7.3 - LeSlie Dwyer and Degung Santikarma, ‘Speaking from...

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Unformatted text preview: LeSlie Dwyer and Degung Santikarma, ‘Speaking from the Shadows: memory and mess violenoe in Bali’, in Pouligny et a]. Aftet Moss Crime: Rebuilding Stereo and Communities, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2007, pp. 190—214. ' COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Copyright Regofations 1 969 Warning This material has been reproduced and communicated to you by or on behalf of the Univereity of Melbourne pursuant to Part VB of the Copyright Act 1968 (the ACE} The material in this communication may be subject to copyright under the Act. Any further copying or communication of this material by you may be the subject of copyright protection under the fitct. Do not remove this notice —_————|—|—- - .- . I' |.-u_|_- "fbul£9,yI..'BéeMch Mme Citrate/men I 'I axe/scat romaine (are), he has Cass: - it. I_ - IIII.- l u I . 190 H _,_, _ g - . 3L3 Cris?" Wflffi Oi“? a“ I I ' "SPEAKING FROM THE SHADOWS 191 UV} aim/i7 ms; 75%0 QCO7 I _ L I _ . . ' - I I anti~ceinmunist vielence. Between Octeber 1965and March 1966, ep- 8 I I I preximately ene' millien Ihdenesians were killed as alleged cemmunists, . . I , seme 70,000 ethers were imprisened'witheut trial, unteld numbers ef -,_:I ' I i' . , I . II I_II_II wemen were sexually assaulted and hundreds ef theusands et family from - members ef these killed er' imprisened were stamped with the label ef ' . . . . _ _ “unclean envirenment” (rides: bersiii iingiciingen) and deprived ef basic 01611101“)? and mass VIOlenCe 111 Ball civil- rights until the fall ef President Suharte’s 32-year military-backed % - dictatership in 1998.3 The island ef Bali is knewn te have experienced LEIIIEIIIIII Dwyw and Dgguflg gamikarma . _ ' . - ' - - seine ef the meat intense vielence, with seine. 80,000 te 100,000 suspected leftists (appreximately S te 8 per cent ef the island’s pepulatien) killed _ - I ' - by military and paramilitary ferces.3 Per the past feu'r decades — and - especially under Suharte’s “New Order” gevernment —. Balinese have struggled with a legacy ef eppressien and vielence a _ abeut articulating memeiies ef terrer iii a ., milieu in which state pewer, teurism capital and the embeddedness ef vii rid with ambivalence secial, pelitical and ecIenemic I;I;. elence in intimate secial relatiens'have censtrained discursive pessibil; ' _ ities. Despite a change in regime, and with it calls fer a Natienal TIUth and Recenciliatien Cemmissien (Kemisi Kebenara'n dan Rekensiliasi . . _ ' . ' ' Nasienal) te be fermed in Indenesia,"flIL these issues have net-lest their pet: I Ne, we have net fergetten, and we have net let em children fergctI. Fergctting III gflflncy far mast Balinesfl Survivflrs Bf thIE Vifllgflcg fif-lgfisféfiI whose SUI}. _ has net been eur preblem. The preblem is hew te live tegether with what we . . . .- . . _ . __ ,,_, --.- , ~ - ,, IIIIII IIEITIBIIIIIIIIIIII _ JECtIVIIIES and secial pathways IhaveIIb-een shaped by the eIngeing engage- v- Balinese surviver et' the anti-cemmunist massacres ef 1965;66 ' -" mam, in? Pas? Ell-35:31.“; a? Til-E Film? “me 33 the” VDICES haVE I been _ - . marginalized fre-ih mainstream discussiens ef “transitienal justice" er ' _ ' “pestI-ceiiflict peace~building”. ' Any attempt at facilitating recenciliatien in the wake ef mass crimes must ' " OUT film in .thifi 'ChflPtET is m Pde3 “flight 111m 110‘” Ballflfi-SE 1'13“? address the place ef memery.1 Fer it is memery that links past vielence, lived tegether 'in the aftermath ef mass vielence, analysing the place ef betrayal and cemniunity fragmentatien te the engeing pelitics ef the memery in beth centinuing cemmiinity tensiens and attempts at natienai present, shaping the limits and pessibilities ef re—imagining secial life. ' ‘ ‘ The relatienship ef memery te peace-building may, hewever, be far mere I the village elf Kesiman en cemplex than is eften censidered by pel' ' ' - , whem we have engaged in discussien abeut their m'emeries ef 1965/66 Memery may effer a language ef hepe, a greunding fer assertiens ef I and their negetiatiens ef secial life in the aftermath ef this peried during “never again”, but memery may alse previde the spark fer centinuing feur years ef anthrepelegical fieldwerk we pay special attentien te hew cenfiict Memery can tester a sense ef shared experience and cemmunity * memeries ef vielence tend te be neither mimetic ner fixed, examining selidarity, and menier can feed feelings ef persecutien and revenge -~ ~ . ,I5; I: hew the public narratien ef past atrecities has been blecked and chan- Memery can previde the material threugh which secial mechanisms — 7. nelled in particular directiens.5 We argue that merrier in. this centext is frem ritual te myth te infermal narrative te fermal truth and recencilia- an inherently pelitical act, but ene that escapes easy censcriptien by con- tien cemmissiens — werk te recensider histery and epen discussien ef the "5’ ‘ ‘ . ceptual eppesitiens such as eppressien versus resistance, silence versus traumatic experiences ef individuals and cemmunities. And memery can ff: SPEEChi hiStDIB’ VEFSUS mfimflf‘l’i Cflflfiiflt VETSUS IECDHCilifltiflfl er a distant be suppressed, channelled and transmuted inte new terms ef SUb}ECtl‘v'lty if past and its “werking threugh” er “lettiiiglge”. Threugh this clese fecus that may beth repreduce and recede relatiens ef inequality, vielence and I; 011 precesses ef recallng and distancing vielence, a number ef key ques- terrer ' , ‘ tiens emerge: Hew is past vielence lecated in centemperary secial prac— Since 1999, we have been engaged in a cellaberative ethnegraphic tice?'Hew are memeries expressed er hidden in a secial field dense with fieldwerk preject with survivers ef Indenesia’s 1965/66 state-spensered ' '_ traces ef betrayal and the fragmentatien ef intimate relatiens? And hew a After innss criine: Rebniiding states and cenininnities, Peniigny, Chesternien and Schnabei . it’risi, iiiiiteii Niiiieiis Univenriry Press, 200?, iSBN 073926084334 I qlqllwi. . ._..\_.__ .. . .— . .-\.-\...._—I —— .—u.—-.._-..- .._._-. __ _- - F . l rr-u—u—n—r-n-n—I—n-u —“ "."" '_. I .,_ . 'lCl’E‘, DWYER AND SANTTKA‘RMA might precesses ef rebuilding self and seciety take place eutside ef er in critical dialegue with fermal peace—buildiiig mechanisms? Like the ether chapters in this velume, eurs is a werk ef cemmitted schelarship, greunded in an engagement with lecal struggles and dedi- cated te a transfermatieri ef the terms threugh which secial justice might be cenceived and premeted. In highlighting the specificity ef relatiens ameng vielence, memery and secial suffering in Bali, eur aim is net te undermine efferts te premete healing and recenciliatien threugh a sweeping decenstructive emphasis en the exceptienal cemplexities ef lecal centexts. Rather, eur geal is te put ethnegraphy te practice in diag- nesing what the anthrepelegist and physician Paul Farmer has called “pathelegies ef pewer“,fi "these relatiens ef injustice and inequality that became situated in bedies, minds and secial lives, using these insights te reflect critically and cemparatively en centemperary internatienal dis- ceurses ef “recenciliatien”, “peace-building” and “transitienal justice”, Sharing a cencern with understanding-lecal cencepts and practices ef rec- enciliatien, we detail the particularities ef the Bali case, but 'cencur with Kimberly Theiden in this velume that reflexive neds te “cultural sensitivu ity" risk reducing situated experiences ef vielence te generic platitudes er mere variatieus en a universalized theme. We argue, tegether with the editers in the Intreductien, that witheut a fundamental rethinking ef the pest-'ceni'lict interventien packages that tend everwheimingly te fail , te recegnixe the cemplex transfermatiens that terrer engenders in the al- termath ef mass crime, prejects te premete secial recevery are far mere likely te he net merely unhelpful but actively dangereus, It is, we believe, enly threugh serieus engagement with the uneven textures ef memer and the secial fabric in which it figures, and with a cemmitment te unrav- elling eur assumptiens abeut the patterns peaceubuilding sheuld take in light et' such lecal realities, that pesitive change has the hepe ef being achieved. We cenclude eur chapter with seme suggestiens fer these in- velved in peacerbuilding efferts, in the hepe ef helping te clese the gaps that currently exist between cenfiict analysis and the eXperiences ef cert- 'llict, hctween transitienal justice pregrams and the hepes and fears ef these whe still face injustice, and between disceurses ef recenciliatien and the everyday struggles ef these whe live tegether in the midst ef cen— tinuing suffering and suspicien that all tee eften passes fer “peace”, History, memory and pewer “533ml? Pitfall Ian fit-scene}: arier ballad” (“The steries ef the defeated ae un- ueted hy histery”) - — Balinese saying -___I__Ii_tary’s invelvement in the killings and en‘th'e "mg Suharte‘s reign ef these alleged te ha - -With the end cf 32 years ef dictatershi te-publicly; recensider the efficial stat .__the destructien cf the tndenesian Ce sympathixers as" a necessary defence against threats te natienal erdcr de- vetepnient, mederaity, demecracy and civiliz‘atien. Taking advantage ef _new civil freedems in the pest-Suharte era, Indenesian human rights werkers, seme ef them supperted by l' - ~ - - . tienal justice er truth and recenciliatien, be p in 1998, many Indenesians began e histery at 196366, which framed mmunist Party (PEI) and its alleged systematic persecutien dur- f I F _ i _ ve cemmunist ties,T A number e ndenesian histerians, eften acting in .cencert with vi‘ctims’ advecacy greups, began te reinterpret histerical reeerds te challenge the state’s ef- ficial acceunt at what happened en 30 September 1965, when ' - I president, Sukarne, and giving the “smiling genei'al”'Suharte a justilica— tien fer leading a campaign te destrey Indenesian cemmunism “dewn te its reets“ (saiiipei kc aker-akamye). In 2000, lecal nen~gevernmental eri ganixatrens pressed Indenesia’s Parliament te autherize a Natiena] Truth and Receiiciliat'ien Cemmissien (altheugh te date such a bedy has— yet te begin its werk), And in cities, trist and villages-acress the these whe lived tlireugh vielence began te semetimes haltinaly, archipelage, I speak ~ semetimes epenlv, semetimes shuttling nerveusly hetwecn enthusiasm and dread — aheut their memeries ef terrer, fear and survival. Such public acts ef re-remembering 1965/66 have, hewever, been met by-amhivalent respenses, making it painfully clear that a change ef re- gime has net preduced simple cerrespending shifts at the levels ef cem~ mummy-culture and subjectivity. Attempts in 2001 te exhume a mass grave at! massacre victims in Wenesebe, Java, sparked a vielent anti- 2001, whe issued a public apelegy in March 2000 fer the rele that mem- bers ef his Nahdlatul Ulama Islamic erganizatien played in carrying eut . . 