lincoln savings and loan

lincoln savings and loan - Cases in Strategic-Systems...

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Unformatted text preview: Cases in Strategic-Systems Auditing Lincoln Savings and Loan Merle Erickson University of Chicago Brian W. Mayhew Georgia State University William L. Felix, Jr. University of Arizona KPMG/University of Illinois Business Measurement Case Development and Research Program The views and opinions are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views and opinions of KPMG LLP. ©1999 by KPMG LLP, The U.S. Member Firm of KPMG International All rights reserved. Printed in the U.S.A. This case was developed under a grant from the KPMG/University of Illinois Business Measurement Case Development & Research Program. Cases developed under this program and other program information can be obtained from the Web site www.cba.uiuc.edu/kpmg-uiuc/. n KPMG/University of Illinois Business Measurement Case Development and Research Program June 1999 o The Lincoln Savings and Loan Case Overview Today’s businesses face fierce competition and a rapidly changing global business environment. The trend toward mergers and acquisitions, the growth of joint ventures and strategic alliances, and the continuous introduction of new technology have created a business climate that is fluid and volatile. To maintain viability, companies must be poised to react to customer-driven preferences, regulatory changes, and the possibility of product obsolescence. Understanding the dynamics of these external forces, how the entity responds to them, and whether the entity’s responses are effective has become imperative to performing, and not just planning, the audit. In a global business environment that is becoming increasingly complex, this knowledge is pivotal to forming the opinion. This case focuses on the 1987 audit of Lincoln Savings and Loan (LSL). Although the audit of LSL took place more than a decade ago, the lessons still are relevant today. During the 1980s, the business environment of the savings and loan (S&L) industry changed dramatically. Many S&Ls responded by changing their strategies and business operations. LSL was no exception. This case enables you to gain some experience evaluating a company’s attempt to adapt to its changing business environment. Your challenge is to evaluate LSL’s environmental and operational changes and the accounting and auditing implications of those changes at the time of the audit. In order to make that evaluation, you must develop an understanding of LSL’s business, operating philosophy, and incentives during that period of change. 1 n KPMG/University of Illinois Business Measurement Case Development and Research Program June 1999 o Case Document Day One: Lincoln Savings and Loan Background and Operations Background During the early 1980s, Lincoln Savings and Loan (LSL), a state-chartered, federally insured savings and loan had 30 branch offices throughout California. The branches performed typical savings and loan (S&L) operations such as making mortgage loans and obtaining deposits. Competitors were other S&Ls, banks, and investment companies. Through its branch offices, LSL solicited deposits and made loans for single and multi-family residences. The interest income from these loans was the primary source of LSL’s revenue. Funding for these loans came from customer deposits in savings, checking, and retirement accounts. Interest expense from these deposits constituted LSL’s largest expense. Profitability was dependent on the interest-rate spread between loans and deposits, that is, the spread had to be large enough to cover expenses and generate a profit. Environment. Beginning in the late 1970s and continuing on to the early 1980s, the interest-rate spread narrowed and then became negative for many S&Ls. Inflation caused interest rates to climb as high as 20 percent on newly originated loans and 15 percent on deposits. These changes in the business environment had a severe consequence for many S&Ls. Pre-inflation fixed-rate loans with interest rates as low as 5-6 percent had to be honored, while at the same time S&Ls had to pay up to 15 percent on to attract deposits. Not only were S&Ls caught short holding these low fixed-rate loans, but they were unable to generate demand for new mortgages at the prevailing 20 percent rate. A fundamental problem was that S&Ls made long-term, fixed-rate loans but could not match the loans with long-term, fixed-rate deposits. Based on federal regulations in effect prior to 1983, S&Ls’ asset operations were restricted to making loans for residential mortgages and to investing in government-backed securities. S&Ls could only lend to homebuyers who tended to take on 30-year fixed-rate mortgages and could not obtain deposits for the same length of time (e.g. 30-year certificates of deposit would be extremely rare). In 1983, the federal government changed the rules governing the assets of S&Ls. In addition to making loans for residential mortgages and investing in government-backed securities, the new rules allowed S&Ls to make commercial loans and to invest in corporate securities and real estate. Regulators thought the new rules would help S&Ls by allowing them to better match their income-producing assets to their expense-producing liabilities. Competition. After