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Unformatted text preview: past Who: policy makers, legislators, others with a stake policy in ongoing programs or problems in How: continuation of past government activities with continuation only incremental modifications incremental Implications/assumptions: accepts the legitimacy of accepts established programs; fear of unintended consequences; sunk costs in other programs may minimize the opportunities for radical change minimize
10 10 7. Game Theory
Public policy as rational choice in competitive Public situations situations Who: players/decision makers who have choices to make players/decision and the outcome depends on the choice made by each outcome (assumes rationality in making choices) (assumes How: each player has goals and resources, a strategy each goals strategy developed given possible moves of opponent, and payoff possible and values that constitute the outcomes of the game values Implications/assumptions: repeated plays should lead to repeated better policy outcomes better
11 11 8. Public Choice
Public policy as collective decision making Public by self-interested individuals by Who: rational self-interested individuals will in both rational politics and economics cooperate to achieve their goals cooperate How: individuals come together in politics for their own individuals mutual benefit; government must respond to market mutual government failures failures Implications/assumptions: individuals have sufficient information to know what is in their best interest know
12 12 9. Systems Theory
Public policy as system output Who: individuals, groups...
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This note was uploaded on 11/21/2009 for the course PPD 225 taught by Professor Lewis during the Spring '07 term at USC.
- Spring '07