9 E II- II- I the vielence, ceuld net succeed in persuading the Indenesian legislature te repeal the 1966 law (TAP XXV/MPRSf1966) banning beth the Indene— sian Cemmunist Party and “Marxist—~Leninist Ideele survivers uncertain aheut the very periences ef suffering. It is net, hewever, enly an anti-cum has questiened activist calls te ' gy”, leaving many legality ef speaking abeut their ex- _ munistright wing in Indenesia that ‘briag the past te light“ in the service at _--—-——-l——m-FI-FF I'llll-‘u F'_- . .I. . . ' I' II 1 ' I .. .-.._..__.__ . . - . r -. .......‘._._._..._".._.......__ .—._._._._I I -____ -- -- . .'| . . - ' "- I I 1 _ _'_"_I.—..-i.-—.-—-1a-i.-....._ ' r '"'--—rrvm-x.=rfi"'-'r1"-': _-|—_u-rn- r-- - I . -. . .. . . . .‘u . : -._._.-.__ ' . ' -i. - - 194 anaa AND SANTIKARMA natienal recenciliatien. In eur discussiens with Balinese survivers ef the vielence. ene ef the mest impertant insights they shared with us is that Mei/66 is net simply an event ef the past against which ene can talte a distanced stance. It is net semething that ene intentionally cheeses te ei- ther “remember“_ by way ef a truth cemmissien er a revamped national curriculum that aims te replace falseheeds with facts, er te “ferget” by way ef erasure frem the mass media er efficial histeries er threugh mere persenal attempts te deny er disregard. It is net, as seine Western psy- chelegical medels might enceurage us te think, a traumatic ezpericnce lecated safely in individual er secial histery, recevery frem which ins velves a “werking threugh“. er “letting ge” ef a destructive past, er the arrival at “clesure” threugh an- impesitien ef meaningful narrative en the chaes ef pathelegically insistent and fragmentary memery.1n Rather, the events ef 1965/66 have channelled and dammed pessibilities fer speech, secial actien and religieus and cultural meaning, giving rise te new relatiens between language, experience, secial space and pelitical practice. Vielence av real, remembered and petential — centinues te rever~ berate threugh seeial netwerks, marking everyday life and meulding as- piratiens fer the future. Fer Balinese snrvivers, “rccenciliatien” implies net simply a “ceming tegether“ ef eppesing sides ef a cenflict, but a far mere weighted re-imagining ef disceurses ef self, seciety, cemmunity and citizenship. ' in part, the endurance ef the events ef 1965/66 and their centinuing peignancy in the present have been effects ef the New Order state’s per- sistent attempts te centrel understandings ef what it termed the Pertrriwe -’65 er “1965 Incident“, te centain a diverse range ef terrifying experi- . ences within temperal beunds (“The incident”) while at the same time expanding them inte a flexible master symbel (“Cemmunism”) that an" therized engeing pelitical eppressien. The New Order state’s strategies fer discursive management included beth the repressive impesitien ef si- lence upen survivers, and an enthusiastic pregram ef cemmemeratien and symbelic centrel ef the histery ef the vielence. The Suharte regime’s efficial acceunt ef 1965/66 was depleyed te advertise its claims te rule and te justify its harsh secial and pelitical pelicies as a paternalistic pretectien fl.- . .' _. ' ' ' SPEAKING EROM rite sr—raeows 195 W. _ lance. (Theiden, inlchapter 4, discusses the use ef similar rheteric by the Peruvian military.) Fer a new generatien ef lndenesians, the halting tales their parents might have teld bf their experiences — er the deep silences they may have effected te preserve their safety — were drewned cut by edile Hele and the Museum Pengkhianatan PKl (Museum cf the Phil Treachery) in Jakarta and prepaganda pieces such as the state—preduced film Pengkhienet {3/30/8 (The 30 September Mevemenr Traders), which was screened en public televisien and in classreems each 30 September until 1999. One Balinese university student whese grandfather had been killed in the vielence, which teelt place 15 years befere his birth, de— scribed te us hew his understanding ef his family histery had been shaped by such state rheteric: “Starting in elementary scheel I learned that cem— munists were evil and vielent, and l was cenfused abeut hew my ewn family ceuld have been ameng them. But when I asked my mether hew Grandfather ceuld have been such a bad persen, she said nething. Only later did I realize that her silence was meant te'pretect me.“ The maintenance ef these efficial narratives ef cemmunist evil and threat centinued threugheut Suharte’s reign, despite the glebal thaw in Celd War rheteric that marked the 19905. Up until Suharteis fall m and even after - state efficials regularly animated the spectre ef cemmunism as an instrument ef secial centrel, dismissing almest any sert ef seeial er pelitical pretest as the werk ef “fermless erganizatiens“ (ergeelsnst limpet heater-t) ef cemmunist sympathizers er__ as the result et' prevecatien by “remnants” ef the PKI. Warnings te remain en guard against cemmu- nism were typically expressed in the cemmand elves beheyn tnrert Plfl/ kemrtnisme (“beware ef the latent danger ef the PKl/cerrununism“), ren- dering “cemmunism” less a matter ef party affiliatien er intellectual pesi- tien than an invisible but inevitable aspect ef virtually any challenge te Suharte er his military regime.ll Labeur pretests, attempts at unieniza- ———-- - .-a.-..a-u.-.. ..- r "I - -- - ----—-—-np-r-u--I—I-II—n-—-——u—I-ra—_I.I-. - ._.. ..-.. _ . -_ .. .-- . . . ..n. '. -\.- l l 1 - tien er the fermatien ef pelitical parties, er the use ef disceurses ef “human rights“ te ceunter state centrel ef civil seciety - all were linked in state rheteric te the lurking threat ef cemmunism. The impertance placed en capitalist develepment by Suharte’s state alse shaped the center-rt inwhich memeries e-f vielence ceuld be articu- lated. Beginning in the 1970s, the New Order, with the assistance ef the Werld Bank, embarked en an ambitieus preject te build en celenial—era stereetypes‘ ef Bali as an ezetic, enchanted island paradise, as well as classic anthrepelegical representatiens ef Balinese values ef seeial har- meny and censensus, te make the island the natien’s premiere “cultural .‘fi‘r against an ever-present threat ef cemmunist diserdcr. Under Suharte, public debate ef the events was banned, and alternative analyses ef beth the alleged ceup and the vielence that fellewed were censered. Berrewr- ing frern medern biemedical imagery, these accused ef being “infected” ‘ by the dangereus virus ef cemmunism - these whe had ence been knewn as neighbeurs, relatives and friends — were stigmatized and secially alien- ated, painted in efficial pertrayals as shadewy, sadistic figures laying in wait fer a chance te centaminate the beleved natien, which needed te be pretected by a vigilant military and a pewerful system ef state surveil- -:|- 1'. -. I. .- it" . ._- I. ' 't. I. II 'a'u. _5 .‘Ir . .-:I '1;- I._.,_ . . :r I. :1 -'i'. ' It. :-:'. '.- 'l- . _ t .‘r " _'\. .. i, I-l ...-I I It. ' ..., . ._-:I. i; ._J .-""'|' ' 113 I. r... . _.!e :1' _'-I _'\.' - -! - ,. 1-H". ———-— —u-n-r -.-n-t.--u—.- I. .-n.-- -.. ... _. ._ .. . _. - _ '- _ . . . _ . - r _".""""'..u-=E1'E'_';"."_. ._._ I; . .'u -' I' 't- latte . ivs owvan not) saurixaama' - - -- - —-—-— —"-l—l'l'I-l—l—l- —-I-|--.--I F-mm tourism” destination. By the mid-r1990s, over 1,000,000 foreign tourists were visiting Bali each year. This tourism industry - upon which some 80 per cent of Balinese depend, directly or' indirectly, for their livelihoods — has simplified and commodified representations of a harmonious Bali, turning them into spectacular commercial displays used to advertise the island as an outpost of peaceful, pre-modern culture where life revolves around ancient, apolitical religious ritual and social relations are based on the avoidance of conflict.” Not only Bali but the Balinese themselves have been subjects of a representational regime that defines appropriate touristic subjectivity through government campaigns such'as Sepia Pe- sonrr, “The Seven Seductions”, which exhorted Balinese to be clean (ber- silt), friendly (rrmnrli), orderly (lei-rib), beautiful (forfeit). safe (rm-inn), preservationist (lesrnri) and memorable (kanangnn) in order to maintain their ability to attract tourists. Tourism attempted to cover up violence with layers of such symbolism, at the same time as it often literally cov- ered up traumatic history, as in the case of one five-star beachfront resort -' in Seminyalt, South Bali whosd lusth landscaped grounds are known by the local community {but not, of course, by the vast majority of its guests) to cover a mass grave containing bodies of victims of 1965/66.” It is important to recognize, however, that tourism is not merely a dis— ' course produced by Balinese for consumption by an outside audience. Tourism in Bali acts not only as an imagemproducing industry but, to bor- row a concept from Jacques Lacan, as an imaginary, a symbolic order that initiates humans into subjectivity, language and social law. Govern- ment agencies charged with promoting tourism as the key to developing Bali have recognized the power of tourism to not only attract foreign exchange but to work as a call to self-control for Balinese, who are ex— horted neither to challenge the status ouo nor to call public attention to past or present violence within families or communities because a fickle tourist audience might be watching. The combined effects of such dis- courses have had serious effects on survivors of 1965/66 and their ability or desire to speak about their experiences, especially in public. Under Suharto, articulating memories that contradicted official “narratives was a dangerous act that risked harsh response from the state. But even in the post-Suharto period, when a new openness finally seemed possible, survi- ' vors with an economic interest in maintaining tourismrindustry images of a non-violent Bali have often been deeply ambivalent about voicing trau- matic memories, recognizing that this is generally not the kind of “cul~' ture” tourists wish to consume. Indeed, one of the many bitter ironies of 196:3]66 is that many survivors of the violence who were marked as being linked to communism and thus were barred from most employment were forced into the informal economic sector. Many survivors who began by selling trinkets to tourists on the beach in the early 19?tls when mass ' mI—fl—l-fl-n-t—"-'I.