larger even than European cities during that time (Wheatley 1983). Thus we certainly find a tradition of "Urbanism in Southeast Asia". This urban tradition did not, however, lead towards independent "bourgeois" cities, but was closely linked with stater formation and systems of domination. In this regard colonialism was both a continuation of this urban tradition and a break in that the elite shifted from natives to an alien elite. Following Wertheim (1980) two main patterns of state formation can be differentiated: the inland states and the harbour principalities. The forms of urbanization are closely related to these patterns of state formation. 1. The city as a centre for territorial control in the context of the inland states:M In this pattern, the capital city is the centre, surrounded by provincial capitals as way stations of the central authority. The elite is defined through its position within the capital city and legitimated by a cosmology in which the capital city, and the main temple, and/or the palace of the king, articulates the secular with the sacred world. This articulation was essential because the religious institutions were one base for territorial control and administration. The main danger was that the provincial cities utilized their power over smaller territories to gain independence in relation to the system of overall control into which they were integrated. This is indicated by the attempts at secessions which happened regularly in Southeast Asia when the centres showed weakness. This type of city “Territorial control does not mean the control of land. Territory is used here in the sense of Sack, as control over everything (land, people, resources etc.) within a given area. 28 emerged in connection with the formation of the "inland states", states based on peasant production. 2. The city as a centre in trade networks: In this pattern the city, often as independent commercial city or as entrepfit city, was a node of trading routes. Control of trade (regional and long distance trade) through the control of nodes of trading routes, i. e. commercial cities, was the main function of these cities. The weakness derived from either threats from the territorial states or from changes in trading relations. These two pattems did not exist in isolation from each other, but were ' interrelated and connected. Goods for trade and for consumption in the commercial cities were supplied by the territorial states, and the élite of the territorial states needed luxury goods, acquired through long-distance trade, for the expression of their status. An overlapping of both systems existed when the capital of a territorial state was also a node in trading relations, thus providing a resource for power and territorial control, as it was the case of Ayudhya, the former Siamese capital city. If, however, a provincial city was integrated into the trading system, while the centre was not, it gained a resource which allowed an increased independence from the centre, usually leading to a conflict with the centre. Examples of this are the conflicts between Nakorn Sri Thammarat and Ayudhya in Siam, or the conflicts between Pegu and Syriam with the capitals of the Burmese state. These two patterns imply a different focus of development. Territorial control put the main emphasis on the integration of the provinces into one framework, dominated by the élite in the capital city. Interest in trade is limited, as trade could potentially allow the emergence of commercial centres or groups independent of the state and its ruling elite. The history of Burma up to the present is characterized by such an inward orientation, and a continuous conflict with the connnercially oriented cities along the Indian Ocean. Only for a short period during the sixteenth century was the centre of a Burmese state located in the predominantly commercial city of Pegu in southern Burma, which, however. led to severe problems, as ten'itorial control was challenged from upper Burma. For territorial integration the location of the centre in upper Burma was more appropriate. The rise of Rangoon is due to British colonialism. Following independence, again a policy of inward orientation and territorial control was instituted, leading to serious problems with the so-called "ethnic minorities". The states on the peninsula, like Malaysia and Singapore, in contrast, have a history of integration into trading networks rather than the establishment of territorial states. Malaysia was established as a territorial state by colonialism, principalities, which male "nation" ha Initially, th diffusion fi referred to administrati city can be would be in purely as an just applied state format Indianizatio: material con The Develu Urbanfsm at In Southeast can be distin areas, of whi international Angor. Both cities provid provided rice had as centre rituals throng through the tectonic mark the centrality expressed list The inland 8‘: following in concepts. The situation on .‘ and cornmerc (Ava) existed both a trading this gave the l centre, but or 29 which makes the creation of a "national" ideology at present complicated. The "nation" has its "traditional" base in colonialism. Initially, the first cities emerged in connection with state formation based on diffusion from the existing empires and states in China and India, a process referred to as "Indianization". From India the concepts of government and administration of larger regions was adopted, together with the ideas of how a city can be constructed and what has to be built where in the capital cities. It would be misleading though to interpret the rise of the cities and their continuity purely as an effect of intrusion from alien groups. The Indian concepts were not just applied but modified in a specific way. Obviously, the potential for both state formation and urbanization existed in Southeast Asia prior to Indianization. Indianization provided only the concepts and ideas which could be applied to the material conditions existing already. The Development of Urbanism in Southeast Asia Urbanism and State Formation In Southeast Asia two main patterns of urbanism connected to state formation can be distinguished: the commercial cities, predominantly alongside the coastal areas, of which Melaka was the most prOSperous and the most central within the international trading network, and the inland sacred cities of the rulers like Angor. Both were integrated into a division of labour in which the commercial cities provided goods from foreign trade for the elites, and the inland states provided rice and other goods for the commercial cities. While the inland states had as centres of power strong capital cities which were integrated into sacred rituals through which kingship was legitimated, and expressed their centrality through the articulation of heaven, world and underworld by magnificent tectonic marks (namely the chedis and prangs of the main temples and palaces), the centrality of the commercial cities did not need an outer expression, it expressed itself in the success of business. The inland states of mainland Southeast Asia were based on strong capitals, following in their construction Indian and, to a lesser degree, Chinese urban concepts. The capitals of Burma fall into this category. There, similarly to the situation on Java, 3 conflicting interdependence between coastal principalities and commercial centres (Pegu, Syriam), and the upper Burman political centre (Ava) existed. A special case is Ayudhya, the former Siamese capital. It was both a trading city and the capital of a powerful inland state. On the one hand, this gave the strength to Ayudhya and reenforced its position as the indisputable centre, but on the other hand, the conflicts between inland states and harbour principalities, a conflict between distinct states in Java, was a conflict within the 30 elite itself in Ayudhya's history is characterized by shifts between elite factions and policies related to foreign trade.15 . The cities can roughly be differentiated into three main categories: 1. The commercial cities as nodes in trading relations Melaka was for a long time the undisputed centre of international and regional trade in Southeast Asia. First of all, Melaka was a place where traders met and made their deals, and where ships could anchor and be repaired. In these cities cosmology, religion and ideology were less important than commerce. As the population was multiethnic, the cities were necessarily heterogenetie. The stability of trading routes and of commerce was most important for the success of these cities. 