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pennsylvania_versus_muniz - OCTOBER TERM 1989 Syllabus 496...

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OCTOBER TERM, 1989 Syllabus 496 U. S. PENNSYLVANIA v. MUNIZ CERTIORARI TO THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA No. 89-213. Argued February 27, 1990-Decided June 18, 1990 Respondent Muniz was arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol on a Pennsylvania highway. Without being advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, he was taken to a booking center where, as was the routine practice, he was told that his actions and voice would be videotaped. He then answered seven questions re- garding his name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age, stumbling over two responses. He was also asked, and was unable to give, the date of his sixth birthday. In addition, he made several incriminating statements while he performed physical sobriety tests and when he was asked to submit to a breathalyzer test. He re- fused to take the breathalyzer test and was advised, for the first time, of his Miranda rights. Both the video and audio portions of the tape were admitted at trial, and he was convicted. His motion for a new trial on the ground that the court should have excluded, inter alia, the videotape was denied. The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed. While find- ing that the videotape of the sobriety testing exhibited physical rather than testimonial evidence within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, the court concluded that Muniz's answers to questions and his other ver- balizations were testimonial and, thus, the audio portion of the tape should have been suppressed in its entirety. Held: The judgment is vacated and remanded. 377 Pa. Super. 382, 547 A. 2d 419, vacated and remanded. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts 1, 11, III-A, III-B, and IV, concluding that only Muniz's response to the sixth birthday question constitutes a testimonial response to cus- todial interrogation for purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 588-600, 602-605. (a) The privilege against self-incrimination protects an "accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature," Schmer- ber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 761, but not from being compelled by the State to produce "real or physical evidence," id., at 764. To be testi- monial, the communication must, "explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information." Doe v. United States, 487 U. S. 201, 210. Pp. 588-590. HeinOnline -- 496 U.S. 582 1989
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PENNSYLVANIA v. MUNIZ 582 Syllabus (b) Muniz's answers to direct questions are not rendered inadmissible by Miranda merely because the slurred nature of his speech was incrimi- nating. Under Schmerber and its progeny, any slurring of speech and other evidence of lack of muscular coordination revealed by his responses constitute nontestimonial components of those responses. Requiring a suspect to reveal the physical manner in which he articulates words, like requiring him to reveal the physical properties of the sound of his voice by reading a transcript, see United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, does not, without more, compel
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