--"\."\_"'\- ..-|- -..-.-..--.m--.._...._____..-..- I---—-- . .. . .. - .. _ “amnesty” and “witnessing” embedded in many models of truthstelling tourism was first developing have ended. up becoming successful partici— pants in the industry, giving them a serious economic incentive to censor their own memories. Speaking about 1965/66 in'ways that counter. official history has, in other words, been understood as not only politically dan- ~ gerous but economically irrational. ' Recognizing the powerful role of the state in managing Balinese rela- ' tions with the past has important implications for understanding Balinese ambivalence'about projects that call upon survivors of mass crimes to support reconciliation in the name of national unity. In post—Suharto ln— donesia, democratic subjects, reconciled among themselves, with their histories, and with the responsibilities of citizenship, have been identified as the necessary building blocks for constructing a new nation. ‘r’et trans- lating “reconciliation” into practices of reshaping power and personhood has-been a complex and contested endeavour. There are no terms in the Balinese language that correspond to the key notions of “forgiveness”, and reconciliation. This is an important matter, for it highlights not only the cultural implications of disseminating concepts of reconciliation, but the ways in which many Balinese have perceived the Indonesianized term rekonsiiiesi as part of a language emanating from the lndonesian state, and beyond it, the West. Speaking of rekonsiliasi, then, is" to insert oneself in a discursive space occUpied by an array of powerful linked terms, including reformnsi (political reform), pnriislpnsi (participation) and denrokrosi (democracy). To engage with rekonsiliasi as it has [seen articulated by political elites within the context of national unity has been to position oneself within particular framings of citizenship about which Balinese victims of state violence and the curtailment of civil rights have frequently been highly suspicious. Many Balinese also recognize that despite the resignation of Suharto, numerous structures and rela- tions of power and inequality remain intact, including the national history textbooks, which still fail to even acknowledge that the mass killings ever occurred. Reconciliation in this context'becomes a matter not just of dealing with a past, but also of facing its continuing traces in the present. The intimacy of terror If we recognize that peace-building in the aftermath of state-sponsored violence entails far more complex transformations than replacing official ' histories-with local memories, what, then, of the place of memory in reconciliation at the community level? As important a role as the state played in directing discourses of communist threat and anti-connnunist violence, the continuing power of 1965/66 to shape Balinese social life - - - "—l-"'-—l—l-l—I'I-'-'I'I'I-Il—I'-II'I'I" . I-* n. .- .| a I '1-'uw—rmmmu_._---_.- - - -- .l. . 't.' I I ' ' tvs ew‘rna awe SANTLKARMA' W and subjectivity has alse been an artefact ef the centext‘in which the kill- ings and their aftermath were embedded in Bali. Te recegnize this is net te fall inte the wern rut ef attributing the intensity ef the 1965/66 vielence in Bali te an exetic “Balinese culture“ er te a fundamentally irratienal Balinese temperament inclined te periedic eutbursts ef wild psychesis er meek” — the deuble thatcenstantly haunts the image ef a peaceful, harmenieus Bali thatltas been premeted by the state and the teurism industry. It is rather te recegnize the extent te which vielence en- tangled itself in lecal cemmunities and kin greups, as neighbeurs killed neighbeurs and relatives killed relatives, and the very assumptiens and expectatiens breught te bear en secial life shifted. It is in the spaces cre- ated by these events and their centinual unfelding in and inte the present — spaces in which state scripts are repreduced even as they are rewritten - that memery arises in cemplex engagement with efficial histery. During the vielence, there were few Balinese secial greupings, whether familial, religieus er cemmunity-based, that were net fractured by deaths, disappearances and arrests er the threat ef such eccurrences. Altheugh there were serieus tensiens in tire—1965 Bali between the erganixed pelit— ical left and the erganized pelitical right, much ef the bleedshed en the island liellewed lines ef secial cenflict that were lecal, diverse and shifts _ing, cenflicts that cress-cut and shaped fermal pelitical allegiances even as they were manipulated by the state te give particular ferms tn the vielence. (See Theideniin this velume, and Scett Straus, alse in this velume, fer discussien ef similar cemmunity vielence in Peru and Rwanda respectively.) These cenflicts erupted ever issues ef caste,'ever access te and ewnership ef land, ever ecenemic inequalities, and ever status and inheritance within extended families. The vielence alse werked te expleit and intensify existing inequalities between classes and between genders, underscering the marginality ef wemen and the peer. Unlike in many ether areas ef lndenesia, where the vielence ef 1965/66 can be described as an intensificatien ef leng-standing tensiens between cemmunist and natienali'st party members er between cemmunists and tn‘thetlex Muslims, these cenllicts that prestigetl the vielence el‘ 1965/66 in'Bali did net always map clearly ente party divisiens er result in the same eutcemes. Fer instance, by the 1960s, caste was epenly acknewl- edged in many areas ef the island as a majer site ef secial tensien, and in Kesiman several lecal bnnjnr (sub-village hamlet asse'ciatiens that erganiae lecal pelities and ritual) fermally split in the late 1950s inte sep— - arate high caste (triwnngsn) and cemmener (satire) banjar. Hewever, membership in pelitical parties did net always fellew ene’s caste status and lecal pelitical parties, including the Bali branch ef the PKI, did net necessarily er censistently place caste en their pelitical agendas. In seme villages, including Kesiman, where the traditienal aristecracy was pewerv '-- 1r: sreaxtne FROM THE snaeews 199 ful eneugh te have had privileged access te medern Dutch-spensered ed- ucatien, it was they .whe fermed the cete ef the lecal leftist erganiZatiens" memberships. In Kesiman, the principle interests ef aristecratic leftists were net in eppesing “feudalism”, including caste privilege, er in re- erdering systems ef land _ewnership deminated by the reyal heuses, but in premeting an eftentimes diffuse netien ef a universal medernity, in- cluding expanding access te medern educatien, bringing Balinese l-lindu- ism in line with what they saw as the “pure” Hinduism ef India (imply- ing, mest centreversially, the eliminatien er “ratienalizatien” et' certain Hindu—Balinese rituals) and making Bali ne lenger seem “backward” in the eyes ef the werld. In ether villages u especially these where the left; spensered land referms that began in early 1961 threatened in put sub stantial dents in reyal land heldings — it was mere eften cemmeners whe supperted the leftist greups as a means ef challenging expleitative land tenure and sharecreppi-ng arrangements and the aristecracy whe eppesed them. And in still ether ‘villagies, traditienal patren-client ties between aristecrats and cemmeners included shared party'affiliatiens. Likewise, when the vielenceerupte'd in Bali in late 1965, it expleited caste eentlicts differently accerding te these lecal pelitical cenfiguratiens. In seine vil- lages it was mainly these ef the Brahmana caste w leftists and lien—leftists alike —- whe were killed, in ethers the aristecracy (sntrin), and in still ' ethers cemmeners. In ether lecatiens, caste seems te have had little de with the patterns the vielence teek. - In seme cases, it weuld indeed even be inaccurate tef say that killings were metivated by pelitical cenflicts, at least in the limited manner in which we nermally understand such phenemena. Must ef the persenal. narratives that we have heard claim that while there were indeed many Balinese whe were knewn te be-and whe identified themselves as cem- munists (er as members ef ether leftist'erganizatiens, including the Bariv san Tani Indenesia [Indenesian Peasants’ Fren-t], Gerwani [Gerakan Wa~ nita Indenesia er Inderiesian Wemen‘s Mevement] er Partinde [Partai Indenesia er IndenesiaPartyD, a great many ef these killed went te their deaths denying fermal party affiliatien. Hewever, after 1965/66, the label “cemmunist” — a label that bletted cut all ether fermatiens ef identity — was attached te victims-and, by lextensien, te their family and friends and even casual acquaintances ence they were dead, as an after-the-fact ex- planatienef their fate and its legitimacy Steries are teld ef peeple being killed ever land claims, ever inheritance, ever leng—remembered insults er sexual jealeusy er, as in Kesiman where many werked as labeurers en the Sukarne-spensered Bali Beach Hetel preject, ever resentment at net being hired er incidents that eecurred ,at werk. But events er eme— tiens ether than pelitical party allegiance "which might have preveked peeple te kill were pest frtcte subsumed by a grand state-spensered narv It) —-l'-'I'd-dI-I-' . I. - - a fl-Ill—LII‘IMH-I I I_-. I..