2. The sacred cities as centres of inland empires The empires of mainland Southeast Asia depended on definable centres of power. Centrality was defined through kingship, and accordingly, "centre" implied the location of the palace and the king as articulator between heaven and earth. In this concept only one centre could exist. Additional nuclei in the form of provincial capitals were subordinate to the capital, and were defined as way stations of the central power. Ideally, the provincial capitals were to be like planets surrounding the sun. In the cities, cosmology, ideology and religion were closely interwoven with the legitimization of rule. 3. The smaller intermediate cities Besides the nodes of international trade and the sacred centres, there were numerous small cities of local importance. On the one hand, these were nodes of regional and local trading networks, on the other hand the smaller cities were provincial capitals of the inland empires. In both cases these cities were way stations of a central authority, be it as a commercial centre, or the centre of an empire. The main function of these cities was to serve-the centre. Particularly in these smaller cities a combination between trade and provincial control could lead to a challenge of the respective centre. Pegu and Syriam in Burma were a potential and often a real challenge to centralized rule in Burma. In Java, we find an interdependency between the many port cities along the northern coast and the inland States centreed around a Kratong. The relation was uneasy most of the 15After regaining independence, following the first fall of Ayudhya the integration into the trading networks was strongly sponsored. Ayudhya dominated the western and eastern part of the peninsula. Ayudhya's position in the long distance trade is indicated as well by the quarters of the different ethnic groups in the south of the city. A shift took place following the reign of King Narai. In the subsequent period Ayudhya lost its control of the western part of the peninsula and trade meant primarily the junk trade with China. time as the i were the pr Tharmnarat, challenging Accordingly exemplary c centres coex Secondly, a nodality in politically a1 trading netw With the inv the commeru intention of and dominar establishing territorial co' the fortified having a na‘ They could s The inland S relevant for Europeans ft the “Spice is strong militz Instead of or changed fror. territories, th The Colonic. Initially, colc with an adja competing or limited for ' monopolize Southeast As fabric of the in the reahns of large seal Asian societi ll'lS rial nd ies the he ess of H 1nd .rm ray ike we cm s of etc vay :‘ an r in mid re a find and ' the nto tern the the l of 31 time as the inland states were not strong encugh to subjugate the port cities, nor were the port cities able to subjugate the inland states. Pattani, Nakom Sri Thammarat, Korat and Phitsanulok can be cited as examples of provincial cities challenging the central authority in Siam. Accordingly in Southeast Asia we find firstly a figuration of sacred cities as exemplary centres of empires (Ava, Mandalay, Ayudhya later Bangkok). These centres coexisted for most of the time, and shifts were due to military conquest. Secondly, a system of commercial cities in which centrality derived from nodality in trading relations, and thirdly, a system of provincial capitals ' politically and ideologically defined by the sacred centre or their position in the trading network. With the involvement of the Europeans in the Southeast Asian world economy, the commercial cities were the easiest prey. The reasons are that the main intention of the Europeans was to control and dominate trade. Thus the control and dominance of the commercial cities, either through conquest or through establishing competitive new centres like Batavia was more important than territorial control. Another advantage of the Europeans were their ships, namely the fortified trading ships. The security of the commercial cities depended on having a navy, exactly the sphere where the Europeans had most advantages. They could switch between being trader or pirate. The iniand states were less important for the dominance of trade, and thus less relevant for the Europeans. Only in those regions where goods which the Europeans found interesting were produced did they try to gain influence, as in the "Spice islands". But as the inland states and particularly the empires had strong military power, conquest was an adventure and if possible avoided. Instead of expensive warfare, treaties were agreed upon. Until colonial policy changed from the control of trade towards the production for trade in controlled territories, the inland states remained independent The Colonial Cities Initially, colonial cities emerged as commercial cities to either facilitate the trade with an adjacent region, as in the case of Amboon on the Moluccas, or as a competing commercial centre like Batavia. Colonization of the interior remained limited for the sake of protection, or, as in the case of the Moluccas, to monopolize the production of spices. "The first intrusion into the world of Southeast Asia was not accompanied by proforrnd structural changes within the fabric of the affected societies. Most of the Western activities and interests were in the realms of overseas trade and naval war. It was not until the introduction of large scale cultivation of commercial crops that the structure of Southeast Asian societies underwent a basic change" (W ertheim 1980: 1 3). 32 In the eighteenth century market-oriented production was enforced in Java by the Dutch through the cultivation of coffee, tobacco and spices under the so— called method of contingencies and forced deliveries. A plantation economy developed in the middle of the nineteenth century, initially under the management of the colonial governments and the companies, later under the management of private "planters". With the colonial administration turning towards territorial administration a dualism between the traditional rule of indigenous local elites and a colonial administration emerged. In Indonesia, intentionally, a dual pattern of administration was established with the western bureaucratic apparatus superimposed on the traditional structure. In Burma, which was under British rule after the third Anglo-Burmese war in 1885, the regions directly under British control were administered by a bureaucracy centralized in Rangoon, while other regions were left under so—called indirect rule.16 This dual pattern prevailed in the economy and society as well, and is discussed as "dual society" (Boeke 1980) or "plural society" (Furnivall 1980). With regard to urbanization, duality or plurality is indicated by the coexistence of the colonial capital (Batavia, Rangoon) and the indigenous centres (Yogyakarta, Mandalay), and within the cities by the coexistence of the European quarter, the centre of administration and international commerce, and the "native" quarters. The changes in the pattern of colonialism affected the rural areas, but also the cities, which is often overlooked. Besides their role as commercial cities, they became centres of territorial administratiOn. In territorial administration, the colonial powers very soon proved more efficient than their indigenous