deregulation, S&Ls and banks (as well as other depository institutions) competed directly with each other for deposits and loans. Banks had always competed with S&Ls and other depository institutions for retail customer (individual) deposits but they dominated the market for corporate deposits. Banks also dominated the market for commercial loans because regulations had prevented S&Ls from making commercial (corporate) loans prior to 1983. Commercial loans tended to carry variable interest rates, thereby allowing banks to adjust more easily to the rising interest rates that had crippled the S&L industry in the early 1980s. S&Ls had difficulty obtaining large commercial clients when the commercial market was opened to them by deregulation. S&Ls simply did not have a competitive advantage in breaking the 2 n KPMG/University of Illinois Business Measurement Case Development and Research Program June 1999 o long-established relationships between commercial customers and their banks. However, S&Ls did have a competitive advantage with real-estate developers and builders because of the S&Ls history of selling mortgages. Many S&Ls worked with home developers to supply financing to new homebuyers. After deregulation, it was natural for S&Ls to branch further into real estate by lending money directly to real-estate developers and homebuilders. Competition for deposits was largely interest-rate driven. Commercial banks and S&Ls offered federal insurance up to $100,000 on individual deposits and the insurance aspect of deposits gave customers little reason to prefer one depository institution to another. Of course, institutions competed fiercely for customer deposits by offering incentives like free checking and interestbearing checking accounts. While depository institutions generally could expect a core portion of deposits to remain with the institution no matter what the interest rate, to obtain new deposits they had to offer competitive interest rates. Additional competition for deposits came from credit unions and brokerage houses. LSL’s Strategic Reorientation In late 1984, American Continental Corporation (ACC), primarily a real-estate developer located in Phoenix, Arizona, acquired LSL and made Phoenix the headquarters location for both companies. In the early 1980s, ACC had participated in a number of successful real-estate developments in and around the Phoenix area. Phoenix’s phenomenal growth in population and business relocation drove ACC’s early success. This growth created tremendous opportunities to buy and develop real estate for commercial and residential use. The business combination brought changes to LSL’s and ACC’s strategies. ACC’s brand equity as a real-estate developer, relationships with builders, and real-estate development expertise could help LSL rapidly develop its commercial lending business. In addition, LSL’s brand equity as a residential mortgage lender, lending expertise, and base of core deposits could help ACC expand its real estate development activities by integrating the financing function into core business activities. After the acquisition of LSL, ACC merged its real-estate development operations into subsidiaries of LSL. With that move, more than 95 percent of ACC’s investments came under the LSL corporate umbrella. Essentially, ACC/LSL was a wholesaler of partially developed land, much as ACC had been before the acquisition. ACC’s main expertise was in purchasing undeveloped land, obtaining the necessary zoning and building authorizations, and developing the necessary infrastructure such as roads. Then, ACC would sell the land to builders. In late 1985, ACC/LSL sold approximately 50 percent of its mortgage loan portfolio to another S&L. The proceeds from the sale were invested into LSL’s real-estate subsidiaries and used to fund loans made to real-estate developers. Top management of ACC and the board of directors included Charles Keating Jr., a real-estate developer with over 20 years experience who owned and operated ACC, and Keating’s family members and close friends. Keating, who had started ACC in Ohio in 1978 and moved the business to Arizona just prior to Arizona’s real-estate boom in the early 1980s, controlled the board and, thereby, the company’s strategic direction. Keating had a very strong personality and oversaw the day-to-day operations of both companies. Often, he would lure promising employees away from competitors by not only paying above market salaries but also by offering a substantial amount of cash as a signing bonus. As a result, top-level employees for ACC and LSL were paid very well by industry and Phoenix standards. 