-. . I I . I . 2m owvatt AND sanrtxaaita" * rative of party participation, these alternative narratives dismissed as the ' products of ignorance, sentimentality or subversive inclinations. The cre- ation and, in the years following 1965/66, maintenance of such thinking was a form of symbolic violence-with very real material consequences for family members of dead “communists”, who saw their civil rights sharply curtailed. In this context, any real reconciliation would require not only social rapprochement but also a rethinking of the very terms that have been used to describe and explain what happened in 1965/66. _ Balinese survivors also describe how, when it became clear that no one with even the loosest of ties to the PKI — such as once having lent one’s truck to a known PKI member or once having attended a PKI-sponsored arts performance -— would be spared, many who feared being condemned asked family members to kill them, preferring to die at the; hands of - someone they trusted would carry out the necessary rituals for the dead, rather than at the hands of the military or paramilitary gangs who “disapu peared”'alleged communists and dumped their bodies in the ocean or in secret mass graves. Others “turned themselves in” at their local banjar halls, where the ritual offerings that are normally made after death were prepared in advance and where banjar members would join together to kill them. Others committed suicide rather than be tortured or disap peared, or drank poison publicly as a way of “proving” they were not communists. Therewere also several cases—in Kesiman where brothers killed sisters, brothers killed brothers or fathers killed children rather _ than see them sexually abused or tortured or killed by-paramilitary gangs, drawing upon and transforming notions of ritual sacrifice through these acts. In our discussions with victims and killers alike, it has become clear that few people felt at the time that there were clear “sides” to take or free options for action or restraint. As the historian Geoffrey Robin— son describes in his account of l965i66 in Bali, the military made it clear through a concerted propaganda campaign that a refusal to actively par~ ticipate in the project of “cleansing” communism from the national body politic would be taken as an aflmission of one’s own guilt.15 Even if there were few “real communists” in a particular village, there were severe pressures to create some by whatever social and symbolic elaboration necessary. The strain caused by these injunctions was severe, and indeed ' some of those who were victimized by seeing family members killed then participated in violent acts themselves. In these cases, categories of “pee petrators“ and “victims” overlap and blur, rendering reconciliation less a“ matter of effecting social intercourse between those estranged by vio- lence than with finding ways to come to terms with the challenge to basic notions of society and self that terror engendered. These particular configurations of violence have helped to create the context in which memory might now be articulated. To the extent that ' - SPEAKING FROM THE SHADOWS 2st parrating one’s experiences involves positioning oneself as a subject of and in the past, it evokes far more ambivalence for those who can neither imagine themselves as havingbeen unequivocally “victimized” nor "vie timizing”. The modern juridical language of perpetrators, victims and witnesses, which presumes certain consistent subject positions, or the neo-liberal' appeal for truth-telling and national reconciliation, which holds as its premise a transparent notion of historical narrative and as its goal the recovery of national subjects who can be brought together into a - shared symbolic community, often falls far short of being able to encom— pass memory, its articulation and the contemporary politics in which it is embedded. As one Balinese woman Survivor of 1965, who lost a husband and a son in the violence, responded to news that “people in Jakarta“ were proposing a National Truth and Reconciliation Commission: “Why should I tell them what happened to my fantily‘;l You know and I know the truth: that nobody knows what really happened.“ Her concern with the audience of memory, with the uses- to which memory might be put, and with the sense that—knowledge of the past can be at once shared (“you know and I. know the truth”) and ineffable (“nobody knows what really happened“) requires a model for making sense of multiple pasts that does not limit sense-making to the realm of public narrative. The end of most of the physical'violence by mid-“l‘il66IE signalled not an end to survivors‘ suffering but the beginning of decades of oppression, as the New Order state elaborated the alleged communist coup-attempt into a historical justification for its repressive practices of rule. In the al- termath of the bloodshed, terror settled-closely into the space of the fam~ ily, which became a crucial site for the transmission of fear and the new state ideologies that depended upon it for their maintenance. Notonly were families broken apart by deaths and arrests, but also the trauma of these losses was compounded by social sanctions against public mourning for the dead, who were demonized by the New Order state as dangerous criminals who deserved their fate. Especially in those cases where the bodies of victims were never recovered and the cremation rituals that would ensure them a place in the pantheon of divine ancestors were never able to be performed, there remain, to this day, ragged gaps in kin— ship networks. Normally, Balinese in the Kesiman area are thought to re- mcarnate back into their extended families, usually within a generation or two of their deaths, and people commonly visit spirit mediums (batten. pelnasan) to determine who has reincarnated in a child. But since 1965, there have been less than a handful of those killed in the violence who have been said to have returned to their families through reincarnation. These painful lingering absences, and the worry that attempts to address them by seeking out victims“. remains and holding proper cremations' could provoke the state to punch new holes in the social fabric, encoun Id-‘I-'—'I.'!-IIIPIII'I_-HI.- .- I - _ . . _ 'l. . ate ame AND sarrrikaama' aged Balinese survivers te enact state scripts ef appropriate citizenship with eften-exaggerated deference, leading survivers te bitterly cite Bali’s "successes" at implementing a [test ef New Order campaigns, [rem latit— ily planning te child immunizatien te “leve yeur village“ develepment prejects te casting vetes fer the ruling Gelkar party. Despite the cemnien use. ef cencepts like “cellective memery” te refer te the recellectiens submerged in pest-cenflict secial life, the Balinese families that emerged frern the vielence were net hemegeneus repesite- ties ef shared understandings ef the past which can new, in the pest- cenflict era, be tapped fer the truths they centain. Gender was ameng the mest crucial differences that shaped survivers” experiences and the limits and pessibilities fer their enunciatien.” In families where men had been imprisened, killed er “disappeared”, wemen were eften'ferced te sheulder the burdens ef caring fer themselves and their children alene er in ceeperatien with ether widews. While seme wemen were lucky eneugh te be received back inte their natal families after the less ef their husbands, many were shunned eut ef fear ef the dangereus pelitical visi- bility theught te accempany them. The hundreds ef Balinese wemen whe were jailed fer alleged cemrnu'nist affiliatiens alse faced. upen their re- lease, frequent refusals by their husbands‘ families te allew them te re- claim their children, whe are eensidered by Balinese custemary law (rider) in belting tn the patriline. Net enly were fermer wemen pelitical priseners theught te be pelitically dangereus, they were believed. be— cause ef their presumed bitterness and emetienal instability, te be mere likely te engage in black magic and thus deubly menacing, even tetheir ewn children. Wemen’s rights as widews tn the lands and pesscssiens ef husbands killed er abducted were alse easily cast aside by using the " stamp ef “cemmunist”. “Vielence did net simply “unmake” families, hewever. Rather, it simul- taneeusly essified ties that had previeusly been fluid te ferm fixed units amenable te state surveillance, and strained emetienal beads by inserting _ suspieien and silence inte everyday family life. Pest-1965, fragmented Balinese families were perverscly knit back tegether by the “clean envi— renment” (hersih ffrrgktmgnn) pelicy ef the New Order gevernment, which claimedthat speuses, parents, siblings, children and even grand- children ef these marked as cemmunists were “infected” by pelitical “unvcleanliness” and thus te be barred frem participatien in the gevern- ment bureaucracy er civil seciety erganizatiens. Balinese families, newly ‘ ' cerperatiaed by the use ef traditienally flexible and centested kinship re- latiens as teelslef pelitical identifieatien,“ became impertant sites fer se- cial surveillance. Older relatives whese memeries ef the vielence were still streng menitered the yeunger generatien [er actiens er utterances that ceuld be interpreted by the state as “pelitical”, thus risking newrew :T '_!r - . . SPEAKING FROM Innertaeews' en's WW pressiens en the entire family. Just as survivers ef the vielence describe the military and paramilitaries’ intrusiens inte the enelesed space ef the family cempeand as a traumatic vielatien ef nermal "tenets ef seeiality, this new insertien ef the state inte family practice and subjectivity is iden‘ tified as ene ef the mest disturbing aspects ef New Order rule. “We still speke te each ether“, says ene wemen, remembering her relatiens with the several deaen family members with whem she shared beth a family cempeund and a designatien as pelitically “unclean”, “but we he lenger speke in .the same way. We guarded eur werds, net knewing whe was helping the state guard us.