09 - 3 Rs of compliance - Reciprocity o Expectation that...

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3 R’s of compliance - Reciprocity o Expectation that compliance pays because other states - Retaliation - Reputation o Noncompliance will harm an actor’s reputation Institutional design - Why do states choose particular arrangements? - States may choose to enter into “soft law” o Obligation, precision, delegation - Hard law o Legally binding obligations that are precise and delegate authority for interpreting and implementing the law Increased legalization - Acts as credibility-enhancing devices to provide information to other actors - Signals long-term commitment - Loss of reputation is costly Credible commitments - Time inconsistency problem o Difficult to commit credibly to future behavior o Third party offers way to enforce behavior - Legal commitments useful for assuring other parties of future coordination - Constraints interpretation - Increases costs of reneging o Reputational effects of Violation Legal obligation legitimacy compliance pull UN commission on human rights
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This note was uploaded on 11/06/2009 for the course GOVT 3937 at Cornell University (Engineering School).

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09 - 3 Rs of compliance - Reciprocity o Expectation that...

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