hw1-key - 2.2 (a) (b) (1) simultaneous; (2) zero-sum; (3)...

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2.2 (a) (1) simultaneous; (2) zero-sum; (3) not repeated (though it is possible to play it repeatedly); (4) imperfect information (don’t know other’s chosen move); (5) fixed rules; (6) noncooperative (b) (1) sequential; (2) non-zero-sum (for voters, who are the players); (3) not repeated; (4) not enough information (if voting order is known, there is perfect information; if voting order is unknown to the voters, there is imperfect information); (5) fixed rules; (6) not enough information (agreements may be enforceable if, for example, voters are elected representatives) (c) (1) simultaneous; (2) nonzero-sum; (3) not repeated; (4) imperfect information (don’t know others’ bids); (5) fixed rules; (6) noncooperative 2.4 (a) 0.5 × 20 + 0.1 × 50 + 0.4 × 0 = 15 (b) 0.5 × 50 + 0.5 × 0 = 25 (c) 0.8 × 0 + 0.1 × 50 + 0.1 × 20 = 7 3.3 (a) rollback equilibrium: (S, t) equilibrium payoffs: (1, 0) A B N S t b 0, 2 2, 1 1, 0 (b) rollback equilibrium: (NNN, b, d) equilibrium payoffs: (2, 3, 2) N A A A B C N N S S S t b u d 1, 1, 1 2, 3, 2 0, 0, 2 3, 3, 3 1, 2, 4 0, 2, 0
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(c) rollback equilibrium: (SSN, nns) equilibrium payoffs: (4, 5) A N S B n s A N S A N S B n s B n s 0, 1 2, 3 5, 4 3, 2 4, 5 1, 0 2, 2 3.5 rollback equilibrium: (in, peace) equilibrium payoffs: ($300 million, $300 million) Knowing that Boeing will choose to compete peacefully if faced with competition, Airbus chooses to
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This note was uploaded on 10/15/2009 for the course ECON 122 taught by Professor Bonanno,g during the Summer '08 term at UC Davis.

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hw1-key - 2.2 (a) (b) (1) simultaneous; (2) zero-sum; (3)...

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