predecessors. The colonial headquarters turned into real centres of commerce and administration. The changes in the pattern of urbanism in the course of colonialism differs from one country to another. In Indonesia, where multiple nuclei and nodes existed, Batavia was the centre of colonial administration and colonial commerce while Surabaya remained as a centre in the connnerce among the Indonesian islands. The change from a centre of trade, and city defined as a commercial city, towards a centre of territorial administration, i. e. a colonial capital city, took place in Batavia with the introduction of the culture system, and especially the plantation economy in the middle of the nineteenth century. In Burma the transformation took longer. Initially, the main interest of the British were the resources of timber in Burma; later, with the conquering of the whole of lower 16One particular problem in Burma was that it became part of the Indian empire, and accordingly, a semi~autonomous self government of villages based on the Indian pattern was introduced, neglecting the differences between Indian and Burmese social structure. Burma, the dl Southeast Asi nineteenth ce- mainly in the ' of the Manda] and administn as the traditior of Javanese c1 by Melaka as Lumpur deve producer of lar The main imp into an econc colonial admir under control 1' between comn "bridgeheads" development i Burma. Siam, context. This several similar and the econo framework of : changes in th colonialism, b was not colon was forming Sr outwardly orir production of development c form of plant: century, and a developed at t' As these socio elite, from an '. but as a sacrer l’Quite simil of the nineteenth in Java by :ler the so; 1 economy under the under the on turning a1 rule of Indonesia, 1e western [n Burma, 1885, the treaucracy :d indirect 311, and is 'all 1980). Jexistence s centres :e of the rerce, and t also the ities, they ation, the 1digenous :ommerce :‘fers from s existed, rce while i islands. cial city, :ity, took :ially the urma the were the of lower pire, and item was 33 Burma, the delta region was deve10ped into a major rice producing region in Southeast Asia centred around Rangoon. However, it took until the end of the nineteenth century that the last independent Burmese state was conquered, mainly in the interest of finding an overland trade route to China.” With the fall of the Mandalay kingdom of Burma in 1885, Rangoon became the commercial and administrative centre, but Mandalay still remained the second biggest city, as the traditional capital of all Burmese, just as Yogyakarta remained the centre of Javanese culture. In Malaya, Singapore took over the position formerly held by Melaka as the node of international trade, with smaller cities like Kuala Lumpur developing as administrative seats when Malaya became a major producer of latex and tin at the early twentieth century. The main impact of colonialism was the forced integration of bigger territories : into an economy dominated by the EurOpean colonial governments. As the colonial administration proved more efficient and able to integrate the regions under control into one territory administered from a centre, the former separation between commercial and peasant production regions was dissolved. The colonial "bridgeheads" and "enclaves" became economic and administrative centres. This development is portrayed in quite some detail for Indonesia, the Philippines and Burma. Siam, as it escaped direct colonization, is not usually discussed in this context. This is in so far astonishing as the development of Bangkok bears several similarities to the development of Batavia as a centre of administration and the economy, but in contrast to the other colonial cities, developed in the framework of a "sacred city". In Siam it was not a foreign elite introducing those changes in the economy and administration which are the characteristics of colonialism, but an indigenous elite. The reason for embarking on this course was not colonial intervention, but the conditions when the new Siamese state was forming some twohundred years ago, which enforced the development of an outwardly oriented state, integrated into trading relations and instituting the production of goods for use in trade. The interesting point is that the development of Siam was in some regard a forerunner of colonial policies. A form of plantation economy was introduced already in the early nineteenth century, and a functional provincial administration of the whole kingdom was developed at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth. As these socio-economic and political changes were induced by an indigenous e’lite, from an indigenous centre, Bangkok was not defined as a"'colonial city", but as a sacred city in which traditions were conserved, which had important 1iQuite similarly, the conquest of Vientiane and Luang Prabang by the French at the end of the nineteenth century aimed at establishing a trade route to China. 34 impacts on the emergence of nationalism in Siam and the ideology of Bangkok up to the present. The commercial cities, where colonial domination found its starting point, were governed by the market, and those who dominated the market were the elite of the city. When the Europeans were able to dominate the market, either through military conquest of the city, or through founding competing centres, they emerged as the elite. They could, however, not become the ruling élite of the inland states by this method as they clearly lacked sacrality. The relationship between the European colonial power and the inland states became uneasy with the establishment of a plantation economy as this necessitated territorial control and administration. In the course of military couflicts the colonial centres became dominant, and on the basis of an efficient, western bureaucratic administration were able to turn the colonial capitals into the real centres of the colonies. The lack of sacrality, however, prohibited the integration of the Europeans into the traditional elites, and the colonial capitals, which also lacked sacrality were unable to replace the former exemplary centres. These later became a base in the struggle for independence. The conflict between "traditional" elites and "colonial" elites already took place in Siam during the early Bangkok period, and was settled when the administration turned into a real centralized administration, integrating regions outside of the core territory like Lanna Thai, Laos, the northeastern and southern regions at the end of the nineteenth and the early twentieth century. Thus no competing centre of indigenous culture could emerge in Siam. Neither was any other centre of power allowed to emerge, as this would have been a threat to the dominant position of the elite in Bangkok. Economic and political developments initiated by the elite to keep or enhance their position of power strengthened Bangkok's position as centre, thus giving rise to an extreme case of primacy. Jakarta: From Commercial City to Colonial City and National Capital Looking at the development of Batavia the changes in the pattern of colonialism can be recognized. