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clemons v state page 3

clemons v state page 3 - Clements v State 3 7 3 rerson...

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Unformatted text preview: Clements v. State 3 7 3 rerson commits an offense if the person, on more than one occasion and pur- the same scheme or course of conduct that is directed specifically at another knowingly engages in conduct, including following the person, that: the actor knows or reasonably believes the other person will regard as threatening: (A) bodily injury or death for the other person; (B) bodily injury or death for a member of the other person’s family or household; or (C) that an offense will be committed against the other person’s property; causes the other person or member of the other person’s family or house- hold to be placed in fear of bodily injury or death or fear that an offense will be committed against the other person’s property; and would cause a reasonable person to fear: (A) bodily injury or death for herself; (B) bodily injury or death for a member of the person’s family or house- hold; or (C) that an offense will be committed against the person’s property. lal Code Ann. §§ 42.072 (Vernon Supp. 1999). This statute became effective ary 23, 1997. SUFFICIENCY ll sufficiency review, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to lict. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979). We must me whether a rational trier of fact could have found all essential elements of [6 beyond a reasonable doubt. _ ellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient for three reasons: (1) the .tion-upon which the court proceeded to trial did not allege more than one 1, (2) the trial court erroneously admitted and considered incidents that oc- )n dates other than April 4, 1997, the date alleged in the information, and considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, no ra— ier of fact could have found Nathan guilty. pThan One Occasion argues that the information upon which the court proceeded to trial e more than one occasion as required by the stalking statute. Tex. Penal § 42.072. However, any error in the charging instrument must be ob- prior to the date on which the trial on the merits commences. Tex. Code . art. 1.14 (Vernon Supp. 1999) Thus, because Nathan did not raise the the informatiOn until after the State rested its case-in—chief, the issue is he is precluded from raising it on appeal. y, the State provided evidence that Nathan committed the offense of a number of different dates, including February 18, 1997, February 25, 29, 1997, and April 4, 1997. All of these dates are after the effective date er Than April 4, 1997 contends the trial court erred in admitting and considering inci- occurred prior to the date alleged in the information, April 4, 1997. We dis- Slate was required to prove Jennifer was placed in fear of bodily injury or time of Nathan’s conduct. Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 42.072. Therefore, the t occurred prior to Ianuary 23, 1997, the effective date of the stalking April 4, 1997 , the date alleged in the information, establishlennifer’ s state the time of the offense. These events did not, however, establish the ele- the stalking statute. Only the events that occurred after the effective date ot established the elements of the offense. ...
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