3 n KPMG/University of Illinois Business Measurement Case Development and Research Program June 1999 o LSL’s Operations1 Deposits. LSL obtained deposits from two sources: individuals and brokers. Its 30 branch offices pursued deposits from individuals by offering certificates of deposit, interest-bearing checking, and interest-bearing savings accounts. Also, LSL obtained brokered deposits from individuals and institutions throughout the United States. Brokers (much like stockbrokers) solicited these deposits and LSL paid a commission to them. Brokers allowed customers to deposit amounts up to the maximum insurable amount ($100,000) in different federally insured depository institutions. By depositing no more than $100,000 in any individual institution, the depositor could insure against loss of principle.2 After its acquisition by ACC, LSL significantly increased its deposit base by pursuing brokered deposits. In fact, brokered deposits made up a substantial portion of LSL’s deposits by the end of 1987 and enabled LSL to expand its investment and loan portfolios significantly.3 Loans. By the end of 1987, 80 percent of LSL’s loan portfolio consisted of approximately 100 commercial loans to real-estate developers, while the remaining 20 percent consisted of traditional mortgages issued prior to ACC’s purchase of LSL. Approximately 80 percent of the commercial loans were secured by real estate, while the remaining 20 percent were unsecured. Customers generally used a majority of their loan proceeds to fund real-estate development and construction costs. LSL estimated borrowers used approximately 20 percent of their real-estate loans for working capital purposes. LSL also made a number of loans in conjunction with sales of real estate by its real-estate subsidiary. These loans were called carryback notes. It was common in the real-estate industry for the seller to accept notes for a portion of the purchase price. SFAS 66, “Accounting for Sales of Real Estate” provides authoritative guidance on the recognition of gains from real-estate transactions when a note is received as partial payment. Under certain conditions SFAS 66 requires gains on sales of real estate involving notes to be deferred until cash is received. LSL typically refinanced the loans made in connection with real-estate sales. In almost every case, loans made in connection with 1986 real-estate sales were refinanced in 1987. In addition, the real-estate buyers received additional construction and working capital loans during 1987. To remain in compliance with SFAS 66, LSL was careful not to refund the 25 percent down payment when it restructured the loans. As CEO, Keating made most of the loan decisions in 1987. It was not uncommon for loans to be granted by him before they were formally approved by LSL’s loan committee. The required documentation would be gathered after the fact. For each loan made by an S&L, federal 1 LSL’s 1986 and 1987 balance sheets are included in the attached tables. Balance sheets for Home Savings and Loan, a California S&L, are included for comparative purposes. Although Home Savings and Loan was larger, its financial statements are typical of an S&L in 1987. 2 The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) insures deposits for each individual customer at a given S&L up to a maximum of $100,000. To obtain insurance on deposits greater than $100,000, a customer must set up several accounts in different S&Ls. For example, one customer with two 5-year certificates of deposit each worth $100,000 at the same S&L would only have insurance of $100,000. However, if each CD were placed at a different S&L, both CDs would be fully insured. 3 A summary of LSL’s 1987 year-end deposits is included in the attached tables. A comparison of the 1987 year-end deposits for Home Savings and Loan also is included. 4 n KPMG/University of Illinois Business Measurement Case Development and Research Program June 1999 o regulations required detailed documentation supporting the decision be maintained in a loan file. LSL maintained loan files for each of its outstanding loans. Interest Rate Management. LSL had a small group of employees who monitored market interest rates for deposits. This group was responsible for ensuring LSL remained competitive for certificates of deposit and brokered deposits. The group monitored interest rates on deposits in the local California branch market and in other geographic markets around the nation. LSL authorized the group to raise rates for new deposits in response to competition. Securities Investments. LSL operated a securities trading subsidiary dedicated to managing its investments in publicly traded securities. Based on federal rules enforced by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), a large portion of LSL’s investments were restricted to mortgagebacked or government-backed securities that included Government National Mortgage Association securities (GNMAs) and U.S. treasury bonds. LSL would attempt to take advantage of interest rate fluctuations to capture trading gains on the sale of these securities. When interest rates decline, prices of GNMAs and U.S. treasury bonds increase, and vice versa. To realize gains, LSL would sell its investments in GNMAs and U.S. treasury bonds when interest rates decline. When interest rates increase, LSL would purchase these same securities in anticipation of future interest rate declines. LSL was an active trader in these securities with both portfolios turning over more than 17 times in 1987. Approximately 20 percent of LSL’s securities portfolio consisted of investments in highrisk/high-return corporate debt called “junk bonds.” Corporations issued these bonds to finance restructurings or expansions. Junk bonds typically carried coupon rates well above rates on government or high-grade corporate bonds. Investment bankers introduced junk bonds to the market in 1985 and they became very popular with issuers and investors by 1987. Real-estate Investments. LSL also generated a significant amount of