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, at the mouth of the Tjiiliwong river, a factory with the name Nassau was founded following a treaty with the local ruler in the village of Jakarta. Initially, the place was used as intermediate anchorage for repairs of ships on their way to the Moluccas and as a warehouse.” IEThe representative of the V.O.C. resided in Banten, the commercial centre of the island region. As this prove: station and tra journey from where the goo- to Amsterdam too small for t] emerging city The main com the west of Jay size and (level: of a Dutch cit) protection fror had to be buili rapid influx of quarters of Bat to the former c In the middle follows: "Die umgeben, und welche mit vie Gassen, so all: wachsendem V der General in Extraordinar~R Burger oder In den Punten lie; sind ihrer viel treiben starker Garkochen, B mehrenteils kt monatlich dem As Cobban poi keen to engage inhabitants the "For most of its of Java, particu the city was 1 regard to cultu more heteroge 1976:55). sm 3a red 1nd nd 35 As this proved successful, the directors of the "V.O.C." thought to extend the station and transform it into a place Where the sailors could rest after the long journey from Holland, making it the main wharf in the region, and a location where the goods to be sent to Europe could be stracked before being dispatched to Amsterdam (Cobban 1976:47). The existing warehouse and factory became too small for these tasks. After more land was granted to the Dutch, in 1618, the emerging city was named Batavia. The main commercial competition for the new Dutch city was Banten, further in the west of Java. After Bantam was suppressed, Batavia was further extended in size and developed as a fortified city. The layout of Batavia followed the pattern of a Dutch city in Europe with several canals crossing through the area. To gain protection from fire, it was decreed in 1633 that all houses in the enwalled city had to be built of bricks. The success of Batavia as a centre for trade led to a rapid influx of people from other countries and regions who resided in specific quarters of Batavia, transforming Batavia into a real trading centre, quite similar to the former commercial cities. In the middle of the seventieth century, Schmalkalden describes Batavia as follows: "Die Stadt ist mit einer hohen Mauer und tiefen Wassergraben urngeben, und stehen in der Mauer gegen alle Gassen grofie viereckige Tiirme, welche mit vielen Stiicken versehen and mit Soldaten besetzt sind. Durch die Gassen, so alle nach der Schnur gleich angelegt, gehen Wassergraben, so mit wachsendem Wasser voll - und mit fallendem ablaufen. In dem Castell wohnet der General in einem schdnen, steinem Hause, ..., desgleichen alle Ordinar— und Extraordinar—Rate von India, item etliche Kaufleute und Assistenten. Die Burger oder Inwohner der Stadt Batavia, exklusive die Soldateska, welche auf den Punten liegen, sind entweder Indianer oder Hollander. Unter den Sinesen sind ihrer vie] gchen Vennt‘igens. Haben ihre eigenen Junken auf der See and treiben starken Kaufliandel. Etliche treiben Kramerei oder nahren sich mit Garkochen, Brandewein, Tobak und Bierzapfen. Diese letzteren haben mehrenteils keine eigenen Hauser, sondern wohnen zur Miet und gehen monatlich dem Eigentumsherm grol3en Zins davon" (J oost 1983:1031). As Cobban points out, the ruling élite of Batavia was outward-looking, and not keen to engage itself in territorial control of inner Java. For the supply of the inhabitants the vicinity where rice and vegetables were grown was sufficient. "For most of its early existence, Dj akarta was isolated from the life of other parts of Java, particularly the interior. During the first part of the seventeenth century, the city was largely outward-looking in its interests and heterogenetic with regard to cultural change, though during the first two centuries it was perhaps more heterogenetic than the traditional city of Southeast Asia" (Cobban 1976:55). 36 Primarily due to security reasons the territory surrounding Batavia was extended in the course of several wars with inland Javanese powers, until the island was under the political domination of the governor general residing in Batavia. When with the rise of British colonialism the centre of commerce in Asia shifted from Southeast Asia to India, Batavia's position was weakened in favour of Calcutta. Initially as addition to profits from trade, later increasingly as the base of the V.O.C.‘s profits, the production of goods for trade was enforced by the colonial government Batavia changed from a primarily commercial city towards an administrative centre of Indonesia. When the military threat from the interior was removed, people could move out of the direct environs of Batavia, which proved to be rather unhealthy, into the Suburb of Weltevreden. Obviously, to build a city in the tropics following Dutch patterns and urban concepts was not appropriate. The canals, which were useful in the Netherlands, proved to be excellent breeding grounds for anopheles mosquitoes, making Batavia the graveyard of the "white men" in Asia. In Weltevreden "the stuffy Dutch canal houses were replaced by country villas - roomy, airy and cool - surrounded by extensive gardens. The new houses of the Dutch certainly gained some inspiration from the Javanese Priyayi home (aristocratic home), just as the suburb plan of the streets, with a large square and wide roads radiating out from it, was imitative of the Javanese kratong-based cities" (McGee 1967:51). With the move of the colonial élite into the suburbs, the old city area became the main residential area of the Chinese and the less well-to-do Europeans. Surrounding the old city were several kampung of different ethnic groups. Until the end of the nineteenth century, the population was hardly in excess of 100,000. Karsten describes the living conditions in Batavia as follows: "As regards housing, the Europeans lived in large, spacious 'old Indies‘ homes with enormous yards, The kampung were extensive, but the buildings in them were primitive and scattered, hence a certain amount of crops were still usually grown in the large compounds. Hence also, the character of the kampung in the town was, with only a few exceptions, still completely rural. The Chinese were required to live in the “Chinese camp‘, which, with the old Dutch quarters dating from the seventeen and eighteenth centuries, was the only section of the town fully built up. The intermediary group of lesser Europeans did not live 'in the kampung', or practically not so, but rather for a part in the older sections of the town and for the rest here and there along the highways" (Dutch Scholars 1958:VI). The urban growth of Batavia remained limited. Most of the population increase resulted from immigration from Europe, China etc., less from rural urban migration in Java itself. Urbanization was not centred on Batavia alone, as Batavia did not emerge as the undisputed administrative and even less so, economic centre Bandung played : remained limited namely Batavia, other Southeast A reach a high deg biggest and secon Burma from 1:2 I Indonesia the shit Batavia was four Banten's. The élitx challenge to Bata However, as a co conflicts on Java selected due to its territory under co: Indonesian states elites, and conune With the rise of B in trade, the polio Batavia was transl economy. Batavia administrative cer indigenous elites, harbour cities (80] Dutch overrule, th the Dutch. With independent: Jakarta (the capita main groups, natit independence (Scl lead to the emerg nation, as happen: Jakarta itself. As : undisputed econor developed as und' the city was loc controlled, remain Sponsored the poli as the economic or is comparatively s: 3'? economic centre of Java. Besides Batavia, Yokyakarta, Semarang, Surabaya, Bandung played a role. A survey in 1930 indicated in general that urban growth remained limited, but it was concentrated in the larger and biggest towns, namely Batavia, Bandung, Semarang and Surabaya. In fact, in comparison to other Southeast Asian capital cities, Jakarta, as Batavia was later called, did not reach a high degree of primacy. While the change of the relation between biggest and second biggest city during the period from 1911 to 1958 changed in Burma from 1:2 to 1:4, and in Thailand from 1:15 in 1947 to 1:26 in 1960, in Indonesia the shift was small with a change from 1:1 to 1:3 (McGee 1967:54). Batavia was founded as a commercial city, as a competitor of Melaka and Banten's. The élite of the city were the representatives of the Dutch V.0.C. Any challenge to Batavia and the elite of Batavia implied a challenge to the V.0.C. However, as a commercial city, there was only limited involvement in internal conflicts on Java itself. Batavia