“ ' ' Extended kinship netwerks eften became fraught with tensiens, as “clean” segments ef families grew resentful ef being linked te their “dirty” relatives, and as these whe had been terreriaed er had eatperh enced the deaths -ef clese family members suspected their mere distant relatives ef having effered the infermatien that led te their victimizatien. Families became sites fer the educatien in and preservatien ef what Veena Des, writing abeut the experiences ef wemen fellewing the par- titien ef India and Pakistan, has called “peiseneus knewledge“, the prac+ tical understandingthat nermative netiens ef secial relatiens are fictiens that may fragment under the strain ef betrayal and disetnpewerment.“‘1 These stresses were semetimes cernpeunded by family members whe ma- nipulated their “unclean” relatives‘ tenueus pesitiens te claim cmnmu- nally held land as their individual pesscssiens. Taking advantage elf vie" tims‘ fears ef thegevernment apparatus, they were able te ehtain fer themselves the land ewnership certificates the lndenesian state, at the urging ef the Werld Bank, began in the 1970s tn premete in the name ef erder and develepmentf'3 While a few Balinese succeeded in ineving elsewhere en the island, attempting te leave the stigma ef the past and the tensiens ef the present behind, the vast majerity remained in their eriginal cemmunities, where they came face te face with these whe had terreriaed them er these they had terreriaed while attending village tem- ple ceremenies, shepping in the market er walking their children te scheel. Patterns ef everyday life, speech and secial interactien shifted te accemmedate' memeries ef vielence and fears ef further rcprisals, render: ing the past censtantly present in secial interactien. The vielence alse created new ways ef speaking and ef imagining lan- guage. Survivers 'ef 1965/66 eften describe it as the time when alien rees abaka metemnhing part — when ene ceuld the just because ef a werd. Speken werds are knewn in Bali te eveke actiens, like the her mantras ef priests er the steries ef shadew puppeteers that resenate acress the visible (sekaln) and invisible (niskele) werlds, temperarily binding and di- recting energies, channelling the impersenal petency knewn as s‘ekti that imbues the erganic and inerganic universef'ii| The werd ef a curse, spe— ml—I—'—_'- . .-. .-- -- _.._—._,I—...._..-...-...--....-.._.........-_.... I l I . - - . I 204' DWYER AND s'anrirtaatta . ' _lt-en by the pewerful, can bring illness er even death, and werds can in- vest the inanimate. ~ a mask, a barring, a jar ef 11er water — with takstt er charisma. But in 1965/66, werds became new kinds ef triggers. lma preperly articulated werds m an insult never quite fergetten, lew Balinese speken te semeene whe theught they sheuld have been addressed in high Balinese. Flirting exchanges with semeene elsc’s wife — ceuld return frem the past te preveke herrifically exaggerated- respenscs. One li— year-eldi in eur village whe was said te have “talked tee much” fer seme peeple’s liking was cerralled in a wicker cage used te transpert pigs and then threwn inte the river te drewn. A man whe saw his neigh- heur helping te burn dewn serneene’s heuse called eut in pretest and the next day was dead. And ene werd abeve all, the werd “cemmunist”, held pewcr te determine whe lived and died, a pewer ne ene werd had ever been knewn te pessess befere- Uttering the werd “cemmunist”, speakers shifted secial-assumptiens: Ne lenger did the pewerful alene utter werds ef pewer but the werd itself, fer these whe dared te speak it in accusa- tien, was imagined capable ef saving ene‘s ewn life and determining ethcrs’ destinies. Heady, extraordinary, herrific: language became an un- stable weapen in terrer’s fantastic arsenal, like a mythical keris dagger, blade leese in the hilt, that ceuld slip and weund its bearer sheuld the flew ef battle turn backwards. Fer as-the werd “cemmunist” was wielded, it came te mean far mere than ene whe had pledged te party member“ ship er even felt sympathy with the PKl’s aims. As an: ambitiens ef these- whe speke it extended beyend the mandate ef upreeting the PKI te stair- ing secial claims, exacting revenge er pretecting ene’s self and family in a treachereusly shifting landscape, “cemmunist” transmuted frem a symv bel ef peliticai affiliatien in the narrew sense te an indeaical sign peinting tn the instability ef knewledge itself, te the impessibility ef accurately reading auether’s signs in an epaque field ef highly charged pewer rela— tiens. As ene man whe saw several ef his family members killed ex“ pressed it: “Teday yeu call me a cemmunist, temerrew semeene calls yen a cemmunist. Anyene ceuld be a cemmunist as leng its semeene was willing te name them as ene.” _ Net enly were werds imbuedwith dangereus new petential, they be- came disarticulated frem the things they had beentheught te represent: remit-nan, an lndenesianizcd werd frem Sukarne‘s “nee—imperial” West, was pepulariaed in 1965 by army prepagandists te refer te lecal afiective ties, with peeple urged te sever their emetienal bends in erder te ree't eut cemmunist evil in their families and villages. A perikse er “inspec- tien”,” an Indenesian werd reeking ef state autherity, ef efficient, tep- dewn bureaucracy, ceuld enter the intimate space ef ene’s family heme, bringing the state-and its subjects inte a terrifying new embrace, as para- military gangs searched _fer evidence ef wemen’s cemmunist sympathies- _ - _. _ SPEAKING FROM THE sr-Ianews - ens . W in'the ferm ef hammer and sickle tattees en the vagina er abdemen, “in~ - spectiens” that eften ended in rape er ferced. cencubinage. latch, an In- denesian. werd meaning an alletment er queta, was understeed prier te 1965 te refer te the ratiens ef keresene, rice and sugar given by the nev— ernment te supplement civil servants? wages, er te the share ef the rice earned by a banjar‘s harvesting seciety (sekahc ntnnyi) that. was distrib- uted te each member. But as the. killings get underway, a jatah became -' the number et men a paramilitary greup aimed te execute in a particular night — a-gift ef the state m these whe served it, the fruit ef ene’s .ceeper- ative labeurs, became ene’s. gift te the state’s .visien ef a new erder threugh vielent. dismemberment ef the secial bedy. Even werds like hrether er neighbeur erfriend turned slippery and treachermis. trnnsu fermed inte new hazards like infermers, cellaberaters and. prevecateurs. And the emet-iens— this speech engendered leftengrew 'se streng as te chelte eff streams ef language and te channel meaning inte silent ferms. Articulating memery Altheugh vielence imbued language and secial relatienshi'ps with new ambivalence and uncertainty *— ambiguities that centinued te faster in the years that fellewed as state surveillance inserted hitself inte intimate areas ef cemmunity and family life — this did net preclude precesses el' remembering, but rather tended tel shift them inte indirect registers. One means by which memery has cemmenly been articulated is in the ferm ef circulating steries,‘ greunded in Balinese Hindu netiens efjusticc. which lecate the family as the site ef karmic retributien. In eur village these include the stery ef the well~l<newn killer whe beasted ef hacking his victims apart whese child was later bern with stumpvlihe legs and arms. Anether tale eften teld is that ef the man, a member efthe anti- cemmunist Indenesian Natienalist Party (Partai Nasienalis lndenesia. er PM), whe killed ene ef his twe brethers, a member ef the PK1, and later killed himself.” Ten years after the events, the surviving bretheris wife gave birth te a child whe, a psychic infermed her, was the reinctn‘natien ef the murdered PKI brether..The.child, .ence it became-public whe he was, was shunned as a “PKI child” within his staunchly natienalist family (altheugh he later grew 'up te be an activist werking te cellect data en the killings). There is the stery ef the natienalist paramilitary-leader knewn te have raped dezens ef wemen accused ef having cemmunist ties, and whe was later unable te father .a child.- And there are dezens ef ether ste- ries ef killers whe died yeung, fell ill .er suffered varieus misfertunes ef supernatural erigiri. Such lecal histeries, spread threugh cemmunity net— werks by rumeur and gessip, exist in stark ceunterpeint te efficial gevv ___. I--- ___- _ -. I ., . 20s. Dwven AND SANTIKARMA _ hm ernment narratives, reaching as they de fer a realm ef justice and hister- ical diagnosis eutside the centrel ef the state apparatus. Yet they share the same premise: that the vielent past is very much a present matter. Memery alse arises 1n debates ever ritual practice, especially ever the including cemmunal washing ef the bedy and crematien (ngnben) rites, it alse led te deep uncertainties abeut the eflicacy ef the rituals that were ferced te substitute efhgies fer actual bedies. Beginning in the _ 19?Os, as the, state assumed greater centrel- ever religieus practice in In- "denesia. the Parisadha Hindu Dharma Indenesia (PHDI), the efficial ' state-regulated erganizatien that claims autherity ever Hinduism in Inde~ ' nesia, began te spenser nyapnh — “sweeping” er “cleansing” rituals that were said te- act in lieu ef crematien fer these whe remained un-cremated due te neglect, lack ef financiial reseurces er,+in1plicitly, because the leca- tien ef their bedies was unknewn te their families.” PHDI efticials in-_ Isisted that it was the crematien ritual’s purificatien ef the “seul” (attire), net the presence ef the material bedy ef the deceased. that made a cre- m'atien effective at returning the dead te the realm ef the divine ances- ters. Yet family members e'f these killed in 1965/66 eften refused te ac~ cept this new theelegical stance, relying en the centinuing absence ef their disappeared family members as reincarnated in their children te keep memery alive in centradictien _ef efficial erasures frern natienal be.