Unformatted text preview: perfect. If an equilibrium is not subgame perfect, explain why not. Question 3 - 15 points For the following game: L R U 1 , 1 3 , 4 D 4 , 3 2 , 2 (a) Solve for all pure strategy Nash equilibria (b) Solve for all mixed strategy Nash equilibria Question 4 - 20 points The members of a hierarchical group of hungry lions face a piece of prey. If Lion 1 does not eat the prey, the prey escapes and the game ends. If it eats the prey, it becomes fat and slow, and Lion 2 can eat it. If Lion 2 does not eat Lion 1, the game ends. If Lion 2 eats Lion 1, then it may be eaten by Lion 3, and so on. Each lion prefers to eat than to be hungry, but prefers to be hungry than to be eaten. There are a total of 139 lions. Find the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game....
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- Fall '09
- Game Theory, Px, py, indirect utility function, optimal demand functions