was a place for entrepot trade at a location selected due to its value for navigation. Only in order to secure Batavia was the tenitory under control extended. In this regard, Batavia fitted into the pattern of Indonesian states as differentiations between inland states dominated by landed elites, and commercial cities dominated by traders. With the rise of British colonialism and the increasing dominance of the British in trade, the policy shifted towards the production of goods used for trade, and Batavia was transformed into a centre of colonial administration and the colonial economy. Batavia was the link between colony and mother country. Batavia as administrative centre of the whole of Indonesia implied the integration of two indigenous elites, namely the landed aristocracy and the commercial elites of the harbour cities (Schiel 1985:428f0. The integration of these groups was based on Dutch overrule, that is, the domination of territorial control and the .economy by the Dutch. With independence Batavia (the capital of the Dutch East Indies) was renamed Jakarta (the capital of Indonesia). Just as Dutch colonial rule integrated the two main groups, nationalism provided a common framework for these groups after independence (Schiel 1985:429). The conflicts between the main groups did not lead to the emergence of a new, competitive centre, or secessions within the nation, as happened in Burma, but to a conflictual situation of the élite within Jakarta itself. As such, Jakarta was the national capital, but not necessarily the undisputed economic or cultural and political centre. Under Sukarno Jakarta was developed as undisputed administrative centre while Surabaya, partly because the city was located away from the administrative centre and thus less controlled, remained the centre of trade in Indonesia. Under Suharto, who again sponsored the policy of integration into the world market, Jakarta was developed as the economic centre, at the expense of Surabaya. Thus, the primacy of Jakarta is comparatively small and quite a recent phenomenon. ‘ - -:1=-.rm.~._v.~ew7_.g“ .24. 38 Singapore: From Commercial Entrepfit to City State Singapore was founded by Raffles after Java, which he regarded as a better location, had to be returned to the Dutch following the Napoleonic Wars. From the very beginning Singapore was to be a centre of trade in Southeast Asia, and the east-west trade between British India and China. The British Colonial government was the administration of the city, in which, however, the settlement of Chinese, Indians, Arabians and Malays was Sponsored. Singapore was multiethnic just as Melaka had been before. As long as the different groups obeyed law and order that is, did not involve themselves in fights with each other, put obstacles in the way of commerce in Singapore, etc. they were more or less left under the government of the local leaders. The elite consisted of different, loosely connected groups, namely the British colonial administrators and the businessmen of the different ethnic groups. Singapore's role as commercial centre remained even after Malaya was under British colonial dominance. The administrative capital was at Kuala Lumpur, not in Singapore. After independence, initially it was planned that Singapore should become part of the Malay Federation. This, however, was problematic for the Malay government as with Singapore the Chinese would have been the biggest ethnic group of Malaysia. It was also problematic for Singapore as it was expected that the different ethnic groups within Singapore would lose their status. Obviously, Singapore could not be integrated into the Malay territorial state, as it might have implied that Singapore would become the economic and potentially the administrative centre of Malaysia. The continuity of Singapore as a commercial city implied its development as an independent city state. As such, however, Singapore was a foreign body within Southeast Asia: the pOpulation consisted predominantly of non-Southeast Asians.l9 While elsewhere the territorial nation states emerged, Singapore developed as a city state. In the nation-states nationalism was propagated as ideology, in Singapore it was difficult to construct nationalism as the different groups came from different nations. The meaning to be connected to the new city state was the meaning of Singapore as an entrepot in which the different groups were connected by the market, integrated primarily into the world economy, and only secondarily into the region. The city government had as its task keepking law and order so that commerce was not endangered, and sponsoring commerce in the city. A nationalism of a commercial city developed, not based on former glory or sacrality, but on current economic success. Any '9The autobiography of Lee Kean Yew (1993) provides excellent information about the political struggle between Singapore and Malaysia, after independence when Singapore was merged with Malaysia challenge to t of Singapore. Rangoon: Frn Rangoon's rir deve10pment : the world. Prir was the main than lower Bl towards lower Rangoon in subordinate or British and In. the Indian patt this was "Britt the Burmese, "legitimate" or The legitimac Buddhism, but Indian Mating interference v furthermore th- in their career society and cu This had three 1 . Buddhism ] colonial rule; 2. the lack of internal factior which the diffe 3. the colonial tendencies of f after independt While in Indor could be used rule did nothir indirectly, it st the frontier pet and barring the 1 better 5. From sia, and Iolonial ttlement ire was groups ith each re more .isted of listrators as under Lumpur, ingapore blematic been the ore as it .ose their :erritorial )mic and em as an 1y within Southeast :ingapore tgated as different I the new different he world had as its :red, and .eveloped, cess. Any . about the gapore was 39 challenge to the ruling elite was defined as a challenge to the economic Success of Singapore. Rangoon: From Colonial City to Capital City without a Nation Rangoon‘s rise as a centre of territorial administration was based on the development of the Irrawaddy delta region into the main rice-producing area of the world. Prior to colonialism the centre of Burma was in upper Burma, as this was the main region for agricultural production, and more densely populated than lower Burma. The development of the delta region led to an overall shift towards lower Burma as population centre and as main agricultural region. Thus Rangoon in fact became the centre of Burma while Mandalay was the subordinate centre of upper Burma. The meaning of the city was defined by the British and Indian immigrants as the centre of colonial administration based on the Indian pattern, because Burma was part of the Indian empire. As Hall argues, this was "Britain‘s greatest mistake in dealing with Burma" (Hall 19772730). For the Burmese, Rangoon was a place of' residence only, as it was not a "legitimate" centre. The legitimacy of a centre was defined by a ruler through his support of Buddhism, but as Hall shows, "the Queen's proclamation of 1858 following the Indian Mutiny ordered all British authorities in India to abstain from all interference with the religious belief or worship" (Hall 1977:?33), and furthermore the governors of Burma saw this post only as an intermediate station in their career which was focused on India, and were not interested in Burmese society and customs and followed the Indian pattern of colonial administration. This had three effects: 1. Buddhism provided one major base for nationalism and the challenge to colonial rule; 2. the lack of support of the Sangha by the authorities led to its decline and internal factionalisrn, thereby destroying the Sangha as an organization into which the different regions of Burma were integrated; 3. the colonial administration did not provide a base for national unity. Thus, the tendencies of factionalism, segmentation and secessions could not be controlled after independence. While in Indonesia colonial government led to national unity, and nationalism could be used as common framework for diverging factions, in Burma "British rule did nothing to foster national unity. On the contrary, both directly and indirectly, it stimulated sectional particularism. It separated Burma proper from the frontier peoples Also by opening the armed forces to the minor peoples and barring them to the Burmese, it fostered racial antagonism and subverted the ‘.: --.