- lenging and in eppesitieu te ellicial claims abeut ritual practice. Other sites ef memery include the return ef the dead via supernatural channels te a secial influence frem which the state attempted te exclude them. Seme - altheugh by me means a majerity u ef the" family members ' ef these killed in 1965/66 maintain centact with their lest relatives, cem— municating threugh spirit mediums, hearing their whispers (-pnwisilr) in dreams er speaking with the veices ef these dead censidered te have al- ready beceme deified ancesters in trance (keranhnn). ibu Ari, a weman whe lest her husband and brether in the vielence, described the first time she was visited ’by her brether'after his death: We were se clese, se very clese. Se clese that when he died that afterneen, when he was killed, whe knews where, nebedy knew the place, that same night he came leeking fer me. He called ent te me three times. I had already fallen asleep ever there, next te that small cecenut tree. Already he was leeking fer me. We were se clese. He wenld tell me everything. If he speke te eur elder brether ence a day, he weuld speak te me ten times. He had left his watch be- hind. The day he died, his first sen was just 42 days did. it was the day el‘ his _ , " _ _ _ SPEAKING FROM THE snaeews m M .l‘ dedinan ceremeny. He said te rne [abeut the child], “L den’t ferget abeut him. It deesn’t matter if yeu have n give him the feed frem yeur ewn meuth, fer this child me te sell the watch te pay fer the dedinan ceremeny. me, ceming back and ferth, telling me, “Remember rem was en shecked. I didn’t knew that he _-w. ater, when he’s grewu, ething te eat, yeu must As the years passed and the New Order centinued its preject ef histery~ making, characterizing these whe died in 1965/66 as cemmunists whe were willing te destrey family, religien and state in pursuit ef their evil aims, lbu Ari centinued te be visited by her brether. Often he weuld just greet heriand then depart, but semetimes he weuld give her instruc- tiens abeut family ritual matters, which she and her relatives fellewed witheut questien. These instructiens had little te de with the stance he i _' i r ef simplifying and “ratienalizing” religieus ritual — a stance that was later g-lessed by the state as cemmunist “atheism” w but instead directed Ibu Ari te make additiens tn the effer- ings she was preparing te make them mere “cemplete”. That her brether, whe had exhibited little interest while he was alive in the wenren’s werk ef effering—making, was new instructing her in rrtu edd te Ibu Ari; she was was addressed by the psychic with the veice ef her uncle, a PKI member with befere his death in 1965 had caused centreversy in the family by ar— guing that his ewn father sheuld be cremated simply. This uncle, Ihu Ari said, teld her that he had changed, that he was new a weman, and ex- herted her, like her brether had, te “remember”. Memeries tee painful er pelitically dangereus te be uttered may alse take reet in terms that aveid speken language altegether. One such case was that ef Gung Ngurah,_wh_ese family cempeund had been attacked and set en fire by paramihtaries frern a neighbeuring banjar, whe later killed feur ef his relatives, including his father. Gung Ngurah’s family, al~ theugh ef high caste, had net been wealthy, and had ewned little ef value except a medern-style cabinet in which his father had stered beeks. This cabinet, hacked and scarred by the blades ef the paramilitaries, whe had emptied it and bdrned its centents, remained in Gung Ngurah’s frent par- leur, where any guest ef the family ceuld see it, fer ever 35 years after the vielence, leng after Gung Ngurah had beceme a relatively successful businessman able te 'afferd the furnishings mere typical el." medern, middle-class Balinese. The battered cabinet was net enly strikingly eut _. Iwwmnn—_.,.u__ I . . _._ . _ I - 1 -_..._ ans Dwvea arm 'SANTTKARMA ef-placein a teem full ef:chreme, glassand plastic, it sat awkwardly at edds with Gung Ngurah’s- absolute refusal to say anything about 1965/ 66, even when ether family members breught it up tentatively in cenver- _ satien. The cabinet, pesitiened net in the private int'erier bf" the heuse bet in the space epen te secial 'interactieri, was certainly a statement ef mem- ery, a pelitical statement net w'itheut‘ its ewn dangers, but ene that did net rely en werds fer its meaning. With this material icen, Gung Ngurah displayed the traces ef an alternative histery. Yet it is impertant te recegnize that memery, despite its pewer te aveid censcriptien inte efficial histeries that replace the subjectivities ef survivers with caricatures ef pelitical agency, is far frem' always libera- tery. Pal: Nyeman, a' member ef the Barisan Tani Indenesia (BTI), er In- denesian Peasants’ Frent, whe made his living farming cern and sweet petatees en a small plet ef'family dry land, managed te escape frem the natienalist paramilitary greup that had reunded up ether BTI members in his village fer executien by the mi-litary.'Hiding behind a stand ef trees in the dark, Pals. Nyeman.-w-atched as his fellew villagers were ferced te digfeur-heles in. his sweet petate field, each twenty-live meters leng, five meters wide and t-we meters deep. He watched as ever 200 cf his BTI cempatriets were herded: at rifle peint, arms tied" behind their backs, teward the edge ef the trenches. He. heard the cracks 'ef the seldiers‘ ri- fles and saw the bedies fall inte the pits, and then he ceuld witness ne mere. Pak Nyeman managed teescape te anether part ef the island, wherehe feund- werk as a heusebey fer an a'nti-cemmunist famin whe did net knew his histery. But several years later he was fired after his em- pleyer- discevered him reading a- newspaper and, suspiCieus that a peer farmer sheuldbe literate, investigated his past and feund eut-he- h-ad pe- l-itical ties. Pak Nyeman felt he had ne'cheice but te return te his village and resume hisreccn'patien as a-fa‘rmer-en his family lands. He planted .sweet petatees as he had befere,-and his father had befere him. Te step planting the field, he explained, weuld have been te acknewledge that he knew what had happened there,_and'te. acknowledge his memeries weuld have been te threaten the tenueus peace in his village that allewed him te live.. And se he planted, precisely because he remembered. But when the sweet petatees, fertilized by death. that his hee uncevered were unm naturally large, seme' the size ef human heads, he sent them by truck te a faraway market, where these whe wenld censume them had ne claim en his memeries. 'I' . Speaking frem the shadews “I’m se serry,” I say tn (3qu Aji, whe has spent the merning shewing us where the benes cf his brether lie under what'it new a plaza ef medern sheps selling - SPEAKING FROM THE snaeews 2m 'l'lshirts, cellular phenes and beauty supplies. “*1 didn’t mean te cause yea pain by asking yeu te remember suchterrible experiences.” Gung Aji smiles. “Ah, it’s net yeu whe has made me remember. I will have these memeries until I‘m alse dead—Ne, yeu den’t need -te feel serry. It is these memeries that make me knew I‘m still alivefl" ‘ I Te understand precesses ef remembering 1965/66 in Bali, it is impertant, we have argued, te attend te the multiple ways in which memery may be situated, hidden er expressed in engagement with everyday life and in centradictien te efficial histerical narratives. This is net, hewever, te suggest that there has been a' shared “cellective memery” preserved by Balinese survivers ef the vielence in defiance ef state attempts at eras- ure er cemm'emeratien, ner te cenclude that “histery” and “memery” can be simply eppesed. The “cellectivities” shaped eut ef vielence —- cellectivities that were eften exaggeratiens ef Balinese secial terms en- ceuraged by state surveillance and the “clean envirenment” pelicy *- were beset by lingering tensien and suspicien, saturated with a sense ef the ineftability ef experience and the inadequacy ef language, grewn alien and treachereus, te act as a means ef free and transparent secial cemmunicatien. Likewise, memery has net been preserved in'seme sterile space, uncentaminated by the pewer-saturated disceurses that emerged in the aftermath ef vielence. Yet te reeegnize the differences threugh which memery is filtered and eat at which it arises — inbluding differences ef gender, secial lecati-en, caste, class er pelitical pesitien -—- is te refuse te repreduce the master symbel ef “Cemmunism” that has ter- reriaed Balinese fer se leng. lnthe pelitical cultural milieu ef Bali in the years fellewing limit 66, a centeitt that has Been distinctly unsympathetic te memery, neither speaking ner keeping silent is an entirely cemfertable pesitien te eccupy. Memery, in this centext, eften refuses apprepriatien intb familiar genres ef “truth-telling” er realist histerical narrative that describe an eriginal trauma leng since past. Rather, it is an unaveidable aspect ef everyday engagement with the werld. Few Balinese can aveid enceuntering traces ef 1965/66 in their families and their cemmunities; these sites ef ambiva- lent memery — knife scars, sweet petatees, Spirit mediums, birth divina- tiens, death rituals, chance enceunters in the market er the street — all beceme unruly gh'ests ef vielence. scars en a secial bedy that may scab but rarely heal, fer te clese eff-the weunds weuld be te fereclese the pes- sibility ef memery, and in step remembering weuld mean te step parties ipating in the werld that has made survival pessible. Indeed, ene ef the mest challenging lessens we have learned frem eur werlt in Bali is that te engage with the place ef memery in the aftermath ef vielence is never a simple matter, whether ethically. petitically er the-- eretically. There is he stable analytic greund frem which ene might de- 1:|.-\.n.---_-Iu.-\.u-Iu-narurn—- |_- . . 1 _ _ _ no ewvsa AND snnrikaams- ' . -' _ WW _ vise universally applicable programs for addressing'memory’s'place in vi- olence. Rather, violence itself shades and shapes memory, the languages ' in which it might be articulated, and the social spaces in which it becomes meaningful, in complex local ways. 'portant general lessens for the practice of peace-building. Memory, as we have stressed, is never simply liberatory, existing in resistant opposition to official history. Rather, history and memory interpenetrate, as dis _ courses that speak not merely to a long-ago past but to broader relations of power in the present. Thus projects to promote peace should not as.