income from its real-estate subsidiaries, which invested in a variety of real-estate projects ranging from hotels and apartments to undeveloped land. LSL’s largest investments were in undeveloped raw land, the largest of which were two adjacent propertiesEstrella and Hidden Valley. These properties were two 10,000-acre parcels located 25 miles southwest of Phoenix. LSL planned to develop them into a master-planned community. Estrella/Hidden Valley. The Estrella/Hidden Valley development started in 1985 when LSL acquired the land in a series of transactions. LSL paid an average of $3,000 per acre for the land and, after acquisition, worked with local governments to obtain the necessary zoning and building permits. In addition, LSL put into place a limited infrastructure in Estrella consisting of a few roads, while Hidden Valley remained accessible only by four-wheel drive vehicles. LSL planned to develop Estrella first and then, approximately ten years later (about 1997), to develop Hidden Valley. LSL expected the completed development to contain 50,000 homes and over 200,000 people. The plans also included some commercial development, especially facilities to serve the expected population (e.g. grocery stores, gas stations, etc.). By the end of 1987, LSL had incurred approximately $100 million in costs for the Estrella/Hidden Valley investments. Most of the cost was in the Estrella investment, with some minor zoning costs allocated to Hidden Valley. The $100 million investment cost included capitalized interest on both projects in accordance with measurement criteria set forth in SFAS No. 34. LSL used the interest rate it paid on brokered deposits to estimate the cost of capital and reduced its reported interest expense by capitalizing this interest. 5 n KPMG/University of Illinois Business Measurement Case Development and Research Program June 1999 o The real-estate market in Arizona and the Phoenix area was very strong in the early to mid-1980s. However, by 1986 the market had begun to slow down.4 During 1987, LSL sold seven parcels of land from the Hidden Valley development, most of which were sold to homebuilders. The average acreage and selling price on these seven parcels ranged from 500 to 1,000 acres and $14,000 to $17,000 per acre. In each transaction, the buyer made a down payment in cash equal to 25 percent of the purchase price with the remainder in carryback notes payable to LSL. These notes ranged from 6-20 years, had stated interest rates of between 8-12 percent, and required annual payments of principal and interest in equal installments. Regulation. The regional FHLBB bank located in San Francisco supervised LSL’s compliance with federal regulations. S&Ls are required to maintain a minimum level of “regulatory” capital. Regulatory capital (similar to the book value of equity) is calculated using a complex formula based on an institution’s investment mix, term structure of liabilities (deposits), and size. In 1987, the FHLBB raised the capital requirement to 6 percent of assets due to concerns about the financial health of the industry and to bring the requirements in line with the capital requirements for banks. Prior to the start of 1987, LSL had regulatory capital of approximately 4.5 percent of assets. Similar to other S&Ls, it had to reach the 6 percent threshold within six years. FHLBB Audit Report. During 1987, the FHLBB completed an audit of LSL’s financial condition and operations. The preliminary FHLBB audit report raised three concerns about the institution. Auditors cited LSL for: n n failing to maintain complete loan files investing in real estate at rates higher than allowed by direct investment regulations enacted during 1985 n having too much high-risk debt. For the first citation, auditors found that many files lacked sufficient documentation to support the issuance of a loan. For example, a number of loan files did not contain appraisals on land used as collateral. For the second citation, LSL strongly disagreed on the grounds that it was grandfathered under the old rules with which it did comply. Finally, for the third citation, LSL stated that it met the regulations concerning its investments and that the FHLBB was not taking into account LSL’s success in managing its real estate and high-risk debt investments. LSL was not required to take any action on these matters until a final report was issued. In the interim, LSL had the right to negotiate and/or object to the contents of the report. The final FHLBB report had not been issued by year-end 1987. LSL reviewed the preliminary report and raised a number of objections to its contents. Also, LSL believed that the FHLBB auditors did 4 For a more complete picture of the Arizona real-estate market in 1987, see “Arizona’s Economy,” published in July 1987 by the University of Arizona’s College of Business and Public Administration. The publication includes Arizona’s economic data compiled from public sources. A table from the periodical that summarizes key real-estate economic indicators is included at the end of the case. 6 n KPMG/University of Illinois Business Measurement Case Development and Research Program June 1999 o not understand its business because it no longer operated as a traditional S&L dependent on residential mortgages for income. LSL appealed the report to the main office of the FHLBB in Washington, D.C. and contacted a number of congressmen from California, Arizona and Ohio to intervene on its behalf. 