~u-_m.-e,-p__-z_;-_n_. .. 40 internal balance of power, rendering it unstable. The object of British policy distancet was to develop the material resources of Burma by throwing it open for free 0f Southf enterprise to all the world on equal terms. This multiplied sectional diversity by centre Of' attracting a host of inassimilable alien elemen " (Fumivall 1960:22). For The foal: Furnivall, nationalism could provide a framework for the integration of the peasant“ different groups and ethnicities of Burma. As Taylor notes, following Furnivall, primal-fly nationalism hardly ever emerged as a unifying force, but the nationalist potential: movement was factionalized and several groups within Burmese society were about urb excluded or alienated (Taylor and Turton 1988). to 3010111“; Taylor describes Burmese culture and society as an amalgam of cultural the SOUth‘ adaptations, borrowing, enrichments and convolutions. Crucial here is the During th varying relationship and evolving synthesis between a central culture and separatist ecological system and a variety of different, but internally rather homogeneous revolts in peripheries, from whence the central culture had received varied inputs (Taylor Spread fm and Turton 1988:44). After independence this synthesis was destroyed and and the di Burma was unmade through factionalism and secessions. Rangoon was the Bangkok, capital city of a country, the centre of an administration, but far from a the citiw "nationa " capital. The nation was limited to the vicinity of Rangoon and some about by bigger cities. After the coup d’état by General Ne Win in 1962, the separatist Manila (I and opposition movements were suppressed, the world beyond the borders shut Vietnam : out, and all enterprises, industries etc. put under state ownership in the course of the "Burmese way to Socialism". Except as centre of administration, Rangoon 1:13:22: lost all of its former meaning and function as a link between the world economy Cambodiz and national economy. Due to Rangoon's position as administrative centre, any ofphmm conflict in Rangoon is a conflict with the governing élite, Than, Rajah (1996) Civil war and is crushed accordingly. Nationalism is ruined through its exercise by the than cent government, and national unity exists only on the basis of the gun barrels of the cities, a“ military. Rangoon is the base of an élite exploiting the people of a divided. Southeast country movemen the nodes Present Patterns of Urbanization _ Cities are definitely not alien to Southeast Asian society. Since the emergence of The. ion“ the first empires and integration into long-distance trade, cities have been a Sim Er: feature of Southeast Asia. They emerged as sacred centres of the empires and as I: 3681:) independent commercial cities at the nodes of long distance trading systems. fmcfiona. ‘ The heterogeneity of the cities is not generated through colonialism. Even the ,1. t r I. sacred cities had large proportions of non-indigenous populations, namely the e l e“ o traders from all over the region, the Brahmins, Arabs etc. Primacy is not a recent phenomenon either. The capitals of the different states had to be primate cities to 20A fl reflect their position as the centre, and the commercial city states depended in as math their rise and development on their ability to create and control a node of long- policy 'or free sity by 2). For of the mivall, ionalist .3! were :ultural is the we and geneous (Taylor 'ed and vas the from a 1d some paratist ers shut Jurse of .angoon conomy itre, any 1 (1996) a by the ls of the divided gence of : been a s and as systems. Even the mely the a recent cities to ended in of long- 4] distance trading routes. Colonialism in this regard realized the implicit ideology . of Southeast Asian urbanism. The capital as exemplary centre became the real centre of the economy and administration. The focus of discussions of protest and revolt in terms of peasant revolts or peasant movements is in line with the perspective of Southeast Asian society as primarily a peasant society. Only recently workers have been mentioned as a potential for revolt. While quite a lot is known about peasant revolts, knowledge about urban social movements is extremely limited, especially for periods prior to colonialism or independence. Does this imply that revolts did not happen in the Southeast Asian cities? During the last decades, revolts and protest movements (with the exception of separatist movements) usually took place in the capital city. In Burma, the revolts initiated by students and intellectuals were centred on Rangoon and spread from there to other cities. In Thailand, the abolition of absolutism in 1932 and the dissolution of the military dictatorship in 1973 were results of revolts in Bangkok, not of peasant movements. In Malaysia, the riots of 1969 happened in "the cities.20 The fall of the Marcos regime in the Philippines was not brought about by the National Liberation Army of the Philippines, but by protests in Manila (more precisely, the financial quarter of Manila). The case of South Vietnam and the Lou No] government of Cambodia indicate, from a different perspective, that only after the capital city is taken can lasting changes be implemented. After the cOup d'état in 19?0, the Lon Nol government of Cambodia hardly had any control over the country apart from the direct vicinity of Phnom Phen; it remained in power, however, until 1975. In Burma, during the civil war (1948 - 52), the central government at times hardly controlled more than central Rangoon. Obviously, cities, and particularly the capital primate cities, are crucial for stabilizing or destabilizing governments and elites in Southeast Asia. There is undoubtedly a need for an analysis of social movements, revolts and political change from the perspective of the cities, i. e. the nodes of political, economic, and cultural relations. The concentration of political power in the capital city and the heterogeneity of social groups make an analysis of urban social movements in Southeast Asian cities both important and difficult. Conflicts in the cities might he struggles between factions of an elite, popular uprising might be supported and functionalized by a social gmup to enhance its own position either within the elite, or in relation to the elite. Small demonstrations might short-circuit and 2“its these revolts had an ethnic dimension, it is logical that they took place in the cities, as most Chinese resided in urban areas. 