-' some that the creation of social or political spaces or mechanisms for the articulation of local memory would necessarily undermine oppression or recuperate the voices of victims. While silence is arguably an untenable ethical position, in Bali, to engage with memories of 1965(66 is not only to expose the terrible history of a state’s violence against its own people and the ‘West’s complicity'in erasing it, but to enter an often more painful domain where families and communities remain fractured by memories of suspicion, betrayal and the intimate reproduction of state power. Like- wise, while many Balinese cite a strong desire to speak of the past, ex- pressions of memory cannot always be counted on to pave a linear path to individual or social healing. Remembering is rarely simply therapeutic or painful, but is frequently far more ambiguous and ambivalent in its emotive power and social effects. Programs to address the aftermath of conflict must recognize such complexities, grounding their work, as much as possible, "in ethnographically informed awareness of not only local histories but also contemporary conflicts. Thus truth commissions, fact- finding projects, national or community forums or other programs for. making memories of atrocity and betrayal public cannot be assumed to eenstitute a final stage of psychosocial repair, but must be followed by at- tention to the social and political tensions such endeavours may expose for let loose. A linked lesson has to do with the role of “culture” in peace—building. All too often, transitional justice programs work with general templates that are then “translated” into local contexts in the name of “cultural sensitivity”. An understanding of local contexts is undeniably crucial; in the Bali case, it helps to explain why Balinese have expressed much more enthusiasm about, for instance, ritual means of articulating memory or the reforging of ritual networks broken by violence than they "have * about the prospects for a formal truth commission. An openness to the diverse forms remembering might take is thus key to planning appropri- ate and effective projects. However, as we - along with the other contrib- utors to this volume —- have cautioned, it is equally important not to re- manticize or essentialiae culture. In the Balinese case, as. in so ‘many _ ~ " - ' ' - fsrsartnvo FROM-THE slaneows 2n - W others, struggles over who gets to define “culture” were among those that provoked conflict, and determined "whose memories were heard in its aftermath. Peace-building projects need to be wary of resorting to “culture” or “traditional means of conflict resolution” as uncritical eaten gories of experience or analysis, instead making room for the diverse, and politically complex, interpretations of the meaning and import of cul- ture in the wake of mass crimes. ' Notes 1. This chapter is a revised version of a paper first prepared by Leslie Dwyer for the inter- national Symposium en Anthropology in Indonesia, Lidayana University, Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia, July 2002. it is based on over four years of ongoing collaborative field research in Bali, funded by a Maci’srthur Foundation Research and Writing Fellowship and grants from'the H. F. Guggenheim Foundation, the l-laverford College Faculty Re- search Fund and the United States institute of Peace. Material from this article was p re- sented at the UCLA Center for Southeast Asian Studies and at Harvard University, we thank audiences at both institutions for valuable feedback. For comments on versions of this article, we thank Mary Zurbucheu, Hildred Geertr, Honk Schulte-Nordholt, Byron Good, Mary-lo Del‘v’ecchio Good and John MacDougall. This article is dedicated to the memory of |Gong Nini Raka, one of hundreds-of thousands of Balinese survivors whose stories have yet to be told. 2. The exact number of lndonesians killed is unknown and will likely remain so, despite recent efforts at “fact-finding” by lndonesian victims“ advocacy groups such as the Yayasan Penelitian Korban Pembantaian (Foundation for Research on the ‘v’ietims of Massacre). Estimates have-ranged from around 300,000 deaths to as many as three mil- lion, with a figure of one million frequently cited in academic and journalistic accounts " of the violence; The politics of numbering the dead is, of course, far from straightfor— ward, speaking both to the state’s desire to block access to non—official historical re- search and to activists’ desires to ground calls for attention to the violence in statistical claims of its significance. It is important to note, however, that while the extent of the suffering wrought by the violence of 1965;66 should be undeniable, survivors often lo- eate its import not in its seepe but its intimacy, not in its manageable flacticity but in its destabilizing incemprehensibility, not in its right to a place in the annals of the twentieth century’s greatest tragedies but in its continuing power to inflect possibilities for living in the present. Gyanendra Pandey discusses a comparable politics of enumerating the deaths that occurred during the'partition of Biitish India in 194?, suggesting that such “extravagant, expandable,_unverifiable but credible” (p. 91) statistics function to ob- scure the social production of history and its qualities of rumour. See Gyanendra Pan- dey, Remembering Partition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 3. Geoffrey Robinson’s historical account The Dark Side of Paradise: Political Violence'in Bali, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995, based on research carried out while Suharto was still in power, gives an estimate of 30,000 deaths in Bali. Activists conducting fact- finding projects after Suharto stepped down from power have estimated the figure to be closer to 100,000. 4. See Agung Putri, “Evading the truth: Will a-Truth and Reconciliation Commission ever be formed?” Inside indonesia 73, JanuarymMarch 2003, available at httptfiwww. insideindonesiaergiediti3iputri9’s20fl’etruthdecommissionhtm; Mary S. Zurbuohen, I—I-l-l-l-Fl-l-I-I-l—l—Fl—l—‘l'l—l'l—II'l-l—I - _r |-.- I. . I .-\. -.- -. .. .. . ...-......-..._ 21's ' DWYER AND sau'rtknama . - . _ _ Wm 10. “Looking back to move forward: A'trath commission could bring healing for a tragic past”, inside indonesia 65. January—March 2001, available at httptiiwww. insideindonesia.org,ledit65imary.htm. . Our work as anthropologists has drawn upon a range of participant—observation meth- odologies. Santikarma was born and raised in Kesiman, and together we have con- ducted fieldwork focused on 1965i66 during a total of four years of residence between 1999 and 2005. In addition to carrying out semi-structured interviews with survivors of ' the violence, their children and their grandchildren, we have paid close attention to hov.r the violence has been portrayed in national and local public culture. including official . speeches, media reports and school curricula, and how memories have emerged. trans: formed and recombined in everyday social life. especially in local political negotiations arid ritual practice. The ability to place the voices of one's interlocutors in a broader so? cial and cultural field of meaning. power and contest is, we would suggest, of crucial im- portance for those working in post-conflict settings marked by barriers and disincentives to speaking openly about the past. Anthropologists, historians and human rights acti- vists are often faced with the challenge of working with methodologies that are better suited to discovering what people are willing to remember than how, what and why they forget. This makes it crucial, we suggest. to consider how a reliance on formal con- tests of fact-finding and truth-telling may miss important aspects of the social life of memory, as well as to give deep consideration to the ethical and political implications of one’s work {see chapter 1}. . Paul Farmer, Pathologies of Power: Health, Human Rights, and the New War on the Poor, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003. . For an overview'of recent work on 1965i66 conducted by Indonesian academics and ac- tivists, see Mary Zurbuchen, “History, Memory and the ‘1965 Incident” in ladonesia”, Asian Survey 42, no. 4, 2002, pp. 561—581. . For discussion of the Wonosobo incident, see Zurbuchen, “History, Memory and the ‘1965 Incident“ ” and Ferni Adi, n.d., “Carat-caret Tcntang Perkuburan Massal di l-Iutan deltat Wonosobo” (Notes on the Mass Grave in the Forest near Wonosobo) on the Web site of the Foundation for Research on the Victims of Massacre (YPKP). http:,i,l www.wirantaprawira.deiypkp,inews.htm. In May 2000, the late Ibu Sulami, a former vice secretary of the leftist Indonesian Women‘s Movement (Gerwani) and one of the founders of the YPKP, was threatened by members of a group calling itself the “Anti- Communist Command”. In September 2000, her house, which served as an office for the YPKP. was burned down (see http:iiwwwwirantaprawira.deiypkpisulami.htm). On Nahdlatul Ulama’s role in 1965i66, see Robert Hefner, Civil isiatn: Musiirns anti De— .ntaeratiration in indonesia. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. We recognise, of course, that psychological approaches to engaging with the aftermath of mass crimes vary widely, ranging from traditional individual therapy based on bio- tnedical or Western psychiatric models, to community-based or “culturally sensitive” models, including those that reposition the therapeutic process within discourses of wit- nessing and working against human rights abuses. We would caution against the inscrips tion of oversimplistic dichotomies between Western “individualism” and non-Western “community”, or between biomedicineipsychiatry and local healing,.with the latter seen as the only appropriate response to suffering. We have, however, been concerned about. the ways .in which the Indonesian state’s attempts to suppress memories of 1965i66 that contradict official narratives have resonated closely with a “pop psychology” prevalent in Indonesian public culture'and sometimes present in international humanitarian work that locates memory as a problematic barrier to individual and national “recovery”. For esample, in the aftermath of the 2002 terrorists bombings of a crowded Bali nightclub, a US-based international aid organisation sponsored the placement of a series of public SPEAKING FROM THE snsoows 213 W service newspaper announcements encouraging Balinese to seek treatment for post- traumatic stress disorder, using a headline reading “lngin Melupakan?” or “Do You Want to Forget?” Those still suffering from the effects of the 1965;66 violence were not included in this program. For a more detailed discussion of the politics of framing suffering in the language of “trauma” or “post-traumatic stress disorder” in Bali.