7 n KPMG/University of Illinois Business Measurement Case Development and Research Program March 1999 o Comparative LSL and Home Savings and Loan Income Statements LSL Income Statement 1986 and 1987: Revenues: Real-estate sales Interest and fees on loans Interest and fees from mortgage banking operations Interest and dividends on investment securities Gains on sales of securities and loans Other income Total revenue Expenses: Cost of real -estate sales Interest expense Savings deposits Mortgage banking operations Borrowed funds Selling and administrative expense Provision for losses Other Total expenses Earnings before tax Tax on earnings Earnings from continuing operations 1987 220,924 162,275 29,604 135,937 102,663 66,882 718,285 139,364 210,314 29,703 102,721 154,002 20,536 35,657 692,297 25,988 12,612 13,376 29% 4% 14% 21% 3% 5% 96% 4% 2% 2% 1987 22,888 2,080,022 79,178 275,362 112,081 8,623 2,578,154 % to Total Revenue 1% 81% 3% 11% 4% 0% 100% Home Savings and Loan Income Statement 1986 & 1987: Revenues: Real -estate sales Interest and fees on loans Interest and fees from mortgage banking operations Interest and dividends on investment securities Gains on sales of securities and loans Other income Total revenue Expenses: Cost of real-estate sales Interest expense Savings deposits Mortgage banking operations Borrowed funds Selling and administrative expense Provision for losses Total expenses Earnings before tax Tax on earnings Earnings from continuing operations % to Total Revenue 31% 23% 4% 19% 14% 9% 100% 22,748 1,356,127 277,099 612,039 26,216 2,294,229 283,925 109,064 174,861 19% 1% 53% 11% 24% 1% 89% 11% 4% 7% 1986 296,039 134,450 87,873 134,906 73,477 125,707 852,452 % to Total Revenue 35% 16% 10% 16% 9% 15% 100% 216,157 198,825 74,651 102,023 126,146 32,496 58,720 809,018 43,434 12,601 30,833 23% 9% 12% 15% 4% 7% 95% 5% 1% 4% 1986 8,536 2,102,753 71,343 442,095 293,902 59,153 2,977,782 % to Total Revenue 0% 71% 2% 15% 10% 2% 100% 9,393 1,503,561 153,762 616,091 27,799 2,310,606 667,176 209,951 457,225 25% 0% 50% 5% 21% 1% 78% 22% 7% 15% 8 n KPMG/University of Illinois Business Measurement Case Development and Research Program March 1999 o Balance Sheets December 31, 1986 and 1987 Cash Securities purchased under agreements to resell Investment securities - equity Investment securities - debt Mortgage-backed certificates Mortgage and other loans receivable Mortgage loans accounted for as real-estate investments Other receivables Real-estate investments Investments in unconsolidated affiliates Property, plant, and equipment Prepaid expenses Excess of cost over net assets acquired, net Total assets Saving deposits Short-term borrowings Accounts payable Long-term debt Policyholder liabilities Deferred income taxes Total liabilities 1987 223,811 45,075 169,070 1,358,165 504,822 1,170,196 % of Total Assets 4% 1% 3% 27% 10% 23% 1986 125,292 255,789 97,457 1,221,676 318,526 987,827 % of Total Assets 3% 6% 2% 27% 7% 22% 69,757 154,448 820,637 60,525 292,173 120,266 106,252 5,095,197 1% 3% 16% 1% 6% 2% 2% 97,714 261,832 714,117 87,516 163,703 130,503 109,184 4,571,136 2% 6% 16% 2% 4% 3% 2% 3,374,531 364,669 112,810 814,505 182,897 16,122 4,865,534 66% 7% 2% 16% 4% 0% 2,821,375 73,796 115,296 1,241,879 172,247 17,952 4,442,545 62% 2% 3% 27% 4% 0% Minority interest in hotel operations 92,902 Preferred stock 54,943 1% 40,225 1% 176 11,261 (21,264) 109,924 (17,000) (1,279) 136,761 5,095,197 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 3% 123 19,530 (8,597) 96,899 (18,500) (1,089) 128,591 4,571,136 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 3% Common stock Capital in excess of par value Marketable equity securities reserve Retained earnings Deferred compensation Less treasury stock Total stockholders’ equity Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity 9 n KPMG/University of Illinois Business Measurement Case Development and Research Program March 1999 o Home Savings and Loan Balance Sheets December 31, 1986 and 1987 Cash Securities purchased under agreements to resell Investment securities - equity Investment securities - debt Mortgage-backed certificates Mortgage and other loans receivable Mortgage loans accounted for as real-estate investments Other receivables Real-estate investments Investments in unconsolidated affiliates Property, plant, and equipment Prepaid expenses Goodwill, net Total assets 1987 2,977,654 414,769 3,133,728 21,625,192 % of Total Assets 10% 1% 0% 0% 10% 71% 1986 2,214,140 1,329,229 68,494 2,222,632 976,933 18,680,570 % of Total Assets 8% 5% 0% 8% 4% 68% 450,810 432,905 584,435 347,316 489,411 30,456,220 0% 1% 1% 0% 2% 1% 2% 149,193 314,718 469,725 652,782 513,878 27,592,294 0% 1% 1% 0% 2% 2% 2% 81% 3% 10% 0% 0% 1% 21,687,190 605,135 3,388,076 234,475 25,914,876 79% 2% 12% 0% 0% 1% Minority interest in hotel operations 22,432,669 3,000,596 3,026,949 230,730 28,690,944 - Preferred stock Common stock Capital in excess of par value Marketable equity securities reserve Retained earnings Deferred compensation Less treasury stock Total stockholders’ equity Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity 985 446,515 (3,069) 1,327,952 (7,107) 1,765,276 30,456,220 979 440,745 40 1,248,530 (12,876) 1,677,418 27,592,294 0% 0% 2% 0% 5% 0% 0% 6% Saving deposits Short-term borrowings Accounts payable Long-term debt Policyholder liabilities Deferred income taxes 0% 1% 0% 4% 0% 0% 6% 10 n KPMG/University of Illinois Business Measurement Case Development and Research Program March 1999 o Comparative Summary of Deposits Lincoln Savings and Loan —Deposits: Passbook NOW accounts Money market savings accounts Total demand deposits Certificates of deposit Retail Jumbo Total deposits Weighted-average interest rate 1987 Rate Amount 5.50% 43,985 5.21% 110,745 6.37% 354,882 509,612 1986 Rate Amount 5.50% 61,958 5.21% 120,562 5.25% 63,094 245,614 9.48% 2,730,884 7.95% 134,035 2,864,919 9.64% 2,435,867 10.47% 2,005,130 7.73% 139,894 8.80% 155,578 2,575,761 2,160,708 3,374,531 8.90% 1985 Rate Amount 5.50% 54,434 6.46% 121,981 6.70% 69,835 246,250 2,821,375 9.17% 2,406,958 9.94% Home Savings and Loan – Deposits: Passbook NOW accounts Money market savings accounts Total demand deposits Certificates of deposit Retail Jumbo Total deposits Weighted-average interest rate 1987 Rate Amount 4.43% 786,647 5.23% 1,683,922 5.51% 4,917,547 7,388,116 Rate 5.25% 5.21% 5.25% 1986 Amount 1,284,310 1,583,844 4,729,911 7,598,065 7.65% 13,768,701 7.90% 1,275,852 15,044,553 7.21% 13,369,545 6.16% 719,580 14,089,125 8.20% 11,747,546 8.80% 1,436,313 13,183,859 22,432,669 6.90% 21,687,190 6.49% 19,422,004 7.70% Rate 5.50% 6.46% 6.70% 1985 Amount 806,497 912,757 4,518,891 6,238,145 11 n KPMG/University of Illinois Business Measurement Case Development and Research Program March 1999 o Key Economic Indicators of the Real- estate Industry in Arizona 1985-1987 Source: Economic and Business Research Program at The University of Arizona Residential Construction Awards ($000s) Date 1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th Quarter 1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th Quarter 1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th Quarter 1985 1985 1985 1985 1986 1986 1986 1986 1987 1987 1987 1987 Units Authorized Date 1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th Quarter 1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th Quarter 1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th Quarter $828,786 1,060,524 944,371 894,480 884,504 1,134,933 881,318 760,379 730,091 777,276 820,875 546,404 1985 1985 1985 1985 1986 1986 1986 1986 1987 1987 1987 1987 7,962 9,068 8,708 6,263 7,795 10,612 8,458 6,114 7,645 8,098 6,770 4,976 Change from Prior Year ($177,879) 12,097 65,294 109,762 55,718 74,409 (63,053) (134,101) (154,413) (357,657) (60,443) (213,975) Change from Prior Year (902) 741 1,945 155 (167) 1,544 (250) (149) (150) (2,514) (1,688) (1,138) Change (%) -17.7% 1.2% 7.4% 14.0% 6.7% 7.0% -6.7% -15.0% -17.5% -31.5% -6.9% -28.1% Change (%) -10.2% 8.9% 28.8% 2.5% -2.1% 17.0% .9% -2.4% -1.9% -23.7% -20.0% -18.6% Employment Construction (000s) 315.4 336.2 347.0 346.7 335.2 346.8 346.0 328.7 307.6 312.8 313.5 304.7 Net Migration (000s) 22.785 22.216 22.310 23.422 24.924 24.252 16.076 17.335 18.375 17.858 11.207 12.411 Change from Prior Year 51.0 49.0 42.8 39.0 19.8 10.6 -1.0 -18.0 -27.6 -34.0 -32.5 -24.0 Change from Prior Year 3.611 3.150 1.584 1.212 2.139 2.036 -6.234 -6.087 -6.549 -6.394 -4.869 -4.924 Change (%) 19.3% 17.1% 14.1% 12.7% 6.3% 3.2% -0.3% -5.2% -8.2% -9.8% -9.4% -7.3% Change (%) 18.8% 16.5% 7.6% 5.5% 9.4% 9.2% -27.9% -26.0% -26.3% -26.4% -30.3% -28.4% 12 n KPMG/University of Illinois Business Measurement Case Development and Research Program March 1999 o Case Document Day Two, Part I: Evaluation of LSL’s Real-Estate Transactions You have now learned about LSL’s business strategy, some of the business processes LSL used to implement its strategy, and some of the risks involved in implementing that business strategy in the economic environment at that time. At this time, you will analyze the two transactions described below using that knowledge and using the measurement criteria set forth in SFAS No. 66 “Accounting for Sales of Real Estate.” After completing your analysis, you will evaluate the procedures LSL’s auditors used to assess these transactions. Wescon Transaction On March 31, 1987, AMCOR, an LSL real-estate subsidiary, sold 1,000 acres of Hidden Valley to West Continental (Wescon) for $14.0 million. AMCOR had acquired this land 12 months earlier for $3.0 million. After closing the sale, AMCOR recorded an accounting gain of $11.0 million. The terms of the sale were that in exchange for the 1,000 acres of Hidden Valley land, AMCOR received from Wescon: n n $3.5 million in cash $10.5 million non-recourse note at a 10 percent fixed interest rate. The non-recourse note required annual payments of principal and interest of $2.4 million over a six-year period. In the event of default, the non-recourse provision restricted AMCOR to repossessing the land. AMCOR could not pursue payment from Wescon or its partners on default on the loan. At the time of the purchase, Wescon had a net worth of $100,000, with approximately $200,000 in total assetsprimarily a few home sites. Prior to the purchase, Wescon had participated in a small number of home-building projects and in an occasional development project. The dollar value of its largest development project prior to the purchase from AMCOR was about one-fourth the size of the cost of land it acquired