42 progress into all-out revolt, thus losing there character as movements focusing on urban issues. While movements of peasants can be defined as "peasant movements", in the cities there are several political and social movements, which cannot unequivocally be regarded as "urban movements", namely the workers' movements, ethnic movements etc. Was the fight against the Ne Win government in Burma in 1988 or the revolt of 1973 in Bangkok an urban movement? The revolution of the Khmer Rouge had far-reaching implications for the cities in Cambodia, but it was definiter not an urban movement. In the same way, the demonstrations in 1998 on the streets of Jakarta were doubtlessly crucial for the removal of Suharto, but they were not part of an urban social movement In Southeast Asia it is difficult to point at genuine urban social movements, understood as movements based on specific urban issues, because movements aiming at general political change and urban movements can hardly be separated. The concentration of power in the major cities implies that urban issues are simultaneously issues touching the basis of state power. As the political elite was and still is based in the capital city, and depends on the capital city, any modification of the meaning of the city implies a modification of the elite and the organization of the state. We find a congruence between capital city, elite and state formation. The development of the cities as "national capitals" implied an increase of the bureaucracy, particularly the substitution of the colonial administrators with native people. As Evers shows, the number of civil servants increased rapidly following independence. This bureaucracy was necessary for the domination of the territory. Agricultural production was sufficient to feed the urban population, but economic growth was insufficient to create employment opportunities. Only a small percentage of the inhabitants of the primate cities found employment in the industries newly established at the periphery. "The result was a proliferation of people in low-income service sectors" (Armstrong and McGee 1985:89), "cities grow, despite their failure to industrialize, not because of industrialization" (McGee I967: 18). The bureaucracy and particularly the bureaucratic elite was centred in the capital city. McGee points to the importance of nationalism as the ideology, propagated by the western-educated new bureaucratic elites, in building up loyalty and as a powerful and believable rationale for change. This nationalism was essentially an urban phenomenon and had its base in the cities, because within the cities the educational and political institutions were located. This nationalism was connected with authoritarian rule, or personal leadership, most strongly shown by Sukarno in Indonesia, Phibulsongkhram and later Sarit in Thailand. Personal leadership and nationalism found its expression in the cities in the form of monuments, most important of course "national monuments", spacious boulevards use: was characteri: style. The natio with the pre-int the 'god—king‘" "pseudo-investt Until World W2 growth. Bairocl the maximum 1988:495). F011 and the Philipp was around 15 '3 biggest city ~ th: as a blessing E Southeast Asia urbanization", urbanization wa; While in Europe by industrializat development, t industrialization The productive the increased or been made po particularly of g Bairoch's is on agricultural pro agricultural pro- discussion of th remained within in urban areas), t a few very big I cities depends on population is su] thereby self-perp 2'This is certain of Thailand and 1nd large cities. Clearly, focusing 'peasant rements, :1er the Ne Win n urban iications t. In the .btlessly a social ements, 'ements 'dly be t urban As the capital I of the capital of the rs with rapidly tion of llation, 3. Only cent in eration 55:89), se of capital agated ld as a ntially ies the 1 was shown :rsonal rm of acious 43 boulevards used for parades, central squares etc. The style of these constructions was characterized by monumentalit , somewhat reminiscent of Italian fascist style. The national capitals assumed th "character of the 'cult centres' associated with the pre-industrial era, only now the rites of nationalism replace the rites of the 'god—king‘" (McGee 1967:19). This led, to what Ginsburg refers to as the "pseudo-investment into the costly trappings of nationalism". Until World War 11 urban growth remained limited, hardly exceeding pOpulation growth. Bairoch calculates that under the condition of a traditional agriculture the maximum possible of urbanization is between 10 and 15 % (Bairoch 1988:495). Following data of McGee's (1967), with the exception of Malaysia and the Philippines the degree of urbanization in Southeast Asia during 1960 was around 15 %. Nevertheless, due to the concentration of urban growth on the biggest city - the primate cities - in the late fifties, urbanization was not regarded as a blessing any more. The pattern of urban growth discernible in some Southeast Asian societies was defined as "over-urbanization", "hyper- urbanization", "urban hypertmphy" (Bairoch 1988:457), to indicate that urbanization was not based on industrialization and modernization.21 While in Europe, North America and Australia, urbanization was accompanied by industrialization, increase of agricultural productivity and general economic development, the cities in the Third World were growing although industrialization remained limited, and agricultural production did not increase. The productive capability of the developing countries was insufficient to feed the increased urban pOpulation. "The urban expansion of the Third World has been made possible, despite low agricultural productivity, by imports, particularly of grain" (Bairoch 1988:4652). For Southeast Asia this remark of Bairoch's is only partially valid as urbanization still remained low and agricultural productivity was high. Most countries are net exporters of agricultural products. Bairoch‘s argument can be used, however, for the discussion of the role of the primate cities. Although urbanization in total remained within the frame given by Bairoch (10 - 15 % of the population resides in urban areas), the concentration of the urban population in one primate city, or a few very big cities (as in Indonesia), implies that the reproduction of these cities depends on the domination of an increasing territory, from which the urban population is supplied with agricultural products. Dominance and primacy are thereby self-perpetuating. Reproduction of the city depends on the domination of ——-——__ 2l'l'his is certainly changing at present. Economic development, leading to the discussion of Thailand and Indonesia as the "little tigers " and new NIC, is strongly concentrated in the large cities. Clearly, urbanization is at present closely linked with industrialization. 44 a territory, which in turn leads to the concentration of population in this city, which again requires the increase of territory under the dominance of the city. For the sixties and early seventies, McGee (1976) differentiates between the following patterns of urbanization: 1. Singapore as a city state deliberately sponsoring urbanization. Up to the late fifties, Singapore was rather similar to all other big cities in the region, characterized by the dominance of low productivity tertiary occupations. During the sixties, Lee Kuan Yew sponsored the integration into the world ecouomy, through the establishment of export zones etc., and urban renewal, or the destruction of the old Chinese-type houses in the inner city area, and the building of new high-rise flats as residential areas. With political stability, foreign capital investment increased. The policy of establishing educational institutions and bringing them up to European and American standard led to the growth of a qualified labour force in Singapore. Evidently, Singapore proves that urbanization and economic development coincide. 2. In Malaysia, urbanization and economic development are closely interwoven as well. There is, however, a problem in that the cities are primarily inhabited by Indians and Chinese, while the Malay reside mainly in their Kampung. This imbalance between ethnicity and rural or urban residence is a potential for conflict, which in fact took place in 1969, and is still smouldering below the surface (Abraham 199?). 