- see Leslie Dwyer and Degung Santikarma. “Post-Traumatic Politics: Violence. Memory and Biomedical Discourse in Bali”. in R. Leroelson ttnd l..- Kirmayer. et'ls. Trauma, (ini- ture anti the Brain. Cambridge University Press, forthcoming. ii. Honna details how Indonesian military ideology framed and reframed the notion of “communism” from 1966 to 1998 to address changing “threats” to its power. ranging from pro-democracy activism to globalisation in Jun Honna, “Military Ideology in Re— sponse to Democratic Pressures During the Late Soeharto Era: Political and lnslitu~ tional Contests”. in B. Anderson, ed., Violence and the State in .Eitti'tarto's intiortesitt. Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, '2001. Heryanto discusses the do ployment of and resistances to the term “communist” during the New Order in Ariel l-leryanto. “Where Communism Never Dies: ‘v’iolence. Trauma and Narralion in the Last Cold War Capitalist Authoritarian‘State“, international Journal of Culturalr Studies 2,no 2.1999,pp.147~17?. '” 12. For a discussion of how tourism and state developmentalism have shaped discourses of “Balinese culture”, see Degung Santikarma, “The Power of ‘Balinese Culture“ in U. Ramsayer, ed., Bali: Living in Two Worlds. Basel: Museum der Kulturen and ‘v'erlag Sch-wabe, 2001. 13. Much of the work of the Bali branch of the national Foundation for Research on the Victims of Massacre (YPKP). (a very small, poorly funded organisation compared to its Java~based colleagues) has consisted of trying to identify mass graves from l965i66. Hopes for eshurning the bodies they contain, as was done-in Wonosobo. lava, have been slim, however. Such land is considered by Balinese to be tenget — spiritually “hot” or “contaminated”, and thus unfit for Balinese to inhabit or cultivate. Much of this land was therefore 'sold to non+Balinese or, in South Bali, used to build tourism facilities, meaning that any attempt to find what lies beneath the ground would most likely face serious opposition from the owners of what now lies above the ground. As one activist reminded us: “Tourism is big business, big money. if you take on tourism. the nest thing you know you‘re a communist. and the corrupt aparat ["security apparatus”. military and police] make sure that you’re buried- as well.” I 14. Good and DelVecchio Good discuss the colonial history of arnuit. described as a culture-bound syndrome unique to Malays, and how the term was later used by the blew Order government to characterise political protest as pathology in Byron Good and Mary-lo Del‘v’ecchio Good, “Why Do the Masses So Easily Run Amuk?‘ Madness - and Violence in lndonesian Politics”: Latitudes, no. 5 (June 2001), p. 12. in. See Geoffrey Robinson. The Dari: Side of Paradise. 16. In Ke'siman. there have continued to be sporadic incidences of violence that residents attribute to the tensions that remain in the wake of 1965i66. 1?. For discussion of the gender politics of 1965366, see Leslie Dwyer, “The intimacy of Terror: Gender and the 1v’iolence of 1965-66 in Bali”, intersections: Gender, History anar Culture in the Asian Contest 10. 2004, available at httpjiunvwsshei.murtlnchedusiui intersectionsiissuel0idwyer.html; Saskia Wieringa, Sexual Politics in indonesia. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Other works that address women’s csperiences of l965i66 through testimonial genre's include Annie Pohiman. “A Fragment of a Story: Oerwani and Tapol Experiences”. intersections: Gender, History and Culture in the slsian Contest 10, 2001, available at httpjiwwwsshe.murdoch.eduiintersectionsiissuel0i pohlmanhtml; Carmel Budiarjo, Surviving indonesia’s Guiag: A Western Woman Tells w—n—n—u—u—u—n—n—u—---r-.- . . ............._ r1--- --.........._ 1 .|_|_LF I _..._..__|._ -Hg..l..__. _..._.. I I 214 owvaa AND SANTll-{ARMA ' _ - Her Story. London: Cassell Academic. 2000; and lbu Marni. “i am a leaf in a storm: A woman’s political autobiography.“ inside indanesia 26. March-1991,1tnportant Indonesian-language discussions of the gender dimensions of l965i66 include Budiawau. “Merintis gerakan rekonsiliasi altar rumput berperspectif jender”. Kornpes‘. 1 March 2003,; Ruth Indiah R'ahayu. “Dampak peristiwa 1965: Hancurnya perempuan kita!” Seltitarcom Internet journal. 2004; Salami. Perempttart. Kehenarart a‘aa Perry'ara. Ja- karta: Cipta Lestari. 1999; Salami. Mereatartg Perempaaa. Jakarta: Cipta Lestari. 2901: and sections of John Roosa. Ayn Ratih and Hilmar Farid. eds. Tahiti: yang Tait Fernair' Berairhir: Mernaliami Pengaiaman Earhart d5. Esai}Esai .Tiejarah Lisan. .ial-carta: ELSAM. 2004. 18. Hildred and Clifford Geerta’s classic work Kinship in Bali. Chicago: University of Chi- cago Press. 1975. notes the contested. flexible nature of traditional Balinese ltinship relations. 19. See 1‘v'eena Das. “The. Act of Witnessing: Violence. Poisonous Knowledge. and Suhjeo tivity." in ‘9’. Das. at. Kleinman. M. Ramphele and P. Reynolds. eds. Violence and Salts jeclivity. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2900. ' 20. The politics of land tenure and use in Bali and their relationship to the violence of 19t515.t on and the contested figure of “communism” are far too complea to be addressed here. For more detailed discussion of the politics of land in Bali. see Anton Lucas and Carol Warren. “The state.'the people. and their mediators: The struggle over agrarian law re- form in post-New Order Indonesia”. Indonesia 96. 29133. pp. Ell—126; Mary Zurbuchen ' and Degung Santilrarma. “Bali after the bombing: Land. livelihoods. and legacies of vi— olence”. paper presented at the Yale University Agrarian Studies Colloquium Series. February 2004: and Graeme MacRae. “The value of land in Bali: Land tenure. land return} and cottttitodilicatioti". in 'l‘hontas A. [{eutet. cd.. inequality. L'rtsis and Social Change in ladanesia: The Muted Worlds of Bali. London: Routledge Curron. 2092. 21. For discussion ofBalinese concepts of saitti see Hiidred |Geerta. images of Power: Bale aese Paintings Made for Margaret Mead and Gregory Batesoa. Honolulu: University of - Hawaii Press. 1994. 22. Indonesia scholars reading our work have pointed out that the lndonesian noun for in" spection should be pemeriltsaan. not periksa. This is true; however. Balinese do not al- ways speak lndonesian as they “should”. l3:ratntuaticallyr proper or not. Balinese iden- tify perilcsa — both the word and the events — as emanating from the central Indonesian state. 23'. These nyapah were especially widespread before large-scale state-sponsored ceremo- ' aics. such as the Eka Dasa Rudra of 1919. The ritual claims and counter-claims made during the New Order by various factions within and without the PHDI over the issue of cremation are complete indeed and cannot be fully addressed here. The nyapuh were. as many servivors of 1965 recognised. part of an lodonesia-wide campaign of depolitici- ration of village life that sought to remove potential sites olilocai contestation by plac~ ing them under state control. For more analysis of discourses of cremation. Hindu “identity” and modernist reform. see Linda Connor. “Contesting and Transforming the Work for the Dead in Bali: The Case of Ngabea Ngirit”. in Being- Modern in Bait: image ariaT Change. New Haven: Yale Southeast Asia Studies Monographs no. 43. 1996. 24. Field notes from a discussion between Leslie Dwyer and a Balinese survivor of violenac. August 2004. I _ i. -v '-'-."i' w .«ifter mass eritrie: Rebuilding states and t‘orttrrtttt-tities. F 9 Shaping political identity through historical discourse: The memory of Soviet mass crimes Thomas Sherleekl Written from the perspective of a political scientist. this chapter examines the importance of historical discourse in developing new political and values inthe Soviet Union and in post-Soviet Russia. identity and self-understandings are influenced in signific norms A polity’s ant ways by __ representations of the past. and the prospective'choices of a political community m sociopolitical. inter-communal and inter-state ~- are The chapter advances this argument by examining historical discourse during Soviet perestraika and in post-Soviet Russia. Particular attention is devoted to history textbooks for secondary school (high school). The totality of the mass crimes of the Stalin era is numbing. Alexander Yakovlev. the former Soviet Politburo member who has dedicated him- self to uncovering the full scope of the" “repressions” of the Soviet period. estimates that at least 20 to 25 million people were killed for po- litical motives or died in prisons or camps duringthe entire Soviet pe- riod.2 Most of these unnatural deaths” occurred under Josef Stalin from the 19305 until his death in March 1953. ‘ Despite the extraordinary dimensions of this tragedy the Stalinist pe— riod is “cold” history for the vast majority of the Russian people. The memories-and problems it” has bequeathed to Russian society are very different from more recent cases of mass killings that are discussed in this volume. including those of Cambodia. Guatemala, Peru. Rwanda. tittiigrty. Citesterrttart tutti St‘itrtaitt'i {eds}. United Nations University Press. 219017. ESBN 9}”8-92—808-1'3354 ...
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7.3 - LeSlie Dwyer and Degung Santikarma, ‘Speaking from...

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