from AMCOR. To finance the purchase, Wescon received a loan for the $3.5 million down payment from Mr. E. C. Garcia, whose company invested in a number of different projects ranging from auto dealerships to real estate. Garcia’s loan to Wescon was secured by a second trust deed (much like a second mortgage) on the Hidden Valley property purchased by Wescon. On March 31, 1987, the same day that Wescon purchased the Hidden Valley property, Garcia received a loan from LSL in the amount of $20.0 million. The loan documents supplied by Garcia suggested that stock in his company constituted adequate collateral for the $20 million loan that would be used to buy out a minority shareholder in his company. Garcia personally guaranteed the $20.0 million loan and also pledged the stock he repurchased in his company as collateral. LSL disbursed the $20.0 million directly to the minority shareholder. Emerald Homes Transaction On September 30, 1987, AMCOR bought four pieces of multi-family and commercially-zoned real estate located in the metro-Phoenix area from Emerald Homes (EH) for a total of $14.6 13 n KPMG/University of Illinois Business Measurement Case Development and Research Program March 1999 o million, of which $6.3 million was paid in cash and $8.3 million in notes payable. On the same date, AMCOR sold two parcels of undeveloped land to EH for a total of $26.1 million, of which $6.5 million was received in cash and the remaining $19.6 million in non-recourse notes. One of these parcels was located in Hidden Valley. The terms of the notes required principal and interest payments due each October for 20 years at a fixed interest rate of 10 percent. AMCOR recorded an accounting gain of $9.6 million on the sale of the two parcels. In a memo outlining the reasons for the sale of the Hidden Valley portion of the land, Keating stated that he was especially happy to have EH on board with the Hidden Valley development. EH had a well-established track record building and marketing homes in California and Tucson, Arizona. Keating felt that selling land to EH sent a strong signal to other homebuilders that Estrella and Hidden Valley were high-quality properties. On September 23, 1987, EH received a $25 million loan from LSL. The loan proceeds were used to repay existing debt with other entities ($10 million), for debt repayment over the next year ($5 million) and for working capital ($10 million). To repay this debt, EH expected that in late 1988 substantial cash flows would be realized from sales of homes in another development located just outside of San Diego, CA. 14 n KPMG/University of Illinois Business Measurement Case Development and Research Program March 1999 o Case Document Day Two, Part II: Clinical Analysis of the Audit Procedures Applied to LSL Audit Procedures Applied by LSL’s Auditors to Wescon The audit team concluded that immediate recognition of the entire gain from the Wescon transaction was appropriate under SFAS 66. Work paper documentation and other information indicated that the auditors relied on the transaction’s structure to conclude that full profit recognition was appropriate under SFAS 66. The documentation indicated that the down payment was 25 percent of the sales price ($3.5/$14 = 25%), which met the SFAS 66 initial investment criteria, and that the payment terms met the SFAS 66 payback criteria (less than 20 years). The work papers did not address the collectibility of the non-recourse note. However, in a deposition the audit principal stated that the auditors expected Garcia to step in and protect his $3.5 million interest in the property if Wescon could not make the payments. The auditors explicitly considered whether LSL was indirectly financing the down payment through the $20.0 million loan to Garcia. The stated purpose of LSL’s $20.0 million loan to Garcia was for him to repurchase stock from a minority shareholder in his company. The auditors decided that the repurchased stock in Garcia’s company and his guarantees acted as collateral for the loan, and the work papers included documentation indicating that the loan proceeds were dispersed directly to the minority shareholder. The auditors also received a confirmation from Garcia stating the terms of his $3.5 million loan to Wescon. In determining whether the full gain on the sale of real estate to Wescon should be recognized, the auditors relied on Garcia’s confirmation and on the evidence that the proceeds of the $20.0 million LSL loan were dispersed to repurchase stock. The auditors concluded that LSL did not indirectly finance the Wescon down payment via loans from LSL to Garcia and that the gain should be recognized in full. Audit Procedures Applied by LSL’s Auditors to the Emerald Homes Transaction There appears to have been some confusion on the part of the auditors as to which accounting standard applied to this transaction. The work papers contain a SFAS 66 analysis of the sale but the audit principal stated EITF 86-29, “Accounting for Certain Nonmonetary Transactions,” was used for the analysis. Available work papers only mentioned that the EITF was discussing similar transactions at the time of the audit.5 The auditors’ SFAS 66 work papers document that the down payment ($6.5/$26.1= 25%) and terms (payment in less than 20 years), in form, met the SFAS 66 criteria. The work papers also indicate that the auditors explicitly considered the possibility that LSL indirectly financed the transaction via the cash portion of AMCOR’s land purchase from EH or via the $25 million loan. As part of the evaluation, the auditors obtained a confirmation from EH stating that neither the proceeds from the loan nor the cash on the sale were used to finance the down payment to AMCOR. The following is taken directly from the confirmation: 5 The EITF discussed nonmonetary transactions involving boot in its 86-29 and 87-29 abstracts. The 86-29 abstract was issued at the time of the 1987 audit but the 87-29 abstract was still under discussion. 