3. Indonesia is cited as a case of urban involution. Java is very densely populated, but shows only a low level of urbanization. People are pushed from the countryside into the cities, but economic deveIOpment is not proceeding fast enough to provide employment for the urban population. "Thus the majority of population in the cities moves into a labour-intensive traditional economic sector characterized by underemployment, low productivity, and very low incomes" (McGee 1976:70). Thailand was not taken into consideration by McGee in his typology. Following Goldstein's (1976) discussion of the pattern of urbanization in Thailand from 1947 to 1967, economic growth was based on the export of agricultural products, mainly rice. Industrialization was limited. Most of the newly established industries (1 ,12? of 2, 1 7"?) were located in metropolitan Bangkok. At the end of the sixties, the situation was modified through American military spending and development aid. Based on these, infrastructure was built in the provinces, thereby connecting these regions more strongly with Bangkok. The use of Bangkok as a Rest and Recreation station increased the demand for service and petty occupations. Altogether, economic growth took place in Thailand, but it is difficult to estimate in how far urbanization was a catalyst for development or not. While the capit after World We million inhabita cities, the scare] the other hand, \Vhile in the cat to his decision 1 into suburbs d: affected. Urban and shifts of the While in the per after the sixtie: ideologies. In 1' dissolved in fav: an ideology of 1 the name of development we Development w.- regime. Whether circumstances 0 ignored though namely the new Since the sevem Southeast Asia Armstrong and 1‘ 1. Slow urbani: Population grow 2. high degree 0 in Singapore; 3. quite rapid in sponsorship of i1 4. slow urbaniza development an 1985 :89ff). The capital citi: nationalism" to t the "rites" of 11a! capitals, the reg.- office towers, 3}: bars, often but 1 this city, he city. tween the to the late 1e region, as. During economy, 31, or the , and the stability, :lucational led to the Iroves that iterwoven labited by ung. This ential for Jelow the ' densely :hed from eding fast lajority of nic sector incomes" iollowing and from Iicultura] 16 newly igkok. At 1 military ilt in the kok. The nand for place in talyst for 45 While the capital cities in Southeast Asia had fewer than 1 million inhabitants after World War II, now they are among the world‘s biggest cities, with several million inhabitants. Urban growth implies on the one hand in-migration into the cities, the search for employment and urban "involution", shanty towns etc. On the other hand, urban growth implies the extension of the territory of the city. While in the case of migration, the peasant becomes integrated into the city due to his decision to migrate the transformation of villages at the urban periphery into suburbs does not leave any chance for decision-making among those affected. Urban growth is accompanied by readjustrnents of the urban ecology, and shifts of the central areas of the city. While in the period following independence nationalism was the major ideology, after the sixties, development and modernization were taken as the main ideologies. In Indonesia the policy of dissociation installed by Sukarno was dissolved in favour of a policy of integration into the world market. In Malaysia, an ideology of modernization was propagated as the new state ideology under the name of the "look east" policy. In Singapore, modernization and development was the main issue after Lee Kuan Yew became prime minister. Development was installed as the major ideology in Thailand during the Sarit regime. Whether or not these policies led to an overall improvement of the living circumstances of the people in Southeast Asia can be disputed; it cannot be ignored though that economic growth took place, and that at least for some, namely the new elites, their living conditions were significantly improved. Since the seventies, the pattern of urbanization has changed again. Altogether, Southeast Asia is one of the fastest developing regions of the Third World. Armstrong and McGee differentiated four main patterns: 1. Slow urbanization, slow economic development and industrialization. Population growth is predominantly absorbed in the countryside, as in Indonesia; 2. high degree of urbanization, rapid economic growth and industrialization, as in Singapore; 3. quite rapid urbanization accompanied by economic growth and successful sponsorship of industrialization, as in Malaysia; 4. slow urbanization with large rural populations anda policy aiming at rural development and industrialization, as in Thailand (Armstrong and McGee 1985:8911). The capital cities shift from being national centres, or the "cult centres of nationalism" to being the centres of modernization in a globalizing world. Just as the "rites" of nationalism needed national monuments as regalia in the national capitals, the regalia for the rites of modernization are the skyscrapers used as office towers, apartment houses or hotels, and the shOpping centres and yuppie bars, often built following latest architectural fashions. The Brahmins 46 conducting the state ceremonies in the sacred cities, and the military using the open spaces for their rites of nationalism are more and more replaced by the technocrats. Institutions of higher learning, private and public, are erected, tutorial classes in English and MBA courses are offered in private homes or shophouses. The march towards a global knowledge society is under way. Circuits of Urbanization on the Malay Peninsula Urbanization in Malaysia, as indeed in any country, is not an isolated phenomenon but represents a process intricately connected with the overall economic, social and political development of the nation.22 But in addition, -' Malaysials urban past has been shaped by outside forces as much as by local ones. In fact, urbanization in Malaysia can be seen as a process of increasing local involvement, from entrepfit cities lacking hinterlands, through the period of colonial urbanization, to the post-colonial system in which the dynamics of urbanization are increasingly shaped by internal economic and social forces, before this is supplemented and eventually overtaken by the forces of globalization. Two Circuits of Colonial Urbanization The geographical position of West Malaysia has been one of the major factors in its development. It is at one and the same time a barrier and a connecting link between Indian and Chinese civilization, between the Asian land mass and the Southeast Asian island world and the Pacific. The historical importance of the Malay Peninsula is derived from this geographical position rather than from the size and development of its population. Indeed, Malaya seems to have been sparsely populated right up to the twentieth century and even now has reached a population density that is relatively low compared to those of other Asian areas. In line with the sparse population, productive capacity was low in pre~colonial times and the surplus for trade from agriculture, handicraft or mining must have been modest by all accounts. The first traces of urban life apparently developed under Indian influence with the establishment of small polities patterned on an Indian state ideology from the ninth century onwards. Unlike the large Southeast Asian empires of the Khmer, Thais, and Javanese - who could establish cities and strong central authorities based on surpluses accumulated from irrigation-fed agriculture, the Malay principalities flourished by means of' entreth trade. These embryonic urban centres developed on the east coast as well as the west coast from the fourteenth century onwards. Kota Bahru, Kuala Terengganu, and 22This section is based on Evers 1983b. Melaka are playing an Melaka, fo competitior differed in other ports the produc geography, passing thr exchange 0 of India" (V thus the re peasant prc mercantile I Melaka unt the British from Bomt century, th comparison for industr colonialisrr In about the the Malay I or Alur Set coast could With the fo Melaka's f: already at t call hypoth circuit" we forms, inch system of 5 discussion 23m: elal is, howevnr, words, betwe labour power different way ...
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SE A ST 1 - (Week 3) Urbanism - 2. Urbanism in Southeast...

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