15 n KPMG/University of Illinois Business Measurement Case Development and Research Program March 1999 o While our operating cash is not segregated as to use or source, there was sufficient cash available to Emerald Homes to fund the down payment on this purchase independent of the funds received from the $25M Subordinate Loan from Lincoln Savings and land sales proceeds received from AMCOR investments. In addition to relying on the confirmation from EH, the auditors’ enumerated EH’s intended use of the $25 million loan; $15.0 million would be used to retire debt and the remaining $10.0 million for “working capital and possible California land acquisition.” The auditors concluded that the $25 million did not constitute an indirect financing because EH did not use any of the money to directly fund the down payment. To determine whether LSL indirectly financed the EH sale through AMCOR’s land purchase from EH, the auditors traced the cash to and from escrow. The work papers document that $1.4 million of the $6.3 million transferred by AMCOR to escrow was transferred back to AMCOR as part of the $6.5 million payment by EH. In waiving a proposed adjustment related to the $1.4 million, the auditors added a note to the work papers stating: “Transferred as a means of convenience by the escrow company according to the client.” The auditors received an appraisal of $16.6 million for one of the two parcels sold to EH. The appraisal price gave further evidence of the transaction’s validity. This parcel was not part of Estrella or Hidden Valley. The accounting gain from this portion of the sale was $2.3 million. However, the auditors did not obtain an appraisal on the second piece of land that was sold for $9.5 million, a sale that generated a gain of $7.3 million. This second parcel was part of Hidden Valley. The audit principal stated that they (the auditors) relied on EITF 86-29 “Accounting for Certain Nonmonetary Transactions” to evaluate the appropriateness of revenue recognition on this transaction. EITF 86-29 allows recording transactions at the fair market value of the property exchanged if boot exceeds 25 percent of the fair value of the transaction. In form, the net monetary asset of $11.5 million received in this case, or the boot, was well in excess of 25 percent, thus, meeting the criteria for recording at fair value. According to the deposition of the audit principal, the $25 million loan was not relevant in assessing revenue recognition under EITF 86-29. The auditors concluded that the $9.6 million recorded accounting gain on the sales to EH should be recognized in full. Additional Audit Procedures Applied by LSL’s Auditors to All Realestate Transactions In addition to the detailed examinations of the previously discussed transactions, the auditors performed other procedures on LSL’s real estate activities that are best described as high-level analytical procedures. For each of the seven LSL sales of Hidden Valley land, the auditors considered whether the accounting for the sales complied with SFAS 66. Also, they compared the selling prices per acre for the seven sales, which ranged from $14,000 per acre to $17,500 per acre. The comparison of the seven sales suggested to the auditors that the selling prices did not appear unreasonable. The work papers do not indicate how the auditors made their determination to rely on these analyses in reaching their conclusions. The auditors also identified all the parties with which LSL had a large number of transactions in 1987 and determined the dollar amounts of the aggregate transactions for each of these parties. 16 n KPMG/University of Illinois Business Measurement Case Development and Research Program March 1999 o LSL had multiple transactions with all the companies to which it sold Hidden Valley land in 1987. It was not clear from the work papers how the auditors used this listing. The work papers suggested that the list was prepared after the analysis of revenue recognition on the individual transactions was completed. Finally, the auditors conducted standard “attention-directing” procedures. These procedures focused on the changes in balance sheet and income statement accounts between years. This fluctuation analysis was used to focus the auditors on areas where significant changes took place. The auditors noted the volume of real-estate sales from this analysis and accordingly planned to review the details of these transactions. 17 ...
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This note was uploaded on 10/28/2009 for the course ACCOUTING 4566 taught by Professor Robert during the Fall '09 term at Aarhus Universitet.

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